Yemen in Crisis: Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope

By Helen Lackner

'Written with compassion and insight, Lackner confirms her standing as the foremost authority on Yemeni politics at work today.'- Eugene Rogan
The democratic promise of Yemen's 2011 uprising quickly unravelled, triggering a shocking political and social crisis with serious implications for the future of the country and region.
Fuelled by Arab and Western intervention, the infighting in Yemen descended into civil war, with thousands killed and millions facing starvation and deep social and political fragmentation. Suffering from a collapsed economy, the people of Yemen now face a desperate choice between the Huthi rebels on the one side and, on the other, a range of forces propped up by a Saudi-led coalition fed by Western arms.

In this incisive, invaluable analysis, Helen Lackner uncovers the roots of the conflicts threatening the very survival of the Yemeni state and its people. This updated edition features a new preface and a new chapter on the problems of humanitarian aid in the country.
'Brimming with erudition and rich in analysis, Yemen in Crisis offers invaluable insight to seasoned observers and newcomers to the region alike.' - Moustafa Bayoumi
'An eminently valuable account of Yemen's modern history and current travails by someone who has made it her life's work to understand the country and its people.' - Roger Owen, Harvard University
'This timely book analyzes the deep roots of the crisis that gripped Yemen even before the destructive war against it created the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Lackner is superbly equipped to trace the causes for the failure and collapse of the Yemeni state, under the inexorable pressures of neo-liberalism and regional and global rivalries.' - Rashid Khalidi, Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University
'A matchless geopolitical profile of the country, its history, its economic structures, and above all, its people.' - Tariq Ali, New Left Review
This book is the best compact presentation of the background and dynamics of the social and political explosion that turned Yemen into the worst humanitarian crisis of today's world.' - Gilbert Achcar

• Language: English
• Publisher: Saqi Books
• Release date: Jan 10, 2023
• ISBN: 9780863561887

Helen Lackner

Helen Lackner is a social anthropologist who has spent the past five decades researching Yemen, working in the country for fifteen years. She is a research associate at the Middle East Institute at SOAS, University of London; a visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; and an associate at the Transnational Institute. Lackner is a regular contributor to Oxford Analytica’s briefs, Arab Digest, Orient XXI and openDemocracy. Her publications include Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition (editor). She lives in Oxford.

Book preview

Preface to the Second Edition

In 2017 I prefaced the first edition of this book by expressing the hope that the war would have ended by the time it was read. Six years later, almost every word of that preface remains valid. Events in early April 2022 hinted that this hope might finally be transformed into expectation. The fourth United Nations Special Envoy, appointed in September 2021, successfully persuaded the fighting groups to engage in a two-month renewable truce while he continues supporting discussions to prepare for serious negotiations between all parties through ‘an inclusive multi-track process to address immediate needs and long-term issues required to make progress towards a political settlement’.1 After two renewals, the truce expired on 2 October 2022,2 demonstrating that the warring factions are not yet ready to end the suffering of millions of Yemenis who still hope that Yemeni and UN efforts to end the war will continue and eventually succeed.

A few days later, on 7 April 2022, the Saudi and Emirati regimes, through the Gulf Cooperation Council, terminated the ten-year tenure of Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi and the six-year tenure of his vice-president, Ali Mohsen, after having supported their divisive, incompetent and corrupt leadership for years. They were replaced by an eight-man (as usual, no women) Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) composed of the rival leaders of the major anti-Huthi military and political factions, to effect an indeterminate ‘transition’. The PLC was tasked with ‘negotiating with (Ansar Allah) the Houthis for a permanent ceasefire throughout the republic and sitting at the negotiating table to reach a final and comprehensive political solution that includes a transitional phase that will move Yemen from a state of war to a state of peace’.3 Readers may be able to assess whether this disparate group of mutually hostile and mostly military leaders has achieved any kind of peace in Yemen, let alone a sustainable one.

