Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31 - June 1, 1862

By Victor Vignola

“The author’s new and important study concentrates on the Fair Oaks part of the battle. His research is thorough, he has walked the ground, and his narrative brings the battle to life.” — Doug Crenshaw, author & historian

The bloody two-day battle was fought on the doorstep of the Confederate capital. It was the first major combat in the Eastern Theater since Bull Run/Manassas almost a year earlier, left more than 11,000 casualties in its wake, and cost the primary Southern field army its commander. The possession of Richmond hung in its balance. Yet, almost nothing has been written about Seven Pines/Fair Oaks. Victor Vignola’s Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, which focuses primarily on the Fair Oaks portion of the battle, is a major contribution to the historiography of the war.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan marched his Army of the Potomac up the Virginia Peninsula during the early spring of 1862 and placed his inexperienced IV Corps at the tip of the spear south of the flood-prone Chickahominy River. McClellan’s opponent Joe Johnston took the opportunity to strike and crafted an overly complex attack plan for his Virginia army to crush the exposed corps. A series of bungled marches, piecemeal attacks, and a lack of assertive leadership doomed the Southern plan. One of the wounded late in the day on May 31 was Johnston, whose injury led to the appointment of Robert E. Lee to take his place—a decision that changed the course of the entire Civil War.

Vignola’s use of primary and archival sources, many of which have never been used, helped craft a wholly original tactical and leadership study that directly challenges conventional accounts.

His stunning reassessment has led to renewed interest in Fair Oaks and the acquisition of a significant parcel of land by the American Battlefield Trust. Contrasts in Command: The Battle of Fair Oaks, May 31–June 1, 1862, will be hailed as one of the most important tactical studies ever published.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Savas Beatie
• Release date: Nov 9, 2023
• ISBN: 9781611216837

Victor Vignola

Victor Vignola is a lifelong student of the Civil War and has written articles for publication in North and South Magazine and other forums. Victor delivers historical programs, conducts tours, and regularly visits various Civil War sites. Vic’s career included executive-level labor and interagency relations for the Office of Mental Health in New York State. He lives with his family in Orange County, New York, home of the 124th New York “Orange Blossoms” Regiment.

Book preview

Introduction

"The battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines?

They are the same thing under those two names, I understand."

"No, sir; they were two distinct places.

The battle in which I commanded on Saturday and Sunday was at Fair Oaks.

The battle of Seven Pines was a separate battle."

— General Edwin V. Sumner¹

The spring of 1862 delivered a promising message for Federal military fortunes, with its army and navy delivering heavy blows against the Confederacy. New Orleans and large portions of the Mississippi River were now controlled by the Federals. The major Confederate army in the west, commanded by Gen. Pierre G. T. Beauregard, sat under siege in Corinth, Mississippi, and several Confederate forts along the Atlantic Ocean had been seized. During May 1862, the only bright spot for the Confederate cause came from the Valley Campaign conducted by Maj. Gen. Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson.

Yet, Jackson’s brilliance failed to compensate for the military situation confronting Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, tasked with the defense of the Confederate capital of Richmond. There, Johnston faced Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac (AOP) making its slow and methodical way up the peninsula, intent on capturing Richmond.

Given McClellan’s proximity to the capital, it appeared his ‘On to Richmond’ drive would soon conclude, with many feeling a victory would end the war. Except for Jackson, the Confederacy appeared to be operating on its back foot.

Johnston faced an enormous task in confronting McClellan’s massive and well-supplied army, which heavily outnumbered his. McClellan’s army boasted a strength of 102,236 men, nineteen batteries consisting of approximately 140 field cannons, and 103 heavy guns available for deployment as long-range or siege weapons. On May 21, Johnston’s army totaled 53,688 men with 88 field artillery pieces. However, during the following ten days, Gen. Robert E. Lee, military adviser to President Jefferson Davis, recognized Johnston’s need for a larger force. He quickly gathered additional troops from North Carolina and other locations, bringing Johnston’s force to 87,890 men.²

Thus, by Saturday, May 31, the opposing armies appeared ready to engage. Johnston, recognizing the opportunity McClellan had presented him by exposing two of his five corps south of the Chickahominy River, plotted to launch an early morning attack.

