Public Opinion and Canadian Identity

By Mildred A. Schwartz

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1967.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2023
• ISBN: 9780520347724

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PUBLIC OPINION AND CANADIAN IDENTITY

PUBLIC OPINION

AND

CANADIAN IDENTITY

MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ

Foreword by SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California

Cambridge University Press London, England

Copyright © 1967, by

The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 67*17693 Printed in the United States of America

FOREWORD

Two NATIONS, the United States and Canada, resulted from the American Revolution. The first, representing the victorious revolutionary side, emerged with a national ethos proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, and subsequently furbished by the successful efforts of various political tendencies to extend the egalitarian aspects of that ethos. The liberal-left groups in the United States have repeatedly laid claim to the national tradition as they fought for universal suffrage, emancipation, state intervention on behalf of weaker and underprivileged groups, and currently equal rights for Negroes. Conservatives in the United States have been at a disadvantage as contrasted with similar tendencies in many European countries since the American national tradition has been identified with anti-elitist and utopian (assumptions about human perfectability) conceptions. The extent to which this revolutionary tradition still informs the character of American society must be seen in comparative perspective, by contrasting different aspects of U.S. behavior and values with those of nations such as Canada which lack this tradition. Thus it will probably come as a shock to most Americans that the late Harold Innis, Canada’s greatest social scientist, writing shortly after World War II, in discussing the emigration of Canadian university graduates to the United States, could present the problem as one involving the training of our best students for export to countries with a revolutionary tradition¹ More recently, a British Labor M.P., David Marquand, in reviewing Hof- stadter’s book, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, pointed to the fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are both revolutionary countries, based on a belief in the perfectibility of man ² as an explanation of the belief in un-American and anti-Communist plots in both countries.

Innis and a number of other leading Canadian social scientists, such as S. D. Clark, A. R. M. Lower, and Frank Underhill, made the fact that Canada, the North American nation formed from the losing side

¹ Harold Innis, Essays in Canadian Economic History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956, p. 384.

•David Marquand, America’s Bad Guys, The Observer, November 27, 1966, p. 27.

in the Revolution, has a counter-revolutionary tradition, the principal clue to an understanding of Canadian values.³ The historic decision which led to nationhood was the rejection of the Declaration of Independence, and republican status. Whereas after the Revolution many supporters of the American cause left behind north of the new international border emigrated south, many thousands of Tories moved north. And from then on, what emerged as a separate Canadian identity has been based on justifying itself as not being American. As S. D. Clark has put it: Canadian national life can almost be said to take its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in the American Republic. ⁴

In rejecting absorption into the revolutionary tradition, Canada chose the losing side from a world-wide ideological perspective. Although it ultimately incorporated most of the changes which everywhere are defined as progressive or liberal—independence, adult suffrage, welfare-state policies designed to further egalitarian ideals, widespread popular education on all levels—Canada made these adjustments much later than her southern neighbor in most cases. These reforms were rarely made as consequence of the triumph of a liberal egalitarian-oriented party or movement. Rather, as Canadian sociologist John Porter has argued, their haphazard development has come about more by the ‘demonstration effect’ of their existence in other countries, than because they have formed the social philosophy of either of the two parties which have been in power at the federal level. ⁵

The presence of Quebec in the Canadian Confederation also represents a negative decision designed to counter the growth of liberal ideals. The ecclesiastics of Quebec, the dominant leaders of the French population after the British Conquest in 1763, did not seize the opportunity of the American Revolution to regain freedom from foreign rule. Rather they feared the revolutionary Puritans of New England more than the Anglican Royalists. And after the French Revolution of 1789 resulted in the widespread dispersion of anticlerical and democratic doctrines in their mother country, the French Canadian church leadership sought to cut their people off from the twin sources of intellectual contamination, the United States and

³ See S. M. Lipset, Revolution and Counter-Revolution—The United States and Canada, in Thomas R. Ford, ed., The Revolution-Theme in Contemporary America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press), pp. 21-64 for references to the literature dealing with these problems.

⁴ S. D. Clark, The Importance of Anti-Americanism in Canadian National Feeling, in H. F. Angus, ed., Canada and Her Great Neighbor, Toronto: The Ryer- son Press, 1938, p. 243.

⁶ John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 370.

France. Participation in a union with English Canadians under a British monarchy was far more preferable.

The leaders of both English and French Canada found themselves in an independent large federal union after 1867, not because they wanted new nationhood, but because they did not desire links with revolutionary countries, and Great Britain refused to continue various responsibilities for her autonomous North American provinces. The very notion of Canada which had emerged in French Canada and spread to what is now Ontario, was foreign to the people of the Maritimes and British Columbia. For many decades, residents of these provinces continued to speak of going to Canada, meaning the central regions of the country.