However, this is the first time since the failed Kuwait negotiations in 2016 that any significant events have taken place in both the leadership structure and the UN-supported negotiation process. This justifies a hope which has faded in recent years as Yemenis suffered the entrenchment of the country’s fragmentation, continued internal fighting, and impoverishment due to the economic war and blockade, leading to a disastrous humanitarian crisis. All these have been worsened by the persistent determination of the Saudi and Emirati rulers to pursue their own, increasingly distinct, objectives in Yemen, mostly noticeable in aerial bombing and support for the divisive policies of the factions each supported. Between them, all these developments left little scope for optimism.

Having suffered more than eight years of military destruction, economic collapse, disintegration of its social infrastructure, and fragmentation, the vast majority of the now 30 million Yemenis have been reduced to the extremes of despair and destitution. Even if a ‘peace’ agreement is reached in the short or medium term, Yemenis will be left to try and restore acceptable living conditions in an extremely hostile and difficult regional political, social and economic environment, in an increasingly divided world and an Arabian Peninsula dominated by two particularly authoritarian monarchs.

The analysis presented in this book remains valid. This preface updates the major developments which have taken place between mid-2017 and October 2022, very few of which call for adjustments to the earlier analysis. The new Chapter 11 examines the critical humanitarian situation including the role of foreign states and international institutions.

The Military Stalemate in the North-East

As pointed out correctly by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg on 15 March 2022, ‘sometimes territory exchange [sic] hands, sometimes it changes back. We see frontlines go quiet in one part of the country, only to intensify elsewhere. Always, we see civilians paying an unacceptable price for choices they have no influence over. Through the ebbs and flows of the conflict, the fact remains that a military approach is not going to produce a sustainable solution. Years of fighting have only destroyed Yemen’s institutions, economy, social fabric and environment.’4 This neatly summarises how, over the past eight years, the overall military situation has remained largely unchanged: the Huthi movement, aka Ansar Allah (AA) governs about two-thirds of Yemen’s population living in one-third of its territory. A major offensive to take Mareb governorate and city, started in early 2020, remained the main military front until the 2022 truce. It is important because success there would give Ansar Allah control over both the last remaining northern stronghold of the internationally recognised government (henceforth IRG) and of one of the country’s major sources of hydrocarbons, in particular gas. This explains Huthi determination to continue its assaults despite very heavy losses: between June and November 2021 alone, the Huthis admitted to losing almost 15,000 men.5 In addition to the historic hostility of the population of that area to Zaydi rule, these two factors explain the fierce resistance they faced both from the local population and IRG forces. When it seemed likely to fall in late 2021, the coalition brought units from the Tihama region to prevent this, thus demonstrating determination to stop Mareb falling to the Huthis. Recognition that this stalemate is unlikely to be breached may have persuaded leaders on all sides that the time has come to seek a political solution.

The Political Situation in Huthi-Controlled Areas, and the End of the Huthi-Saleh Alliance

In mid-2017, while the Huthi-Saleh alliance was under serious strain and the Huthis were becoming the stronger element, it still seemed possible that this alliance contre nature would last, particularly given the historic allegiance to Ali Abdullah Saleh of the major Zaydi tribes living around the capital (see pp. 197–8). Events in early December of that year marked its decisive termination: under pressure from the Huthis, ex-President Saleh attempted to change sides and ally with the coalition, resulting in two days of heavy fighting in Sana‘a and his death at the hands of Ansar Allah elements.

***

Since then, Ansar Allah has been fully and exclusively in control of most of Yemen’s population. The continued formal presence of members of Saleh’s GPC and other parties comprising the National Salvation Government formed in November 2016 (pp. 197–9) does not detract from the fact that AA has full authority; members of other parties are mere ‘tokens’ unable to assert verbally or otherwise any views differing from those of the dominant Huthi movement. Over the years AA gradually dispensed with the ‘double management’ of institutions which it had instituted earlier, involving the appointment of Huthi ‘supervisors’ in each institution who held ultimate authority over officials at all levels. As new Huthi ministers and other senior officials took over, the need for supervisors diminished, and they are gradually being phased out. The different political tendencies within the Huthi movement are kept under control thanks to the ultimate authority of AA’s leader, Abdul Malik al-Huthi. Tensions and internal dissent are likely to emerge into the open either if they suffer military reverses, or once peace returns and the glue of the ‘external aggression’ disintegrates.

