Napoleon and the Dardanelles

By Vernon J. Puryear

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1951.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2023
• ISBN: 9780520349032

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NAPOLEON and the DARDANELLES

VERNON J. PURYEAR

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1951

NAPOLEON

DARDANELLES

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley and Los Angeles California

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

London, England

Copyright, 1951, by

THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

The title page shows Napoleon receiving Persian Ambassador Mirza at Finkenstein, April 27, 1807. From the painting by Mulard, now at the Musée de Versailles.

Printed in the United States of America By the University of California Press

Preface

STATESMEN still may learn from the opportunities and mistakes of Napoleon’s era. The collapse of the once mighty Napoleonic empire may be attributed significantly to the ultimate failure of its policies for the Near East. These policies involved the deception of Turkey and Persia and the withholding of the Dardanelles from Russia.

This account of Napoleon’s policies for the Near East is based on original manuscript sources, drawn primarily from among the documents in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. The documents reveal not only French policy but also the significant Turkish, Persian, Russian, and English reactions to it.

Special thanks are due M. Amédée Outrey, director of the French foreign ministry’s Service des Archives, for the permission accorded the author to utilize the original documents. The reports of the secret discussions with Russia in 1808 were studied in the Archives Nationales. A grant-in-aid by the Social Science Research Council enabled the author to carry on his research while on sabbatical leave.

V. J. P.

Davis, California

Contents

Contents

Observer on the Bosporus 1802-1803

Emperor and Padishah 1804

Scheming for Persian Cooperation 1805

Ottoman Policy Veers Toward France October, 1805-February, 1806

New French Courses Are Charted March-July, 1806

Breaking the Russo-Turkish Alliance August-December, 1806

That Infernal Strait January-February, 1807

Persia Enters the French Orbit March-May, 1807

Napoleon Abandons the Ottoman Empire June-July, 1807

An Unratified Armistice July-September, 1807

Testing the Franco-Russian Alliance October-December, 1807

Shall Turkey Be Partitioned? January-February, 1808

The Dardanelles— La Langue de Chat March, 1808

The Bases Cannot Be Accepted March-June, 1808

Post-mortem at Erfurt July-November, 1808

Near Eastern Policy at Loose Ends 1808-1809

Rim of the Blockade 1809-1814

Epilogue: The Last Phase 1814-1815

NOTES

Notes

Bibliographical Note

Index

Observer on the Bosporus

1802-1803

NAPOLEON’S policies for the Near East accounted in great part for the ultimate collapse of his imposing empire. Observable unity and continuity for several years, only to be followed by vacillation, marked the French dictator’s diplomatic activities that centered at Constantinople. One forgotten result of General Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 was Russia’s reversal of its usual policy of aggression against Turkey to one of support. It was Bonaparte who forced these two traditional enemies into alliance, partly in consequence of his implied threat to march from occupied Egypt through Syria and perhaps take possession of the Dardanelles. His pro-Turkish policy extended from his treaty of peace with Sultan Selim III of the Ottoman Empire in 1802 to his alliance with Tsar Alexander I of Russia in 1807. In 1806 Emperor Napoleon wished Turkey to form an alliance with France against Russia and Great Britain, whereas in 1808 he discussed with Alexander a partition of Turkey. Whether as friend of Turkey or ally of Russia, however, the French emperor never permitted the tsarist realm to possess the Dardanelles. With Persia he signed a military alliance in 1807, only to leave that state to itself in its conflict with Russia. It is thus understandable that Napoleon’s continental blockade was not enforced in the Levant, and that Turks and Persians determined not to become his pawns in 1812, the year memorable for his defeat in Russia and Spain.

That is a broad outline of the significant French policies discussed in this book. The heretofore neglected story of their evolution and results, as recorded in the archives, begins when the French Revolutionary wars ended in 1802 with the general pacification of Europe. A halting step toward the ultimate return of France to an impressive position in the Near East befitted the power that had suffered complete military defeat in Egypt at the hands of Turkey and Great Britain. First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte announced that he wished to be friends with the theo-

I cratic Ottoman Empire, the state he had attacked by invading Egypt in 1798.

Yet the occupation of the land of the Nile until 1801 by French forces had so seriously wounded the prestige of Turkey that only a cautious peacetime nurturing of the new policy could make real the official pledge of the Franco-Turkish peace treaty negotiated in mid-1802. Bonaparte in 1802 apparently had no political policy for Turkey; he sought only to save face and restore France’s economic profits»

This chapter recounts the hesitant diplomatic efforts of the First Consul, acting through Foreign Minister Talleyrand in Paris and through Chargé d’Affaires Pierre Ruffin and Ambassador General Brune in Constantinople, the latter being Bonaparte’s first observer of Russia stationed on the Bosporus»

The pain of the Turkish wounds from invasion had been somewhat assuaged by victory» The handicaps to Brune’s implementation of the policy of friendship, or even to winning Turkey’s faithful fulfillment of stipulated treaty terms, dated also from the latter’s arguments over terms for an armistice in 1801 and for the treaty in 1802» Turkey had not wished to concede to France the commercial navigation of the jealously guarded Black Sea» Even in peacetime it did not relish restoring full equality of treaty status to Bonapartean France» French ships nevertheless won admission to that sea for the first time when, by treaty, the French invasion of Egypt and the consequent war were terminated» Paradoxically, the Egyptian adventure conceded England the same right, both victor and vanquished winning the same legal authority to sail the Black Sea with their commercial vessels»

The search for added profits made Bonaparte insist on penetrating the Black Sea for the first time» In the course of the negotiations for the Franco-Turkish treaty, he had secretly guaranteed the sultan’s territories against possible retaliatory action by the Russians and the British» The foreign ministers, Talleyrand of France and Galib Effendi of Turkey, included this long-debated requirement in the treaty, which they signed in Paris on June 25, 1802» The commercial opening to France of the Turkish Straits and the Black Sea was thus positively stipulated:

The Ottoman Empire agrees that French vessels of commerce henceforth shall enjoy without contestation the right of entrance and of free navigation in the Black Sea under the French flag. The Ottoman Empire agrees, moreover, that the said French merchant vessels, in their entrance into and in their departure from that sea, and in everything which can facilitate their free navigation, will have privileges entirely comparable to the merchant vessels of the nations which have obtained the right to navigate the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire and the government of the French Republic will concert in efficacious measures to purge from piracy the seas which serve their commercial vessels. The Ottoman Empire promises to protect against all piracy the French commercial navigation of the Black Sea.

