CIA's Gulf of Tonkin Secrets

By Lorna Dare

When retired Special Forces soldier Kurt Andrew Atwood receives a call in July of 1991 from “The Company,” he can’t imagine what the CIA needs from him. Now running a security firm, Atwood is older and has changed since his service in the Vietnam War.

He discovers he’s being recruited to run an unauthorized, undercover mission to rescue General Fong and his family from Vietnam. Atwood clearly remembers Fong and his involvement in the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964. Fong helped stage a hoax attack on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin to escalate the war and persuade President Johnson to send more troops. Now, authorities fear someone will discover Fong’s collaboration and wage an attack against the CIA.

Atwood is more than willing to attempt the mission, as he has some unfinished business from the Vietnam War days. He assumes the identity of Paul Carper, a casual tourist on his way to Bangkok, and returns to a country that holds a plethora of both painful and joyous memories. But his efforts must concentrate on the dangerous task of getting Fong, his wife, and their two daughters out of Vietnam and to safety in the United States.

• Language: English
• Publisher: iUniverse
• Release date: Jan 19, 2010
• ISBN: 9781440195617

Lorna Dare

Lorna Dare was born and raised in the Midwest. She took weaponry training and traveled to various military bases and museums to study the history of the Vietnam War. She conducted extensive interviews with many Vietnam Veterans over three years. Dare is also co-author of Surviving a Hostile City.

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CIA’s Gulf of Tonkin

Secrets

A Novel Based on True Events

Lorna Dare

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CIA’s Gulf of Tonkin Secrets

A Novel Based on True Events

Copyright © 2009 Lorna Dare

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced by any means, graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or by any information storage retrieval system without the written permission of the author except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

This is a novel base on true events. All of the characters, names, incidents, organizations, and dialogue in this novel are either the products of the author’s imagination, are real people who are dead or who have given permission to use their names, or the names have been changed.

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Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any Web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them.

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ISBN: 978-1-4401-9560-0 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4401-9562-4 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4401-9561-7 (e)

iUniverse rev. date: 10/13/2023

Contents

Map of Southeast Asia

Dedication

Map of Vietnam showing location of Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Illustrations

Preface - Gulf of Tonkin Incident, The Big Lie

Prologue - What Really Happened at the Gulf of Tonkin

Chapters:

1. To DC

2. A Run on the Wild Side

3. The Rotunda

4. JFK Remembered

5. Ho Chi Minh’s Birthday – The Day Skinner Died

6. Back to Southeast Asia

7. Landing in Bangkok

8. To Cambodia

9. Operation Cherry

10. To Tay Ninh!

11. The Punji Pit

12. To Nui Ba Den

13. The Bad Day

14. Getting the General’s Family

15. Long Shot at the River

16. The Medal of Honor

17. They Get Bull!

18. Worried About Bull

19. The Torture of Commander Thomas, POW

20. Word about the General!

21. The World’s Biggest Water Buffalo

22. Brutality In Cu Chi

23. Taking the General

24. Operation Oak

25. The General into Cambodia

26. Vietnam Snake-Eaters

27. The VC Walked Right Over Us

28. Going to Get Bull

29. Operation Junction City

30. Going to get Bull/The Last Stand Room

31. Heading to Cambodia with Bull/The Village of An Loc

32. The General’s Safe/Bull’s Back

33. Out of Vietnam

34. End of a Mission or Beginning of a New?

Vietnam Facts vs. Fiction

After Word

Acknowledgments

Glossary

Vietnam War Zone Map

Image21100.JPG

Dedication

by Kurt Andrew Atwood

This book is dedicated to Song and my other three Vietnamese friends, bodyguards and fellow warriors without whose dedication and sacrifice I, and many others, would not have survived.

The dedication they showed to their country should inspire all Americans to be so dedicated to our country.

Their loyalty, bravery and devotion to their country and to me, are both an inspiration and the example I try to live up to in my life.

In the end I came home, but they gave the ultimate sacrifice by willingly giving their lives so others might live.

Image3.jpg21164.png

Illustrations

Southeast Asia Map

Dedication

Map of Vietnam showing location of Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Museum of Natural History, Washington, DC

Remains of Bunker in An Loc

Weapons used by Kurt’s Team during Vietnam War

Nui Ba Den, Black Virgin Mountain

Chart for Sniper Shots

Local Loving and Friendly Water Buffalo

Dinner Anyone?