By any standards, AA rule is authoritarian and retrograde, manifesting no respect for fundamental human rights of any kind. Any expression of dissent is liable to lead to arrest and ill-treatment. Arbitrary arrests and lengthy prison sentences are imposed capriciously,6 and executions, even of minors, follow court cases which bear no relationship to recognised legal procedures or proper transparency. Freedom of expression is non-existent: journalists are arrested, imprisoned and given heavy sentences (including death) for doing no more than their jobs. Restrictions on women’s rights include being forced to be accompanied by male relatives [mahram] when travelling, and to wear loose-fitting abayas to conform with Huthi dress codes. Arrested under the flimsiest of pretexts, women suffer even more than men when detained, facing violations including sexual harassment and assault. Coffee houses and other public places are compelled to have gender-segregated facilities or are closed down.

The Stockholm Agreement and Its Impact on Hodeida

In 2017, the coalition forces, and particularly the United Arab Emirates, were ready to launch a major offensive to retake Hodeida from AA, believing that this would force the Huthis to the negotiation table. Whether this might have worked will never be known, as the Western states supporting the coalition prevented this offensive from happening in anticipation of its expected disastrous humanitarian consequences. A year later the offensive was launched, with mainly Sudanese and Yemeni ground forces under UAE leadership. They succeeded in taking most of coastal southern Tihama and reached the outskirts of Hodeida city. As fighting took the predicted heavy civilian toll, the international community intervened and forced its interruption. Later in the year, with the Saudi regime disgraced by its assassination of the journalist Jamal Khashoqji in Istanbul, the international community pressured the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) regime to bring about a meeting of the warring parties in Sweden.

The resulting Stockholm Agreement of 13 December 2018 raised hopes among many that it would lead to a wider peace agreement. The three-part agreement included one to establish a committee to discuss the situation in Taiz. Nothing has been heard of this since. The second, agreeing the exchange of 16,000 prisoners, merely achieved an exchange of 1,080, almost two years later, in mid-October 2020. The third, known as the Hodeida Agreement, included the creation of the UN Mission to support the Hodeida Agreement (UNMHA) on 16 January 2019 (UNSC Resolution 2452). It achieved a significant reduction in fighting in Hodeida governorate and stabilised the military front, limiting fighting until September 2021 – when the main anti-Huthi forces withdrew 100 km southwards, leaving the Huthis to take over. The UAE-supported forces retained and are unlikely to abandon the southern part of the Tihama, including the Bab al-Mandab Strait which controls the entrance to the Red Sea and, by extension, access to the Suez Canal.

In May 2019, UNMHA failed to prevent Ansar Allah’s full takeover of Hodeida port as the UN recognised as legitimate its ‘unilateral withdrawal’ from the area. As the IRG pointed out at the time, this was little more than a change of uniforms by the Huthi units in control. In March 2020, an IRG liaison officer was wounded (and later died); the IRG withdrew from the Redeployment Coordination Committee, which ceased to function thereafter. In December 2021, Major General Michael Beary of Ireland was appointed as the new head to the mission. The UNSC continues to renew the mandate of the UNMHA – despite the obscure rationale for its existence, as all of Hodeida city and its governorate have been firmly under Huthi control since late 2021.

Southern Separatism and the Riyadh Agreement

The rise of southern separatism has been a significant change since the publication of the first edition of the book. Following his dismissal as governor of Aden in April 2017 (see p. 225), Aydaroos al-Zubeidi announced the creation of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in May and appointed himself as its president. He installed his close ally the Salafi leader Hani bin Breik (who had been dismissed from his position as minister without portfolio at the same time) as his second in command. In the following years tension between the STC and the Hadi government systematically worsened. Two major military confrontations took place, first in January 2018, and then decisively in August 2019 when the STC expelled the IRG forces and ministers from Aden. Taking place shortly after the ‘withdrawal’ of the UAE forces from Aden and other positions, this was one marker of UAE distancing from KSA positions, as the Saudis were left to address this problem effectively on their own.

