The Brink of 2036: Why There Must Be a War in the Asia-Pacific: An exploration of war; geo-strategies within the Asia-Pacific; and the coming age of pax-Sino

By Dr. Strobe Driver

War and conflict never occur ‘in a vacuum,’ as there are always signallers and events that indicate and then dictate the onset of an upheaval. This has been true of relatively minor conflicts such as the Japan – Russo War of (1904 – 1905), the Vietnam War (1963 – 1975), the Afghanistan War (2001 – ongoing) and the major ‘total wars’ of World War One (1914 – 1918); and World War Two (1939 – 1945). There is a new and emerging war that is about to happen and its epicentre will be in the Asia-Pacific, and more specifically, the historic, contemporary and emerging issues associated with China – Taiwan tensions are a continuum; and show no sign of abatement or downward-moderation. The signals are there and they consist of but are not limited to, the historic baggage of China’s ‘ownership’ of Taiwan; of this factor being rejected by consecutive governments of Taiwan; China’s increasing sclerotic (irredentist) demands and policies toward Taiwan; the steadfastness of Taiwan’s attempts at recognition as an independent cum sovereign entity; other Asia-Pacific and international actors attempting to intervene in the region; and the uncertainties associated with who will help defend Taiwan. All are signals. Within them there is and remains a continuous rise in tensions of which – and is held within the title of this book – remains the ‘tipping point’ of 2036. There are many reasons for this date to be used as a pivot point and they are explored in detail in the lead up to this date, and whilst the outcome is due to current machinations not subsiding (and will only continue to deteriorate), the contention is and remains not whether a war will occur, but when. The magnitude of the war that will take place demands the inherent complexities be considered, understood and explored in detail. This book is a significant step in that direction.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Austin Macauley Publishers
• Release date: Jan 5, 2024
• ISBN: 9781528988629

Dr. Strobe Driver

Dr. Strobe Driver writes both journalism-style and peer-reviewed articles since completing a doctorate in war studies in 2010 and has a decade-plus history as a university lecturer and tutor specialising in history, war studies and the social sciences. His writing centres on war, conflict, terrorism international relations, counter-factual analysis and in more recent times Asia-Pacific security—with a particular focus on China-Taiwan relations and the historic, current and emerging tensions therein. This book is an extension to his PhD and of his (2018) independent analysis of the deepening China-Taiwan crisis. His previous thorough analysis was entitled Asia-Pacific and Cross Strait Machinations: Challenges for Taiwan in the Nascent Phase of Pax-Sino. He continues to write on the aforementioned subjects as an independent and freelance analyst.

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Introduction

This book is meant to bring about a more acute awareness about the contemporary approach to diplomacy and politics, that is, one of being underpinned by an adversarial approach to claim and counter-claim, and the book rests on the premise a war will happen in the Asia-Pacific circa-mid-2030s. In order to emphasize the high probability, in the opinion of the author, of a war taking place, the book is written in a narrative-style, which is in turn is built upon an academic evidence-base and at times, a quasi-academic foundation—citing both academic as well as general informative literature which includes banner headlines that indicate what a populace is reading, articles from newspapers and other non-academic sources. The aim therefore, is to encompass as broad a spectrum within the various analyses as possible, whilst engaging a message: war is approaching. This book is deemed a work of fiction due to its predictive nature and the assumptions therein, although the narrative does have an evidence-base the future remains a mystery.

The notion that a war is approaching is constantly reinforced throughout, which encompasses the certainty of a war happening—as much as ‘certainty’ can be embraced—and an evidence-base is offered for the timeline of the mid-2030s being presented. The book has been written with the risk of, of course, the timeline not being correct however, the author having read much about the threat of China, has not read any information which offers a definitive date of the war happening in the predictive sense of the happening. Nonetheless, the build-up continues unabated. As many aspects of what war ‘is’ and what it consists ‘of’ is also dealt with, as is the way in which the subjectiveness of why a war ‘takes place’ is also offered and as such, the chapters do at times involve some repetition, in order to reinforce prescribed avenues of exploration.