War Zone C (Iron Triangle) and Surrounding Areas

635 Viet Cong Killed in 4-hour Battle; Lightning Tropic News

Vietcong Tunnel System

Village of An Loc and Treating Kids in An Loc

Vietnam War Zone Map

Preface

Gulf of Tonkin Incident

The Big Lie

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident was but one of many deceptions perpetrated by the CIA on the United States military, the President, his cabinet and the American public in an effort to manipulate the course of the war and increase the U.S. presence and participation in Vietnam to bring about the defeat of the North Vietnamese.

The Incident:

Daniel Ellsberg, who was on duty in the Pentagon that night receiving messages from the ship, reported that the ships were on a secret mission, code-named DeSoto Patrols, near North Vietnamese territorial waters. Their purpose was to provoke the North Vietnamese into turning on their coastal defense radar so they could be plotted.

On July 31, 1964, the American Destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731) began a reconnaissance mission in the Gulf of Tonkin and was attacked by five North Vietnamese patrol boats in international waters on August 2, 1964. Admiral George Stephen Morrison was in command of the local fleet from his flagship, USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31). The Maddox evaded a torpedo attack and chased the boats away.

The Maddox, suffering only very minor damage by a single machine gun bullet, retired to South Vietnamese waters where a destroyer, the C. Turner Joy, joined her.

On August 4, the Maddox and the C. Turner joy launched another Desoto patrol to the North Vietnamese coast. The latter received radar and radio signals that they believed were to signal another attack by the North Vietnamese. For some two hours the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of foes. It is highly unlikely that any North Vietnamese forces were actually in the area during this gunfight. Captain John J. Herrick even admitted that it was nothing more than an overeager sonar man who was hearing his ship's own propeller beat.

Although information obtained well after the fact indicates that there was actually no North Vietnamese attack that night, U.S. authorities and all the crew present said they were convinced at the time that an attack had taken place. As a result, planes from the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation were sent to hit North Vietnamese torpedo boat bases and fuel facilities (Operation Pierce Arrow) (NARA, 2007).

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

This joint resolution of Congress (H.J. RES 1145) dated August 7, 1964, gave President Lyndon Johnson authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam. However, this resolution was generated as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, which was a deception perpetrated on the United States Military by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution stated that, Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression. As a result, President Johnson, and later President Nixon, relied on the resolution as the legal basis for their military policies in Vietnam.

Later, as public resistance to the war heightened, Congress repealed the resolution in January 1971 (NARA, 2007).

Prologue

What Really Happened at the Gulf of Tonkin

I am Kurt Andrew Atwood, K.A.A. for short, codename Coconut. As a result of being a member of a Special Forces detachment assigned to an operational group assisting the Central Intelligence Agency, also known to us as The Company and the Christians in Action, I have knowledge of, and did participate in, many operations that were deceptions throughout the course of the Vietnam conflict.

It was mid-February 1964, and I was at a meeting in Saigon at the U.S. Embassy. Coleman, the CIA Station Chief, was there and called the meeting. The U.S. Ambassador, a U.S. General and four others with him, the President of South Vietnam, the head of Vietnam’s police, six other Vietnamese who I didn’t know, four were in military uniforms, three Company men, and four of us were present. The four of us were Special Forces troopers who worked for The Company. Everyone wore polite smiles and nodded in greeting to the others. Everyone, that is, except Coleman. Nondescript in many ways, Coleman had the look of a forty-year old professor, round eyeglasses and slicked back hair. He was stone-faced, no smile, and his piercing black eyes were all business.

All the talk was about how the war was going and where to go from here. In the end, the conclusion was that it was going to take a lot more U.S. combat troops if we were going to defeat the North. The General, the Vietnam President, and the U.S. Ambassador were going to recommend to President Johnson to increase the U.S. forces in Vietnam. Coleman was in agreement.

The next day we met again. This time only Coleman and two of his men with the four of us were at the meeting. Coleman was worried that President Johnson would not commit more troops. We discussed what we could do to persuade President Johnson to increase troop levels. No one had a good idea. Frustrated, Coleman ended the meeting saying that we should all think about it, and if we came up with an idea, we should contact him.

Coleman was right; Johnson did not want to increase the troop level, and things were not going well with the war. It was obvious that the Vietnamese along with U.S. advisors could not defeat the North and maintain control of the free South.

We had another meeting on 5 May 1964. This meeting was not at the Embassy but at a house about a half-mile from the Embassy, and only Coleman and his men were there again with the four of us. Coleman demanded our attention with his direct stare and said that he had a plan to persuade Johnson to send more troops and to hit North Vietnam from the air. He went on to give us a history lesson. In Cuba in 1899 when the Battleship U.S.S. Maine blew up, the U.S. used this as an excuse to attack Cuba. Later, we found out that the boiler had blown up. In 1915, the Germans sank the Lusitanian; we used this as a reason to go to war in WWI. On 7 December 1944 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, we went to war in WWII.