The Saudis initiated months of difficult negotiations, finally achieving the signing of the Riyadh Agreement on 5 November 2019. Intended to reconcile the two factions, it was the high point of KSAUAE cooperation on this issue, as both Crown Princes Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) of KSA and Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) of the UAE attended the signing ceremony. Further cooperation between the two coalition partners on this issue was limited. The UAE supported the STC, including its military actions, against the IRG after the signing of the Riyadh Agreement. According to its clauses, the entire agreement was to be implemented within two months. In reality, the redeployment of military forces had simply not happened by the time Hadi was replaced by the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022. The formation of a joint government in which only half were southerners (there were more than half in the previous government) took more than a year. It was finalised on 18 December 2020. During the remaining period of Hadi’s presidency, the presence of government officials in Aden was on sufferance by the STC, which has controlled the city since 2019. Hadi’s last visit to Aden as President took place in June 2018.

A few points need to be made about southern separatism, an issue which remains relevant. First, the STC is only one of many southern separatist factions, and many southerners continue to support Yemeni unity. Second, the STC’s international public prominence is due to UAE political, diplomatic, financial and military support. Third, the STC’s actual military control and political influence on the ground are limited to the areas of origin of its leaders: parts of the governorates of al-Dhala‘, Lahej and Abyan, as well as Aden city, reflecting the outcome of the internal PDRY struggle of 1986 (see pp. 139–40). By contrast, IRG support in the south came mainly from the eastern part of Abyan and Shabwa governorates. Most Hadramis and Mahris do not support either of these factions. Finally, STC governance is characterised by the same authoritarianism and oppression as found elsewhere. There are disappearances, arbitrary arrests including torture (with and without assistance from the UAE forces), and assassinations, particularly of Islamist political opponents.

The Saudi-Led Coalition and the ‘Withdrawal’ of the UAE

Relations between the two main partners of the Saudi-led coalition have continued their increasingly divergent paths in the Yemen war and beyond. Following the interrupted Hodeida offensive of 2018, in the face of the absence of strategy to defeat Ansar Allah and the increasing public relations disaster of the war, the UAE announced its ‘withdrawal’ from Yemen on 8 July 2019. Also promised was a shift from a military to a diplomatic strategy. All this had consequences on the ground: first, as mentioned above, it led the STC to take over Aden and expel the IRG from its official temporary capital. The increasing breach between KSA and UAE is mostly visible in Yemen where the UAE has supported STC forces fighting the IRG forces, including through direct military action. An example is Abyan in August 2017.

Second, it increased UAE reliance on its various clients, including the STC and its military forces in and around Aden (the Security Belts), those in Shabwa and Hadramaut (the Shabwani Defence Forces [formerly the Shabwani Elite Forces] and the Hadhrami Elite Forces), the Amaliqa (in the Tihama, Lahej, around Aden and beyond) and Tareq Saleh’s Guardians of the Republic. None of these is likely to act against its UAE paymaster. In addition, their rivalries and mutual hostility further strengthen UAE influence; for example, Amaliqa units are often deployed as buffers between STC and IRG forces.

It is also notable that the UAE’s ‘withdrawal’ remains partial. Although it withdrew military forces from positions in Aden, it remains present in the coalition HQ in Aden, as well as keeping forces in Mokha and in positions controlling the Bab al-Mandab, including the air facilities constructed in 2021 on Perim Island. Further east, the UAE has not relinquished control of Mukalla’s airport in Riyan, which remains closed to civilian traffic and whose role as a prison and torture site may remain active. Its handover of the al-Alam base in northern Shabwa to the re-established former Shabwani Elite Forces (now the Shabwani Defence Forces) in January 2022 could easily be reversed. And, most importantly, it has shown no sign of abandoning its base and control over the Balhaf gas export port and terminal.