The resulting May 31-June 1, 1862, battle occurring near the small crossroad hamlet of Seven Pines became known as a battle in search of an identity. Many Civil War battles have more than one name, as Confederates commonly referenced the locality, town, or village in naming a battle. In contrast, the Federals forces generally used a local geographic feature, like a river. Labeling the Battle of Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks) appears to have evolved from a different process. Since the battle’s conclusion, Southerners have referred to this as the Battle of Seven Pines, recognizing the overwhelming success that Confederate forces experienced along Williamsburg Road during the afternoon and evening hours of May 31.³

Major General Joseph Johnston writing in his post-war Narrative of Military Operations, that no action of the war has been so little understood as that of Seven Pines; the Southern people have felt no interest in it … they saw no advantage derived from it.⁴ As shall be explored in this book, Johnston was one of those who caused the battle to be so little understood.

On May 31, at Seven Pines, Confederate forces enjoyed great success overrunning Union encampments, capturing large quantities of supplies, weaponry, artillery pieces, and many prisoners. Their successful attack drove the Federal defenders well over a mile beyond the intersection of Williamsburg and Nine Mile Road hamlet known as Seven Pines.

Later that afternoon, less than a mile northwest of Seven Pines along Nine Mile Road, combined Federal forces made a strong stand near a small railroad station known as Fair Oaks Station. The success of this stand prevented a complete Federal disaster and inflicted many casualties on the Confederates. Capt. Francis A. Walker, serving as a staff officer to Brig. Gen. Darius Couch, described it best, writing, It is no wonder that the Confederates called the action of May 31 the battle of Seven Pines, for on that end of the line they had been completely victorious, carrying our intrenchments by storm, and capturing guns, colors, and prisoners. It is as little matter of wonder that our people should have preferred to call it the battle of Fair Oaks, for on the right we were altogether victorious.⁵

Brigadier General Edwin V. ‘Bull’ Sumner, whom many consider responsible for the Federal victory at Fair Oaks, responded to an inquiry at a hearing of a Congressional Joint Committee for the Conduct of the Civil War. A panelist asked, regarding the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines? They are the same thing under those two names, I understand.

Sumner, seeking to clarify the success of his corps and distance himself from the forces being overrun at Seven Pines, replied, No, sir; they were too distinct places. The battle in which I commanded on Saturday and Sunday was at Fair Oaks. The battle of Seven Pines was a separate battle, some miles from Fair Oaks. General [Samuel] Heintzelman was in command at Seven Pines.⁶

The continuation of the battle on June 1 resulted in non-decisive fighting, concluding with the Confederate forces retreating toward their starting point. The Federals, meanwhile, solidified their hold on the ground on which they had made their stand. With casualties estimated at 11,165 and having occurred less than two months after the April 6 Battle of Shiloh, Seven Pines and Fair Oaks yielded another reminder that this war would be long and costly.⁷

Many Union and Confederates wrote about the Seven Pines segment of the battle. It is challenging, however, to find Confederate battle reports regarding the Fair Oaks segment.

The 128 volumes of the Official Records contain correspondence and battle reports by leadership from both armies. Volume 11, Part 1 contains one hundred reports submitted by Union officers who participated in either the Seven Pines or Fair Oaks segments of the battle. Yet only twenty-two Confederate reports were filed for the entire battle. Only one addresses the May 31 fighting at Fair Oaks.⁸

Previous descriptions of fighting at Fair Oaks are therefore gleaned primarily from Union reports and letters from soldiers that were present. The dearth of Confederate battle reports has limited a broader understanding of the conduct of the Fair Oaks battle. A diligent search for Confederate letters, newspaper articles, and other accounts has revealed many threads, which were woven together to produce this book.

Advancing toward Fair Oaks, the Confederate forces under Gens. Joseph Johnston, Chase Whiting, and Gustavus Smith consisted of five brigades totaling 11,240 men. Those men did not lack bravery, holding a commitment to defeating the Union defenders, eventually commanded by Brig. Gens. ‘Bull’ Sumner and Darius Couch.

This book also discusses the reason for the lack of reporting by Confederate leadership. More importantly, this study includes an analysis of the Confederate decisions, resulting in the attack on the Union’s defensive position in the Adams House and farm area.

