Historicizing the Enlightenment, Volume 1: Politics, Religion, Economy, and Society in Britain

By Michael McKeon

The Enlightenment has been blamed for some of the most deadly developments of modern life: racism and white supremacy, imperialist oppression, capitalist exploitation, neoliberal economics, scientific positivism, totalitarian rule. These developments are thought to have grown from principles that are rooted in the soil of the Enlightenment: abstraction, reduction, objectification, quantification, division, universalization. Michael McKeon’s new book corrects this defective view by historicizing the Enlightenment--by showing that the Enlightenment has been abstracted from its history. From its past: critics have ignored that Enlightenment thought is a reaction against deadly traditions that precede it. From its present: the Enlightenment extended its reactive analysis of the past to its own present through self-analysis and self-criticism. From its future: much of what’s been blamed amounts to the failure of its posterity to sustain Enlightenment principles. To historicize the Enlightenment requires that we conjure what it was like to live through the emergence of concepts and practices that are now commonplace—society, privacy, the public, the market, experiment, secularity, representative democracy, human rights, social class, sex and gender, fiction, the aesthetic attitude. McKeon’s book argues the continuity of Enlightenment thought, its consistency and integrity across this broad range of conceptual domains. It also shows how the Enlightenment has shaped our views of both tradition and modernity, and the revisionary work that needs to be done in order to understand our place in the future. In the process, Historicizing the Enlightenment exemplifies a distinctive historiography and historical method.
 
Published by Bucknell University Press. Distributed worldwide by Rutgers University Press.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bucknell University Press
• Release date: Jul 14, 2023
• ISBN: 9781684484737

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Cover: Historicizing the Enlightenment, Politics, Religion, Economy, and Society in Britain by Michael Mckeon

HISTORICIZING THE ENLIGHTENMENT

HISTORICIZING THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Volume 1

Politics, Religion, Economy, and Society in Britain

MICHAEL MCKEON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: McKeon, Michael, 1943– author.

Title: Historicizing the Enlightenment / Michael McKeon.

Description: Lewisburg, Pennsylvania : Bucknell University Press, [2023] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Contents: V. 1. Politics, Religion, Economy, and Society in Britain—v. 2. Literature, the Arts, and the Aesthetic.

Identifiers: LCCN 2022054831 | ISBN 9781684484713 (v. 1 ; paperback) | ISBN 9781684484720 (v. 1 ; hardcover) | ISBN 9781684484737 (v. 1 ; epub) | ISBN 9781684484744 (v. 1 ; pdf) | ISBN 9781684484768 (v. 2 ; hardcover) | ISBN 9781684484751 (v. 2 ; paperback) | ISBN 9781684484775 (v. 2 ; epub) | ISBN 9781684484782 (v. 2 ; web pdf)

Subjects: LCSH: Great Britain—Intellectual life—18th century. | Enlightenment—Great Britain. | Great Britain—Civilization—18th century.

Classification: LCC DA485 .M35 2023 | DDC 941.07—dc23/eng/20230203

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022054831

A British Cataloging-in-Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Copyright © 2023 by Michael McKeon

All rights reserved

No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. Please contact Bucknell University Press, Hildreth-Mirza Hall, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, PA 17837–2005. The only exception to this prohibition is fair use as defined by U.S. copyright law.

Credit lines for previously published material are listed in the Source Notes section.

References to internet websites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing. Neither the author nor Bucknell University Press is responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was prepared.

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

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Distributed worldwide by Rutgers University Press

Contents

Introduction

Periodizing the Enlightenment

Understanding Enlightenment Thought

Enlightenment Separation and Conflation

Experimental Method

Quantification

Politics

(Civil) Society

The Public Sphere

Capitalist and Enlightenment Universality

Imperialism

Macro-pastoralism

Conjectural History

Slavery

1 Tradition as Tacit Knowledge

Tradition

Ideology

The Aesthetic

2 Civil and Religious Liberty: A Case Study in Secularization

Accommodation

Civil Society

The Empirical Criterion

The Sociology of Group Formation

Accommodating God’s Will: Thoughts, Speech, Actions

Defining Spheres of Discourse

The Three Negative Liberties

Secularization

3 Virtual Reality

Religion

Corporation

Polity and Economy

Capitalist Universality

False Consciousness and Uneven Development

The Commodity Form

The Trope of the Fetish

Parody

The Trope of the Invisible Hand

Conceptual Abstraction

Capitalist and Enlightenment Universality

Superstructure and Dialectics

Conjectural History

Polity and Society

The Public Sphere

The Two Publics

Print

Experimental Science

Experience and Experiment

Instruments: Experimental versus Artful

Extending Experiment I: Political Philosophy

Extending Experiment II: Beyond Observables

The Imagination

4 Gender and Sex, Status and Class

From Patriarchalism to Modern Patriarchy

From Domestic Economy to Domestic Ideology

Separate Spheres?