This tradition meant that the concept of a Canadian identity had little meaning to most citizens of the country. Until World War II, the term Canadian was not even used in Canadian passports. The British flag remained the flag of Canada until the 1960’s. Canada’s highest court of supreme appeal was the Privy Council of the British House of Lords until recently. Canada’s constitution is the British North America Act, passed by the parliament of Great Britain in 1867. Amendments to the Constitution still require pro forma ratification by the British parliament. Such symbols of national inferiority which would be outrageous to the citizens of the various new nations of Africa and Asia apparently have bothered few Canadians.

During the decades of the fifties and sixties, Canada has witnessed a weakening of federal power in favor of the provinces. Although her constitution written immediately after the American Civil War, gives to the federal government much more ultimate power over the provinces than is held by the U.S. government with respect to the states, many of these central powers have rarely been used, because of weak national legitimacy. In short, although Canada has been one of the most successful nations on earth from the point of view of economic growth and the provision of a high standard of living to its citizens, it still lacks a strong sense of national pride and identity. It is still not certain what it is, a North American nation, not much different from the United States, which a significant minority thinks ought to join the United States, a British nation with a large French subculture, two nations, one English and the other French, which exist in a loose confederation, or some combination of these and other concepts.

This is some of the background to which Mildred Schwartz has addressed herself in this magnificent effort to bring together the public-opinion data gathered in many years bearing on the problem of Canadian identity. Her analysis indicates that the problem of identity is far from being resolved. Her emphasis on the integrative role of the two major political parties points to processes which analysts of the formation of national identity in other states have also suggested as crucial. For residents of the United States, this book supplies important insights into their own national development. It suggests that the nationalization of political orientations and opinions which have been occurring there are not a simple outcome of increased urbanization, industrialization, and better transportation and communication facilities. All of these which make the environment of most Americans similar presumably contribute to the formation of common reactions to comparable experiences in different parts of the country. But a basic cultural similarity and national ethos are also necessary for the growth of such value consensus. Where either is lacking, one may expect less integration. Even in very small countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, cultural disparities in the form of sharp linguistic and religious differences have not resulted in a strong sense of national identity. Switzerland has much more than the others, resulting in part from the fact that, like the United States, its existence is the result of a conscious effort at maintaining its independence.

I do not wish to comment further on the problems raised in this book, since this is properly the task of the author, a task which she has handled well. I would, however, like to note in conclusion that this book is not only important for its substantive findings, but it should be recommended reading to social scientists as an excellent example of the contribution to knowledge which can be made from a secondary analysis of the public-opinion data collected since the 1930’s by the various commercial polling organizations. These materials provide a new dimension to historical and social science analysis. It is a commentary on the lack of imagination and training of scholars in these fields that this is the first book published based on such materials dealing with Canadian problems.⁶ Mildred Schwartz, therefore, deserves to be congratulated both for her contribution to our understanding of problems of national identity, and for her methodological pioneering.

Seymour Martin Lipset

Harvard University

⁹ There is one previous work which uses Canadian opinion data in a comparative treatment of voting behavior in the four major Anglo-American democracies. See Robert Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

PREFACE

THE TWENTY-SIXTH parliament of Canada, in an act preceded by acrimonious argument, finally passed legislation giving Canada its own flag, distinct in design from that of any other nation. It was an act that was probably little noticed outside the borders of Canada. As far as Canada itself was concerned, it did nothing to solve pressing economic problems, nor did it contribute to the social welfare of the people. It did not even have much bearing on French-English tensions, except that in some quarters it served to exacerbate these. Where then does the significance of the new flag lie? It points up the anomalies of Canadian nationhood. Ninety-eight years after its formation as a viable state, Canada was only beginning to cope with problems most nations meet (though not necessarily solve) at their birth. Canada’s late start in acquiring the symbols of nationhood is indicative of the larger problems it faces as a creation of Britain, a neighbour of the United States, and a nation peopled by groups that somehow had never developed many unifying bonds.

As a Canadian, and one who has also lived in the United States, I had my own ideas about what it meant to live in Canada. At the same time, as a sociologist, I was attracted to the question of what it meant to other Canadians, divided as they were by regional, ethnic, and religious loyalties. From my interest in the role of political parties in a democratic state, I was drawn to the part played by parties in the development of national ties.

