Dr Zarepour demonstrated Fārābī’s interpretation of Aristotle’s work  on logical fallibilism. He showed how Fārābī’s views differs from  Aristotle on logical and theological fatalism. To reject these types of  fatalism, Fārābī argues that the truth values of future contingent  propositions are already distributed but this distribution is  indefinite. As a result, that a contingent proposition is now true does  not make it necessary in itself. Formalising Fārābī’s solutions to the  problems of logical and theological fatalism in the language of  contemporary modal logic, Dr Zarepour discussed its strength and  weakness. He also showed that although Fārābī defends these solutions,  there can be found passages in his commentary which signal that he is  not totally satisfied with them. These passages can be taken as a sign  for his implicit inclination towards a specific sort of open theism  which was later explicitly defended by some important figures of Arabic  philosophy.
Mohammad Saleh Zarepour is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Philosophy of  the University of Birmingham. He received a PhD in Philosophy at Tarbiat  Modares University, Iran in 2015 and another in Theology and Religious  Studies at the University of Cambridge in 2019. Before going to  Birmingham he was a Humboldt Postdoctoral Researcher at Ludwig  Maximilian University of Munich. He is the author of Necessary Existence  and Monotheism: An Avicennian Account of the Islamic Conception of  Divine Unity (contracted with CUP) and co-editor of Mathematics, Logic  and Their Philosophies (Springer, 2021). His areas of research interests  are medieval Islamic philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of  logic and mathematics, and philosophy of language.