Jacques Derrida's Philosophical Odyssey: Navigating History's Complexities

By Lexander Quill

With the help of this fascinating book, discover the secrets of philosophy and history!

Explore Jacques Derrida's "Of Grammatology" in depth to uncover previously undiscovered aspects of "history" that will completely alter your viewpoint. This book is not your typical read; rather, it is an engrossing excursion into the core o

• Language: English
• Publisher: Independent Publisher
• Release date: Oct 4, 2023
• ISBN: 9784730606985

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Jacques Derrida's Philosophical Odyssey: Navigating History's Complexities

By:

Lexander Quill

Copyright © 2023

Book Name - Jacques Derrida's Philosophical Odyssey: Navigating History's Complexities

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Table Of Content

Summary

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Enigmatic history

The history machine?

History and historicity

‘History’ in Derrida: situating the argument

Structure of the Book

A note on translations and terminology

Approaching 'history' in Derrida via Heidegger and Levi-Strauss

Equivocations: between philosophy and history

History and historicism

Repetition and destruction

Destruction and deconstruction

Deconstruction and the sign

Heidegger and Levi-Strauss

Derrida and Levi-Strauss

Conclusions

The Impossible Diagram

Introduction

A few words on ‘history’

Supplement

The diagram of history

The history of writing

The unsuitable name

Thus to infinity

The history of life

Adventures of the diagram

Conclusions: towards historiography

Time and Narrative

Gathering around narratives: a historical introduction

Hayden White’s challenge to historiography

Narrative, phenomenology and history

Gestalt and diagram

Time, metaphor and narrative

The History of Ideas

Introduction

Derrida and the history of ideas

The history of ideas in De la Grammatologie

The history of the text in general

The ‘history of ideas’ in the Rousseau essay

History in the idea

Intellectual history in the United States

Texts and contexts

'In the Shadow of Shadows': Gender

Introduction: feminist history, theory, and deconstruction

Gender, a useful category in historical analysis?¹⁰

What is gender?

Gender in action

Is deconstruction a useful strategy in the analysis of historical categories?

A comparison

The Rani of Surmur

‘Woman’; that is, which level are we talking about here?

Complicity: why ‘is it deconstruction?’ is the wrong question to ask

Conclusion

Summary

In this book, the author delves into Derrida's Of Grammatology to examine the multifaceted concept of 'history.' The objective is to unearth a novel and influential dimension of history that has a significant impact on historical disciplines, especially historiography. This is a complex undertaking for two main reasons. Firstly, 'history' carries a multitude of meanings, making it challenging to pinpoint its essence. Secondly, the book addresses the disconnection between contemporary historiography and philosophy, where historians and philosophers often talk past each other. Historians sometimes overlook the fundamental distinctions within 'history' that deconstruction underscores, while philosophers have occasionally disregarded history as uninteresting.

The book's first part focuses on reconstructing the conceptual network surrounding 'history' as presented in Of Grammatology. Derrida, taking a phenomenological perspective, does not engage with the specific historical disciplines but rather with the very historicity that is the foundation of any historical endeavor. Derrida's intention is to liberate history from concepts that would stifle its organic development. Through an analysis of his reading of Rousseau, the book highlights how      Derrida      exposes      the      metaphysical      constraints      on    'history' and simultaneously frees it through his reinterpretation. This process leads  to the formation of a complex 'diagram,' implicitly related to contemporary historiography and central to Derrida's own body of work.

The second part of the book reevaluates recent historiographical debates from the perspective of the 'diagram' created by Derrida. This viewpoint compels historiography to confront not only the historicity of the objects it studies but also its own historical context. In recent years, historians have shown a growing interest in examining their own historicity, and the 'diagram' facilitates this introspection. The book explicates the 'diagram' in the context of narrative, meaning, and gender. Through this exploration, Derrida's emphasis on history is revitalized, infusing historiography with a renewed philosophical acuity. Throughout the explication and dialogue in the book, Derrida emerges as a thinker deeply engaged with concrete historical situations. This portrayal is a departure from the conventional view of Derrida as primarily concerned with signs and texts. Instead, the book reveals Derrida's philosophy as classical in nature, while he continually seeks out interdisciplinary dialogues between philosophy and other fields. His work offers a fresh perspective on how philosophy can contribute to the understanding and interpretation of historical contexts, making it a valuable resource for scholars across disciplines.

