The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great Power Conflict

By Sepehr Zabih and Shahram Chubin

This study of the foreign relations of a small state in a zone of Great-Power conflict focuses on the evolution of Iranian foreign policy from a struggle for national survival to the achievement of preponderance in an otherwise unstable region. The topic is of special interest because of the continuing proliferation of new actors on the international stage and the paucity of published studies of their foreign affairs. It is also particularly timely because of the increasing importance of the Persian Gulf and of oil in world politics. Recognizing that international politics exercises a major influence on the diplomacy of a small state by imposing constraints as well as offering options, the author argue that the success of Iranian diplomacy in achieving a balanced international posture and a strong regional policy is primarily a result of two factors: the gradual transformation of Soviet policy toward Iran from expansionism to accommodation, and Iran's enhanced economic and political capabilities. A perceptive interpretation of the international political environment and a realistic recognition of the constraints and opportunities involved have redounded to the advantage of Iran. Consequently Iran has been able to use its proximity to a Great Power with a long history of expansionist aspirations in order to pursue a posture of de facto nonalignment without abandoning a generally pro-Western orientation. The authors have designed their book to provide a detailed case study of Iranian foreign policy within an analytical framework conductive to theorizing about the foreign policy of other comparable small states. Previous treatments of the subject have ignored insights afforded by contemporary international relations, and have been largely historical and descriptive. The present volume, taking a different approached, should serve both the specialist on Iranian affairs and the student of international relations and comparative foreign policy. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1974.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of California Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2023
• ISBN: 9780520311176

Sepehr Zabih

Shahram Chubin was director of studies at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland, from 1996 to 2009. Sepehr Zabih was Chairman of the Department of Government, Saint Mary's College, Moraga, California, and a Research Scholar in the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

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The Foreign Relations of Iran

A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict

SHAHRAM CHUBIN and SEPEHR ZABIH

The Foreign

Relations

of Iran

A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict

With a Foreword by Paul Seabury

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

Berkeley • Los Angeles • London

University of California Press

Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England

Copyright © 1974, by The Regents of the University of California

ISBN 0-520-02683-7

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-91677 Printed in the United States of America

For Nassrin and Abdolhossein For Joan, Ramin, and Leyla

Sh. Chubin S. Zabih

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

THE SINGLE CASE-STUDY APPROACH

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC POLITICS ON FOREIGN POLICY

Part One THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

PROLOGUE

Chapter I RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

THE OIL-AZARBAYJAN CRISIS

THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH

THE SECOND ERA: SINCE 1962

Chapter II RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

IRANIAN POLITICS: THE AMINI EPISODE

MILITARY EQUIPMENT

THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

APPENDIX

Part Two THE REGIONAL LEVEL

PROLOGUE

Chapter III RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

THE NASSER ERA

YEMEN AND THE GULF

THE INTERNAL DIMENSION

THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL, 1960-1967

IRAN-EGYPT RELATIONS SINCE 1967

Chapter IV IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS

THE SHATT AL-’ARAB QUESTION

OTHER ISSUES IN IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS, 1961-1968

THE KURDISH QUESTION

THE SHATT AL-’ARAB AND ITS AFTERMATH

TACTICS AND ARGUMENTS EMPLOYED IN IRAN-IRAQ RIVALRY

SUMMARY

Chapter V IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF,1958-1967

EFFECTS OF BRITISH PRESENCE IN THE GULF

THE EVOLUTION OF IRANIAN INTERESTS IN THE GULF

THE KUWAIT INCIDENT, 1961

IRANIAN EMIGRATION AND INTRA-ARAB POLITICS

Chapter VI POLICY TOWARD THE GULF STATES

THE FEDERATION: FIRST PHASE, JANUARY 1968-MARCH 1970

THE FEDERATION: SECOND PHASE, MARCH 1970- DECEMBER 1971

AN EVALUATION

Chapter VII THE SECURITY OF THE GULF

IRAN AND THE GULF PACT: AN EVALUATION

SUMMARY

Chapter VIII THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE GULF

THE UNITED STATES

THE SOVIET UNION

OIL AND NAVAL PRESENCE

SUMMARY

Chapter IX OIL IN REGIONAL CONTEXT

THE ISSUE OF CONTINENTAL SHELF BOUNDARIES: THE BACKGROUND

SUMMARY

Chapter X CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

DECISION-MAKING AND FOREIGN POLICY

Chapter XI POSTSCRIPT

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. BOOKS

2. PERIODICALS, PAMPHLETS, PAPERS

3. PH.D. DISSERTATIONS

4. IRANIAN SOURCES A. REGULAR IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY PUBLICATIONS

INDEX

FOREWORD

No state would seem more unfortunately situated than a small power set adjacent to a superpower with a reputation for aggressive, expansionist behavior. Such a state, lacking the force to guarantee its own sovereignty, confronts several options. It may choose to place itself at the mercy of its strong neighbor. It may opt for a course of agile diplomacy, seeking to solicit limited aid from remote powers to redress the imbalance. Or, as in the instance of Castro’s Cuba, it may choose the hegemony of a distant power in preference to that of its immediate neighbor. None of these courses of action is without risk and penalty. The first may lead down a slippery slope from dependency to subjugation to actual extinction of independence. The second and third risk trading one form of dependence for another. In all cases, however, success requires a high degree of centralization of authority over foreign policy, and strong political will. Foreign policy dictates its necessities to domestic policy. The grim fate of eighteenth-century Poland, faced by such a dilemma, in large measure sprang from its internal constitutional weakness.