Another stipulation—which Turkey neither understood nor applied —provided that the sultan, no less than France, had to pay indemnities for the French civilian losses suffered during Bonaparte’s invasion of his territory. The treaty called for a special convention to indemnify equitably and reciprocally the losses of property by confiscation or sequestration during the war.¹

Encouraging Turkey’s prompt approval of the treaty, Bonaparte issued his formal ratification on July 2, and dispatched a friendly letter to his perfect friend, the sultan. Galib accepted the French executive instrument but could himself transmit no ratification because it was not authorized by Sultan Selim III. The First Consul also decided to dispatch a special envoy to Constantinople for diplomatic effect and to undertake certain investigations in the Levant. He at first appointed Horace Sebastiani, who had made a very good impression on the Turks the year before. Under the drafted instructions, the envoy would have made suitable clarifications and could have begun the negotiation for indemnities. He might have instituted the commission, whose purpose was to collect, verify, and liquidate all the French claims. Indemnities were to be paid to merchants and other claimants from a general fund supplied by Turkey. That Turkey would ratify the treaty this time, in contrast with its failure to do so in 1801, was almost assured by the circumstance that Turkey’s allies now also had signed with France. The contrasting lack of urgency this time led Bonaparte to commission Ruffin to see the ratification through, while Sebastiani was to investigate conditions in the Levant.

The treaty’s reciprocal guarantee of territory required prompt explanation, for otherwise it might frighten Turkey into repudiating the treaty. Ruffin was directed to convey the First Consul’s interpretation of this guarantee. Bonaparte himself dictated the vague language to be used, language which Talleyrand phrased for Ruffin as follows: The First Consul wishes that nothing respecting this be discussed in detail. The guarantee, in view of the circumstances in which Turkey is found in respect to some of its possessions, must remain vague, indeterminate, and general. The chargé d’affaires was instructed to say that Bonaparte had added the secret stipulation only to avoid alarm on Turkey’s part at the possible consequences of the guarantee; such a liberal concession attested the disinterested and benevolent spirit of France.²

The Ottomans interposed no objections to the treaty, and ratifications were exchanged in Paris on September 8. Talleyrand agreed with Ruffin and the others that sailing the Black Sea should strengthen political relations with Russia as well as with Turkey and should contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability. The chargé d’affaires was directed to notify the merchants and to support them in order that French commerce might properly enjoy the advantages and extensions which the treaty assured it. The foreign minister affirmed that French merchants would be welcomed again throughout the Ottoman Empire. Turkey should protect the French merchants and ships, and it should concert with France to destroy piracy in all the seas which serve their commercial vessels.³

A treaty which covered commercial privileges throughout the Ottoman Empire, in place of the old unilateral capitulations, of itself represented a notable advance in the French position. All the powers at once reexamined their restored tariff rates effective in Turkey. They discovered approximate equality in the over-all rates, although Frenchmen believed they possessed advantages in their prewar tariff, while Englishmen believed that Russia held some slight advantages.⁴ The impatient Council of Commerce of Marseille wrote Talleyrand on July 17 that its merchants were eager to trade in the Black Sea and throughout the Near East. The council recalled Bonaparte’s assurance in January, 1802, that freedom for commerce in the Black Sea would be stipulated by treaty. It reviewed the limited French trade in the Black Sea during the 1780’s —carried on of necessity under the protection of foreign flags. Because France had not shared with Russia and Austria the duty-free commercial passage through the Bosporus into the Black Sea, the council believed similar privileges would be of the greatest advantage to French commerce. Marseille did not doubt that French commerce there would soon reach a high degree of usefulness and profit.⁵

The profits and other potentialities from France’s commercial navigation of the Black Sea became a subject of Talleyrand’s inquiries. Typical is the reply by E. Gandin, secretary of the embassy at Constantinople and former consular agent in Wallachia. He predicted an expanded trade with Russia, Danubian Europe, and western Asia. The tsarist realm would purchase French wines, liquors, fine oils, perfumes, sugar, coffee, and textiles, while France would take Russian grains, salted meats, tar, hemp, flax, potash, and tobacco* Trade could be carried on with Ottoman Bulgaria and Rumelia through the port of Varna, and more considerably with Moldavia and Wallachia* Connections could be established with such centers as Tiflis and trade opened in Circassia, Georgia, and the adjacent regions* Means could be found from the Black Sea concession to open up interesting political relations with Persia, in order to combat English influence there* In Gandin’s opinion, the peacetime development of commercial routes to Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the east generally would prove of incalculable value during any naval war. The knowledge of the Black Sea gained by merchant sailings could perhaps later prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.⁶