Sex and Sex Consciousness

The Two-Sex Model?

The Three-Gender System: Conflation I

Gender as Culture: Conflation II

The Dialectic of Sexuality and Class

The Common Labor of Sexuality and Class

Sodomy and Aristocracy

Types of Masculinity

5 Biography, Fiction, Personal Identity

Biography, Fiction, and the Common

Biography, Fiction, and the Actual

Biography, Fiction, and the Virtual

The Self behind Self-Fashioning

From Secret History to Novel

The Rise of Personal Identity

6 Historical Method

Distance and Proximity

Historicizing Empiricism

Historical Method: Matching Particulars and Generals

Dialectical Opposition I: History as Focalizations of Perspective

Dialectical Opposition II: History as Moments of Temporality

Dialectical Opposition III: History as Levels of Structure

Acknowledgments

Notes

Source Notes

Index

HISTORICIZING THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Introduction

To historicize is to enclose what we think we know in a spatiotemporal frame that transforms its meaning. To historicize the Enlightenment requires that we try to imagine what it was like to live through the first emergence of concepts and practices that are now commonplace.

Enlightenment is a cognitive state or action. The Enlightenment situates this state or action in a particular historical period. My concern in this study is with the period of the English—after 1707, the British and Scottish—Enlightenment, which by loose convention comprises the century and a half from 1650 to 1800.¹ But because my argument will be that with the Enlightenment came a new way of thinking about the world, my concern is also with Enlightenment thought as such. This point requires emphasis. Historicizing the Enlightenment is an exercise in intellectual history that seeks to overcome misconceptions about what we refer to when speaking of Enlightenment as the innovative mode of understanding that characterizes the period of the Enlightenment. I’m not concerned to claim that this innovative way of thinking has no precedent before this period. My central aim is to argue the nature of Enlightenment thought by showing its continuity and integrity across a broad range of conceptual domains. To be clear, what I mean by Enlightenment thought is not its high philosophy (although philosophy will have an important place in the sources I rely on), but its way of thinking, the concepts and ideas that underlie what makes the Enlightenment distinctive and innovative as a way of thinking. So, along with philosophical texts my sources will include writings in advocacy and controversy on political, social, economic, and religious topics, works of literature and reflections on the aesthetic, and a broad range of cultural commentary.

Historicizing the Enlightenment consists of two volumes: volume 1 concerns Politics, Religion, Economy, and Society; volume 2 treats Literature, the Arts, and the Aesthetic. Together they construct an overarching perspective on the nature of Enlightenment thought: how it has shaped our views of both tradition and modernity and the revisionary work that needs to be done in order to understand our place in the future. In the process, Historicizing the Enlightenment exemplifies a distinctive historiography and historical method. This introduction will begin with the fundamental terms of my argument, the relationship between Enlightenment as a period and as a new way of thinking. On this basis I’ll then turn to the most important criticisms that have been leveled at Enlightenment thought, and to a brief summary of how I’ll counter those criticisms in the body of this volume.

Periodizing the Enlightenment

Never mind that the Enlightenment is an invention of the late nineteenth century, the Scottish Enlightenment a fabrication of the early twentieth century, the Enlightenment Project, of more recent pedigree than the Manhattan Project, just a scheme largely devised in the past two decades. What possible bearing can genuine scholarship have upon claims about the conceptual roots of modernity which are writ large and on stilts?²

