<![CDATA[Looking to 2020 for India, Indonesia, the Koreas and US-China tensions: the expert view]>

This is the first in a two-part series, with the second part coming on December 29

SHASHI THAROOR

Current Indian MP and former United Nations communications head

At the regional level we have the coming into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or RCEP, from which India abstained " reflecting its fears (of China) rather than aspirations (of its entrepreneurial young). India's absence will mean that both the pact and the country will miss a transformative opportunity.

Those fears seem less in evidence, however, in the political relationship between India and China " which, despite the significant strategic challenges posed by Beijing, seem to be on a reasonably even keel after the Xi Jinping-Narendra Modi summit in India in late 2019. I expect the two leaders to maintain the pattern of regular interactions in 2020. There may be no great congruence of views, but they will be able to contain potential diplomatic hostilities by staying engaged with each other.

India will look with interest at how the situation between Beijing and Hong Kong evolves. Will "one country, two systems" work, permitting a lively democracy to flourish in the former colony? Will Hong Kong's rebelliousness ignite similar revolts elsewhere in China? Or will China crack down definitively and impose authoritarian control, undermining its own soft power around the world?

Closer to home, the subcontinent presents a large number of problems, many caused by the domestic belligerence of India's Bharatiya Janata Party government, animated by its sectarian Hindutva ideology which risks accentuating major internal divisions and provoking disruptions. Tensions with Pakistan are high and show no sign of being defused; the risk that they may worsen and erupt even into conflict, perhaps over Kashmir or in reaction to another cross-border terrorist attack, cannot be discounted.

While the South Asian subcontinent is otherwise at peace, there is understandable disgruntlement in Bangladesh and Afghanistan about the way their countries have been demonised by India's government in justifying its controversial Citizenship Amendment Bill.

Sri Lanka, meanwhile, has just installed a government that seems to replicate much of the tough-guy majoritarian chauvinism and militarism of its Indian counterpart. That might mean better mutual understanding between New Delhi and Colombo, or, since "like poles repel", accentuate problems between them.

Altogether, the prospects are uncertain, and in many areas, worrying.

Indonesia's President Joko Widodo has embarked on his second term in office. Photo: Bloomberg alt=Indonesia's President Joko Widodo has embarked on his second term in office. Photo: Bloomberg

EVAN LAKSAMANA

Senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta

I will be looking at three questions under Indonesia's second term President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. First, to what extent will Jokowi be personally invested in managing foreign and defence policies on a daily basis? If the president remains disengaged and only intervenes when necessary, Indonesia's strategic policymaking will be incoherent and reliant on the idiosyncrasies of key ministers and whether they get along. Bureaucratic politics and organisational autonomy will then drive the country's external engagement and activities.

Second, to what extent will the major political parties treat Jokowi as a "lame duck" president as they prepare for the 2024 general elections? While Jokowi seems committed to boosting foreign investments and beefing up infrastructure spending, he has also accommodated too many political party officials and interests in his new cabinet. But the major parties are more interested in running their own agenda, from weakening anti-corruption efforts, amending the constitution to what it was during Indonesia's authoritarian days, or simply extracting state resources for their own coffers. The ensuing deterioration of the country's democratic quality and state capacity will further weaken its regional and global standing.

Third, to what extent will Indonesia's defence diplomatic engagement keep up with the military's organisational expansion and arms spree? The military has been creating new units and regional commands over the past few years " many of which are located in the eastern part of Indonesia. The expansion remains driven by internal personnel problems like promotional logjams, but will have significant implications for civil-military relations and regional security.

Defence minister Prabowo Subianto has also vowed to rein in corruption in the defence sector and boost spending for hardware procurement. But without expanding existing defence diplomatic engagement or opening new venues of cooperation, such policies might raise the strategic temperature in Indonesia's regional environment.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. Photo: AFP alt=North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. Photo: AFP

JUNG PAK

Senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies

Tension is likely to mount on the Korean peninsula, as North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is poised to resume provocative actions in the new year, determined to show his toughness to US President Donald Trump. Rather than bow to US demands that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for what Trump has described as "a brighter future," and despite sanctions and the country's contracting economy, the North has intensified threats against the US and its neighbours and conducted over a dozen short-range ballistic missile tests since May 2019.

As a result, a return to a confrontational US-North Korea relationship is more likely in 2020, with an increased potential for more provocative and aggressive North Korean actions, followed by critical US and UN responses " which, in turn, will be used as an excuse by Pyongyang to conduct additional demonstrations of its military capabilities. Kim's harsh rhetoric, refusal to invest in substantive working-level discussions with the US on the nuclear issue, and its open disdain for South Korea and rebuffing of President Moon Jae-in's repeated efforts at inter-Korean engagement have laid bare the hollowness and fragility of the summitry of 2018 and 2019.

Kim's next moves would be designed to show his resoluteness and the North's advancing military capabilities, while testing the willingness and ability of Washington and the international community to cooperate on a united response to Pyongyang's aggressiveness. China and Russia are likely to continue calling for a lifting of sanctions, so we should anticipate significant obstacles to US efforts to secure leverage to press Pyongyang toward denuclearisation.

Trump's open derision for alliances and exorbitant demands in burden-sharing negotiations probably will continue to put additional stresses on US relationships with key allies South Korea and Japan, undermining Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy and reducing its ability to deter and contain the North Korean threat.

On a potentially brighter note, South Korea-Japan ties might improve. If North Korea steps up its belligerent moves, possibly resuming testing of longer-range ballistic missiles or a nuclear weapon, Seoul and Tokyo would be more inclined to cooperate on security matters, as they had in previous periods of Pyongyang's provocations.

The US and China's contentious relationship is set to continue in 2020. Photo: AFP alt=The US and China's contentious relationship is set to continue in 2020. Photo: AFP

YUN SUN

Senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia programme and director of the China programme at the Stimson Centre

The contentious relationship between the US and China is unlikely to de-escalate in 2020, given the election season in the US and the affirmed consensus there about the need to effectively define and tackle China as its strategic competitor. The heightened competition between the two giants makes Asia an increasingly vital region for both. While the Trump administration is continuously accused of undermining the US alliance system in Asia, China has not yet fundamentally improved or changed its Asian neighbours' perception that it is a threat over its hegemonic intent regardless of whether it entails any territorial claims.

While Beijing and Washington are on a foreign-policy collision course, the root of this situation is in their domestic politics " which do not look too positive, either. For the US, China will be the top strategic issue in the 2020 election season, inviting further scrutiny, criticism and debate. Meanwhile, domestic politics in China has unfortunately done extremely little to reassure the US and the rest of the region. This year has been marked by the chaos in Hong Kong, a deterioration in relations with Taiwan, and controversies in Xinjiang and Tibet " none of which are likely to improve in 2020.

We're hoping the top leaders in the US and China will wake up to the problems and pursue a change. Whether that affords much hope is a different question.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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