In summary, this book undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Derrida's exploration of 'history' in Of Grammatology. It elucidates the multifaceted nature of 'history,' bridges the gap between historiography and philosophy, and highlights Derrida's unique approach to historical thought. By introducing the concept of the 'diagram' and applying it to recent historiographical debates, the book reinvigorates the study of history with philosophical depth. It ultimately portrays Derrida as a thinker deeply immersed in the intricacies of concrete historical situations, emphasizing the relevance of his work to contemporary interdisciplinary discussions.

Acknowledgments

Under the pseudonym Lexander Quill, the previous four years have been a wonderful literary voyage shared with many people. While much of this extraordinary experience might go lost to time, it's important to save a few remnants of thankfulness here.

Jean-Philippe Deranty was essential to this literary journey. He oversaw the project, especially in the latter two years, and led it with the ideal balance of humour, profundity, passion, and empathy. He always kept the door open to answer my inquiries and gave me support when the subject matter or travel appeared difficult. His generosity and patience were unfailing. He still managed to deliver encouraging comments when we were miles apart.

Marnie Hughes-Warrington made a big contribution to the earliest stages of this endeavor by bringing excitement and providing priceless advice. This literary journey started out in the field of Modern History but eventually changed as it went down a philosophical road. I was able to bridge the gap between these two different disciplines and comprehend my wide audience with the assistance of classmates, professors, and administrators in both fields.

Thanks to Macquarie's kind funding, I was able to travel to the United States twice for research and personal growth. I was able to interact with the History and Theory staff on my visits to Wesleyan University, who not only made for great company but also shared their wealth of knowledge. Brian Fay, Ethan Kleinberg, Dick Vann, and Julie Perkins all voluntarily contributed their experiences and the journal's history. Scholars like David Hollinger, Martin Jay, Lynn Hunt, Mark Bevir, and Allan Megill gladly gave me their time and offered me their passionate and sage guidance.

The support and generosity of Edward Baring in providing study resources were much appreciated.  A lasting impression was created by David Carr's gracious hospitality in Atlanta and the enjoyable company of his phenomenology seminar students throughout a protracted journey. A glimpse of a desirable environment to live and work was provided by Hayden White's unforgettable afternoon  and the tour of Santa Cruz. The encouragement and suggestions from Joan Scott for discovering downtown Manhattan were priceless.

Despite being brief, my trip to the Derrida archives at the University of California, Irvine, served as the starting point for the rest of my research. The work done by Steve McLeod and his group to  make the archives open for longer hours was essential. I'm eager to come back and continue the  work I started over here.Although our literary tastes in the limited universe of Australian book authors rarely coincided, fellow students at Macquarie were always available for conversation. Adam Tate, Ian Erikson, and Kyle Harvey all offered helpful friendship and support. I was treated kindly and generously by the Higher Degree Research administrators in the Faculty of  Arts, especially when I arrived with two broken forearms and a damaged shoulder following a mountain biking accident. Their prompt scheduling of medical leave and sincere care were extraordinarily moving. The institution also made accommodations for me when I had to write the last year of this book while standing due to a back injury. I want to express my gratitude to the medical professionals who were helpful because writing turned out to be unexpectedly physically demanding.

My path has been anchored by my family's continuous support and ongoing encouragement. During pivotal moments, Simon and Sandi, Bill and Sally helped me come out of my shell and assisted me in finding the perfect words. The most important thing was that my constants, Ellena and Wesley, offered love, inspiration, and motivation. Ellena was a source of constant and adoring provocation. She was an exceptional editor and organizer. Concerning Wesley, how would one describe this piece of writing to a two-year-old? I am writing a book, my dear, but alas, it has no pictures.

Expenses for travel were paid for by a Postgraduate Research Fund grant, money from the departments of Modern History and Philosophy, and a Macquarie Research Excellence Scholarship that supported this literary endeavor.