Like any historical period, the Enlightenment has undergone fluctuations in the way it’s been understood by its posterity. For a great number of thinking people, the historical significance of the Enlightenment—what it stands for—is a matter of great cultural importance, a touchstone of critical belief about not only how modernity in the West came to be but also what it amounts to. Especially in recent decades, the Enlightenment commitment to principles of analysis, division, reduction, abstraction, objectification, quantification, and universalization has been acutely criticized both in itself and as bearing responsibility for some of the most destructive developments of modern life.³ My purpose in this volume is to correct the defective understanding of Enlightenment thought in itself, and of the Enlightenment as a period phenomenon. To be clear at the outset, I don’t suppose that this basic misconception has dominated the majority of recent studies of the Enlightenment. That notion is belied both by projects in the general and explicit reappraisal of the Enlightenment,⁴ and by the work of numerous scholars whose treatment of particular topics in the field of literature implicitly affirms a considered approach to it.⁵ My concern is rather with a diffuse and pervasive conjecture about the nature and sources of modernity whose influence has required, at least in part, that it not be looked into very deeply. Evidence of it isn’t hard to find, as this introduction will document from time to time. I’ll begin with the period problem: the misconception of the Enlightenment in its relation to its past, self-reflectively to its present, and to its future. My argument is that the critique of the historical period of the Enlightenment has abstracted it from its past, present, and future—from its history.

1) The modern reaction against the Enlightenment, largely confined to a problematic view of its future influence, ignores the Enlightenment’s past—that is, the Enlightenment’s own explicit and self-conscious reaction against the traditional domination of unexamined authority. When we criticize the innovations of the Enlightenment, we do so as human agents who are capable of both action and passion—who can both act in pursuit of our choices and suffer effects we haven’t chosen. However, our conception of Enlightenment agents is too often by this standard partial: we ascribe to them the former but not the latter capacity, and if we suffer the consequences of their actions we tend not to ask what they may have suffered and whether their actions may be a consequence of that suffering.

My aim is to overcome this partiality in structural rather than evaluative terms. My point is not that the negative effects of Enlightenment innovations may be balanced by adducing their positive effects. This can and has been argued; but it’s a method of qualitative accounting that leads in a different direction. My point is, first of all, not evaluative but structural because historiographic actions have consequences, but they are also the consequence of antecedent actions. Consequence has two distinct meanings. As chronology consequence is clearly evident: one event follows another. Consequence as determinacy in the strong sense of causation must be rigorously demonstrated; in the broader sense of the setting of outer limits, it may be assumed in the spirit of further inquiry. I observe below that the determinacy of Enlightenment thought on what follows it has been too routinely asserted without examination. We need to ask how Enlightenment thought might be a reaction against, and therefore determined by, what precedes it. By the same token, we must ask if Enlightenment thought is not in opposition to, but continues, extends, and is determined by, modes of thought antecedent to its own. These are not quibbles, but a ramification of taking periodization seriously as a tool to think with, one that puts in practice the fundamental premise that historical understanding is a matter of both continuity and discontinuity.

2) Propelled by its initial momentum, the Enlightenment extended its reactive analysis of the past to its own present through self-analysis and self-criticism. There’s no doubt that the Enlightenment played a determinant role in initiating the divisions that characterize the modern world. But by the same token, the Enlightenment is also responsible for modern impulses that complicate, mitigate, or overcome those divisions in the ongoing process of historical change. The modern critique of the Enlightenment, largely oblivious to these immediate and local reactions to division, tends to look beyond the Enlightenment itself for the kind of conceptual movement that, set going by categorial division, elaborated methods of synthesizing the new categories that division generated, a movement that began in the Enlightenment itself. A classic example of the Enlightenment’s self-analytic and self-critical impulse can be seen in the trajectory of thinking about the grounds of empirical epistemology in the half century between the writings of John Locke and David Hume. Challenging the metaphysical view of mind, Locke posited two separate operations of the understanding: sensation of experience and reflection on the mental experience of processing that sensation. Inspired by Locke’s empirical method, Hume used it to for a closer analysis of these mental operations and found that they’re not really separate: what we know is a function of how we know.⁶

3) On the one hand, a common modern devaluation of what the Enlightenment achieved is unhistorical because measured against modern achievement, and incongruous with what might be expected when Enlightenment innovation is first underway. On the other, what can look from a modern perspective like the failure of the Enlightenment must be distinguished from the failure of its posterity—of its future—to sustain Enlightenment principles. Belated and distorted versions of Enlightenment principles have then been read back retrospectively into the Enlightenment. Behind these errors, which are to a real degree subject to empirical inquiry, lie more profound and difficult questions, central to historiography, that I’ve already alluded to. When we say that the Enlightenment led to or was responsible for or determined later developments, the nature of the relation we posit is unavoidably more problematic than the language itself suggests. What concepts or events might have entered into the process of transmission to influence the nature of what was transmitted? Is the relation between earlier and later phenomena thought to be one of cause and effect, or are the earlier phenomena thought to result from a motive that foresees and affirms the nature of the later phenomena? Post hoc non est propter hoc. The stringent requirements for showing a causal relationship are well known; and what has been called the law of unintended consequences makes tenuous the assumption that an original function or purpose will be replicated in the minds of those who preside over and sanction what’s taken to be its later fulfillment. Easy outrage at our forebears for having promoted policies that we take to be the straightforward antecedents of what is currently outrageous can assume on our part a comparative moral rectitude that is facile and unearned.