But excessive centralization of control, while it may ensure firm command, is not without its own risks. It may bring into being a brittle authority which, out of caution and anxiety, may conceal its purposes in secrecy and refuse to share and diffuse knowledge and responsibility in decision-making. The absence of a domestic consensus thus places a premium upon the survival abilities of its current leadership.

In the present work Professor Zabih and Dr. Chubin focus upon Iran to illustrate these classic dilemmas of such a small power. Situated for more than a century in a zone of great-power rivalry, Persia (subsequently Iran) has experimented with all of these options and risks in its diplomacy. Fortunately, like the Abbé de Sieyès through the French Revolution, it has managed to survive. Yet in surviving it continues to confront the dilemmas which such a situation entails. Iran today has, for the time being, attained a surprisingly high level of autonomy, and now plays an increasingly influential role in the affairs of the Persian Gulf. But, as the authors point out, one condition of such success has been the dynamic will, and skill, of its hereditary ruler. It lacks a stable polity in which foreign policy might command broad understanding and support. In a time of super-power detente, uncertainties have arisen about the dependability of the countervailing influence of the United States in the region.

A fine book appearing at the right time combines merit with good fortune. The October War of 1973 and the world energy crisis have lent great importance to Iranian regional and economic policies. The role of Iran in relations between oil-producing countries and advanced industrial societies is as critical as its stabilizing, or destabilizing, role in the Middle East.

The multi-dimensioned character of this book makes it a timely and invaluable aid not just to scholars but also to political leaders and opinion-makers who seek to comprehend the changing essence of power politics in the 1970s.

Paul Seabury

PREFACE

Experience in teaching and research as well as work at the United Nations over the last ten years have convinced the authors of the need for a comprehensive and systematic analysis of Iran’s foreign relations, especially those of the recent decade. The unevenness, both in quality and scope, of the literature on the post-World War II era has been a further incentive. Available works on the earlier part of this era have treated the subject matter either from a primarily international coldwar angle or exclusively from the narrow perspective of Iran’s relations with one or another major power. The rise of Iran’s influence in the Persian Gulf, beginning in the early 1970’s, and the dynamics of oil politics in the region as a whole, have reinforced the need for completing this study.

In a sense the genesis of this project dates back to the authors’ initial contact in 1965, when they met in the department of government at Oberlin College in Ohio. Since then they have both participated in research and writing on this subject. During his years at the Middle Institute and department of political science at Columbia University (1966-1973), Dr. Chubin has pursued his interest in international politics, particularly the study of Iran’s foreign relations. In addition, his advisory work at the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations (1969-1973) has given him an insight into Iran’s diplomacy in a multilateral forum. A considerable portion of the present study is an outgrowth of his research on this subject while completing his doctoral dissertation at Columbia University.

As a guest scholar at the Center for Advanced Study of the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., in 1969, Professor Zabih conducted initial research in Washington in support of a related study of de facto nonalignment in the Northern Tier countries of the Middle East, as well as field work in Iran. As a research scholar at the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, since January 1972, he has done research and field work on a study of Soviet foreign aid to selected non-Arab Middle Eastern countries. Of particular value was the time he spent in the spring of 1973—while visiting in the government department of the University of Texas in Austin—at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, with its valuable collection of data and research material covering United States foreign relations during Mr. Johnson’s presidency.

This study is thus the result of a fully collaborative relationship in which both authors, though emphasizing particular chapters, have contributed to the entire book.

Many individuals have lent a helping hand at various stages of this study. James Bill of the University of Texas; J. C. Hurewitz, Donald Puchała, and Annette Baker Fox of Columbia University; and John Badeau of Georgetown University have read all or parts of an earlier draft of this work and made many useful suggestions. Equally helpful have been Iranian government officials, including Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Court Minister Assadollah Alam, and Foreign Minister Abbasali Khalatbary, who granted frank and comprehensive interviews in the course of their field work. They are grateful to Paul Seabury of the University of California at Berkeley for consenting to write a foreword to the book.