I saw these issues in comparative and historical terms, and I tried to obtain data which would permit me to so treat Canada’s identity. In this regard I was helped by the availability of twenty years of Canadian Gallup material. But without disparaging these data, which form the basis of all my generalizations, they were after all collected by others to serve other purposes, and they put considerable limits on the kinds of analyses I was able to make or the conclusions I could draw. Whether they still provide valuable insights into Canadian society, I leave to the reader to judge.

Data were obtained through Professor Philip K. Hastings of the Roper Public Opinion Research Center in Williamstown, Massachusetts, and Miss Byrne Hope Sanders of the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion Research, Toronto. Both Professor Hastings and Miss Sanders and their staff were consistently helpful and prompt in meeting my requests for information.

This book was originally a doctoral dissertation for Columbia University, partly supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the Canada Council. The dissertation was supervised by Juan J. Linz, whose critical comments have contributed immeasurably to the value of this work.

Tabulations and calculations of statistical tests were done through the great generosity of Statistical Reporting and Tabulating Limited, Toronto, and the Computing Center of the University of Alberta, Calgary. I would particularly like to thank Ronald May, Anton Colijn, Philip Hadfield, and Mary Lynn Losie at the Center. An initial preparation of the hundreds of tables upon which this study is based was ably done by Mrs. Mary Engelmann. In preparing this book, however, it seemed unnecessarily cumbersome to include all these tables. For further information or confirmation of discussions in the text, the unpublished dissertation, "Canadian National Identity as Seen Through Public Opinion Polls: 1941—1963/’ is available on file at Columbia University.

Other research assistance was provided by Moira Mclvor, Lois Carrier, and Victor Marshall. The style of this book has hopefully been improved by the discerning editorial comments of Rosemary Plotnick, Timothy Enos, Ann Jacobs, and especially Jean Block.

The topics which I cover touch on a number of disciplines, and in all cases where I required expert advice I was able to call on my former colleagues at the University of Alberta, Calgary. Of the many who aided me, two in particular can never be adequately thanked. They are Frederick C. Engelmann and Eugene Oetting. Professor Engelmann’s fund of knowledge about politics was always available to me, and his sage advice was a major source of support. Dr. Oetting brought his creative insight to bear on my methodological problems, and he was always ready to discuss these with me.

Various versions of the first section of this book were discussed with Robert R. Alford, Leonard Binder, James A. Davis, Thelma H. McCormack, Donald L. Spence, Sidney Verba, Douglas Verney. Although I was not always able to use directly the suggestions they made, I benefited in all cases from their critical comments.

Typing of the final manuscript was the work of Masako Oshita, Nella Siefert, Lillian Rochon, and Dolores Farrell of National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago.

M.A.S.