One military event affected both the KSA and UAE regimes’ strategies and had a medium-term impact on their policies. Following a series of maritime and other incidents in 2019, a drone and missile strike on Saudi Arabia’s major oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September caused major fires and forced the temporary closure of the facilities, reducing Saudi oil exports by half for weeks. Although the Huthis claimed it, it was soon clear that the attacks came from the north and east and consequently could not have been Huthi initiated. However, then-US-President Donald Trump’s lukewarm response was certainly below the expectations of the Gulf states when he pointed out, ‘that was an attack on Saudi Arabia, that wasn’t an attack on us. If we decide to do something, they’ll be very much involved, and that includes payment, and they understand that fully.’7 Following this, and the actual Huthi attack on Abu Dhabi in January 2022, both states decided that they could not rely on the US to defend them and that self-reliance was essential. One of the outcomes of this change of perspective was in their strategy concerning Yemen.

Few UAE actions are helping the Saudi regime to find a face-saving exit from its Yemen quagmire. Until the April 2022 truce, the air war continued and, indeed, expanded. Huthi missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia increased in accuracy and frequency, with a focus on oil-related installations. In response to UAE support for the forces which expelled them from Shabwa governorate, they launched the first serious attacks on Abu Dhabi in January 2022,8 which damaged oil facilities and killed three civilians – an indication that the Huthis now take the UAE as seriously as they do the KSA. Coalition air raids on Yemen continued their downward trend. There were a total of 1,790 in 2021, the second-lowest figure since the war started, out of a total between March 2015 and December 2021 of 24,276 raids.9

Concerned about the weak support from the US, particularly after the Biden regime asserted its intention to bring the Yemen war to an end, the UAE and the KSA agreed to transfer formal authority from Hadi to the Presidential Leadership Council in Riyadh on 7 April 2022. Both parties hoped that ensuing negotiations would end attacks on their territories and enable them to terminate their military involvement in Yemen. Both do indeed appear determined to end their direct military involvement in Yemen, though their perception of a solution is unlikely to bring sustainable peace and development for Yemenis. Although the establishment of the PLC may have been intended to create a united front between UAE- and KSA-supported elements to confront the Huthis, its first six months have, predictably, been the scene of internal divisions and conflict between its disparate factions. In late October 2022, there is little indication of a shared strategy by the two neighbouring states currently dominating the policies of the IRG.

The Economic War

No fundamental ‘game-changing’ events have taken place in the economic war since the first edition of the book. People’s suffering increased as the economy continued to collapse with the worsening stranglehold of Hodeida and other ports. The country’s GDP has contracted by 50 percent since the war started, leaving Yemenis with a per capita income of about US $600, less than half of its value before the war. The human impact of this situation is discussed in more detail in the new Chapter 11 on the humanitarian crisis.

Alongside the blockade of the Red Sea ports, the economic war has been the main cause of the worsening of living conditions for the population at large. In addition to manipulation of fuel supplies and prices, the IRG’s shift of the headquarters of Central Bank of Yemen to Aden has been the main weapon of the economic war (see pp. 79–80). Its immediate and lasting impact has been the interruption of salary payments to about 1.2 million government staff, most of whom have been paid intermittently since then, averaging about half a month’s salary every few months, though the situation differs according to the ruling entity’s financial means. To help the IRG finance the import of basic necessities (remember that Yemen imports 90 percent of its staples, and all medical supplies), the KSA provided the Aden Central Bank of Yemen with US $2 billion in 2018, an amount that was exhausted by the end of 2020.

The other major element intended to strangle the Huthis financially has been the printing of currency by the IRG. This has led to increasing divergence of the value of the Yemeni riyal between the Huthi-controlled area and the rest of the country. Starting at YR 215 per US dollar in 2014, the currency rapidly lost value; but it was only with the printing of new, slightly different notes that the situation became critical. Ansar Allah banned the use of the new notes in the area it controls, thus keeping the exchange rate there at about YR 600 to the US dollar; meanwhile it rapidly deteriorated in the rest of the country, reaching a peak of YR 1700 to the US dollar in late 2021. The ousting of Hadi was accompanied by a renewed commitment from the KSA and the UAE to provide US $3 billion to support the Adenbased CBY; when it happens, this should help return the new riyals to a better exchange rate and reduce inflation for the citizens.