Dr. Chubin wishes also to acknowledge his gratitude to Ambassadors Mehdi Vakil and Fereydoun Hoveyda and members of the Iranian Mission to the United Nations, as well as to Douglas McArthur III, the former American ambassador in Iran; Timothy W. Childs and Martin Hertz of the U.S. State Department; and Richard Peyer and Colonel John A. Reed, Jr., of the U.S. Defense Department, for their generous time and valuable cooperation. In addition, he wishes to single out his friends Nancy and Basil for the encouragement and understanding they provided during the course of this long and at times arduous enterprise.

Professor Zabih is indebted to Ahmad Ghoreichi, dean of the faculty of law of the Danashgahe Meili Iran, and Jahangir Tafazzoli, Iranian ambassador to Afganistan, for their valuable suggestions and keen insights as well as their hospitality, which made his field work so enjoyable and rewarding. Harold Saunders of the White House National Security Council and Theodor Eliot, Jr., former country director for Iran at the State Department and the present Ambassador to Kabul, were most generous with their time and cooperation while he conducted research in Washington. Responsibility for the content of this study, however, belongs to the authors exclusively.

The Middle East Journal and World Politics, in which Professor Zabih published some of the preliminary findings of this study, have granted permission for the use of parts of the material therein.

In the absence of a standard method of transliteration of Persian, Arabic, and Russian names and titles, a fairly simple formula has been used to permit their reasonably accurate pronunciation by those unfamiliar with these languages. Occasional exceptions are due to the retention of different styles of transliteration used in various citations. Primary sources in non-Western languages are translated in the bibliography.

INTRODUCTION: THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The evolution of Iran’s foreign relations since the end of World War II accurately reflects the transformation of power relationships in the Middle Eastern region and the shift in the international political system as a whole. It also reflects major developments in the Iranian political system which have either generated that evolution or benefited from it. The nature and intensity of the interaction between domestic and foreign political developments account for the essence of this evolution which, in about a quarter of a century, has ranged from the struggle for Iran’s survival as an independent state to its emergence as a dominant regional power whose interests and aspirations may exercise considerable influence on both regional and, to a lesser extent, international politics.

Chronologically the postwar era represents several distinctive phases. During the immediate postwar years to 1953, the major objective of Iran’s foreign policy was to liquidate the consequences of wartime occupation by the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Iranian political system of this period could be characterized as a quasi-parlia- mentary regime with a multi-party system that rendered the task of forming a stable cabinet immensely difficult. Thus between 1941 and 1953 Iran was ruled by 19 cabinets with an average life span of about yi/2 months. During this period the Shah did not exercise a powerful role in Iranian political evolution; he reigned rather than governed. Effective power belonged to the landed aristocracy, which controlled the Iranian parliament, particularly its lower house, the Majlis.

Nevertheless Iran achieved remarkable success in restoring its terri- torial integrity and sovereignty against formidable odds. This was possible mainly because the open and clear Soviet threat to Iran’s sovereignty generated strong nationalistic resistance among most of the country’s politically articulate. The paramount danger in their eyes was Soviet desire to extend its influence into Iran, through Sovietization or, failing that, through economic and political concessions. Thus it was Iranian policy to rely on whatever external support it could muster to offset this. In this period the majority of successive governments and nationalist political groups, though disagreeing on means and methods, recognized the priority of frustrating the threats to Iran’s sovereignty from a proximate power like the Soviet Union. It was hoped that a subsequent effort drastically to reduce British economic and political influence could presage a posture of neutralism toward both powers.

The first objective was fully achieved by late 1947, when the Soviet- supported separatist regime in Azarbayjan collapsed and a treaty for a vast oil concession to the Soviet Union was rejected by the Iranian parliament. Having attained the primary goal of regaining Iran’s sovereignty in the face of open Soviet design, foreign policy was focused on the second objective, vastly more complex than the first.

The influence of Great Britain in Iran was more subtle and disguised, and the struggle to reduce it to manageable proportions was prolonged and difficult. The Soviet danger could be dealt with in the context of the cold war; British influence could not. However, Iran’s efforts to lessen the British presence culminated during the period of the nationalist movement (1950-1953), when Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh dealt a severe blow to British economic power through nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

As leader of the small parliamentary group Jebhe-ye Meili [National Front], Mossadegh had persistently advocated a policy of resistance to both Great Britain and the Soviet Union, even during the wartime occupation (1941-1945). Indeed it was he who had authored and successfully initiated a parliamentary move to prohibit any new oil negotiations with foreign companies, when both Soviet and American companies approached Iran in late 1944. The successful implementation of this policy, which came to be known as Siyasate Movazenehe Manfi [negative equilibrium policy], required even-handed treatment of Britain and the Soviet Union. When Mossadegh became prime minister in April 1951, the thrust of his foreign policy gained a pronounced Anglophobic accent. Although the oil nationalization was legally successful when the International Court of Justice at the Hague refused to adjudicate the Anglo-Iranian dispute in July 1952, the political and economic ramifications of the Western oil companies’ boycott of Iran’s nationalized oil negated that success. A number of external and internal factors combined to cause the collapse of the Mossadegh regime and inaugurate a new era in the country’s foreign policy.

