What ‘Because of Sex’ Really Means
Justice Neil Gorsuch appears to have been serious. In his recent book, A Republic, If You Can Keep It, Gorsuch explained his twin philosophies of judging, “originalism” and “textualism”:
Rather than guess about unspoken purposes hidden in the hearts of legislators or rework the law to meet the judge’s estimation of what an “evolving” or “maturing” society should look like, an originalist and textualist will study dictionary definitions, rules of grammar, and the historical context, all to determine what the law meant to the people when their representatives adopted it.
Yesterday, Gorsuch applied his philosophies to a sticky question. Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans employment discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s … sex,” forbid discrimination against LGBTQ employees?
[Todd S. Purdum: The three-letter word that triggered a revolution]
In a major victory for the gay- and transgender-rights movements, Gorsuch—writing for six members of the Court—concluded that it does: “It is impossible