Finally, I want to express my sincere gratitude to my readers in advance for their time and perseverance as they travel through literature with me as Lexander Quill.

Introduction

Enigmatic history

‘History’ means many different things for different people, and not least among them, philosophers and historians. For a good deal of people, however, I imagine that ‘history’ first conjures up memories of a required subject in their schooling. At least in an Australian context, we would normally feel closer to ‘history,’ and historians, than to a philosopher.¹ This closeness would be of a familiarity that usually takes the form of a national story and a school teacher, an education in founding moments, turning points, perhaps horrific conflicts of country and world, shameful injustices that were heroically (or perhaps still are), being put to rights. Indeed, when we think of ‘world’, ‘history’ soon comes trotting on after it. Indeed, ‘it’ (that is ‘history,’ whatever ‘it’ is) seems to be everywhere once one begins to try to define it. The aging buildings on the main street, the monument in the park, the public holiday that commemorates the  ‘glorious dead’ (whoever they may be). It can be where I came from, and what I seek to escape, or something I seek to recover. It can strongly polarise opinions. On the one hand, spoken in tones of reverence, it must be gathered up and recovered, protected against the corrosion of  time. On the other hand, it must be broken free from, thrown off, perhaps violently even, in  order to realise potential, promise, and to not be dominated by a memory, or a competing  version of a memory. Even within the individual, at times competing versions of a past can struggle for supremacy. History, it seems, displays a certain kind of promiscuity: it can quickly  be turned against itself. No sooner is a history invoked, then another, and then another is told, competing against its forbears, piling one on top of another, clamouring for our attention.

History, it seems, breeds more history. But everywhere it is one history amongst others. Some are large and encompassing, and others are but a few minutes old. Some are inflated, taking in

¹ Although this differs from state to state in Australia. In Victoria, philosophy is an optional subject available in high school. There also exist groups that promote the study of philosophy in schools.

the very universe, and others are the life of a single person. But where is history ‘itself’? Historians can help us when our interest is captured by one or another history. Experts in a    small patch, a relatively enclosed group of histories, they can assist us in tracing the story. But whence do we go for history in general? It sounds like a task for the philosopher, you might answer (assuming, of course, you have a general acquaintance with such things). Definitions    and generalisations that go ‘what is…?’ seem a domain for a different kind of inquiry to telling  a history. We have crossed a threshold from one kind of talk to another, from ‘tell me what happened when…?’ to ‘what is it in a history, any history, which leads us to call it so?’ And this latter kind of enquiry is just what the philosopher engages in, but engages in it in a way that seems importantly different to the question of ‘what happened…’

The enquiring attitude we portray here, bent on recognising histories wherever it looked, would quickly realise that philosophy, and individual philosophical topics, are likewise possessed of a history, and that their fortunes can rise and fall. Indeed, even if philosophy is not best wholly characterised by a historical question, this does not mean that philosophers never have these types of questions. Assuming a little more knowledge again about things philosophical, that it often takes place as a kind of conversation, we can readily imagine that somebody might collect together a whole range of philosophical questions and answers. Some would occur with more frequency than others, some questions and answers are more pressing, sometimes less so, depending on interests or the ‘state of affairs’. This would be philosophy’s history. So, the philosopher, even though he is not defined by the historical question, is still not without a  history, still less able to view it as something from which he or she is exempt or is able to maintain a distance to. But now, we ask, granted that philosophy itself has a history, what kind  of a position does ‘history’ have within this collection of philosophical questions?

Now this situation is, of course, something of a fantasy, apparently an innocent conversation, mimicking a philosophical dialogue. In ‘Western’ countries, at least, more or less by the time we have finished our compulsory education, we are well able to recognise historical and

philosophical kinds of questions, and to respond with more than a few examples of each. But I would wager that the weight is not evenly distributed, and our knowledge of history far outweighs that of philosophy, (unless, perhaps, we are French). But I introduce this rather naYve dialogue here in order to try to pose the philosophical question about history at the right level. And this for just the reasons I wrote of above, that no sooner do we begin to talk of history, then the stories begin to pile up, and they can easily obscure the view. What then, is the position of history within philosophy, or viewed from philosophical activity?