This is done deliberately, as the author has found a need in the many discussions, has to often apply a formulaic, say relating a sociological or a societal dynamic to various scenarios, allows for history to be ‘read’ with a renewed outlook and some counter-factual argument being applied, can form a transformative base thereby, allowing a more accurate understanding of the future to be made. A good example of the aforementioned, is to observe the bombing of Pearl Harbour by the Imperial Japanese Navy’s fleet-air-arm, to be thought of as a ‘revenge attack’ rather than a ‘surprise attack’. By observing the attack in this way, one is forced to track down why this could possibly be, and in doing so, requires an examination of what evolved in, within the League of Nations—the forerunner to the United Nations—and the reasons why consecutive post-World War One, Japanese governments thought Japan had been treated badly by the west, and in particular by the United States of America (USA).

Hence, the ultimate action was to exercise revenge. Thus, the bombing of Pearl Harbour did not occur without reason, or ‘in a vacuum’. This is evident in the following analysis by Monk which alludes to Japan taking revenge on the USA. Monk states, The First World War was still some years off in 1907 and Roosevelt did not anticipate it. The Second World War, in scale and horror, was unimaginable. However, Roosevelt sat one summer night in 1908, with his military aide Archie Butt, and declared that war with Japan, though he did not think it would come soon, was sure to come one day.¹ Throughout the chapters of this book the author has attempted to correlate, overlap and construct numerous ‘positions’ that have been taken in order to facilitate opinions with an evidence-base and therefore, make the reality of a war happening circa-2035 to be more ‘grounded’ in an evidence-based, if you will, chain-of-comprehension.

Over and above the rational and logic that is applied in war studies per se, it is also important to note that war as an event is often handed over to a deity and of it being in a deity’s hands, and the prayer-base that accompanies it is also included by decision-makers and politicians in the prosecuting or war; or having to defend it as an action. This book, whilst recognising it is within the right/s of people to choose whatever deity-based beliefs they require, in order to recognise a war is about to take place or is taking place, this book is nonetheless, grounded in western scientific cum sociological logic and rationales. Thus, beyond acknowledging fighting for a deeply-felt cause and within the duties, this places on individuals going to war and that the associated factors do assist in driving a cause or causes, the numerous analyses offered, are recognitions that have taken place over centuries, albeit with western-driven core components and understandings.

Acknowledging this inherent rationale, the aim is to elevate the idea and notion that war does not ‘come out of nowhere’, and thus, the aim of the arguments attributed to the logic is to explode this myth; and offer a way in which an erudite approach to war can be grasped and infused into conversation with one end result, being, the catastrophe of war is able to be traced and where it is ‘going’, is able to be forecast other than predicted. The ultimate aim of this book is to contribute to the literature of war in a positive way; and in doing so, to hopefully prevent it from happening—forewarned means, steps to prevention can be taken.

Furthermore, and as alluded to, the book is deliberately redundant in parts, and the reason for this is because I have found in my research that taking a particular scenario or piece of research and applying it to contemporary times allows for the historical to be overlapped into the ‘now’, or the near-future. This approach also supplies perspectives which can be extrapolated upon, and as stipulated, applied with different reasoning to current politico- and military-dynamics. To be sure, understanding different ‘types’ of war and how they have been applied, and indeed how they were formulated and comprehended as societies, became more and more, educated, sophisticated and cosmopolitan. Therefore, an historical perspective of how war became more ‘understood’ is vital in predicting and forecasting what will happen in the near-future, as China ‘rises’ to a mantle of regional, if not global superpower. The repetition too is deliberate and designed to assist any reader who is not completely familiar with dates, abbreviations and the like. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is used on several occasions so as to allow the reader a familiarisation with the abbreviation. Technically speaking the bracketed ‘CCP’ should only be used once and the following times just the abbreviation. The usage is therefore deliberate, as it assists in my opinion of allowing the reader to maintain an understanding without having to trawl back through pages and find the original ‘CCP’ mention.

Finally, war and the politics that drive it are a dynamic and therefore, require consistent and persistent investigation of which, it is hoped this book goes someway of, and as, contribution.