The first causal factor in the downfall of the nationalist regime was the emergence of the United States as the dominant power in the region, replacing Great Britain in the traditional Anglo-Soviet rivalry which had dominated Iran’s foreign policy responses and objectives for more than a century. Although initially sympathetic to the nationalist aspirations of Mossadegh’s regime, the United States ultimately reversed its stand and coordinated its policy with Great Britain, as well as with Iranian opponents of Dr. Mossadegh, to bring about the downfall of his regime. The persistence of cold-war considerations in the overall American conception of international allegiances in the early 1950’s, coupled with the looming shadow of the Korean war, were chiefly responsible for this policy change. Iran’s desire for a nonaligned posture toward Britain and the Soviet Union had to be subordinated to the broader bipolar cold-war exigencies.

A second factor contributing to the demise of Mossadegh’s regime was the serious threat to Iran’s internal security posed by social and economic chaos, and its exploitation by a revived communist movement. Many who had originally believed in negative equilibrium sensed in renewed communist activity a threat to their earlier success in reducing Soviet encroachment.

Finally, unlike the struggle against the Soviet threat, attempts to undermine British influence entailed tremendous economic hardships which weakened the regime’s ability to withstand the combined pressures from internal and external opponents.

The overthrow of the nationalist regime in August 1953 by a royalist military-civilian uprising signaled the end of the first phase in Iran’s foreign policy. It had attempted to strike a balance between the diametrically opposed aspirations of interested powers, to rely on international organizations and, somewhat ambivalently, to rely on United States support in order to adopt a nonaligned stance in the international system.

In the period between 1953 and the early 1960’s the Iranian political system experienced a radical transformation which significantly altered Iran’s foreign policy priorities and objectives. The crux of this transformation was total abandonment of the quasi-parliamentary system of the previous period and the ascendancy of the Shah in the country’s political hierarchy. Reigning and ruling became indistinguishable as the monarch consolidated his position at the apex of that hierarchy. Iran’s international posture and specific actions in foreign policy soon began to assume a pronounced pro-Western course. This can be attributed to several causes: first, failure of the earlier negative equilibrium policy and the quest for other feasible alternatives; second, the need of the reinstated regime of the Shah for internal security and new sources of support; third, the replacement of British power by the United States, which made pro-Western alliance appear less a reinstatement of traditional British influence; fourth, American initiative, which sought to complete a chain of anti-Soviet defense pacts by linking the three Middle Eastern countries on the southern periphery of Russia to existing NATO and SE ATO treaties. This new defensive alliance, also known as Northern Tier Defense, gradually interested Iran.

As for the first factor, the Shah viewed the failure of negative equilibrium as only the most recent example of a small power’s inability to cope with security dangers posed by a proximate great power. Thus memories of wartime occupation and its concomitant internal upheaval were revived to reinforce the case for alliance policy. The government pointed out that a policy of neutralism, faithfully adhered to by the late Shah on the eve of World War II, did not keep Iran out of the hostilities. These two experiences proved that a strategically located country such as Iran, which lacked the military power to conduct independent foreign policy, had no choice but to ally itself with those states whose interest dictated the maintenance of her sovereignty, even if this entailed the acceptance of political and military commitments.

This line of argument was closely linked with a second factor, that of the regime’s internal security. Because the security of the Shah’s regime and the state as a whole were equated, foreign policy was expected to strengthen the internal and external requirements for stability and survival of the regime. This meant a concerted search for external sources of military support from those powers which accepted this equation of regime security and were able and willing to support it.

The absence at that time of any serious alternative to the United States which could satisfy both these requirements made the choice of pro-Western alliance easier. This choice was also calculated to pave the way for substantial economic aid from the U.S. and other interested Western powers. A third argument in its favor was that, as the United States was a distant power without a tradition of imperialistic goals toward Iran, alliance with it did not entail restoration of a dominant Western power in the country.

Finally, mention should be made of American initiative in convincing Iran of the wisdom of her policy choice. In fact, this might be regarded as the single most determinant factor, for the United States was diligently seeking to complete a chain of defensive pacts around the Soviet Union. With the failure of such alternative projects as the Middle East Defense Pact involving the whole region, the U.S. State Department seemed bent on realizing the Northern Tier Defense concept. Iran, while responding affirmatively to American urgings, did endeavor to secure maximum concessions in return. The main thrust of these efforts, which did not terminate with the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact, was to seek reassurance that the United States* overriding concern in the region also extended to the survival of the Iranian regime.