Ruffin relayed information received from, among others, A. Raubaud, a former French agent at Smyrna personally known to Talleyrand. Raubaud duplicated many of Gandin"s predictions, advancing the thesis that France would have little to fear from competition by the English Levant Company. V. T. Fourçade, former vice-counsul at Crete, suggested, as a means of extending French trade, the use of Varna and Galatz as the most important depots for Danubian produce, and Odessa, Kherson, Nikolaev, Kaffa, and Taganrog as centers for trade with southern Russia. For Asia Minor, Ottoman Sinop and Trebizond could serve. Other less well-founded or reasonable predictions reflected a considerable variety of new economic hopes. Some Frenchmen believed that gold and copper mines and vast forests only awaited exploitation. Others wished for a Black Sea route to the Indies.⁷

Bonaparte complemented his policy of peace with one of collaboration with the Ottoman Empire. To the ambassadorship he appointed General Brune, a distinguished former commander in chief of the French army in the Netherlands. The selection of such a figure of itself suggested Bonaparte’s purpose. By his instructions Brune, a known proponent of closer commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire, must regain the position and respect in the Near East which France had held for two centuries. The new ambassador’s ostensible instructions were of the generalized type customary for French ambassadors to Turkey during Bourbon days. Most of their details we may omit from consideration, as did Brune himself. It is important that the government wished Brune to build up Turkish confidence in the good will of the French Republic and to restore and extend commerce. Bonaparte wished to stress the reciprocal guarantee of territories. Although Turkey assumed no responsibility to participate in French wars, the French Republic guaranteed all the Ottoman territory. Obviously Brune must have observed the omission of any explanation of what constituted the Ottoman territory thus guaranteed.⁸

In the secret instructions to Brune, we can see Bonaparte beginning to occupy himself with the opportunities of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt itself no longer lured him. The French Republic intended by all the means in its power to recover the supremacy it enjoyed under the Ottoman capitulations. The ambassador was directed to take back under his protection the Roman Catholic hospitals within that empire, the Roman Catholics of Syria and Armenia, and the pilgrims who visited the Holy Places of Palestine. He had to protect French commerce in all ways, protesting every infraction of capitulatory privilege. He had to make a personal friend of the Ottoman foreign minister, or of someone close to the minister. Because Russia and Austria possessed local interests within certain of the Ottoman states, it would be to French advantage to hold the balance between these two. Brune might concert with the ambassador of Russia but be more friendly with the ambassador of Prussia, the state more sincerely within French interests.n He should offer Turkey his mediation whenever occasion arose. The ambassador of France should always be in the limelight and should see that Turkey focused attention on him. As an example borrowed from his experience in Egypt, the First Consul directed that the French palace be fully lighted on Mohammedan holidays. Two French frigates should be stationed regularly in the seas of Syria and at Constantinople" in order to protect French commerce in cooperation with the French consuls. Brune must forward exact information respecting the Ottoman provinces, extending his research in the direction of Persia.⁹

General Brune’s characteristic, leisurely departure—to facilitate preparations for a more pompous arrival—permitted his stop for entertainment by the merchants of Marseille. He came at last to Constantinople with a considerable staff, transported for show by a small naval squadron; the disembarkation at the Ottoman capital in December, 1802, awed even Ruffin. It offered a marked contrast to that day in 1798 when, upon Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt, the chargé d’affaires had been led away to an Ottoman prison. Brune believed the honors accorded him by the sultan and the grand vizir to be superior to those given others. Following the example of Madame Brune, several wives of the new officials accompanied their husbands» Brune appeared at a moment when it was not difficult for Frenchmen to capitalize on whatever anti-British feeling had resulted from the latter’s overlong military sojourn in Alexandria» Would France take diplomatic possession of the Levant?

Brune brought new commissions for the existing staff» Interpreter Kieffer became secretary-interpreter; Citizen Parandier, the agent for foreign affairs, became first secretary; and Citizen Lamarre became second secretary» The observer on the Bosporus was given adequate assistance throughout the Ottoman Empire; French consular services were promptly reestablished» Among the consuls (commissioners of commerce), a consulate general for the Morea had a shifting official residence» A vice-consul came to Athens, and agents appeared again in Crete and Cyprus» For Syria there were French consuls in Acre, Aleppo, and Tripoli» New positions were opened for the Black Sea, including viceconsulates for Heraclia and Trebizond» V» T» Fourçade became consul general at Sinop» Odessa for the first time received French consular representation, and an agent was sent to Kherson» Brune placed consular agents in Moldavia and Wallachia» A geographer mapped the newly opened regions»¹⁰

Brune and Ruffin did not at first get on well together» The ambassador needed the latter as the principal translator of documents and as an adviser, but he did not wish him to be in the limelight» It was owing to Brune that Kieffer, Ruffin’s ablest associate during the previous eight years, went back to Paris in company with the new Ottoman ambassador, Halet Effendi» So low were Ruffin’s spirits that (unsuccessfully) he requested his own recall to France» Kieffer was appointed to teach Oriental languages in Paris» In publishing a French-Turkish dictionary he collaborated by mail with Ruffin, his lifelong friend» Bianchi, coauthor of the dictionary, was another who had studied with Ruffin and with the most famous French Oriental language teacher of the day, Antoine Silvestre de Sacy.¹¹

It had been intended that Pierre Ruffin’s title be commissioner- general of commerce—really consul general, except that during the First Consulate this title was not in use» Such a status did not satisfy Brune, probably because it did not satisfy Ruffin» On Brune’s recommendation Talleyrand appointed Ruffin to be counselor of embassy, but thereafter he always signed himself ex-chargé d’affaires as well as counselor» In another change of consequence—because the embassy’s interpreters were in a sense the real ambassadors—Eugene Franchini gradually replaced Dantan as the principal interpreter and liaison officer. This Franchini and his brother Antoine had been inherited by the French from the defunct Republic of Venice in 1797.