The political leaderships and warlords on all sides are seeking sources of funding. For the AA regime, the absence of international development financing, the contraction of the economy and the need to pay its fighters have led it to make even more demands on the 70 percent of Yemenis living in the areas it controls. Ansar Allah therefore imposes heavy and even multiple taxation and customs duties on local produce and economic activities, as well as on international humanitarian aid. It uses manipulation of the limited fuel supplies as a particularly effective means of increasing its income, as well as that of its own black marketeers.

The anti-Huthi forces have access to additional financial resources, primarily from their sponsors, the KSA and UAE regimes who finance humanitarian aid, military costs and even some development investments, particularly in the provision of services. They too use fuel as a main source of income.

The Environment

Updating the situation demands addressing the environmental crisis. As discussed below (pp. 259–67), environmental issues play a major role in the worsening living conditions of the population. Climate change and its impact are increasingly covered in writings about Yemen and here only two elements will be mentioned. First that in 2020, 2021 and 2022, there were devastating floods in many parts of the country on a largely unprecedented scale, a trend which is likely to become more frequent. Second, international attention has focused on the fate of the Safer FSO (floating storage and offloading) ship, moored about 7 km west of Ras Isa without maintenance or attention since 2015. Containing 1.1 million tons of crude oil, it has been on the verge of sinking or exploding for years. By 2022, multiple efforts by the UN and others to prevent this major environmental disaster for Yemen and the Red Sea have been ongoing for three years. Agreement has been reached, not for the first time. Whether the problem is solved before disaster strikes is, once again, something readers will be in a better position to assess. As of October 2022, the US $75 million needed to fund the first emergency part of the operation had been raised, while the cost of prevention is estimated at US $10 million, that of coping with the disaster is in the range of US $22 billion – not to mention the human suffering and the damage to the environment. It is worth noting that the wealthy international hydrocarbon companies have failed to contribute anything.

Helen Lackner,

Oxford, October 2022

Preface to the First Edition

Hope. Writing well into the third year of Yemen’s internationalised war, I hope, first and foremost, that the war has ended when you read this. Second, that the end of the war brings a lasting peace and that Yemen’s new leadership joins with its people to solve the country’s fundamental social, economic and political problems. Third, that Yemen’s unique culture can re-emerge allowing Yemenis of all ages to flourish and develop their talents. Fourth, that reconciliation, rather than revenge, is everyone’s priority. Fifth, that the states involved with Yemen focus on helping its people, rather than on pursuing their own geopolitical agendas. Finally that this book helps readers to understand why and how Yemen sank into the war, but also provides the elements needed to contribute to a peaceful and equitable future.

Yemen is in the grip of its most severe crisis: the civil war between forces loyal to the internationally recognised government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi and the Saudi-led coalition on the one side and those of the alliance between the Huthi rebel movement and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh on the other has devastated the country. On 12 July 2017, the Special Envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations told the Security Council that

the situation in Yemen remains extremely grave. The intensity of the conflict increases day after day … The humanitarian situation is appalling … The country is not suffering from a single emergency but a number of complex emergencies, which have affected more than 20 million people and whose scale and effect will be felt long after the end of the war. Fourteen million people are food insecure, of whom almost 7 million are at risk of famine … There are now over 300 000 suspected cases [of cholera] and over 1,700 have died as a result of the epidemic … The speed and scale of Yemen’s cholera outbreak highlights the consequences of a collapsed public sector system.1

This cholera epidemic was declared the worst ever recorded worldwide. At the end of his briefing, the UN’s Special Envoy expressed a view shared by many when he reminded the political leadership that

history will not judge kindly those Yemeni leaders who have used the war to increase their influence or profit from the public finances, and Yemenis’ patience will not last. The people need an alternative to politicians who work for their own interests and not for their country, who destroy and do not build, and who use the finances of the people and the state to enrich themselves, rather than serve the people.2