Having decided on the necessity for reinforced United States commitment, the Iranian government set out to explore American-Soviet rivalry and mutual distrust in order to stimulate a positive U.S. reaction. Ideally, Iran would have liked the United States to formally join the Central Treaty Organization, believing that a treaty obligation approved by the U.S. Senate would elevate the commitment to the level enjoyed by NATO members. The fact that Turkey already enjoyed this type of American protection strengthened this Iranian conviction. As an alternative, Iran aimed at a bilateral mutual defense treaty similar to that between the United States and Japan, hoping this would maximize American commitment.

Toward the end of this phase, Iran’s efforts to use the potential of a rapprochement with the Soviets in order to consolidate the American commitment to Iranian security generated a major crisis in Iran-Soviet relations. However, by the fall of 1962 a considerable shift toward normalization of relations between the two countries became apparent. The fact that this coincided with a series of more drastic government-sponsored economic and social reforms in Iran facilitated the Soviet task of rationalizing this change in attitude.

The third phase began in 1963, when a marked trend toward disengagement from a rigid pro-Western posture had become visible. The decade since 1963 has also witnessed significant changes in Iran’s internal political development. After long hesitation, the Shah set in motion a series of socioeconomic reforms, including a three-stage land reform project, designed to broaden the base of his support. Along with these measures Iran’s economic development was greatly acceler ated by the steady increase in oil revenue. However, the basic feature of the political system—namely, the concentration of all legitimate power in the institution of monarchy—remained unchanged. If anything, these reforms, which have since been labeled the White Revolution, or the Shah and People Revolution, reinforced the claim that the centralized authority of the Shah was indispensable to the task of rapid modernization.

The principal ramification of the new foreign policy orientation is the acceptance of the logic of nonalignment, so roundly rejected in the second phase. This fundamental change in Iran’s foreign policy was firmly reinforced by the second Kashmir war in 1965. Just as the Iraqi revolution in 1958 had demonstrated the inadequacy of the Baghdad Pact to insure the survival of the regime of a member state, the second Kashmir war shed serious misgivings on the regional reliability of bilateral agreements with the United States when the territorial integrity of another member state was endangered by a stronger proximate power other than the USSR.

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a chief intermediary for the termination of this war lent weight to the impression that the Soviet Union had changed into a status-quo power which, far from seeking to exploit national and social conflicts on its periphery, utilized its power and influence in the opposite direction.

The Iranian outlook toward the international system therefore underwent a number of significant changes in the mid-sixties. The premises of this new outlook were that: (1) the intensity of the bipolar system manifested in the cold war had radically abated; (2) the Soviet Union, though not formally abandoning its world revolutionary aspirations, had become at least a selective status-quo power in terms of its foreseeable objectives toward such countries as Iran and Turkey; (3) U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, and China’s dispute with the Soviet Union, had rendered a large number of bilateral and regional issues far less significant than they were in the mid-fifties.

From these premises the Iranian regime formulated a concrete set of conclusions for its foreign policy, since labeled Siyasate Mostaghele Meili [independent national policy]: (1) The cold-war decline rendered a rigid pro-Western posture superfluous, for the West neither needed nor benefited from automatic adherence of its allies to a prescribed position on every international issue. (2) The experiences of Irano- Soviet relations since 1962 meant that the Soviet Union, at least for the foreseeable future, no longer constituted a clear and present danger to the regime’s security and existence. (3) The American attitude toward Pakistan during the second Kashmir war, as well as the third Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, made the diversification of military supply sources indispensable for a more independent foreign policy.

The attraction of these new concepts was due largely to a mood of confidence that the regime manifested in its own ability to cope with internal and even regional threats to its security. Neither the bloody riots of June 1963 nor the assassination of Prime Minister Hassanali Mansur, and an attempt on the life of the Shah himself, two years later, indicated any visible weakening of the regime. Hence, military support from external powers no longer had to be viewed primarily in the context of the regime’s survivability. Even the military establishment, which had earlier espoused a policy of pro-Western alliance, chiefly in the hope that it would fulfill the dual aspirations of coping with the Soviet threat and strengthening the army, accepted the logic of the new foreign policy.

However, the need for nonalignment stemmed from new domestic economic and political needs as much as from new external conditions. It was hoped that material economic aid could be obtained from both sides: a Soviet alternative would help relations with the West, just as a Western alternative would help divorce economic ties with the Soviet bloc from political subordination. Furthermore, an independent foreign policy could be presented as inherently nationalistic, since it reduced the dependence of Iran on either of the superpowers. It guaranteed a wider range of choice in terms of satisfying Iran’s requirements for military and economic supplies. Diversification of their sources also meant fewer strings attached to them and more freedom in their utilization. Inasmuch as U.S. interest was geared to the maintenance of territorial status quo in the region anyway, Iran’s alignment seemed less valid—for any alliance between a superpower and a small one contains an element of subordination, however sincere its intentions.