On the one hand, let us first consider the approach of historians reflecting on their discipline. The discipline of history does indeed have its theorists, its own philosophers. But the role is not relished generally, and is often unenviable. (My comments here are directed toward ‘modern’ history, as it is practiced in Australia and the United States.) Historians for the most part would rather get on with doing history—which implies, usually, minimising the ‘theory’ to prefatory material, with the implication that it is somehow less historical. I know I am generalising here, and I am only too happy to be corrected on this score. But it seems fair to say that historians are relatively less interested in theorising their science than any other of the human sciences, for example, anthropologists or sociologists. Indeed, some of the most noted philosophers of history—think Weber, or Levi-Strauss—come from these latter two disciplines, as they have struggled to come to grips with the dynamic processes and conditions of human societies. We will return to the position of historians and their philosophical attitudes shortly, and indeed, regularly throughout this Book, but it suffices to first note here that ‘history’ is not exhausted  by ‘discipline of history’. What I have to say does not solely concern historians in their professional capacity, but equally it does not avoid, or exclude them either. In fact, one of my ultimate intentions is to increase the trade between history and philosophy.

On the other hand, returning to the curious position of ‘history’ as a topic viewed from a philosophical point of view, there is the divided house of the philosophers. Already with history we could become embroiled in a division between so-called ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’

philosophers. Having announced my topic as Derrida and the philosophy of history, I seem to already be in the Continental camp on two counts. Firstly, of course, in studying Derrida’s  work, and second, for a concern with ‘history’. History and ‘historicity’ has been suggested as a defining feature of Continental thought.² This is, indeed, a general feature of post-Hegelian thought, and insofar as a philosophy considers Hegel to be somewhere amongst its parentage, it also sees the philosopher as within history, and engaged with thinking it. Historicity, what  Joseph Margolis calls ‘the historied nature of thought’, is ‘what is most modern in modern philosophy after Kant,’ and this is, precisely, Hegel’s achievement.³ As Robert Sinnerbrink writes:

Hegel was the first philosopher to really force us to consider history itself as a philosophical problem; to consider how our very self-understanding and our horizons of knowledge are part of an ongoing process of historical transformation and philosophical self-reflection.⁴

And herein lies a problem. For Hegel’s infamous ‘historical optimism,’ as Sinnerbrink calls it, has become a part of the Western academic mythology, and Hegel has been criticised ever since for it.⁵ For the title ‘philosophy of history’, at least in its classical understanding, is synonymous with a kind of excessive historical optimism that all those who begin to think about history in  our age feel compelled to decry. Even, or we should say especially, Derrida. Framing his investigation in De la Grammatologie, he writes that were a ‘grammatology’ to live up to its intentions, it would perhaps be ‘a history of the possibility of history which would no longer be

² See Simon Critchley, Continental philosophy: A very short introduction, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 60-62, and David West Continental Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 243. Following an extensive project analysing the different traditions in philosophy, Jack Reynolds comments that an ‘enduring interest in the relation between time, history, and politics … has some kind of diagnostic privilege’ not only for identifying the Continental ‘family’, but also for singling out the methods and positions that attain enduring success. Jack Reynolds, Chronopathologies: Time and politics in Deleuze, Derrida, analytic philosophy, and phenomenology (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2012), 3-4. My emphasis. See also James Chase and Jack Reynolds, Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the methods and value of philosophy, (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2010).

³ Joseph Margolis, 'Historicity and the Politics of Predication,' Journal of the Philosophy of History 1, no.

1 (2007): 92, 94.

⁴ Robert Sinnerbrink, Understanding Hegelianism (Stocksfield: Acumen, 2007), 28.