Despite this calamitous situation, compared with other crises in the Middle East, Yemen remains the least known and most neglected. In March 2017, a poll found that 51 percent of the UK’s population3 (and 63 percent of 18–24 year olds) did not know about the ongoing war, despite the fact that in previous weeks it had been mentioned daily in the media as one of the four countries where famine was likely to kill many thousands of children, men and women. The nightmare humanitarian crisis had also been subject of a specific appeal from the UK’s Disasters Emergency Committee in December 2016, which was covered by all media. In the course of 2016, moreover, Britain’s involvement in the war had attracted considerable public attention because of its weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and the latter’s role in the many air strikes on civilians in markets, mosques, weddings, funerals and hospitals, among others.

Why is there such widespread ignorance of a country in such deep crisis? Yemen is most definitely part of the Middle East, yet it has been deprived of the mainstream attention which has for decades focused on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and more recently the disastrous wars in Iraq and Syria. The Arabian Peninsula is known mostly as the home of the super-wealthy oil exporters, including the new tourist destination of Dubai. In fact, younger readers may be surprised to learn that Aden was a British colony until 1967 and then became the capital of the only socialist country in the region.

While the current equally devastating crisis in Syria is getting far more attention in the West, this is partly due to the ‘threat’ of hundreds of thousands Syrians seeking safety and refuge in Europe. Yemenis have even more hurdles to overcome before they reach the borders of fortress Europe: travelling through Saudi Arabia is by no means easy, crossing the Red or Arabian Seas would then mean travelling through many African countries alongside their desperate colleagues from Eritrea, Somalia and beyond. But even with full-scale war and the many dangers of being in Yemen, more people were still heading towards Yemen than away from it during the first two years of the war.

Geopolitics is frequently stated as the reason for international interest. In this respect Yemen should, in theory, receive considerable attention, given that it controls the strategically vital Bab al-Mandab Strait leading to the Red Sea, which is still a major route for international maritime trade. Yemen is also the poorest country in the Middle East and its living standards, prior to the war, were on a par with those of many African countries. Ranked 160th out of 188 in the UN’s human development ranking, Yemen is one of the few non-African countries in the low human development category. A possible explanation for the lack of attention on Yemen is that the situation in the country is complex. The humanitarian emergency which exploded in 2017 has been compounded by war, yet the crisis had roots in a combination of pre-existing factors acting in synergy: climate change, extreme water stress, rapid population growth, internal conflicts, a low-skilled labour force, decades of autocratic rule based on divisive patronage strategies, the existence of three states in the last half century, and neo-liberal development policies which have impoverished the majority. To cap all this, Yemen is all too often described as ‘tribal’, a blanket term popularly used as an instant simplistic label to condemn a society as backward and reduce the humanity of its people, as if tribal systems were anything other than just one form of social organisation among others.

Why should Yemen be given more attention? The country’s position on a major international trading route should be sufficient reason for serious interest by the mainly Asian and European states which depend on it. What little concern this country of 27 million has attracted from the outside world in recent decades has been largely as a result of US counter-terrorism policy, which is focused on the presence of jihadi groups, mainly al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula, that are given far more attention than they deserve.* The reality is that this demon is more a creature of Western political propaganda than a real international threat, and Muslims form the vast majority of those killed by jihadis. Moreover, for most Yemenis, jihadism is an insignificant threat in comparison with hunger, disease and other survival-related issues they face on a daily basis.

***

Given its population of more than 27 million people, Yemen deserves our concern and interest simply by virtue of elementary human compassion. The threatened famine affecting 7 million people is an emergency on such a scale that anyone with any sense of human solidarity should want to understand how this came about and help find a solution. Why and how can such a famine happen in the twenty-first century? Part of the answer is that this is largely due to the internationalised war and internal strife which are at the heart of the situation.