In effect, postwar Iranian foreign policy has come full circle, from rejection of an alliance policy in the first phase to acceptance in the second, and finally to a de facto nonalignment within the proWestern alliance that characterizes Iran’s contemporary international posture. Throughout this historical evolution Iran’s foreign relations have been vulnerable to transformations in the main international system. Some of the transformations have had immediate ramifications for all small states; others have more directly affected a strategically located state such as Iran.

Chief among the more general transformations has been the emergence of many new actors participating fully and independently in a global system. The homogeneous European-centered system has now expanded into a heterogeneous world system. The tight bipolar pattern imposed on international politics by the rivalry of the superpowers at the height of the cold war submerged the impact of these new actors on world politics (except as symbolic allies) and stimulated little scholarly attention to the conduct of their foreign policies. Many of the new actors are also new states (e.g., Pakistan, Israel); some are fragments of older multi-national states (e.g., Turkey, Iraq); some are new entities, aggregations of tribal polities (e.g., Ghana, Nigeria, the Persian Gulf states), or simply large and complex aggregations (e.g., India). Several new actors are older states that participated, if at all, only peripherally in international politics in the past, usually as objects of European imperialism (e.g., Iran [Persia], Thailand [Siam], Ethiopia). Some are states that were colonized (Algeria), or controlled or protected by imperial states (Egypt, Morocco). These states range in size and population from India to Mauritius, and share in common the negative attribute of being non-Western states and the disadvantage of being nonindustrial states, for the most part dependent on the export of primary commodities. With the possible exception of India, their underdeveloped economies are usually matched by equally underdeveloped bureaucracies and political institutions. There are many differences between the states sometimes vaguely referred to as the Third World. The presence or absence of a colonial tradition and the geopolitical location of the state, in particular, appear to account for the varying responses of these states to the cold war.

Our focus is on the foreign policy of one non-Western small state which is not a new state, but which shares with many of these states both a history as an object of imperialism and a contemporary condition of underdevelopment. Unlike many of these states, its experience has not been solely with the Western variety of imperialism. There is consequently little disposition for the government in Tehran to succumb to the notion that imperialism is exclusive to any one type of great power. Indeed, the primary and conditioning element of Iran’s foreign policy has been its contiguity to the Soviet Union.

THE SINGLE CASE-STUDY APPROACH

Students of international politics have long had to grapple with problems of reconciling the level of analysis. Either they have chosen the wider perspective given by a general systems approach, at the cost of losing the rich detail that comes from single-country studies; or, emphasizing the national level, they have obtained deep insight into the foreign-policy processes of a single state at the expense of a wider overview. The attempt to bridge these levels has led some scholars to suggest that comparative foreign policy may be the necessary link between the two levels, and to argue that the distinction between national and international systems is in any case a false one, given the penetration of most polities in single or multi-issue areas.1

This study is concerned with the foreign relations of a single state. It is intended as an analysis of the salient aspects of Iran’s foreign relations, with emphasis on tactics, levers, and arguments in a shifting international context.2 We hope thus to facilitate theorizing about the behavior of a certain category of small states. The dearth of studies on contemporary Iranian foreign policy has necessitated some emphasis and attention to detail, but it is hoped that this has not been at the expense of the analysis.

Not only is there a scarcity of detailed studies on many states, but there still exists no common or generally accepted theoretical framework which is manageable for one student to utilize in a single case study. The author of a recent monograph has concluded that, given this situation, the possibility of comparative analysis

depends less on the use of a common framework than on the willingness of writers of case studies to put their conclusion in the form of general hypotheses, using well-known, loosely defined variables capable of easy translation from one study to the next.³

This study will proceed on a similar assumption.

We are also cognizant of James Rosenau’s views about individual, role, governmental, societal, and systemic variables which serve as causal agents in foreign affairs.4 However, operationalizing Rosenau’s five sets of variables is extraordinarily difficult in the case of Iran. This is due partly to the type of government system in Iran and partly to the dearth of reliable evidence available for all five sets of variables. Individual, role, and governmental variables are virtually indistinguishable from the Shah as a person and institution. The societal variable is also difficult to discern and weigh, in its nonmaterial or value manifestation, although it is doubtless partly reflected in the general attitude of the attentive public (which is largely coterminous with the elite). The systemic operational environment is the most easily focused upon. As a result, our primary emphasis in the following chapters is on the content and outcome of foreign policy rather than on the perceptions, motivations, and decision-making process giving rise to it.

The Shah’s unique characteristics as an individual, official government roles, and the government structure are inextricably bound together in contemporary Iran. His Imperial Majesty, the Shah, makes every major foreign policy decision and most of the minor ones. No one occupies a public position except at the tolerance of His Majesty, and all are dependent directly or indirectly on the monarch for continuance. There exists no formal policy-making process as that term is understood in the West, nor are there any interest groups, lobbies, associational groups, or mass media that influence the content or conduct of foreign policy. The formal governmental structure has no relevance at all to the content of Iran’s foreign policy. Insofar as societal values are known, they serve as general constraints on Iran’s foreign relations. This section will attempt to substantiate and enlarge on these assertions.