Brune’s first dispatch from Constantinople bore the date of January 7, 1803. The Russian minister, A. Italinski, had arrived on an English frigate some ten days earlier. The French ambassador overcame the difficulties raised by the Ottomans upon the passage through the Bosporus into the Black Sea of the first French ship from Marseille, the Epaminon- das. He debated Italinski’s claim of Russia’s right to issue bills of health at Constantinople for all foreign ships entering the Black Sea. Captain David awaited authorization to proceed to Odessa while Brune debated the question of the quarantine. Italinski intimated that David’s ship would not be permitted to anchor in a Russian port unless he submitted to the usual quarantine and inspection. Brune wished treatment in Russia similar to that accorded in Turkey—or at least that David be charged no more than a nominal payment for clearance papers and suffer no delays for quarantine. Russia, he contended, needed this extra opportunity to develop its commerce in the Black Sea. Evidently he won out for specific ships, if not for the principle, because on March 10, 1803 he reported that other ships from Marseille would proceed to Odessa.¹²

After conferences with French merchants, Brune forwarded their recommendations to Talleyrand. These merchants desired the reestablishment of the eighteenth-century privileges of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseille, in the hope of again directing and unifying French commerce in the Levant and in Barbary. They wished the construction and repair of certain public ships and the status of a free port for Marseille and its environs, like that of Genoa, Leghorn, and Trieste. Although Bonaparte had granted a nominal 2 per cent, they wished restored the former duty of 20 per cent, or an equivalent protective measure against foreigners who imported French manufactures into the Levant or who imported raw materials from the Levant into France.¹³ Brune thought it might be a good plan for France to establish for the Black Sea a privileged company of merchants, directed and encouraged by the government. He observed the jealousies of Turkey and Russia; each seemed to desire to monopolize trade on the Black Sea. He reported that Odessa was ahead in winning Russia’s southern trade.¹⁴

The new ambassador actively protected and extended French interests in collaboration with the French merchants. He restored the former commercial deputies in the Levant and sent investigators to various points in Turkey and southern Russia. Turkey reaffirmed France’s traditional privilege of protecting the Roman Catholics. Brune urged French subjects to utilize their privileges. Paris newspapers credited this initial success to him by anticipation, using the fictitious date lines which Bonaparte so often employed: on February 2, 1803, the foreign ministry prepared a note—published in the Moniteur and datelined Constantinople—which announced that several Roman Catholic churches of the Levant, deprived of French protection during the war, now possessed it again. Bonaparte’s government, the official gazette concluded, should be congratulated for its resumption of the protector’s role.¹⁶

Enthusiasts for French trade did not foresee the brevity of the general peace. While it endured, considerable commercial activity began in the Black Sea. Approximately 815 foreign ships called at Russia’s southern ports in 1803. Twenty-five per cent of the grain from southern Russia went to Marseille. A grain scarcity, with consequently augmented profits, increased France’s share. Only fifteen ships under France’s own flag loaded at Odessa, however, before the renewal of the Anglo-French war forced this commerce to go into new channels or to cease altogether.¹⁶

The Ottoman Empire, on the whole, accepted France’s commercial navigation of the Straits and Black Sea with good grace. The least disposed of all Ottoman subjects to accept the peace settlement with France, as anyone could guess, proved to be Bonaparte’s implacable foe during the invasion of 1799, namely Djezzar Pasha (Ahmed Pasha) of Syria. Under pretext that peace had not been concluded, Djezzar took action against the first French ship to appear off his coast. He confiscated it, sequestered its merchandise, and arrested its captain and crew. Once more Bonaparte angrily revealed his bellicose disposition of 1799; he personally issued the order for Brune to make strong representations against Djezzar. If the Turkish government appeared too weak to require that justice be done to that pasha, said Bonaparte, he himself would do it. The matter was readily adjusted.

Attention was called to another anti-French governor by Alexandre Romieu, who represented Bonaparte in Corfu as consul general and chargé d’affaires. He said that Ali Pasha of Albania seemed to be sundering the last slender bonds which connected him with the sultan’s central administration. Romieu feared that the pasha might declare his independence. If, believed Romieu, Ali Pasha were once master of Albania and his strong ambition held, no obstacle could bar his conquering Greece. Afterward he could even develop a naval power manned by Greek sailors. Romieu added, He supremely detests the French.¹⁷ Meanwhile the resourceful Brune did not neglect to use, for rebuilding French prestige, the tendencies toward insubordination in the provinces. He protested against Ali Pasha’s arbitrary arrest of a servant of the French consul in Albania. He submitted to the grand vizir early in March a list of other grievances against provincial officers. These included slights or insults to French consuls in Coron, Patras, Athens, Crete, and Alexandria, and at the Dardanelles. He enumerated the handicaps to the complete restoration of trade. As a result the sultan decreed better protection to Frenchmen and their commerce throughout the empire.¹⁸

More important, neither Britain nor Russia took recriminatory action against Turkey for opening the Black Sea to France. Instead the former promptly obtained for itself the same privilege of navigation as France by transforming its wartime concession into a permanent treaty concession. Britain, as Turkey’s fighting ally, had earned nothing less than peacetime equality of treaty rights with a France defeated in Egypt. British statesmen suspected in advance what France would accomplish and officially informed Turkey that they expected the free navigation of the Black Sea to be conceded to them permanently by treaty, should the subjects of any other powers than those of Turkey and Russia participate in that navigation. Turkey replied that any privileges to France or other powers would be conceded immediately to England, indeed two days sooner to Britain than to any other nation.¹⁹ The phraseology of Britain’s request caught Turkey off guard, for it had seemed that only France was meant. But Austrian ships already were sailing the Black Sea, as were also the vessels of the new Ionian Republic. Turkey therefore did not wait until the treaty with France was ratified to redeem its promise to Britain. On July 24, 1802, it delivered an official note authorizing to British vessels free access to the Bosporus and the Black Sea. Turkey also confirmed and clarified the equality of Great Britain’s tariff rates in Turkey with those of Russia—another matter of interest to the privileged English Levant Company.²⁰ Logic, rivalry, and the commercial potentialities of the area dictated the treaty status, although Great Britain did not depend extensively upon the commerce of the Black Sea. Moreover, since 1581 whatever extensions of the Levantine trading rights came to other powers usually accrued to England also.