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¹ Paul Monk. ‘China, America, and the Danger to World Order’. Quadrant online. 1 May, 2012.

https://quadrant.org.au/magazine/2012/05/china-america-and-the-danger-to-world-order/↩︎

Foreword

In the twenty-first century, there is, for many reasons, an ongoing and interminable redundancy of the term ‘war’, and moreover, it continues to gain momentum through numerous, well-established and inter-connected channels of reportage cum information. Notwithstanding, this state-of-affairs, long before a conflict, a skirmish, a fire fight or a violent clash of any ‘type’ is able to be analysed at a deeper level—and due to the twenty-four-hour news cycle—it is indubitably, presented as a ‘war’, or a ‘war-of-sorts’. Due to the omnipresence alluded to, the term ‘war’ having reached such a saturation point, it must be stated, is often-times placed and then disseminated with a hype which in turn forces a focus upon the overt and therefore, easily noticeable components of violence.

This includes but is not limited to, the presence of blood stains and spatter; an observable piece or pieces of destruction; and the most palpable piece of physical evidence, comprising a deceased person or persons. Intertwined within the terminology of presenting a ‘war’ are the invariable offshoots that underpin a commentary. Whether it be through a newscaster, person in the street, politician or some such, the emphasis is further developed through the prism of the multiples, with the contemporary vernacular: ‘gang war’, ‘warring sides’, ‘at war with the public’, a ‘war on corruption’, neighbours or government institutions being at ‘war with each other’. The list goes on.

Whilst all the aforementioned constitute as acts of violence, they are not necessarily a war. As often as the occurrence of violence is a singular event or a series of connected single events, which may constitute and have at the base deliberate motives; however, they may also be confined to a given geographic area and be chronologically short and even dissipate. Whether the occurrences are random, partially-or well-organised and they do not necessarily constitute a ‘war’. Nonetheless, the factors mentioned are eminently observable and are seized upon by news outlets and offered up as a ‘war’. From the particulars alluded to, a particular locale is then usually given the mantle and title of being a ‘war zone’, which further adds to a long established and especially in the late-twentieth and the twenty-first century—and due to news saturation components—befits an inculcated sociological norm of any violent action equalling a ‘war’.

The ongoing and continuous usage of the term, in both developed and developing nation-states is and remains, a continuum in the public sphere. Due to this, there is a need to perspicaciously determine what a war ‘is’, and therefore what it comprises ‘of’. As such, the intricacies therein, need to be examined and explored to a greater extent in order to more accurately understand the term ‘war’, and by necessity, what it actually encompasses. Knowing for instance the nuanced approach to how a war begins, its prosecution, evolution, continuance or demise are necessary. As it is within these parameters, that the inherent power-stakes at play are able to be observed prior to, and within, a war—in a more succinct way and with general terms applied what is driving it, allowing for it to develop and what will bring it to an end.

For these components there are a series of chapters which offer a consideration and assessment of the way in which war as an ‘act’ has evolved and it is commissioned through a western focus—that is to say a European and thus, a Eurocentric-prism—and the outcome will be an attempt to use the evidence-base to forecast what ‘type’ of war will take place in the mid-2030s, in the Asia-Pacific region. In observing war through such a prism, it will also be discerned how the west has managed to control the ‘direction’ the war has ‘taken’. This too will be given some detail with a view to putting a perspective on the way in which wars are classified; and the way in which wars are fought and will be in the future. The analysis will also contain a foci; upon the complexities of war and will be implied through the chapter headings and the sub-headings that break up the paragraphs—the aim is to infuse the chapters with an ease of comprehension, and to inspire an ongoing interest through the use of these signposts.

The Second World War will be offered as evidence of a ‘type’ of war, as will the Vietnam War. Having these two wars as a grounding in war types, and what evolved throughout the post-war environments—what they ‘taught us’—will also be dealt with especially, from the perspective that they did not diffuse the necessity of using war as a tool of persuasion. The Vietnam War, because it is so iconoclastic for the west, and the way in which it was dealt with by the west, in

particular the United States of America (USA). It inevitably, changed the way the west ‘controlled’ the war, will be brought to the fore, through the prism of a western superpower (and its middle-power allies), being defeated by a lesser-power and the cathartic impact the happening has on war as a tool of persuasion per se. The narrative will then evolve and move in to a Sino—that is to say China-driven perspective—in the latter part of the book, which will include the ‘trigger point’ of Taiwan and its unique ‘position’ it will hold, and the way in which China will approach, taking it as the continuum of its ever-expanding role in the Asia-Pacific proceeds.