Coleman reasoned that it appeared any time someone attacked our ships we went to war. So, we needed a way to have one of our ships attacked by the North Vietnamese to escalate this conflict. He told one of his men to find out where all of our ships were at present and where they would be assigned to be in the future. He told us to stand by, and he would get back with us.

We met again on 10 May 1964 at the same location. In his calm, self-confident, determined way, Coleman said it looked like we could arrange an attack on one of our ships sometime in July. I asked if we were going to let the South Vietnamese in on this? He said, No, we don’t need them, and we don’t want them to know anything about it.

I said, Well, if we don’t use the South Vietnamese, who is going to be manning the boats – U.S. personnel? What if something goes wrong, one of the boats sinks, and they find Americans on the PT boat?

He said, Don’t worry about it, because all the boats will have Vietnamese aboard them. He then told us to come back the next day with two of our guys and three of our Vietnamese bodyguards so he could fill us in on what was going to happen. As we left the room he said, You are going on a mission.

The next day we boarded a C130 and proceeded north to Hue. At Hue we picked up a slick and a Company pilot and headed west. Even with the doors open on the chopper, it was hot; the wind blew in like the heat from a furnace. We made a stop at the village of Ko Va La Dut; it was a small village in Vietnam just east of Laos where we picked up another Vietnamese who also worked for The Company. He had about ten other armed men with him. He looked to be about thirty-five or so and had a big smile. I didn’t know his real name, but his code name was Bull.

Bull didn’t look like most Vietnamese. He was only about five foot five but was built more like a Korean. He had dark hair and eyes, but his face was wider. He was stockier than most Vietnamese. He had wider shoulders and larger biceps like an American. Looking past his easy smile, though, I could see that he was a very determined person. I found out later that in spite of his friendly demeanor, he was all business all the time.

Bull got on the chopper with us, and we flew west to the village of Co Ka Va just inside Laos. We landed, and Bull said to stay at the chopper, that he would be right back. Since we were in Laos I had everyone set up a perimeter. In about ten minutes, Bull came back and said to follow him. We went into the village and entered a small hooch.

In the bigger cities, like Cu Chi, there were hard-packed roads and more substantial buildings. The buildings had doors, windows and power poles running along the streets. Out here in the small villages, the buildings were made of mud and straw, most didn’t have doors or windows, and they were spread out, not close to each other like in the cities where they were built so that two buildings would share one wall. This hooch had one door opening and two window openings, but no real doors or windows. There was no ceiling; you could see light coming through the thatched roof in some places. I told the guys to take up defensive positions around the hooch, and Song, one of my Vietnamese bodyguards, and I went inside with Bull.

Bull walked over to a man and shook his hand. I couldn’t see this person very well because it was dark in the hooch, and Bull was standing between us. There were two other men there, too, one on each side of the man to whom Bull was talking. They were in North Vietnamese khaki uniforms with AK-47s. Bull said something to the guys, and they turned to face me. He then introduced me to the men.

Bull didn’t speak good English, and as he started to introduce me, the main man walked over to me from about ten feet, and in almost perfect English said, Hello. It’s good to meet you. I am General Fong. He put out his hand to shake mine.

I looked into the general’s eyes searching for a sign to see if I could tell what he was thinking. If I shook his hand, I would have to take my hand off my weapon and my finger off the trigger, and I didn’t feel safe enough to do that.

I looked at the other two men with him. I was worried one of them was going to raise his AK and fire at us. I had been told I was going to meet someone from the North Vietnamese Army, but I never thought it would be a general, and for sure not General Fong. He was the number three or four man in North Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. He was in a dark green short-sleeve shirt with red tabs on the collars and gold emblems on his shoulders – a three-star general. He had no rifle but a side arm in a holster on his right side.

General Fong looked to be in his mid-forties, and there were gray streaks around his temples and through his mustache and goatee. He was extremely thin but a little taller than most Vietnamese, five foot seven or eight. He was very soft spoken but exuded tremendous confidence.

In the moments that followed my mind was jumping back and forth. I was here to meet with someone who was to help the CIA with the attack on our ships, but I never thought I would be face to face with one of the leaders of the North, the enemy, and a general who had helped kill some of my men.

I didn’t understand just what was going on. Was this for real, or was it a trap? I looked at Bull; was he really one of us, or part of a deception? There were just a few of us, and we were in Laos. With the exception of Coleman, no one even knew we were here. If we were killed or taken as POWs, no one would come to help or even know we were missing.