With respect to Russia, obviously a more difficult problem, France did what it could to render the settlement palatable and thereby avoid any occasion for upholding the territorial guarantee given Turkey. As an illustration of Bonaparte’s approach, one speaker argued before the French Senate on September 7, that France, far from wishing to diminish the power and prosperity of Turkey, had in view the introduction of new elements of civilization, and the opening up of the great world commercial route in the center of its provinces. Turkey had negotiated without constraint only upon the pacification of Europe. The access to the Black Sea opens a new commercial route for us, the speaker continued, and the sphere of our commerce is now expanding through its direct communications with southern Russia. He encouraged Tsar Alexander to put aside possible vulgar jealousy and agree that the expansion of industrial relations between France and Russia would be advantageous to the industry of both. Turkey had sought only the friendship of France.²¹

Russia acquiesced because foreign economic access to the Black Sea would indeed aid its commerce. The tsar nevertheless remained watchful of his Turkish ally and was a jealous protector of Russian interests. In 1802 two new hospodars took office in Moldavia and Wallachia. These chief executives of the Principalities were given additional privileges; their terms of office were lengthened to seven years. In accordance with friendly action under the Russo-Turkish alliance, the sultan agreed that the hospodars should not be deposed except in cases of misconduct established by joint Russian and Turkish inquiry. As we shall see (chap, vi), Turkey’s violation of this agreement at French behest in 1806 proved exceedingly important. Russia’s military sailing of the Straits conformed with the alliance signed with Turkey against General Bonaparte in September, 1798. A continuing basis for such passage was the Russian communications with the Ionian Islands, which dated from the agreement of March, 1800. This agreement provided for their joint Russo-Turkish occupation.

French resistance to this passage engendered Franco-Russian political rivalry everywhere for several years. France met the competition in part by becoming more and more a Balkan power in its successive treaties with Austria. Brune reported his first observation of impressive Russian military forces passing the Straits for Corfu on May 30, 1803. That day he saw at anchor before Constantinople a Russian vessel of the line of 74 guns and another of 60 guns, their crews totaling 1,190 men. Periodically he sent reports of similar observations to Paris.

Soon after his arrival, the French ambassador recounted to ° Citizen First Consul Bonaparte an important debate with Italinski. The Russian minister affirmed the Black Sea to be a great lake appertaining to Russia, for the sailing of which Russia might enforce whatever quarantine or other rules it liked. Brune held that because this great lake" possessed at least two masters, namely, Turkey and Russia, its key could not pertain exclusively to the latter. Italinski cited the case of a British frigate long stationed at Constantinople; in order to enter the Black Sea at all this ship had to sail furtively for Odessa and Sevastopol.²²

Talleyrand reacted violently against the procedure followed at Constantinople for the Epaminondas. He labeled as a pretension the Russian intention to clear all French ships entering the Black Sea. Italinski’s additional claims infuriated him. He advised Bonaparte of his decision to direct all French captains thereafter not to ask for Russian authorization but to seek Turkish authorization alone. He boldly notified the captains that only Turkey controlled the Straits. After studying Italinski’s claims further, Talleyrand, on May 14, directed the French minister at St. Petersburg to seek to have countermanded at its beginning a Russian practice of inspection and quarantine not supported by treaty. Only the Turks might authorize the sailing into the Black Sea. In addition, French commercial relations with Russia were required to follow the Franco-Russian treaty of 1787, which authorized no Russian inspection at Constantinople.²³

Brune in 1803 displayed some of the nervous irritation shown in 1853 by Ambassador Stratford Canning of Great Britain in contributing to the coming of the Crimean War. He requested Paris to authorize a French frigate and two brigs to come to Constantinople to be at his disposal; ostensibly these ships were to map the coasts of the Black Sea but actually they were to protect and facilitate French commerce. Talleyrand forwarded this proposal to the navy on May 18, 1803. From there it was sent to the war department. The evasion had not ended by the time everyone in Paris agreed that the approaching rupture with Great Britain must terminate the discussion of this interesting possibility. Had the new war not intervened, the navy would have favored Brune’s plans—and so it was finally decided upon, when too late to have any effect.²⁴

The debate between Talleyrand and Italinski suggests a parallel present-day problem. The Soviet Union in 1946 might have won passage for its warships, had not the Turkish, American, and British governments resisted its diplomatic efforts. Launching the move on August 7, 1946, the Soviet Union sought to place the defense of the Straits under the joint control of itself and Turkey» Consulted by Turkey, the Anglo- American policy-makers insisted upon the continued control of the Straits by Turkey, or alternatively by the United Nations»²⁵ Brune’s skirmish with Italinski in 1803 over quarantines seemed trivial as compared with the dispute over Russia’s treaty privilege of that time to pass the Straits with its warships and military transports» Russia temporarily possessed then, by virtue of its Ottoman alliance, what the western Allies of the Second World War actually conceded to the Soviet Union, contingent upon treaty arrangements, in the Potsdam Conference of 1945»

In due course Ruffin opened negotiations in Constantinople intended to adjust reciprocally the pecuniary claims that accumulated during the invasion of Egypt» The Turks seemed to believe they might require France to pay reciprocal indemnities for Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt» In the treaty stipulation, however, the French held the advantage because only civilian losses were mentioned» Damages by Turkey arose from its arrest of some 1,842 French civilians and the seizure of their property» No such numbers of Turks lived in France, and Bonaparte would not even discuss the counting of Ottoman civilians in Egypt who had suffered in consequence of almost three years of French rule» Like a faithful servant Ruffin remained—if unsuccessfully—at the task for several years; the conferences were stenographically recorded and officially attested» Talleyrand considered the negotiations to be Ruffin’s special assignment, and his alone» The 18 official sessions dragged from August, 1802, to February, 1804, without achieving any significant results» The negotiators authorized a few restitutions of houses and property but failed in all attempts to devise a formula for general settlement.