What the abovementioned presents is an opportune time to mention that war as an act, and as a happening, has been enabled through the prism of the west via the invention and implementation of the nation-state. What is meant by this is the nation-state, having usurped all communities that had gone before, and the subsequent power that mass deployment of organised and directed troops has allowed the west to engage Euro-centric models of war, and given the west a license to interpret what has happened. Which fits neatly into ‘the inherent rights in the [western] system’¹ as ascribed by Bull. The system alluded to, has offered the west a platform to triumph through the use of war as a tool of persuasion and in doing so, has come through with its dignity and state-centrism intact.

This mantle fractured somewhat with the advent of World War One—which was one of Europeans fighting Europeans—although the model of war as a worthwhile prism through which one could make gains did however, disintegrate when yet another world war took hold. War therefore, had to be modified and not allowed to ‘get out of hand’, especially if it was destroying Europe. What this inspired western governments to do, is take control of the worth of war. World wars had to stop and therefore, the way in which war was used had to be modified. This will be dealt with throughout.

The narrative of war for the west became one of which ideology offered the best government and governance—liberal-democracy versus communism was born. This mantle has since moved on to war against terrorism with sovereignty which the west had invented becoming less respected, as the west intruded into the sovereign land of others in order to destroy terrorists; and install (or restore) good government and governance. Hence, it is safe to argue, that through the model the west has essentially struck, has allowed it to control the narrative of war and its codicils. That is to say, it is the ‘developed’ west that has asserted its version of what war is, the way it should be used and what it has become. It is a germane, yet necessary point to make, that there have been numerous wars in non-western countries with the involvement of the west.

For instance, France fighting Jihadist insurgents in Chad, and at times the involvement of non-western forces, and the Russian Federation fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria 2010–2018, against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. There are many other occurrences, although only a brief mention is required to emphasise the involvement of powerful western and non-western actors. The list is far too vast to mention in greater detail here. War as a tool of persuasion and the increasing porousness of borders and the incursion of military assets into and across the borders of sovereign nation-states has essentially, shattered the exclusiveness of the nation-state; its legal entitlements; and its sovereignty. The implications of the actions of powerful nation-states, especially the USA and its powerful allies has not been lost on China.

What is meant by this is, China has absorbed the lessons the west has dealt out the sanctity of sovereign territory, no longer being respected by the most powerful, and of it being able to be reinterpreted through the prism of a (more) powerful nation-state’s ‘need’. The freedom to redefine and reinterpret regions by China and insist its actions, are those of a determined and well-intentioned regional and global actor. It is the contention of this narrative that these aspects will collide with the west’s regional ideals, even though it is the west that has continually sent signals to China that direct force and threat-of-force are meaningful and comprehensive ways to gain and sustain power. The notions of good government and good governance are no longer in the realm of what the west wants, as while it is still capable of arguing its heady opinions, it is no longer capable of enforcing its notions and ideals. China will not, in the future, tolerate the west’s complete intervention and will respond, as the west once did to recalcitrant populations and their lands.

Returning to and in conclusion, and as previously stipulated is to note the west that defined what a war ‘is’ and what it comprises ‘of’, and whilst there have been, and in more contemporary times a more nuanced approach to what a war comprises of such as so-called ‘grey war’ and a ‘niche war’. It is nonetheless, necessary to enunciate the dynamics of war through the history of the west, so as to ascertain what drives war in the twenty-first century. To be sure, and in order to understand what war ‘is’, one must first and foremost acknowledge wars do not just ‘happen’, as there are always many factors which signal a kinetic exchange is about to take place. In more succinct terms, there is always a build-up to a kinetic action or as series of kinetic actions which signal a war is about to take place—a war does not happen in a vacuum.

The chain-of-events that are alluded to, are needed to come to terms with a war or conflict situation. Whilst war is an act, and because the human race has not been able to eradicate it—although much of the blame must rest on the patriarchy, as it can be safely argued, it is they who have indulged in war with considerable robustness over the centuries. War should nonetheless, be observed as something that when scrupulously examined, can, and is able to be understood. When examined through the prisms and applications of economic-; fiscal-; historical-; mercantile-; military-; and societal-parameters war is, and it is the contention of this analysis able to be thoroughly understood with the intermingling of the aforementioned tenets. To be sure and from a clinical perspective, when all of these tenets are amalgamated, albeit in varying degrees, there is no mystery to war.