Yemen is an extremely beautiful country with fantastic landscapes of mountains, desert and coast. It also has many cultural features, including a unique architectural heritage as well as archaeological and cultural sites dating back to pre-history, which are of major significance in the history of the entire Arabian Peninsula and the broader Middle East. All these could easily make it a top destination for upmarket cultural and ‘hiking’ tourism as well as research. Yet it has escaped that fate due to limited infrastructure, the prevalence of terrorist incidents in the past three decades, the fact that English is not widely spoken – and, of course, the current war. In addition it is also the home of a people famous for their hospitality and generosity, traits which have somehow survived the worsening impoverishment and international hostility of the past few decades. I remember a friend telling me that in his home area people invited passing strangers to join them for lunch. I initially thought this was a slight exaggeration and that it was his way of saying people back home were friendly and generous, but driving through that very area later, farmers and others we drove past did indeed shout loud invitations to lunch.

***

Like so many others, my interest in Yemen and my sympathy with its people increased as soon as I arrived there. The country has remained my main interest and concern for more than four decades. Initially going to Aden, the capital of the then People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), in the 1970s, I intended to improve my Arabic and to understand the reasons why this colonial outpost had become the only socialist state in the Arab world. Living and working under the same conditions as Yemenis, I then did what many of them did, and moved to the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) to earn some money as my PDRY salary was substantially less than what I would have received from unemployment benefit in the UK. In the YAR, I found employment in a development project and thus started my involvement in the kind of rural work I had always dreamed of, and for which my social anthropology studies were helpful. Since that time, I have worked in most parts of rural Yemen. I thus have seen the changes of living conditions for rural and urban Yemenis throughout the country over much of the past half century.

Returning to analytical work happened both by choice and through the changing circumstances in many of the countries where I have worked. Years of field encounters with rural Yemenis in different regions gave me a good understanding of existing social and cultural differences. I also witnessed the impact of the autocratic regime and the internationally imposed neo-liberal development policies on people’s daily lives. I saw how the combination of these two factors contributed to people’s impoverishment and increasing frustration, which eventually blew up in the uprisings of 2011. These decades also saw significant changes and here, again, my long-term involvement enabled me to notice the significance of what might at first sight appear to be unique and isolated incidents. Some changes were positive such as improved communications, particularly the now almost universal presence of mobile telecoms and the ability to connect to the world through the internet. Many, however, were perceived as negative, such as the high cost associated with increased availability of medical services. Overall deteriorating living conditions affected the vast majority and were exacerbated by the lack of employment opportunities, including the dramatic reduction in emigration destinations.

This long and intimate experience of most parts of Yemen has given me a unique insight into the social, political and economic transformations which have taken place throughout this period. Without writing a personal memoir, I have tried to reflect some of these experiences in this book. However, its main objectives are to present the country, its people and the socio-economic and political changes which have led to the current crisis. I hope the book informs readers whose involvement and concern for Yemen is new. My insights should also assist others who have been or are currently involved with the country, whether in humanitarian and development work or as diplomats, journalists or even analysts and politicians. For them, my experience of the country and focus on ordinary citizens should improve their understanding and, ideally, assist in developing strategies and policies which will address their challenges. Far too often only the views of the elite are heard at the expense of the majority. Younger Yemenis and many in the diaspora may also learn something new about aspects of their country. Or at least they may benefit from a vantage point based on a broader context.

The book starts with analysis of the country’s main political features. Chapter 1 presents events and the situation since the crisis started in 2011 with the popular uprisings, the apparent downfall of President Ali Abdullah Saleh after thirty-three years in power, and the internationally supported transition regime of the period 2012–14. It also addresses the war, which became internationalised in 2015 with the intervention of the Saudi-led coalition and which, by mid-2017, at the time of going to press, shows no sign of ending. Chapter 2 discusses the role of other countries in Yemen’s development in the past century, focusing on those which have the greatest influence, Saudi Arabia and other Peninsula states, as well as the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. Chapter 3 addresses the country’s recent history, the different social