Indirectly these conferences were of enormous benefit to later Napoleonic policy» During the sterile negotiations Ruffin met and grew to like Ibrahim Effendi, whom Turkey kept returning as negotiator to most of the conferences» The friendship was mutual, and Ibrahim proved a genuine friend of France» He held the position of kiaya bey, strategically important with respect to Ottoman policy-making. The position was variously described by contemporary writers as that of private secretary to the sultan, or Greek agent of the minister of the interior, or first lieutenant of the grand vizir. Owing to his position, Ibrahim Effendi knew the leading court secrets and had direct access to Sultan Selim III. We shall read of Ruffin’s secret political discussions with him in 1805 and 1806 (chap. iv).

At the same time as he appointed Brune, Bonaparte ordered Sebastiani to Alexandria to learn whether the British had evacuated the country as required by the Treaty of Amiens. Ostensibly he would ° obtain information respecting the status of the former French commercial establishments and concerning means for their prompt reorganization. " Sebastiani traveled impressively on the Cornélie, a French frigate authorized to visit several ports in the Levant. He embarked at Toulon on September 17; he was expected to visit Tripoli, Alexandria, Jaffa, Acre, Smyrna, Zante, Corfu, and Cephalonia—some of these places known personally to Bonaparte. Remembering his naval defeat at Aboukir in 1798 and the subsequent Anglo-Turkish blockade, Bonaparte doubtless welcomed this opportunity for the undeterred sailing of a French frigate in the eastern Mediterranean. As secretary-interpreter went young Amédée Jaubert, an interesting linguist, whose activities in behalf of Napoleon’s policies for Persia will loom large in our story. He had been with Bonaparte in Egypt, becoming the chief interpreter following the death of his superior. Bonaparte liked him. He pleased Sebastiani during this particular voyage.

The secret instructions on which Sebastiani acted reveal many of the major objectives of the First Consul at the time. Sebastiani induced the pasha of Tripoli to recognize the flag of Italy, not a difficult assignment. Although ordered to fight Bonaparte as the invader of Egypt in 1798, all the pashas in North Africa had either feared or admired him enough to be lukewarm antagonists. Sebastiani transmitted a communication from Talleyrand to the pasha, who stated his liking for Bonaparte.

Fortified by a letter in hand from the Ottoman ambassador in Paris to the pasha of Cairo, Sebastiani anchored his frigate before Alexandria on October 15. He investigated the English status and sought to learn whether French consuls could be stationed in Egypt. For a moment the British mistook the French vessel for one of their own so commonly seen in that port. The scene represented a stark contrast to the French humility during the enforced evacuation of 1801. An arrogant French officer reported the English as in strong positions at Alexandria. Sebastiani called on General Stuart, the British commandant. He stated bluntly that the French government had believed Alexandria to be evacuated in conformity with the treaty and announced that he possessed authority to claim the execution of that stipulation. Stuart replied, as Sebastiani had surmised he would, that he as yet had received no orders to evacuate. The commandant nonchalantly added that he be lieved he would spend the winter in Alexandria. The French could make the best or worst of these challenging words, spoken in the city so intimately associated with Bonaparte’s rise to power. Such talk, by a prominent officer of the nation in large part responsible for the First Consul’s failure in Egypt and Syria, probably would hasten the reopening of the Anglo-French war.

The people of Alexandria evince great joy at seeing us, Sebastiani reported, doubtless pleasing Bonaparte. Some gossip placed Sebastiani in the city in order to take possession of it in the name of the Great Consul. Sebastiani found Egypt disunited, a condition attributed to the rival Mamelukes. With three or four thousand men the Mamelukes held Faiyum and the district up to a short distance from Cairo. Rumor had it that Djezzar Pasha would align himself with them to force a change of Ottoman governors at Cairo. The English with 4,430 men occupied Alexandria, while the Turks with some 20,000 governed most of the remainder of Egypt. Sebastiani discovered bad feeling between the Turks and the English, another encouragement to Bonaparte’s still bellicose attitude. Sebastiani believed the Turks probably could not hold their major military positions for long.