An American confidant of the Shah, E. A. Bayne, has attested to the monarch’s primacy in Iran’s foreign policy.

As diplomats in Tehran know, Iranian foreign policy is largely personified in the king. … The personal nature of Iranian foreign relations is its chief characteristic, and what the monarch believes is of primary significance.

Nevertheless, the Iranian Foreign Office is not a nonentity in the management of foreign relations, although it must be regarded as an extension of the Shah’s personal direction of policy. … The Shah is his own foreign minister, his policies deriving from a personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power.⁵

The present foreign minister recently described his role thus: "I am honored to be executing Iran’s foreign policy. The Imperial Government’s overall policies are worked out by the Shahanshah. He decides the principles, all the broad outlines. We carry out his policies to the best of our abilities.⁶ It is what Bayne calls a personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power that is the most puzzling aspect of decision-making in Iran. One specialist, Marvin Zonis, has written that the Shah’s divide et impera policy toward the Iranian elite has fractured and discouraged their ability to work together in groups, and that the phenomenon of institutionalized immobilisme and the irrelevance of institutions’ has severely curtailed their ability to formally affect policy decisions in Iran.7

Less clear is the pattern of informal decision-making that has resulted. Bayne agrees that position and privilege in the hierarchy depend on the king’s favor and observes that there is a substantial lack of communication between the monarch and the elite. He suggests that this may be partially due to the Shah’s reluctance to share his responsibilities as a decision-maker, a reluctance which is understandable in an Iran where power must be served assiduously by those who hope to survive in a changing society. But Bayne does not elaborate how a personal synthesis of diverse views held within the structure of national power is possible in this situation, or how it takes place. Clearly it is not through any policy process so much as through informal contacts with confidants:

Bayne: Who reaches you with the proper information? Who can tell you that something is not working well? Who dares to tell you?

H.I.M. the Shah: I have my information sources. And in addition I have my valet. My valet, my gardener—all those people.8

Zonis, in his study of the contemporary Iranian political system, has observed:

The system is highly conducive to the avoidance of assuming responsibility for any bureaucratic act. Conflicts are pushed ever higher in the bureaucracy for resolution. … One result is a continued reinforcement of the tendencies of the elite to avoid challenging others and the system." 9

One consequence of this is a diminution in the possibility of any bold, imaginative, or novel suggestions that might serve as useful inputs into the formulation of policy.

Since politics is seen as a zero-sum game in Iran, with self-advancement as the goal, substantive policy suggestions or criticisms of public policy are viewed and evaluated as motivated by personal gain, and treated accordingly. One result is that discussions inside the bureaucracies, including the foreign ministry, are seldom based on facts or reasoned analysis, and the weight given to a particular view reflects the weight of the person advancing that view.10 Similarly, to enhance effectiveness frequent references are made to the Shah’s speeches and writings. It is hardly surprising, given the political culture, that the foreign ministry’s suggestions, when they are elicited by the Palace, tend to be a repetition of His Majesty’s last public utterance on the subject.

The foreign ministry is not very different from other bureaucracies. Perhaps because of the apparent lack of expertise required in this field (compared to, say, development economics), the Shah has dominated every facet of its activities. Although the members of the ministry are on the whole better educated than their counterparts, the education consists mostly of memorization and an emphasis on static principles (often outdated) rather than the dynamics of recent history, modern concepts, or analysis. Since loyalty and longevity are valued over merit and expertise, there has been little incentive until recently to recruit qualified personnel. Like other institutions, it primarily implements policy in whose formulation it had scant participation.11

If the role of the executive branch in foreign policy-making is weak, that of the legislature is still weaker. Writing in the early 1960’s, when the monarch’s role was less solid than it was by the end of the decade, Leonard Binder observed: Constitutionalism as presently maintained in Iran is a farce. 12 Ann Tibbitts Schultz, a student of the lower house of Iran’s parliament, the Majlis, has noted that its power is far from being significant relative to the power of the Shah and his cabinet, and that loyalty to the Shah is the main factor in the choice of a legislator. The legislature’s role is somewhat different from that of a check or balance on the government’s policies : Because Majlis deputies are primarily chosen by the Shah, efforts of the Majlis to exert control over the government are roughly synonymous to the efforts of the Shah, in cooperation with less powerful groups, to control the established political elite. ¹³

Despite the fact that the foreign affairs committee is considered an important one in the Majlis, the legislature’s impact on Iran’s foreign relations is minimal for a number of reasons: (1) Most policy decisions are made before legislation reaches the Majlis or can be referred to committees. (2) Consultation between a committee and the ministry takes place at the ministry. (3) The ability of the Majlis to contribute constructively is weakened by the committee’s lack of resources, personnel, or private sources of information. (4) Floor debate is monopolized by the committee chairman and the relevant ministerial representative. (5) Debate generally involves long speeches directed to an external audience. (6) High turnover in the Majlis’ leadership posts inhibits the development of expertise. (7) Parties in Iran serve as personal recruitment organizations rather than aggregates of people agreed on basic principles of public policy or similar philosophy.14