Period maps, and a review of letters and accounts by Confederate and Federal participants clarify the terrain features, and the impact on the attack in the evening hours of May 31, 1862. Some letters written by soldiers appeared in newspapers. Others were retrieved through various sources. Regimental histories were also useful sources.

Today, the Fair Oaks battlefield is heavily developed, erasing many of the terrain features that impacted the fighting in 1862—with one key exception. The Adams House and farm was the key piece of ground anchoring the Federal defensive line, and the house still stands. This enables a reasonable determination regarding the positions of the Federal troops.

The Federal force defending the area of the Adams House consisted of approximately 2,000 men from four regiments of the Union IV Corps. Cobbling together the regiments from three different brigades was necessary, after being cut off from the main body during an attack from a South Carolina brigade led by Col. Micah Jenkins. This isolated force, including four artillery pieces, protected the right flank of the Union army from an attacking force more than four times its size. The outnumbered Union soldiers opened the fight against the Confederate force around 4:30 p.m. Disaster or success for the Federal defenders hinged on the arrival of Union reinforcements attempting to cross the flooded Chickahominy River and surrounding swamps.

While the primary focus of this work will be on the fighting at Fair Oaks, the narrative begins with a brief overview of the initial Confederate attack plan, and a short description of the fighting along Williamsburg Road. It also describes the advance of the partial brigade under Col. Micah Jenkins’ command, as he sought a way around the right flank of the Union defensive positions located along Williamsburg Road. The account then shifts to the Union defenders, and the factors involved in shaping the defensive position at Fair Oaks Station.

Another key to understanding the Battle of Fair Oaks is the remarkable crossing over the flooded Chickahominy River by the Union II Corps. The crossing and arduous advance to the Adams House was vital for the Union’s successful defense. The narrative concludes with an overview of the June 1 fighting, providing post-battle information about hospitals, care of the wounded, and a summary of hardships endured by soldiers remaining on the field.

Hitherto, the fighting at Fair Oaks has attracted the attention of students of the Civil War for two reasons. First, is the wounding of Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston while observing the action during the evening of May 31. Johnston’s wounding permitted President Jefferson Davis to appoint Gen. Robert E. Lee to command the Army of Northern Virginia, propelling Lee into legendary status.

The second is the alleged and infamous ‘misunderstanding’ by Maj. Gen. James Longstreet of Joseph Johnston’s May 31 attack orders. Longstreet’s ‘misunderstanding’ lost the Confederates the opportunity to destroy the two isolated Union corps south of the Chickahominy, and all that might have followed.

A discussion on the factors that led to the alleged ‘misunderstanding’ and their post-battle impacts are in Appendix 1, Understanding the ‘Misunderstanding.’

* * *

One legacy of Gustavus Woodson Smith, an 1842 graduate of West Point, and engineer by profession, is the initiative in recording the significant details of this battle.

Smith conducted extensive research on the entire battle, providing his results in an 1884 book entitled Confederate War Papers of Gustavus Woodson Smith. In 1888, he wrote an article for the Century Magazine titled Two Days of Battle at Seven Pines. In 1891, Smith authored The Battle of Seven Pines. In each, Smith relied on a vast number of personal documents, and letters written by those engaged in the fighting. Additionally, Smith drew five maps, illustrating significant details relating to the terrain and placement of the combatants.⁹

Perhaps Smith also became befuddled on the proper designation of the battle, with three of his maps titled Seven Pines or Fair Oaks. Each map draws from an 1853 map of Henrico County, produced by Robert P. Smith, a Richmond surveyor. The maps display property owners’ names and terrain features existing nine years before the battle. Battle descriptions show that those terrain features had changed little in nine years.

Smith’s maps covering the fighting on May 31 and June 1 can be viewed in the appendix to this book. Both maps appeared in Smith’s Confederate War Papers.