⁵ Ibid., 26.

an archaeology, a philosophy of history or a history of philosophy.’⁶ Nonetheless, as David Carr observes, recent Continental philosophy can be recognised precisely in this way as ‘a new kind  of philosophy of history’, a ‘general historicisation of knowledge.’⁷

We must add to this situation, however, on the behalf of a small but vibrant tradition of ‘philosophy of history’ that should be separated from the Continental strand. Building on the work of British Idealist philosophers R.G. Collingwood and W.H. Walsh,⁸ and also on a substantial interest in history by philosophers of science, (especially the logical positivist Carl  G. Hempel), a small journal titled History and Theory: Studies in the philosophy of history, was established in 1960 at Wesleyan University, in Middletown, Connecticut.⁹ Long-time editor Richard Vann characterises their interests in the following way:

When History and Theory was founded in 1960 one of the aims of its editor George Nadel, as articulated in many rejection letters, was to establish some boundaries around what, at least for the journal, would count as ‘philosophy of history’. The great speculators, Vico and Hegel and later Marx, were (if treated analytically) in; Toynbee was taken seriously, if critically; but Spengler and Voegelin were out … the main interest of the journal was in what was conventionally called analytical philosophy of history.¹⁰

⁶ ‘Histoire de la possibilité de l’histoire qui ne serait plus une archeologie, une philosophie de l’histoire ou une histoire de la philosophie?’ Jacques Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1967), 43/28. My emphasis. This passage should be compared with Derrida’s preface to The Problem of Genesis in Husserl's Philosophy, trans. Marian Hobson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). All further references to the Grammatology will give the French pagination first, followed by reference to the Gayatri Spivak’s English translation after a forward slash (/). All translations are my  own, however. On this, please see the last section of this introduction.

⁷ David Carr, 'Philosophy of History,' in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 673. My emphasis.

⁸ For whom, of course, Hegel is crucial. Although Collingwood is known for the text posthumously published as Idea of History (1946), for a more accurate collection of Collingwood’s thought, one should

see R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of History, and other writings in philosophy of history, ed. William H. Dray and W. J. van der Dussen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Cf. A revised edition of Idea of History has also been published, The Idea of History, Rev. ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁹ On this topic, see Kerwin Klein’s recent book, chapter 2 of which maps the fortunes of ‘philosophy of

history’ within the analytic side of philosophy. Cf. Arthur Danto, ‘The decline and fall of the analytical philosophy of history,’ in A New Philosophy of History, ed. F.R. Ankersmit and H. Kellner, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 70-85).

¹⁰ Richard T. Vann, 'Turning Linguistic: History and Theory and History and Theory, 1960-1975,' in A

New Philosophy of History, ed. Ankersmit and Kellner (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 41.

‘Analytic,’ or synonymously ‘critical’ philosophy of history,¹¹ then, following a distinction proposed by W.H. Walsh, divided up the philosophy of history by an analogy with a philosophy of science and nature. Given that the word ‘history’ admitted two meanings, the happening of events, and the narrative of events, Walsh proposed to call philosophy pertaining to the first ‘speculative,’ and to the second ‘critical’.¹² Although Walsh saw philosophy of history as properly concerned with both, he nonetheless reasoned that for those who strongly rejected the first, the second might still be perfectly respectable.¹³

Now, this Book concerns itself foremost with a ‘philosophy of history’ that appears within Derrida’s work. Derrida never names it thus, although he did teach courses on the philosophy of history, which has a far stronger institutional position in France than in English language countries and is a regular subject in the agrégation. Raymond Aron’s path-breaking    Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire is of course the important reference, and is still used today.¹⁴ More importantly for us, Aron is also decisive in being the one to introduce Heidegger  to Jean-Paul Sartre.¹⁵ However, I am not only concerned with Derrida’s reading of history. For I also have the intention of seeing Derrida’s interpretation of history meet with historical practice. To this end, I develop his reading by staging several encounters developed from philosophy of history, taking as my clue or guiding thread a study of the history of the journal History and Theory.

¹¹ See, too, Arthur Danto’s 1965 book, titled Analytical Philosophy of History, republished in Arthur Coleman Danto, Narration and Knowledge, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985). The first

chapter deals with the distinction between analytical and substantive philosophy of history.

¹² W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1967 ), 16.

The terminology is borrowed from C.D. Broad. ‘Speculative’ is also sometimes substituted with

‘substantive’.

¹³ Walsh’s book was first published in 1951. It is easy to sense the immense feeling on this topic in Walsh’s defensiveness for even proposing the topic. A bias against the philosophy of history is ‘a

permanent feature of British philosophy,’ and it is ‘anathema to the cautious British mind,’ ‘If philosophy of history is thus generally despised, why venture to revive it?’ ‘We must break through the fog of emotion with which the name of Hegel is now surrounded,’ Ibid., 14, 14, 15, 143 respectively.