The weakness of contemporary political institutions is partly accounted for by Iran’s historical experience. The maintenance of Iran’s nominal independence in the nineteenth and early twentieth century was at the cost of fracturing and undermining the indigenous institutions, which were thoroughly penetrated by Britain and Russia.15 The wartime occupation of Iran by the Allies further weakened these institutions, and the postwar world saw a new government, the United States, penetrating Iran’s politics on many issue areas. The impact of the U.S. penetration on Iran’s political system has been a pervasive and generally acknowledged, though probably declining, fact.16 There is little concrete evidence as to the impact this penetration has had on the content of Iran’s foreign policy, although it can be hypothesized that its impact on Iran’s cold-war posture has been more far-reaching than on its regional foreign policy. The Iranian government’s cold-war orientation had a profound impact on Iran’s domestic politics in the early 1960’s. To the extent that this affected what Rosenau terms the societal variable—i.e., its values—it has provided a parameter beyond which the Shah has not lightly ventured.

There is also evidence that the issue of foreign military aid to Iran is frequently perceived by the elite as not serving the purpose of helping Iran protect itself from foreign aggression but rather as maintaining the power of the regime. 17 The identification of the regime with its foreign mentor, and vice versa, gave Iranian dissidents a convenient method of criticizing the Shah’s government by focusing criticism on foreign countries.

This critical attitude toward the regime had two manifestations: criticism of the United States and support for the USSR. Zonis’ study is particularly useful in the case of the regime’s relationship with the United States. He found a tendency among the elite to lay responsibility for the major policies of their own government on the United States, and observed that xenophobia in Iran has far-ranging connotations for domestic politics, connotations that imply dissatisfactions with the contemporary balance of political power within Iran… He found the better educated, younger members of the elite most actively opposed to the association of the Shah with foreign governments and the nearly pervasive intervention of foreigners in Iranian affairs."

Dissatisfaction with the regime and criticism of its western patron, the United States, have also been reflected in the attitude of the regime’s opponents to the USSR. The communist movement in Iran served as an umbrella for many groups opposed to the regime; it was, in Binder’s phrase, a negative protest party. Thus the foreign power supporting, or identifying with, the regime became a focus of hostility; and the power opposing the regime, a force to support.18

15

The impact of Iran’s foreign policy is not difficult to discern. The relationship between the regime and its domestic opponents, and the government’s attitude toward the U.S. and the USSR, have undoubtedly influenced Iran’s foreign policy to the extent that strong opposition to one foreign power has prevented too open or blatant an identification with any one power. It has thus given the Shah every incentive to assume the pose of the supreme nationalist, pursuing an independent, national foreign policy, and to cultivate such societal values as independence, nationalism, and glorification of the Iranian past.

It has also been a steady incentive for the Shah to normalize relations with the USSR—and later, China—to diversify his sources of arms supply, and to balance—at least by visits—the U.S. and the USSR. Values such as the glorification of Iran’s historic role also in part account for the pursuit of a foreign policy of prestige, and an emphasis on style, over the more difficult and elusive concentration on the quality of foreign policy.19

The interaction between discontent with the regime and criticism of its foreign policy has probably been recognized by the regime and used to externalize energy, as a safety-valve. In the early 1960’s the National Front was given one seat in the Majlis, although its degree of influence on policy remained limited. In the mid-to-late 1960’s, when the Shah had consolidated power, the Pan-Iranist party, a right-wing party with claims to an authentic nationalist ideology and expansionist in its foreign policy goals, particularly in the Persian Gulf, was permitted in the Majlis. Its right-wing foreign policy goals were tolerated by the government (until 1970), but on domestic issues the Pan-Iranists follow the other … parties in trying to be the party most closely identified with the ‘Shah-People Revolution.’ 20 The displacement of political energy on foreign policy has been permitted, but it should not be viewed as a constraint on the leadership’s ability to follow its own foreign policy goals. To the extent that the Pan-Iranists and other groups became constraints on specific issues of Iran’s foreign policy in the late 1960’s (e.g., on Bahrayn and the Gulf islands), it was at the suffrance of the government. It is essential to establish time boundaries when discussing the Shah’s control of foreign policy. During the 1953-1963 period, when the monarch’s position was weak and the cold war was as its height, the Shah was both more vulnerable to nationalist attacks and more dependent on the United States. The consolidation of the Shah’s position since 1963 has coincided with a decline in the intensity of the cold war, an improvement in relations with the USSR, rapid growth in Iran’s economy, and an increasing salience in regional issues, all of which gave the Shah increased latitude in handling foreign policy. This is