The investigator’s report excited Bonaparte further. It stated that the English were generally detested in Cairo and that Egypt as a whole seemed anxious for their departure. The country admittedly would fall into disorder afterward, the situation accordingly inviting Bonaparte to return. Sebastiani reported Osman Bey, one of the three principal Mameluke chiefs, as devoted to the French. The envoy, basing his belief on his own friendly reception, wrote: Today 6,000 French soldiers would be sufficient to reconquer Egypt. Egyptians held in great respect the well-remembered French army of Egypt.²⁶

According to Sebastiani’s survey, disorders of all kinds marked Syria. Djezzar still mastered the coast, held Palestine, and controlled Damascus, whose pasha appeared to be in full revolt against the sultan. Sebastiani inquired whether the Christians suffered vexations and whether Turkey duly observed all the privileges assured to them under the French protectorate. In November he visited Acre, Djezzar’s capital, which had withstood a Bonapartean siege in 1799. He covered up reality with reports that Bonaparte doubtless would like to read. He stated the unlikely, that the Syrians received him with the same enthusiasm as had the Egyptians. He visited Smyrna and returned to France by way of the Ionian Islands. He reported an impressive welcome at Zante.²⁷

An order by Talleyrand and the reactions to it supply us from time to time with useful bits of hitherto unpublished information respecting the Straits* He requested precise information of the actual passage of Russian ships through the Straits from the Black Sea and around to the Adriatic*²⁸ Reports from Constantinople and St. Petersburg meanwhile detailed the latest gossip concerning Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Brune advised, in a ciphered dispatch of February 19, of the arrival at the Turkish capital of a large armed Russian vessel* It anchored near the stationary frigate, so called by Brune because the Russians always had one there under one pretext or another* Cargoes of wine had arrived for the crews of the ships transporting Russian troops to Corfu*

The French legation in St* Petersburg seldom communicated directly with the embassy in Constantinople, news from Russia being forwarded to Brune from Paris or Vienna* Minister Hedouville reported that Russia was arming a force in the Black Sea, and particularly at Sevastopol* Thus already began to appear what would be the principal strategic objectives of the Crimean War of the 1850’$* A regiment of artillery was moved southward to the Sea of Azov. Hedouville believed Russia advanced the charge of French ambitions for southern Greece in order to cover up this armament.²⁹

General Brune reported the coming in mid-April of two Russian frigates and three transports en route from Sevastopol to Corfu. They took on provisions at Constantinople, in conformity with the Russo-Turkish alliance. At the same time a dozen small English commercial boats under escort of a brig of war entered the port of Constantinople; they were destined for Odessa and were to return to Malta with grain. Italinski later assigned Ambassador Elgin’s calling that British brig into the Dardanelles as one reason for Russia’s insistence upon maintaining the military passage of the Straits. For over two months Russia’s diplomats avoided the French ambassador’s palace in Pera. Brune reported that Italinski actually belonged to the pro-British crowd in St. Petersburg.³⁰

Events soon pointed to another Anglo-French war. The numerous French plans—including many ephemeral ones—for peaceful penetration of the regions bordering the Black Sea would have represented a substantial economic challenge in the Levant. They were halted almost at their inception because, as every student of history knows, the general pacification proved only temporary. Recriminations in the press between England and France had become an important factor when (in August, 1802) Bonaparte threatened to intervene in Switzerland. Belatedly France evacuated Otranto. Commercial relations had not been restored with England; certain Frenchmen attached to the ancien regime were welcomed across the English Channel; British troops remained in Malta.

The discussions soon broadened, and Bonaparte became increasingly hostile. Sebastianas report of the pro-French and anti-English feeling he found in Egypt created a sensation when published in the Moniteur of January 30, 1803. The report incensed the British, whose object in Egypt had been to render compatible the particularistic Mamelukes and the restored Ottoman military authority. The British government heeded the implied warning. It withdrew from Egypt in March, thus complying belatedly with the Treaty of Amiens. Not to be too greatly intimidated, however, it declared that British troops would not be withdrawn from Malta until France fulfilled the conditions of the treaty.

Bonaparte’s annoyance changed to anger. Taking a lesson from Sebastianas success in discovering or promoting a pro-French spirit in the east, Bonaparte, in mid-January, 1803, ordered General Charles Decaen to prepare an expedition for Mauritius Island (then known as île de France) in the Indian Ocean. France still held tiny outposts in India. France under cover of the Treaty of Amiens thereupon fitted out a colonial expedition. To many this project seemed to raise more than the question of routes to India. Bonaparte intended Decaen to enter into discussions with native Indian princes who manifested hostility to British rule and to learn how large an army from Europe would be needed to help them eject the British.

Decaen and his contingent of soldiers sailed early in March, 1803. Tariff discussions between France and Turkey opened without enthusiasm late that month, when General Brune could relay the official Turkish news of the departure of the English troops from Alexandria. General Stuart withdrew after arranging with the beys for a government there. He had been prodded by a hostile letter from the grand vizir—to which he rejoined that he saw with chagrin this letter, based on poorly represented facts. A Turk friendly to the French, probably Ruffin’s new friend Ibrahim, turned over the original of Stuart’s reply, which still reposes in the French archives in Paris.³¹ The British general sought to contradict Sebastiani’s story of Egypt’s anti-English sentiment by stating to his government that Turkish officers evinced cordiality at the time of the evacuation and gave the strongest testimonies of affectionate attachment on the part of the inhabitants at large. Stuart hoped for the permanent preponderance of British influence in that country.³²

Not yet knowing of the evacuation, Talleyrand near the end of March directed Ambassador Brune to neglect no opportunity to express the view that Turkey should not be deceived. The English pretension to conserve Malta, he said, of itself should suffice to reveal British policy the same as the long sojourn in Egypt. If, in spite of the wishes of the First Consul, England should again disturb the peace, it would be important for the Ottoman Empire to reassert its sovereignty over Egypt by insisting upon a prompt evacuation.