¹⁴ Raymond Aron, Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire, essai sur les limites de l'objectivité historique, Nouvelle edition, ed., Bibliotheque des idees (Paris,: Gallimard, 1948). Translated as

Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An essay on the limits of historical objectivity, Trans. George

J. Irwin, (Boston,: Beacon Press, 1961).

¹⁵ See Ethan Kleinberg, Generation Existential: Heidegger's philosophy in France 1927-1961 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), 87ff. See especially 90, 93 and 116. Cf. Edward Baring, The

Young Derrida and French Philosophy, 1945-1968 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 68-9.

This Book does not present a history, either of Derrida’s thought, or of the philosophy of  history. Rather, it seeks to understand Derrida’s positions concerning history and historicity,  and thence enters into a dialogue with critical developments in historical theory, which I term ‘historiography’. Historiography, in current historian’s parlance, is the theoretical arm of historical study. Technically, this is still ‘philosophy’—of the historical discipline. However, insofar as, with a few exceptions, history as a discipline is largely ignored by philosophers (which has concrete ramifications for historiography), it seems to me appropriate to designate it by a different term to the ‘philosophy of history’. The ‘critical developments’ I have selected presuppose an interpretation of the recent history of historiography, and indeed, at an early  point, this Book was proposed as a historical one. It is no longer. But a history of History and Theory, and its engagement with Derrida and continental philosophy more generally persists mostly in footnotes. Indeed, a study of the archives of History and Theory helped me determine the ‘critical developments’ I selected, and this archive ‘experience’ also became an attempt to put myself in the shoes of the historian, and understand their concerns.

Derrida is not, however, generally recognised as a philosopher of history. We shall have to undertake to prove that it is both true and important to say that Derrida does concern himself with ‘history’. None of Derrida’s works were reviewed in History and Theory until Spectres of Marx, four years after its publication.¹⁶ In that book Derrida offers a retrospective glance on his work that presents history not just as one theme among others but as absolutely central:

Permit me to recall very briefly that a certain deconstructive procedure, at least the one  in which I thought I had to engage, consisted from the outset in putting into question the onto-theo but also archaeo-teleological concept of history—in Hegel, Marx, or even in the epochal thinking of Heidegger. Not in order to oppose it with an end of history or   an anhistoricity, but, on the contrary, in order to show that this onto-theo-archaeo- teleology locks up, neutralises, and finally cancels historicity. It was then a matter of

¹⁶ Moishe Postone, 'Deconstruction as Social Critique: Derrida on Marx and the new world order,'  History and Theory 37, no. 3 (1998). The lateness of the review was not for want of trying on the part of the editors, who struggled to find an appropriate reviewer who had not already been promised publication for the book review elsewhere.

thinking another historicity—not a new history or still less a ‘new historicism,’ but another opening of eventness as historicity that permitted one not to renounce but on the contrary to open up access to an affirmative thinking of the messianic and emancipatory promise as promise: as promise and not as onto-theological or teleo- eschatological program or design.¹⁷

Derrida is quite precise. His intention was not to present a rival theory, but to free it from a concept that somehow threatened to close it down. Derrida frames his reminiscence on the early period of his work in the later vocabulary—a futural emphasis: ‘messianic’, ‘promise’ etc.¹⁸—  of his pronounced ethical ‘turn’ evident from the late 1980’s. If this later period is widely recognised to concern itself with historicity, what of the earlier work? Derrida claims here that historicity is foundational, ‘from the outset,’ at the very beginnings and the very motivation of what became ‘deconstruction’. What I shall be undertaking is to show that, in Derrida’s De la Grammatologie and central to its concerns, or indeed its fundamental movement, is the thinking of a new history or historicity. And, as Derrida indicates above, this new ‘concept’ is in fact a liberation for history, that has definite, positive effects that can be described and concretely inquired about. To that end, we will now briefly illustrate how Derrida can be conceived of as a thinker of history.

¹⁷ Jacques Derrida, Specters