<![CDATA[Looking to 2020 for China's relations with the US, Japan, Taiwan and more: the expert view]>
Unrest in Hong Kong, tensions between the United States and China over technology and trade, resurgent Hindu nationalism in India, and frictions in the South China Sea are just some of the issues that shaped Asia in 2019.
Following our earlier look ahead to 2020, four more commentators, including the editor of This Week in Asia, offer their predictions for the trends likely to impact the region in the year ahead.
EZRA VOGEL
Professor emeritus at Harvard University
Chinese President Xi Jinping announced he plans to visit Japan in 2020 when the "cherry blossoms bloom". This will be the first visit by a Chinese leader to Japan since the 2008 to 2014 period, when relations between the two reached their lowest point since being normalised in 1972.
Chinese attitudes towards Japan had grown worse in the 1990s. After the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, the Chinese government launched a patriotic education campaign to gain the loyalty of Chinese youth. China produced many World War II movies featuring heroic Chinese fighting against vicious Japanese. In turn, Japanese became angry after they saw film clips of Chinese attacking Japanese-owned stores in China, and the Chinese military threatening the disputed islands known as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China. Nearly 90 per cent of the public in both countries viewed each other negatively.
From 1895, when Japan won the First Sino-Japanese War, until 2008, Japan enjoyed the upper hand in relations with China. But in 2008, China began to pull ahead after the Lehman shock and the Beijing Olympics. In 2010, the World Bank announced that the size of the Chinese economy had surpassed Japan's.
In 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler bumped into two Japanese coastguard patrol boats near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and in 2012, when the Japanese government bought three of the islands from private owners, Chinese officials behaved with the confidence that their military and economic power surpassed that of Japan's.
In 2014, with China as the dominant power, leaders of the two countries began trying to stabilise relations. But the growth of China's military, the closed nature of Chinese politics, and the pressure of Chinese planes and ships on Senkaku/Diaoyu place limits on how much the Japanese welcome Chinese "friendship". Yet, both are neighbours, they share a base of common culture, they both worry about the reliability of the United States, and their trade with each other already exceeds their trade with the US.
Xi's visit to Japan provides an opportunity to contain the mutual hostility and to expand trade, tourism and cooperation on a variety of issues on which they share common interests.
Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, who currently has a strong lead over her rival ahead of the January 11 presidential election. Photo: AFP alt=Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, who currently has a strong lead over her rival ahead of the January 11 presidential election. Photo: AFP
DEREK GROSSMAN
Senior defence analyst at the RAND Corporation
This year was certainly active and interesting in the Indo-Pacific, especially as the competition between the US and China heated up. While many issues warrant attention in 2020, two that should be near the top of Asia-watchers' lists are Taiwan and Vietnam. Both are on the front lines of Chinese coercion, and their ability to respond, either with or without American support, will set the tone in the Indo-Pacific well beyond 2020.
Taiwan has its presidential election on January 11. Incumbent Tsai Ing-wen currently has a hefty lead over her rival Han Kuo-yu, with the latest polls showing nearly 59 to 15 per cent in her favour, meaning she is virtually assured re-election. Such an outcome would dramatically heighten tension in the Strait as Beijing deeply distrusts Tsai's intentions in regard to the so-called "1992 Consensus" in which it views Taiwan as part of "One China". Beijing has already ramped up coercion against the island, and it will surely double down if Tsai gets re-elected.
The US has sought to significantly strengthen defence ties with Taiwan to enhance deterrence, but Washington's likely desire to prevent bilateral ties with China from spinning completely out of control, may reveal some American limits in cooperation.