CONTENTS 1

1 Percentage Distribution of Population by Region, 1881-1961 32

2 Per Capita Personal Disposable Income, for Canada and

Provinces, 1961 34

3 Indicators of Differences in Living Conditions by Region,

1941-1961 34

4 Percentage Distribution of Population of Non-British Ori

gin, by Region, 1961 35

5 Canadian General Election Results, 1940-1963 47

6 Opinions on Aid to Britain, 1942-1952 61

7 Opinions on Trade Relations with Britain, 1947-1963 62

8 Evaluation of Britain, 1942-1963 64

9 Evaluation of Britain, by Official Language, 1942-1956 65

10 Opinions on Military Relations with the United States,

1959-1961 66

11 Opinions on Economic Relations with the United States,

1943-1957 67

12 Opinions on Economic Relations with United States, by

Region, 1943-1957 68

13 Opinions on Foreign Resource Development, 1954-1957 68

14 Evaluation of the United States, 1948-1963 70

15 Evaluation of the United States, by Region, 1956-1963 72

16 Opinions on Commonwealth, 1943-1963 74

17 Regional Variations in Favouring Independence from the

Commonwealth, 1950-1962 76

18 Opinions on World Organization, 1945-1960 78

19 Opinions on Canadian Troops Serving Abroad, 1942-1958 79

20 Opinions on Canadian Troops Serving Abroad by Region,

1943-1954 80

21 Opinions on International Commitments, 1944-1962 82

22 Opinions on French-English Relations, 1942-1963 84

23 Regional Distribution of Canadians Stating Official Lan

guage as Both English and French, 1961 85

24 Opinions of Change in Feelings Between English- and

French-Speaking Canadians Over Past Five Years, 1963 86

25 Opinions on Population Size, 1945-1960 87

26 Effects of Immigration, 1949-1961 88

27 Preferred Influences on Government, 1943-1960 89

28 Preferred Influences on Government, by Occupation of

Household Head, 1952-1960 90

29 Participation of Organized Labour and Farm Groups in

Politics, 1948-1962 91

30 Opposition to Organized Labour and Farm Groups in Poli

tics, by Union Status of Household, 1948-1962 91

31 Evaluation of Confederation, 1945-1960 92

32 Opinions on Federal-Provincial Powers, 1943-1960 93

33 Opinions on Specific Areas of Responsibility for Federal

and Provincial Governments, 1944-1957 94

34 Opinions on Public Ownership, 1943-1957 96

35 Opinions on Government Control Over Prices, 1941-1962 98

36 Opinions on Social Welfare Measures, 1942-1962 99

37 Opinions on Government Participation in Fields of Culture

and Ideas, 1942-1957 102

38 Ideological Orientation, 1942-1961 104

39 Choice of National Flag, 1943-1963 107

40 Choice of Flag by Region, 1952-1963 108

41 Choice of New Flag by Party Preference, 1945-1962 109

42 Choice of National Anthem, 1950-1963 110

43 Choice of National Anthem by Region, 1950 and 1963 111

44 Desired Origin for Governor-General, 1944-1957 113

45 Opinions on Members of Royal Family as Governor-Gen

eral, 1952-1958 114

46 Opinions on Royal Family as Governor-General by Origin,

1956-1958 115

47 Opinions on Royal Family, 1948-1959 116

48 Opinions on Other Political Symbols, 1943-1959 117

49 Opinion Consensus Within Types of Social Groupings, Re

gardless of Party Supported 131

50 Relation Between Problem Area and Intraparty Consensus

for All Parties 132

51 Relation Between Problem Area and Intraparty Consensus

for Each Party 133

52 Relation Between Party Preference and Residence in Trade-

Union Household for Consensus on National Identity 134

53 Relation Between Party Preference and Type of Community 141

54 Relation Between Party Preference and Region in Canada 146

to Stability of Preference, 1951-1962 155

56 Relation Between Party Preference and Religion 159

57 Relation Between Party Preference and Official Language 166

58 Relation Between Party Preference and Birthplace 170

59 Relation Between Party Preference and Occupation of

Household Head 174

60 Trends in Distribution of High Intraparty lGH’s According

to Occupation of Household Head 176

61 Relation Between Party Preference and Education 180

62 Trends in Support from the University-Educated for Con

servatives and Liberals, 1954-1962 184

63 Relation Between Party Preference and Age 187

64 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions

of Commonwealth 190

65 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions

of Government Activities 192

66 Relative Effect of Age and Historical Situation on Opinions

of Political Symbols 193

67 Relation of Party Preference and Sex 194

68 Similarities in Viewpoints Between Party Supporters, by

Problem Area 201

69 Party Supporters with No Opinions on Party Differences 209

70 Extent of Awareness of Problem Areas 218

71 Awareness of Symbolic Problems 219

72 Awareness of Internal Problems 219

73 Awareness of External Problems 220

74 No Opinions by Education and Problem Area 222

75 Proportion of "No Opinions/* by Region, Language, Reli

gion and Problem Area 224

76 Proportion of No Opinions, by Party Preference and

Problem Area 227

77 Proportion of No Opinions, by Stability of Party Prefer

ence and Problem Area 228

78 Main Issues Facing Canada, December, 1957 229

79 Most Important Problem Facing Canada, July, 1960 229

80 Interest in Coming Election and Opinions on Having Or

ganized Labour Support Own Party, January, 1962 230

1 The Relation of Party Types to Consensus 19

2 Canadian Identity: Underlying Problems and Critical Influ

ences 46

3 Conditions Affecting Awareness, in Rank Order, Compared

with Actual Awareness 221

4 The Current Location of National Problems and Solutions

in Canada 238

CONTENTS 1

I THE PUZZLE OF CANADA

I THE ADOLESCENCE OF NATIONHOOD THE MEANING OF IDENTITY

IDENTITY AND CONSENSUS

III CANADA: PROMISE AND DISAPPOINTMENT NATIONAL PROBLEMS

INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL IDENTITY

SOURCE MATERIAL

IV EXTERNAL PROBLEMS INTRODUCTION

VIEWS ON INDEPENDENCE

CANADA’S ROLE ON THE

V INTERNAL PROBLEMS THE DIVERSITY OF SOCIAL INTERESTS

THE ROLE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PLAY

VI PROBLEMS OF SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION

THE FLAG

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

THE ROYAL FAMILY

OTHER SYMBOLS

VII THE IMAGE OF CANADA

VIII PARTY INFLUENCE ON OPINIONS THE POLITICAL PROBLEM

METHODS OF DISCERNING OPINION CLIMATES

EVIDENCE OF PARTY INFLUENCE

IX BARRIERS TO CONSENSUS REGIONALISM

ORIGIN AND PARTY

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIVERSITY

X THE PULL BETWEEN PARTY AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS SOCIAL CLASS AND PARTY

PARTY AND AGE, SEX,

XI THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARTIES CANADIAN PARTY TYPES

