Monasky v. Taglieri
Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org
Argued on Dec 11, 2019.Decided on Feb 25, 2020.
Petitioner: Michelle Monasky.Respondent: Domenico Taglieri.
Advocates: Amir C. Tayrani (for the petitioner)
Sopan Joshi (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, in support of neither party)
Andrew J. Pincus (for the respondent)
Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
Michelle Monasky, a U.S. citizen married to Domenico Taglieri, an Italian citizen, claimed that Taglieri had repeatedly assaulted her before and during her pregnancy. Monasky returned to the United States with their two-month-old daughter, and Taglieri asked an Italian court to terminate Monasky’s parental rights.
The Italian court ruled in Taglieri’s favor ex parte (without an appearance by Monasky). Taglieri then asked a federal court to require that Monasky return the baby to Italy. The court granted Taglieri’s petition, finding that Italy was the baby’s habitual residence. Both the Sixth Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied Monasky’s motion for a stay pending appeal, so Monasky returned their daughter to Italy. A panel of the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and then the Sixth Circuit agreed to a rehearing en banc.
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. implements the Hague Convention in the United States, and the law defines wrongful removal as taking a child in violation of custodial rights “under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal.” To determine the child’s habitual residence, a court must look “to the place in which the child has become ‘acclimatized,’ or as a back-up inquiry, “shared parental intent.” Because the child, at two months of age, was too young to acclimate to a country, the relevant inquiry is the parents’ shared intent. The district court is in the best position to make such an inquiry, and, finding no clear error in the district court’s finding as to habitual residence, the Sixth Circuit (en banc) affirmed.

Question
When an infant is too young to acclimate to her surroundings, is a subjective agreement between the infant‘s parents is necessary to establish her habitual residence under the Hague Convention?
What is the proper standard of review of a district court’s determination of habitual residence under the Hague Convention—de novo, a deferential version of de novo, or for clear error?

Conclusion
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, a child’s “habitual residence” depends on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parties. Such a determination is subject to review for clear error.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg delivered the opinion for the Court that was unanimous in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined in part and concurred in the judgment. The text of the Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but the accompanying explanatory report states that a child habitually resides where she is at home. No single fact is dispositive of all cases; instead, courts must make a fact-driven inquiry “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.”
The Court found unpersuasive Monasky’s argument that an actual agreement between the parents on where to raise their child was required to determine the child’s habitual residence. None of the treaty partners interpret the treaty that way, and to do so would run counter to the principle that the inquiry is an intensely fact-driven one.
Turning to the question of the standard of review, the Court found that because the question of habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact that is heavily fact-laden, a determination by a trial court should be entitled to deferential clear-error review.
Justice Thomas filed an op