A few extra elements not identified on Smith’s maps have been added. For instance, at the intersection of Nine Miles (sic) Road and the Road to New Bridge, there was a burned-out building known as the Old Tavern. The Old Tavern area is where Gen. Joseph Johnston located his headquarters for most of May 31, and where the Confederate advance embarked down Nine Mile Road toward the Union position at Fair Oaks Station.¹⁰

Another essential feature not identified on the maps is the road designated by the author as Grapevine Bridge Road, leading northeast from the Fair Oaks Station. Grapevine Bridge Road connects to Sumner’s Upper Bridge, named for Union Brig. Gen. Edmund Sumner. The author used the name ‘Grapevine Bridge Road,’ as local names for the road were not located during my research. Currently, Hanover Road follows the track of this road from Fair Oaks Station, passing the Adams House.¹¹ The Adams House is not named on Smith’s maps, although the location is marked by the black mark at the end of the ‘y’ in ‘Dr. Courtney.’

The primary route taken by Union reinforcements was a farm lane from a road east of the Adams House. One can locate the lane by tracing the progress of Sumner’s troops after crossing over Sumner’s Upper Bridge. After walking a half mile, the troops entered onto a road to their right, proceeding another half mile to an intersection, where they turned left onto a nameless road running south and parallel to Grapevine Bridge Road. A little more than a half mile in, a lane branched off into the woods. On Smith’s map, a series of slight dashes indicates the farm lane emerging from the wooded area to the right of Grapevine Bridge Road.

The weather played a significant factor in the battle. As a local newspaper shared: The rain descended like a flood upon the earth …. The treacherous Chickahominy River, suddenly swollen, spurned its banks and sent its angry waters through the fields and forest.¹²

Perhaps the most overlooked feature of the fighting at Fair Oaks is the northward flowing ‘nameless stream.’ The northward portion of the stream is under the ‘R’ in the heading of Fair Oaks on Smith’s maps. This stream, which empties into the Chickahominy, originates near the Courtney House. On May 31, the nameless stream had extended well past its banks, flooding the surrounding fields.¹³

Additional maps were produced for this text. However, the best map source remains the Smith maps. After all, it isn’t often that a study of a Civil War battle contains a detailed map drawn by a senior officer and major participant, possessing the training of an engineer.

Finally, letters and accounts written by soldiers to loved ones at home are among the sources used in this manuscript. Many include misspellings and poor grammar. Rather than indicate this by use of the term (sic) after each error, the accounts are reproduced verbatim.

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan

Library of Congress

1 Edwin Sumner’s testimony from Feb. 18, 1863, 1:363. Report of the Joint Committee for the Conduct of the Civil War (JCCCW), 3 Vols., U.S. Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1863.

2 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington D.C., 1880-1901) Series1, vol. 11, Part 3, page 184. Hereafter cited as OR, 11, 3:184. All references are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted. For Confederate totals see, ibid., 3:503-531. Also, Steven H. Newton, Joseph Johnston and the Defense of Richmond, PH.D. dissertation, William and Mary University, 1989, 436-438, passim.

3 Richmond Dispatch, Jun. 11, 1862, What shall it be called? The citizens of Richmond decried the Northern press using the name Battle of Seven Pines as a weak invention of the foe, deceptively and mendaciously boasting of a victory. Some citizens preferred the battle to be called The Great Battle of the Chickahominy, many having heard of the river, whereas Nobody ever heard of the Seven Pines. Other references to the battle as Seven Pines appeared in the Richmond Dispatch on Jun 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10.

4 Joseph Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations: Directed During the Late War Between the States, (New York, NY, 1874), 143.

5 National Tribune (Washington D.C.), Oct. 14, 1886. Sumner at Fair Oaks, by General Francis A. Walker.

6 JCCCW, 1:363.

7 OR, 11, 1:762. Federal casualties for the battle are listed as 5, 031; Confederate casualties 6,134. The divisions of Hill, Huger, and Longstreet at Seven Pines suffered 4,851 casualties, Ibid, 1:942. An additional 1,270 casualties were recorded by Smith and Whiting’s Division during the fighting at Fair Oaks on May 31, See Gustavus Woodson Smith, The Battle of Seven Pines (New York, NY, 1891), 101, 173.