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTIES

CROSS-PARTY CONSENSUS

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

XII THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL PROBLEMS THE MEANINGFULNESS OF ISSUE

INDICATORS OF SALIENCE

AN ASSESSMENT OF SALIENCY

XIII RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL VIABILITY PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: STABILITY AND CHANGE

DEFINING AN IDENTITY

THE CASE OF CANADA

INDEX

I THE PUZZLE OF CANADA

At PRESENT we are witnessing the creation of more new states than at any other period in history. Many of these are faced with serious problems stemming from a low level of industrial development, a high rate of illiteracy, and a burning impatience to bridge the gap between tradition and modernity. Some of them are also characterized by political instability, both as cause and effect of their other difficulties. Yet many of the problems troubling today’s new nations were also troublesome to those created generations ago, and, in some instances, continue to plague long-established states. Among the vexing tasks facing new nations (which some older ones have even yet not resolved) is the need to create a sense of unity for disparate member groups. Partly to satisfy these diverse interests, such nations need to overcome gross inequalities of opportunity, raise the general level of existence, and hold up these accomplishments as a source of pride to their citizens. The political organizations are called upon, then, to prove themselves by providing for the satisfaction of wants. It is important too that, wherever appropriate, a marked disassociation from former colonial rulers take place.

What happens to countries in the presence of these tasks is the subject of the growing literature on new nations. We will seek our answer, however, in the example of Canada, a country which in no sense of the term is a new nation or a developing country.1 Canada, settled by migrants from developed countries, never had to contend with large-scale illiteracy or stultifying tradition, nor has it suffered from serious political upheavals. It possesses a differentiated social structure with all the accoutrements of a modern, industrial nation and an educated, technically skilled population. Yet Canada, although nearly one hundred years old, recapitulates in its daily existence many dilemmas experienced by newly emerging nations. Unity from diversity, the overcoming of gross inequalities, the need for a focus for national pride, contrast with other nations—in short, the essence of the business of politics and the creation of stable nationhood are still prominent political concerns in Canada, as they are in other multi-ethnic states. Statehood of many years duration or status as a developed country do not in themselves guarantee the existence of an unambiguous national identity. The study of Canada then takes on special significance in illuminating the continued existence of problems of identity long after a nation has passed its infancy.

The character of Canadian nationhood appeared as both an enigma and a cause for concern.

That there should be a country called Canada distinct from the United States is a mere accident of history, in fact, a political paradox. Nature has not conferred upon Canada any particular personality of her own. There is no geographical difference to separate her from her great neighbour to the South. It is a problem to determine wherein lies Canada’s centre of gravity: politically it is in England, and geographically it is in the United States—in either case outside her own boundaries. Her very existence is connected with this problem; for a purely British Canada could never be anything but a colony, and an American Canada could only be a group of states in the Union.²

Although the Fathers of Confederation and notably the first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, were gripped by the vision of a great nation emerging from their political efforts, and a later Prime Minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, saw the twentieth century as belonging to Canada, national greatness has often seemed just out of reach, and many have been dismayed at their chance of ever obtaining it. Throughout Canada’s history, historians, political scientists, economists, and a host of commentators have expressed concern for the chances of Canada’s continued existence as an independent country.³ They tend to view it as either a British colony or an American satellite. Even the less pessimistic recognize the historical developments which have produced the anomalies of Canadian existence.

To begin with, Canada and the other British colonies emerged as essentially political projections of Great Britain. ⁴ More recently, the economic influence of the United States has been so great as to help perpetuate Canada’s economic development as a resource-pro-

* Aiidré Siegfried, Canada: An International Power, trans. Doris Hemming, 2nd ed.; New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1947, p. 23.

³ For a recent book in the pessimistic tradition, see George Grant, Lament for a Nation, The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965.

¹ Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, 3rd ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958, p. 5.

during country. Canadians have always had this prosperous and populous neighbour, and, when disappointments have grown too great and opportunities have seemed much richer across the border, scores of Canadians have left their homeland. In the 1880’s and 1890’s Canadian immigration to the United States was extensive. Again in the 1920’s, with a population of under ten million, Canada lost about one million residents to the United States. To one economist deeply concerned with Canada’s development, the most realistic solution is for Canada to accept its limitations and to grow as best it can with them.

Canadian economic policy has