Gaining a comprehension of issues beyond the actual fighting is necessary, if one is to develop a whole-picture approach of what drives many critical aspects of war-making. Observing and comprehending how wars ‘happen’ does eventually return us to the original précis of it being able to be ‘understood’. This will again come to the fore, as China evolves from a regional middle-power to a global superpower. The objective of the following therefore, is to allow the notions of what war ‘is’ and comprises ‘of’ to percolate and intermingle with the more nebulous components, of what is driving an outcome and how the success of a war is nonetheless a measurable commodity.

For Ho Chi Minh and Vietnam, it was the total unification of the country; for the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, it was the establishment of a dedicated geographic area. Whether the belligerent is a state actor or a militia group, and what level of success is achieved on the part of particular belligerents is moot, as what is of interest here is what ‘type’ of war was applied to their ideals, what failed and what was successful completely or only for a measurable time.

As this book unfolds the reasons for Asia being on the brink—and what a brink actually means—will be discussed and probed. Although it is important to stipulate, that as previously mentioned, the advent of war is an inexact science. It is with this in mind that the contention of this book, that an Asia-Pacific war will ‘happen’ in the mid-2030s, and for the reasons which will be extrapolated upon as the book progresses. What will (hopefully) be proven is this will be the time when all aspects of a war ‘coming’ coalesces into a many factored comprehension, that is fundamentally understood by all. Venturing further into the realm of the unknown in terms of when a war will actually take place and upon the date stipulated. It is mid- to late-2035 that will be the date that a war will be signalled as about to take place in the Asia-Pacific, by numerous regional actors; as their aims finally collide. Specific occurrences will come together and there will be an express ‘need’ for kinetic actions to take place in order establish a war; the winning of it; and the unambiguity that victory brings. The end result that this body of work is by knowing the date. It is through anticipation that this knowing brings, will elevate relevant issues and some of the most critical aspects will come to the fore, such as, will the coming war comprise of a series of skirmishes, will the skirmishes evolve into a regional war, will a regional limited war develop into a ‘zero-sum-game’² encounter for one or more actors, and will a regional war evolve so rapidly the exchanges will execute a total war?

All of these aspects cum questions will once again hopefully, percolate through the narrative which will vary from hard evidence through notional commentary, and in some cases an opinion-base to generate debate.

It is however, the contention of the following analyses which brings together the past, present and future that war is imminent, and because there is little evidence of cathartic change on the part of political decision-makers that a war will begin in the mid-2030s. The ‘direction’ and the processes therein will be examined in due course and through the following chapters the impact of it will be writ large, as will the core and peripheral components of the coming war. What is of most importance at this point in the move to understanding why an Asia-Pacific war must happen circa-2035, is to come to terms with what war ‘is’—in the traditional sense of the term—which will in turn, allow for the compilation of reasons Asia will be ‘on the brink’, and from this standpoint what ‘type’ of war will take place. Now, we turn to Chapter One to gain an understanding of total war; limited war and the complexities therein.

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Hedley Bull. Justice in International Relations. Hageys Lectures, University of Waterloo, 1984.↩︎

According to Cohen a ‘zero-sum-game’ or ‘zero-end-sum-game’ is the polarised ‘win-lose’ environment that is dictated by the extreme of the hostilities and is summed up, ‘when one state wins the other must lose’. See: Benjamin Cohen. ‘International Finance’. Handbook of International Relations. Edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons. London: Sage Publications, 2002, 441. Emphasis added.↩︎

Chapter One

War, What it ‘Is’, ‘Type’ and Trajectory

War: A Definition

To understand war and the underpinnings alluded to, in the title, there is a need to accept the implementation, power and expansion of the sovereign nation-state; and to accept it is the sovereign nation-state for all intent and purpose of this narrative that has engaged in war as a means of ‘progress’. That is to say, the nation-state has engaged in war as a tool-of-persuasion, of conquest; to conquer; and to occupy (cum colonise). Recognising the four modicums and the subsequent actions, is to also comprehend these actions happened long before the nation-state was enshrined in the political vernacular is a germane, yet necessary point to make. What is of interest here however, is to focus on the act of war and concomitant with the aforementioned acknowledgement to recognise it is the nation-state which generated the necessary conditions to go to war on a continuing basis and on a large scale.