8 OR, 11, 1: 746-748 for a listing of the individual Union and Confederate Reports. Report #122, submitted by Gustavus. Smith, see ibid., 1:990-992, is the only report that contains information on the May 31 fighting near Fair Oaks. Whiting led a division comprised of sixteen regiments, distributed among the four brigades engaged at Fair Oaks on May 31. Counting his division and brigade commanders, twenty additional reports could have been filed. Regarding the Jun 1 fighting near Fair Oaks, only Reports #119, submitted by Brig. Gen. George E. Pickett, #120 of Col. Harrison B. Tomlin, and #121, of Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox provide Confederate accounts. Missing are the reports from a total of twenty-one regiments, four brigades and Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger’s Division report. All told, the Fair Oaks portion of the fighting lacks a total of forty-six Confederate reports. In contrast, a total of sixteen Confederate reports, including those of Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Hill, four brigade commanders, and eleven regimental commanders describe the fighting in the Seven Pines sector.

9 Gustavus Smith, Confederate War Papers, Gustavus Woodson Smith (New York, NY 1884). Maps Index has 3 pages with individual dates, May 30, 31, & Jun 1. The maps used in this book are found of pages 395 and 397. In addition, Robert Smith’s map titled Smith’s Map of Henrico County, Virginia from actual surveys by James Keily, Robert P. Smith, & C. Carpenter, 1853, is accessible on the Library of Congress website.

10 Smith added the improper ‘s’ to all his references to the road.

11 Interestingly, this road did not function as the primary route taken by Sumner’s reinforcements in reaching Union forces near the Adams House. Sumner’s troops entered from a road to the east entering the rear of the Adams property.

12 Nashville Daily Union & American, Feb. 7, 1866.

13 Modern maps identify this stream as Thomas Branch. However, none of the period maps or maps through the mid-1960s identifies the stream by that name.

Chapter 1

A STORM Approaches

… everything … indicates an attack on my position.

The day was not going as General Joseph E. Johnston planned. He stood gazing out a window from his headquarters at the Stubbs House on the outskirts of Richmond, Virginia, on Saturday, May 31, 1862. The time, approaching 10:00 a.m., indicated a hot, humid, and musty day ahead. Looking across the fields, Johnston could see ground saturated by the violent rainstorm that had deluged the area throughout the night. But he could hear no sounds of battle.

He stood, straining his ears for the sounds of musketry, or of distant cannon fire—but heard nothing. The evening before, Johnston and Maj. Gen. James Longstreet had developed a plan to launch an early morning attack on the exposed IV Corps of the Army of the Potomac, at the small hamlet called Seven Pines. The plan seemed simple and clear, yet Johnston knew something was wrong. He asked a nearby aide if he could hear any battle sounds, and the aide responded that he heard none. Johnston, could no longer contain his anxiety as he sighed, I wish the troops were back in their camps.¹

* * *

Johnston had been under a great deal of pressure on many fronts, in the days before his Saturday disappointment. The pressure emanated in part from the 102,500 men in Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac (AOP), outnumbering Johnston’s army of 87,890 effectives defending Richmond.² McClellan’s advance through the Peninsula brought him to within sight of the Confederate capital, approximately four miles away.

Maj. Gen. James Longstreet

Library of Congress

McClellan enjoyed a significant advantage in numbers, equipment, and artillery. Besides field guns, McClellan’s artillery included 103 siege cannons. Although the siege guns were not yet in place, once McClellan’s forces reached the vicinity of Old Tavern south of the Chickahominy River, they could bombard the outskirts of Richmond.

Johnston’s greatest pressure to perform came from President Jefferson Davis. The rocky relationship between the two began on August 31, 1861. Davis submitted five names to the Confederate Senate of officers for promotion to the rank of full general. Johnston was angry when he learned his name was behind those of Samuel Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, and Robert E. Lee. As Johnston had been the highest-ranking officer in the U. S. Army to resign his commission and join the Confederacy, he maintained he should have been first in seniority rather than fourth.

The enmity between Johnston and Davis grew through the fall of 1861 and into the winter of 1862. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army in Virginia, engaged in a regular war of words with Judah Benjamin, Davis’s Secretary of War. He felt betrayed when Davis chose to keep his distance from this dysfunctional spat. Douglas Southall Freeman described Johnston’s nature best when he wrote, love was not easily destroyed in his heart; hate once enflamed always was cherished.³

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

Library of Congress

To make matters worse, Johnston became secretive about military matters. On February 13, Davis summoned Johnston to Richmond for discussions with Davis and his cabinet on the withdrawal of Johnston’s army from its forward position in Manassas. The meeting, held on February 19, resolved to move Johnston’s army as soon as practicable southward to a more defensible position behind the Rappahannock River.