Bull seemed relaxed and had a smile on his face, like the general. Did that mean things were okay, or that they were happy that they had us where they wanted us? Conflicting thoughts flew back and forth in my mind, but the relaxed body language of Bull, the general, and the two NVA soldiers told me things were probably all right. They didn’t have their weapons at the ready or their fingers on the triggers. They didn’t seem nervous; none of the little signs were present that people exhibit when there’s something about to happen.

I instantly looked at Song. This was one of those times when having someone like Song with me gave me some confidence that we might survive all this. Song had been with me for about a year now. He was only eighteen, but he had already lived two people’s life times. The VC had killed his mother and father when he was twelve and cut the unborn baby out of his sister killing them both. He was not just my bodyguard, but also my friend who I trusted with my life. He was like most Vietnamese but taller at five foot seven or eight, with black hair and dark eyes. Most of the time he had a smile on his face. His face was rounded, and he had wider shoulders than most, more like an American. I had to keep reminding myself he was just a boy, because he was the fiercest warrior I had ever known. He had earned my trust many times and had saved my life a time or two. He was good at reading people, and this was a time when his skill would be of great value.

I found him staring at me now. Our eyes met, and I could see he was as worried as I was. He backed up a step, looked at the two guys with the AK’s, and I saw and heard him flip the safety off his weapon. I quickly moved my 16 to my left hand and pointed it up in the air and kept my left trigger finger on the trigger with the safety off. With a smile I slowly reached out my right hand and shook the general’s hand.

I said, It’s good to meet you, General.

I was worried he would grab my hand and reach for his handgun or try to hold me as the two other guys started shooting. But, when he shook my hand it was with a firm grip – but not a grip strong enough to hold me.

I looked him in the eye as we shook hands. He smiled, let go and stepped back a step pointing to a table and said, Let’s sit and talk.

We both sat down, and I laid my 16 on the table pointed to the left so the barrel was aimed at the two guys with the AK’s, the trigger near my right hand. Song and Bull were to my left about ten feet away and a little behind me, and the two North Vietnamese soldiers with the general were to my left and to my front.

We started with some small talk; he asked in his quiet tone where I was from in the States. I told him I was from a small town in Indiana, so I was sure he wouldn’t know where it was. How far is that from West Lafayette? he asked. Surprised, I said about a hundred miles north of there and asked how in the world he knew anything about Indiana. He told me he had gone to Purdue University where he learned to speak English and was an Agricultural Engineer in Hanoi before he was in the army.

Amazing, I thought, how small the world really is.

He began to talk about the war, and from the way the General spoke about his people and his home it was obvious that he loved his country. I couldn’t understand why he was helping us.

The General asked what exactly we needed from him. I told him about Coleman’s plan to have North Vietnamese PT boats attack a U.S. ship in the Gulf of Tonkin so that President Johnson would have the support of the American people and Congress to increase U.S. troop levels in Vietnam.

This whole situation seemed surreal. I felt very uncomfortable telling this man our plans, but Coleman had told me to tell the man I was to meet everything, that he could be trusted. I sure hoped he was right.

After listening to the plan the general said that he could make it happen. He just needed to know when and where. I told him I didn’t know that yet, so we agreed to meet again later when I had the time and place for the attack.

It was strange; we shook hands, and we left. It was an eerie feeling, me shaking hands with a North Vietnamese general.

When we returned to Saigon I met with Coleman and told him what had happened at the meeting with General Fong. I said, Sir, I don’t understand all this, but if this attack works and we increase troops and air strikes, then we should win this war.

That’s right, Coleman said in his straightforward, positive way.

Okay, I said. So, that’s good for the United States and good for the South Vietnamese, but it would be bad for the North and General Fong. So why is he willing to help us win the war? I could tell by the way the General had talked that he loved his country, and he had power and money. So, I didn’t understand his eagerness to help us. It looked to me like he might have been a spy, and I didn’t see any reason we should trust him.

Coleman answered, It’s because the general loves his country that he is helping us. He loves his country but isn’t a fan of Communism or Ho Chi Minh. He thinks that if this war keeps going it could destroy his country, and even now, Ho Chi Minh is mistreating his people to win the war. His people are suffering great hardships to keep this war going.

General Fong had been telling the other generals that they should not attack the U.S. personnel or the United States would get more involved, and they would win the war causing the NVA to lose everything. So, Coleman said that if we could pull this off and get a lot of our troops over here to win this war and drive the VC out of South Vietnam, then Ho Chi Minh should lose his credibility and control. General Fong would take the lead in making peace with the South and stop this war thereby saving the people of the North and South from all the hardships they were suffering.