The Roman Empire is a useful reference point for observing this tenet and to recognise war on a large scale existed prior to the nation-state, although what is of particular interest here, is the nation-state and its use of war per se. Thus, having established the notion of ‘sovereignty’ which will be addressed more fully later, and the politico-, cultural-, and legal-parameters—the last being observed through the prism of the Treaty of Westphalia¹ (hereafter referred to as the Treaty). And further acknowledging the protocols of the Treaty having been continually reinforced through the structural functionalism of it as a European-based and Eurocentric ethos, it is timely to address war as an organized phenomenon and using this lens, what it ‘means.’ Grounding the phenomenon of war and those that either directly participate or are prone to some form of contribution (such as arms trafficking or the offering of expertise), it is necessary to briefly examine what ‘actors’ cum participants are involved in war, and how they contribute to the happening per se. Although, the list is vast in terms of direct, indirect and peripheral actors often being involved in the numerous machinations associated with tensions, there is and remains a somewhat relatively easy-to-identify list of belligerents cum actors involved in a war, or the possibility of a war developing from their actions. Indubitably, there are many groups involved, and it is worth acknowledging those invested in a successful outcome may become more or less involved as a war ‘evolves’. Which in turn, is often dependent upon whether success is assured or lessened over time.

The actors alluded to, in the ‘making’ of war comprise of, but are not limited to, nation-state against nation-state; non-state actor fighting a quasi-state actor; a nation-state government suppressing a recalcitrant domestic population with military force; nation-state versus irregular forces; non-state actors colliding with other non-state actors; and guerrilla fighters, challenging the legal authority of a nation-state actor. All, when they kinetically collide—which is often referred to as a ‘shooting war’—are able to be defined as being ‘at war’, usually because a particular level of volatility has been reached and direct violent clashes take place.

With the above parameters in mind, it is also relevant to acknowledge a population may have come to terms with any exchanges long before a political definition is arrived at—a declaration of war—as there is often a pre-kinetic tension. Thus, a waiting period is involved and this too, has evolved a colloquial reference: a ‘phony war’. Therefore, and in order to take a stance on a given situation whether it be through the lens of expertise, quasi-expertise or a generic opinion, there is some need to establish the categories war has been given over time, including the politico- or military-proclivities (or a combination of both), that are present within a given categorisation; and the way in which the military dynamics elevate or diminish. That is to say, a war may seem imminent and then tensions will subside, or alternatively kinetic actions may be more sudden than expected. All need to be taken into account, as situations in the build-up to a war tend to ebb and flow, although there are usually consistent signals, that a kinetic exchange is about to take place.

Defining ‘war’ as a ‘phenomenon’ requires a comprehension that a kinetic exchange has either taken place or is imminent between belligerents, and as such, there is a need to observe the underpinning of war rather than the imminent or actual act—an embracing of its intent, if you will. In straightforward terms, what the use of war is meant to achieve by a belligerent, and therefore, what it entails, is succinctly summed up by Vasquez. Hence, war involves a contention over something, and that, while, war differs from other contentions in that it employs a special means, namely force, we should not lose sight of the fact that war is a form of contention … From this perspective, war may be considered a violent way of getting objects of value.²

Accepting this perspective and its descriptive accuracy, there is a need to extrapolate upon the contention alluded to, and introduce two concepts which have largely defined war in both, historical and contemporary times: ‘total war’ and ‘limited war’. To be sure, there is a need to scrutinise the two definitions further, and through the prism of traditional Eurocentric-values, that denote what a war ^‘^is’; and to observe the way in which they have been used throughout history as a means-to-an-end. Because, the use of war is so vast, the scrutiny of war as an act and the perils it brings, the narrative will be confined to the total war of World War Two (WWII) (1939–1945) and the limited war of Vietnam. World War Two, because of the enormity of the event, its geographic engagement and the sheer intensity of the war as it drew in nation after nation; and the Vietnam War (1963–1975), because of the way in which it changed the ‘face’ of war and ‘warfare’ (the way in which a war is fought). Subsequently, how a superpower unravelled and eventually fractured on the battlefield in the pursuance of a war, which it was, at least statistically, assured of winning. The concept of total war can now be engaged.

Total War as a Phenomenon

Total war is a ‘type’ of war and like any war, it is a complex happening, as it has many