Meanwhile, 2020 should be a banner year for Vietnam as it will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the normalisation of US-Vietnam relations and serve as both chair of Asean and a non-permanent member to the United Nations Security Council. Hanoi assumes these positions following a summer of sustained tensions with China over disputed territory in the South China Sea at Vanguard Bank, and it will be telling to see how it handles these responsibilities under regional and international scrutiny. Vietnam could choose to highlight Chinese violations of international law to curb bad behaviour in the future (for example Hanoi has threatened to sue, as the Philippines did), but Vietnam is likely to keep bilateral ties with China on an even keel to sign a Code of Conduct, which also has a 2020 deadline. But a more proactive Vietnamese posture, including elevation of US ties, cannot be ruled out, especially if tensions with China return.
US President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit. Competition between the two powers is set to continue in 2020. Photo: Reuters alt=US President Donald Trump meets with China's President Xi Jinping at the G20 summit. Competition between the two powers is set to continue in 2020. Photo: Reuters
YUN JIANG
Co-editor of China Neican
The US-China strategic competition will continue in 2020. This will be the dominant driving theme for countries in the Asia-Pacific as they navigate the strategic landscape in a time of flux. In particular, US-China friction in science and technology is likely to escalate further. In response, more technology companies will relocate their production. The trend towards decoupling, however, will be limited. On the bright side, further tariff escalation is unlikely, so other trade and investment will be mostly unaffected.
The rise of nationalist sentiment in many parts of the world is likely to continue. Liberal and internationalist discourses will come under increasing pressure. Situations in places like Xinjiang and Hong Kong will become the status quo as global attention turns to new and emerging issues.
A coalition of like-minded countries to counter China will not emerge without effective US leadership. This is not on the horizon in 2020 as energy will be directed to US domestic politics in an election year. The interests of countries such as India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Australia are simply too divergent currently.
For Australia, the biggest foreign policy challenge will continue to be navigating between the US and China. If Australia was forced to choose on important issues, it would choose the US, as it sees the alliance to be of overriding importance. There would be some resistance from industry or business groups. But as trade other than science and technology is likely to continue, such concerns would not be strong enough to override strategic concerns. Beijing knows that it has little scope to influence political decisions in Canberra, and in fact, efforts to do so could backfire due to claims of political interference.
Pro-democracy protesters retreat after police fire tear gas during a protest in Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong. Will the protesters continue taking to the streets in 2020? Photo: EPA-EFE alt=Pro-democracy protesters retreat after police fire tear gas during a protest in Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong. Will the protesters continue taking to the streets in 2020? Photo: EPA-EFE
ZURAIDAH IBRAHIM
Editor, This Week in Asia
No one could have predicted just a year ago that Hong Kong would be plunged into its worst and most prolonged crisis since returning to China in 1997, and yet here we are, more than six months of protests later, unable to see the way forward, and with no light at the end of the tunnel.
How can the city get its act together? Will protesters keep taking to the streets in dissent against the local and Beijing governments in 2020? Will there be a recalibration of the "one country, two systems" model? How long will Beijing's patience last?
We will be tracking and analysing developments from our home base in Hong Kong, while keeping an eye on the global context of popular resentment against establishment institutions.
But more than protests, 2020 will be yet another year of uncertainty in US-China relations. The rivalry between the two powers will continue to force smaller countries to take sides, though nimble ones will try to walk a fine line between them. China will want to be firm and assertive in protecting its interests but without confirming fears that it is the new global bully. The US will be turning inwards during an election year, and thus continue to retreat from its traditional global leadership role.
For the rest of Asia, there is the Tokyo Olympics to celebrate. The rapprochement between Japan and China, and the prospect of better Japan-South Korea ties should be good news.
The big questions, however, remain on the global economic front. Will the slowdown bottom out? And can we expect a modest recovery for the region? Analysts are cautiously optimistic. But there is also talk of looming financial crises in China and India. When these big economies sneeze, the rest of Asia can hardly avoid a cold.
Politically, Singapore and Malaysia will be interesting to watch as they undergo leadership transitions " or, in the case of Malaysia, maybe not. Will the world's oldest Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who will be 95 in 2020, stay another year?
With these and other questions up in the air, expect another year of fascinating stories from Asia with far-reaching implications.
This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).
Copyright (c) 2019. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