Johnston assumed these sensitive discussions would be secret, but almost immediately was disabused of this assumption. Shortly after returning to his hotel, Col. William Dorsey Pender of the 6th North Carolina surprised Johnston by inquiring about the information circulating about withdrawing the army from Manassas. The next day, Johnston received a second surprise during the train ride back to Centreville, when a civilian made a similar inquiry. When Johnston asked the man the source of his information, he replied, from the wife of a member of Cabinet.⁴

The security breach shook Johnston’s confidence about trusting others with sensitive military information. As Johnston’s army began withdrawing from Manassas and from its positions along the Potomac River, he neglected to inform Davis of the movements.

Between March 6 and 10, Johnston moved the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV) away from its forward positions, a movement almost unnoticed by Union scouts. Johnston’s forces gathered south of the Rappahannock River. Given the poor quality of the roads, the shortage of railcars and wagons, and having only a single-track railroad available, a large amount of material was unmovable. Millions of dollars of public property, including 400,000—1,000,000 pounds of beef and pork were abandoned or torched.⁵

Davis was furious at the loss of property and the lack of notice of the movement, when notified by Johnston on March 12. Davis responded, I have had many and alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions … but, having heard no cause for such a sudden movement, I was at a great loss to believe it. I have not the requisite topographical knowledge for the selection of your new position.

Johnston’s claims that the blunders of others, including inefficient railroad officials causing material losses, appeared to Davis to be an attempt by Johnston to dodge responsibility. This added to the toxicity of their relationship.⁶

In April, Davis, concerned with the advance of McClellan’s Army of the Potomac toward Richmond, transferred Johnston to oversee military operations in the Peninsula. Communication remained sparse between the two leaders. They devolved to the point where Davis found it necessary to summon Johnston to the White House in Richmond, or to make personal visits to Johnston’s headquarters for information.

By mid-May, the Confederate position deteriorated into what Davis described as a ‘new phase to our military problem.’ The problems included the May 10 abandonment of the naval port of Norfolk and the destruction of the ironclad Virginia, which opened the James River to Union naval operations, offering a potential base of operations for McClellan’s army. The Confederate’s withdrawal up the Peninsula to a position north of the Chickahominy River and near the outskirts of Richmond added to the problem.

With the James River now open to Federal gunships and transports, Johnston suspected McClellan would shift his base of operations away from the Pamunkey River, moving to the James. This exposed Johnston’s rear, destabilizing his right flank as long as he remained north of the Chickahominy.

During this period of uncertainty, Davis and Lee arrived at Johnston’s headquarters to have a conversation with him so we might better understand his plans and expectations. Davis described the meeting as inconclusive, and as he and Lee rode back toward Richmond, they felt unable to understand Johnston’s intentions other than that the policy was to improve his position … and wait for the enemy … so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him.⁷

On May 15, a flotilla of Federal gunboats, including the Monitor, ascended the James, engaging Confederate artillerists posted on Drewry’s Bluff. The Federals were repulsed, but the engagement reinforced Johnston’s fears about his exposed position. He decided to move his army to the southern banks of the Chickahominy. Johnston believed that should McClellan seek to change his base of supply, he would have to cross the Chickahominy, likely exposing part of his force to attack.

Johnston communicated his intentions to Lee, to which Lee responded, Will it be possible for you to strike him a successful blow in the passage of his army to the James River? … should his approach be across the Chickahominy his passage … may furnish you the opportunity.⁸

Not being privy to Johnston’s plans, Davis authored a note on May 17, sending it through Col. G. W. Custis Lee, son of the general, seeking a response from Johnston. Davis, not knowing Johnston’s intentions, wrote he also felt it likely that McClellan would change his base of operations, creating an opportunity for Johnston to launch an attack if he should cross the Chickahominy, which we can only hope.