Coleman went on to say, We would provide aid, food and money for the new government in the North. If this worked it should shorten this war and save lives on both sides, hopefully getting rid of Communism in the North and helping to stabilize this area of the world to stop the spread of Communism everywhere. This is important for the South, General Fong, his people, and us, he continued.

As Coleman told me this, I saw in his face the sincerity and determination to do whatever he thought necessary to win this war for our country. At the same time, however, I knew that in his drive to accomplish his goal he would be absolutely ruthless.

Coleman went on to say that General Fong was taking a big chance; if anyone in the North found out what he was doing he would be a dead man. Of course, if anyone found out what we were doing, we would be making little rocks out of big rocks in Leavenworth for the rest of our lives. I knew that if this worked, or if it didn’t work, we must take this to our graves, all of us. That is why as few people as possible could know what we were doing.

On 19 July 1964 Coleman contacted me with the information that needed to be in the hands of General Fong. He said that I needed to meet the general at the same place as the last time on 22 July 1964 at 1500 hours. I didn’t know how Coleman contacted General Fong, but I thought it had something to do with Bull. This was not unusual; we all worked together, but we all had our own contacts on the side that the others didn’t know about.

I met General Fong for the second time on the 22nd at the same place with the same people. I told him that at the end of July and the first of August a carrier task force with the carrier Ticonderoga would be in the Gulf of Tonkin. On the 30th and 31st of July the Marines were going to use Nasty Boats, small fast boats, to attack a base on the island of Hon Me just off the shore of North Vietnam. Those operations should go on for a week or so. To provide security and electronic surveillance for the Nasty Boats the destroyers, Maddox and Turner Joy, would enter the Gulf of Tonkin but stay in international waters. We thought that when the Nasty Boats attacked, everyone would expect the North to respond. If they used PT boats and went after the Nasty Boats they would be in the area of the Maddox or the Turner Joy. This would be a great opportunity to attack one of the destroyers in international waters. It would be up to General Fong to decide when and where, but we thought this would be a good opportunity.

I asked him what he thought and if he felt he could do it. Silently, he got up and walked out of the hooch and continued to walk around outside for about twenty minutes. He returned and sat down to say in a quiet voice that he thought he could make it happen. We agreed to meet back here on the tenth of August at the same time for an after action report.

On the second of August there was a report of the Destroyer Maddox being attacked in the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters by North Vietnamese PT boats. On the fourth of August the Maddox reported being attacked again. The Maddox reported being attacked by three or four PT boats and that the PT boats had fired torpedoes and 50 Cal rounds at them. The report stated that they were not hit by the torpedoes but were hit by a 50 Cal round. The Maddox returned fire and said it hit two of the PT boats and that aircraft assisted in the attack on the PT boats. They reported that one PT boat was dead in the water and burning and three PT boats were damaged and headed back to shore.

Well, this worked. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and gave President Johnson a blank check to escalate the Vietnam War. By 1965 there were about 100,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, and by 1966 the troop level was up to almost 400,000. It looked like we would win this war, and General Fong would soon be in power in North Vietnam.

The Los Angeles Times urged Americans to face the fact that the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated the hostilities.

I met with General Fong again on the tenth of August. I asked him what had happen on the second and the fourth. He just smiled and said, Well, what happened was not what the American news and military reported.

He said he had used the attacks from the Nasty Boats to go out into the Gulf with the PT boats. Then, when the Nasty Boats headed for international waters, they had pursued them and then made a run on the destroyer that was out there. I guess it was the Maddox, but we didn’t know which one it was and didn’t really care. Unlike the United States who reported that there were three or four PT boats, we only used two PT boats and never fired a torpedo; we did fire our 50 Cal machine guns. Neither one of our two PT boats were ever hit.

I told the general what the Maddox had reported. We both had a laugh about what they claimed had happened, what the news was reporting and what had really occurred. But we both agreed that whatever really happened didn’t matter; all that was important was that the whole world thought the North had attacked our ships in international waters. It looked like our plan had worked and that we should soon have many more troops in the country and air strikes going on. However, even though Vietnam was one day and twelve hours behind U.S. time, Coleman was concerned that someone would discover that the CIA had identified targets for retaliatory air strikes before the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred.

General Fong said that he hoped the time would soon come when his people would see that peace with the South was better than a long hard war and that soon we would meet again as friends. I said I hoped so, too. We shook hands, and I never saw General Fong again – until 1991.

Chapter one

To DC

It’s now July 1991. I was on my way to DC following a phone call from The Company also known as the CIA. I had passed mile marker 110 eastbound on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the last exit before the tunnels. There was a tunnel about fifteen minutes