68 min listen
Gualtiero Piccinini, “Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account” (Oxford UP, 2016)
Gualtiero Piccinini, “Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account” (Oxford UP, 2016)
ratings:
Length:
65 minutes
Released:
Jul 15, 2017
Format:
Podcast episode
Description
A popular way of thinking about the mind and its relation to physical stuff is in terms of computation. This general information-processing approach to solving the mind-body problem admits of a number of different, often incompatible, elaborations. In Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account (Oxford University Press, 2016), Gualtiero Piccinini integrates research in mechanistic and psychological explanation, computability theory, and other areas to provide a detailed account of the sense in which some, but not all, physical systems compute, and in which genuine computing systems need not be defined in terms of semantic or representational properties. Piccinini, a professor of philosophy at University of Missouri St. Louis, also argues that the mind is not strongly autonomous from its physical implementation but it is not thereby reduceable to physical mechanisms.
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Released:
Jul 15, 2017
Format:
Podcast episode
Titles in the series (100)
Uriah Kriegel, “The Sources of Intentionality” (Oxford UP, 2011): It’s standard in philosophy of mind to distinguish between two basic kinds of mental phenomena: intentional states, which are about or represent other items or themselves, such as beliefs about your mother’s new hairdo, and phenomenal states, by New Books in Psychology