As Johnston confided no valuable information to Col. Lee, the disappointed president decided to ride to Johnston’s headquarters for answers. While en route from Richmond, his astonishment grew, discovering that Johnston had already withdrawn the army to positions south of the Chickahominy. Johnston’s discussion with Davis salved his initial impression, as it now appeared as though a harmony existed among Johnston, Lee, and Davis. Davis described the meeting:

General Johnston’s explanation of this (to me) unexpected movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy, and had directed the troops to cross and halt at the first good water on the southern side, which he supposed would be found near to the river. He also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather than in the rear of him—an advantage certainly obvious enough, if the line was to be near to it on either of its banks. The considerations which induced General McClellan to make his base on the York River had at least partly ceased to exist … and the destruction of the Virginia had left the James River open to his fleet and transports as far up as Drury’s Bluff, and the withdrawal of General Johnston across the Chickahominy made it quite practicable for him to transfer his army to the James River.⁹

Johnston’s decision to place the river barrier between him and the Army of the Potomac appeared sound. By placing the river to his front, Johnston held a formidable defensive position atop a four-mile section of the Chickahominy Bluffs stretching from the Mechanicsville Bridge to the New Bridge Crossing.

The Chickahominy River possesses a temperamental influence throughout the tidewater coastal plain region through which it flows. The coastal plain begins north of Mechanicsville and stretches generally southeast for around forty miles until reaching the James River.

The Chickahominy is best described as being the ‘Rodney Dangerfield of rivers,’ in that it receives little respect. A newspaper provided the following unflattering description, The Chickahominy is a stream rather above the dignity of a creek and not fully up to that of a river, which meanders through the tidewater district of the James River in a line generally parallel to the James, at a mean distance about ten or twelve miles from that river until it (the Chickahominy) reaches the lower end of Charles City county when it abruptly turns southwardly and empties into the James.… It is skirted generally by wide low lands and in some parts considerable swamps.¹⁰

During dry periods, the river may easily be forded. However, bordering on marshy bottom lands laced with dense undergrowth, it is also subject to sudden and great variations in the volume of water and a rise of a few feet can overflow the bottom lands on both sides.¹¹

Johnston addressed the deficiencies presented by the low-lying six mile stretch by creating a strong position at Old Tavern, at the strategically important intersection of Nine Mile and New Bridge Crossing Roads and by locating Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Hill’s Division at a position along Williamsburg Road, approximately four miles east of the Confederate capital. By positioning his forces in this manner, Johnston kept his army out of the low-lying, wooded terrain bordering White Oak Swamp.¹²

Johnston’s secrecy regarding his planning and conduct of operations had become problematic for Davis and Lee. On May 21, Davis directed Lee to write to Johnston requesting the specifics of his intentions for the defense of Richmond. Lee’s polite inquiry stated: The President desires to know the number of troops around Richmond, how they are posted.… also the plan of operations which you propose. The information relative to … your plan of operations, dependent on circumstances … may not be easily explained, nor may be prudent to commit to paper. I would therefore respectfully suggest that you communicate your views on this subject personally to the President.

Johnston’s response contained the complete roster, by division and brigade, of all the troops in his command, but nothing related to their specific location or of his intention to meet with the President.¹³ With McClellan drawing closer to Richmond, the frustrated president did not have accurate information from the general in command of the forces protecting the capital.

Johnston’s relationship with Lee was weak, but they had developed an understanding on the strategic outlook facing the Confederacy. Lee, forever the diplomat, understood the difficulties facing Johnston, given McClellan’s superior numbers and equipment. He possessed sympathy for the operational and administrative issues confronting Davis, and the strain on Johnston, having the nation’s president and press observing every move he made.

On May 20, McClellan fulfilled Davis’s wish that a portion of the AOP begin crossing the Chickahominy. McClellan ordered Brig. Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes’s 17,132-man IV Corps to cross the river using the Bottoms Bridge Crossing. By May 25, Brig. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman’s III Corps, with 17,000 men, had also crossed the river, resulting in a sizable Federal presence on the southern bank. McClellan’s decision to cross two of his corps south of the Chickahominy left his AOP in a precarious and vulnerable position astride the river, as three of his corps remained positioned on the north bank.

Keyes moved his corps two miles west along Williamsburg Road on May 26, taking up a position at Seven Pines at the intersection of Williamsburg and Nine Mile Roads. The terrain in this area was woody and flat. Keyes’s left flank connected to White Oak Swamp, which offered a geographic protection against attack. However, Keyes’s right flank at Fair Oaks Station was vulnerable to an attack along Nine Mile Road.

Keyes and Heintzelman’s movements to a position within four miles of Richmond did not escape