Threats followed from both sides of the Channel. Warlike preparations in England and France stimulated the martial spirit. Great Britain forced the issue by declaring war against France on May 18. This freed England of the treaty stipulation to evacuate Malta. Decaen’s efforts were circumscribed, although Mauritius would not be taken until 1810. The new war suspended action on all French plans for economic expansion in the Levant. Tensions had prepared the people for the news in Constantinople, where spreading word of the event required several weeks to arrive. When the British ambassador withdrew from Paris on May 12, Marseille spread the report. French commerce became uncertain when Constantinople learned of this on June 23. Precautionary measures thus had intervened before news of the official announcement of the war was received a week later. A British squadron—consisting of a ship of the line, two frigates, and two brigs—anchored immediately at Tenedos, just outside the Dardanelles.³³

There was a momentary danger that Turkey would join the English and thus return the assistance accorded from 1798 to 1801. But the sultan soon indicated his desire to remain neutral by presenting to Bonaparte a diamond-encrusted jewel box (July 20, 1803). France reopened its consular establishments in Egypt. Mathieu de Lesseps served there until his departure for reasons of health in November, 1804.³⁴ The sultan’s government waited several weeks before announcing on September 20 its policy of neutrality.

Brune’s initial successes in advancing French interests terminated abruptly, however, except for the Turkish neutrality, as we shall see. Moreover, he had to complain on August 22 of the culpable conduct of several French merchants who, not trusting Bonaparte’s ability to protect them, sought Prussia’s protection. The merchants remembered well their plight during the French adventure in Egypt. By mid-October, Bonaparte found time to express annoyance and astonishment at their attitude, especially since France and Turkey were still at peace.³⁵

For several months Brune conducted the routine business of a wartime embassy in relations with a neutral state* Among other things, he offered France’s good offices in the interminable quarrels between the local beys and the Ottoman military administrators in Egypt—an offer Turkey deferred for future acceptance, although De Lesseps relayed it to the beys. Reports had it that Turkey once more feared a French landing in southern Greece by the forces stationed in Italy, as had been expected in the summer of 1798. Brune explained away the story as an English trick, and Talleyrand later instructed him to deny it officially.

France’s General Council of Commerce, a subdivision of the Ministry of the Interior, drafted a new proposed tariff for Turkey which stipulated the most-favored-nation privileges. Talleyrand sent Brune full authority to negotiate it (December 23, 1803), meanwhile authorizing language at Constantinople that would keep alive the French expectation of being able to sail the Black Sea some day. I deign to remark, the foreign minister wrote, that the epoch of our admission to the Black Sea has been that of a sort of revolution in the commercial relations of that part of the world with all the powers. Before our admission, almost all the other flags were excluded from the Black Sea. Today most of the great powers are admitted. It is natural that France wishes to extend its trade there. The more powers admitted, he reasoned, the more difficult would it be for England to realize its projects for an exclusive commerce. He said the embassy should still do its best to have French merchants indemnified for their losses from 1798 to 1801.³⁶

Bonaparte’s Levantine policy was conditioned by his general European policies. Meanwhile he began for Turkey and Egypt the contradictory policy that in the long run would mark almost all his Near Eastern actions. On September 19 he directed by ciphered instructions that De Lesseps assure the Mamelukes at Cairo of his friendship for them. Any communication they wished to make could be sent safely, without the Turks’ knowledge. He played the other side also. He did not wait to learn of the favorable reception accorded Mathieu de Lesseps in Alexandria; without pledging France to anything, he ordered the Mameluke beys and the pashas to be played against the sultan. Among the First Consul’s Letters and Orders in the archives is an instruction of August 6, 1803, to Talleyrand: Inform General Brune that the English are disembarking arms at different points in southern Greece, using ships bearing the French flag and commanded by captains speaking French. This is a ruse to indispose Turkey against us.³⁷

British policy, in contrast, supported the interests of the sultan in Egypt. When in October, 1803, a Mameluke chief came to London to lobby, the British government announced that he did so without official approval. Its fixed determination⁰ forbade listening to proposals that might affect the interests or the rights of the Ottoman Empire in Egypt.⁰³⁸ Britain belatedly followed France in restoring official representation to Egypt. The reactivation began with the appointment of a consul general on January 30, 1804. By instructions this official could not take sides in local quarrels but must devote his efforts to seeing that the pashas upheld all the privileges and immunities of the English Levant Company.³⁹

British moves for its consuls in Egypt annoyed Brune. He complained to Bonaparte against the new titles for Consul General Missett (who was given the additional title of chargé d’affaires), and for Vice-consul Briggs of Alexandria, an influential trader who was also appointed commercial agent of the English Levant Company. Brune thought France should at least match the titles by promoting several French agents. He suggested promotions for Consuls Rousseau of Bagdad, Corancez of Aleppo, Choderlos of Smyrna, Fourçade of Sinop, Vice-consul Dupré of Trebizond, Consul General de Lesseps of Cairo, and Vice-consul Drovetti of Alexandria.⁴⁰ Drovetti became especially renowned, for it was he who, in 1829, after distinguished service in Egypt, encouraged France to venture the conquest of Algeria by using Mehemet Ali of Egypt as its strong lieutenant.⁴¹

Franco-Russian relations turned cool, a factor of subsequent importance. Count Markov complained bitterly to Talleyrand respecting the treatment of himself by Bonaparte during a conference on September 25, 1803. The Russian minister had come out second best when he called on the First Consul to discuss the personal affairs of two French citizens. Talleyrand handed Markov a blistering reply. Through General Hedouville, Bonaparte’s minister in St. Petersburg, the foreign minister won Markov’s recall by Tsar Alexander. Easygoing Baron Pierre d’Oubril, left in charge of Russia’s affairs in Paris, elicited Bonaparte’s and Talleyrand’s approval. Meanwhile, although Italinski followed courteous and correct forms with Brune, he manifested none of the intimacy so obvious in his official relations with Lord Elgin.

Talleyrand directed observations to be undertaken by an attaché of the French legation in St. Petersburg of the coast of the Black Sea, including its population, customs, and commerce. Hedouville could re port only scant headway in assuring Russia’s neutrality in the Anglo- French war. Bonaparte complained that Hedouville’s reports