Again, my purpose is not to apologize for the Enlightenment but to take history seriously. However, because my aim is to defend the Enlightenment on its own terms, I run the risk of appearing to denigrate the tradition that the Enlightenment defined itself against. In correcting the historical balance at one end I inevitably, but only temporarily, overbalance at the other. My aim is to think historically, not to take sides. The distinction between tradition and modernity is central to my argument; but although it has substance in my own thinking, to give it substance for my readers I must first formulate it heuristically in the schematic form of the bare distinction itself.⁷ However schematic, I intend the distinction between tradition and modernity to be understood as a dialectical relationship, whereby the two are constituted over against each other as what the other is not. By this understanding, the period of the Enlightenment, mediating between these two greater periods, must partake of both.

I ask readers to understand this distinction, like periodization itself, as a tool to think with, a methodological generalization whose plausibility and utility will be tested by the argument that follows. My generalization is likely to be refuted especially by readers whose specialist knowledge, in this case of what I’ve called tradition, will quickly and reasonably adduce concrete instances that defy my abstraction. I urge them to suspend the impulse to reject my argument until they’ve had an opportunity to test it more fully by sampling a more extensive portion of it, as well as on the basis of this consideration. Like any tool, periodization leaves its mark on its material. It imposes on the fluid medium of temporality a chronological quantification that gives categories like tradition and modernity the definitive difference of before and after. However, Historicizing the Enlightenment is an intellectual history, and the difference between these periods is substantive and conceptual. This being the case, where tradition ends and modernity begins varies according to variations between particular concepts under study, as well as between the particular national and regional traditions that constitute tradition in general. I urge specialists to read with a confidence that although tradition refers to a period, the fact that this period is defined conceptually means that it’s adjustable according to differences in specific and local conceptual histories. The chronological breadth of the English Enlightenment as I define it, 1650–1800, acknowledges this variation; and in particular cases these dates should also be seen as adjustable.⁸

The method of reading history I’ve entered into is itself a product of Enlightenment thought. By this I mean not periodization as such, which was practiced long before the Enlightenment, but the hypothesis of a difference between periods produced by a method that attends closely to testimonies and evidence both of a continuity between them and of discontinuities within each. (By the same token, I speak of the Enlightenment in the hope that this, too, will be read as a manner of speaking, appearing to take in the generality of Enlightenment thinkers in order to throw into relief particular thinkers and modes of thought as a distinguishable part within a greater whole.) This attention to the empirical grounds for periodization aims to adduce and analyze relevant evidence in order to achieve an increasingly precise understanding of difference based on standards of not certainty but probability. These categories—empirical evidence, probability, historicity itself—are themselves products of the period and the method of thought this inquiry aims to define, and they must guide the reader’s judgment of its adequacy in defining the Enlightenment in relation to, and in distinction from, tradition and modernity.

To characterize periodization as a tool to think with runs counter to the anti-Enlightenment view that formulating categories like historical periods is a technique of abstraction that overrides and erases the concrete particularity of things. The chapters that follow will argue the fallacy of this view by showing, across a broad range of subject matters, that the Enlightenment innovated and undertook to practice a method of abstraction that was sanctioned and authorized by an ongoing, self-conscious attention to the adequacy of totalities to the divisions they subsume, of generalities to the particulars they enclose, and of abstraction to the concrete entities it abstracts from. My claim is not that this attention was fully and regularly sustained, but that Enlightenment abstraction was committed in principle to accounting for the plurality of concrete instances, because this was the end for which Enlightenment abstraction was undertaken. So too, the rhetoric of periodization. Although the period is spoken of as though a singular self-identical subject, this should not be taken to conflict with the principle, evident in the multiple contingencies that affect the discrimination of the Enlightenment from both tradition and modernity as I’ve just discussed them, whereby periods are probable and relative constructions based on a plurality of testimonies and evidence.

My analysis of the Enlightenment’s role in crucial historical developments like scientific method, capitalism, and imperialism should be read in the light of the foregoing discussion of periodization. Any attempt to discriminate the period of the Enlightenment runs up against the ongoing nature of temporal existence, which from an ontological perspective precludes analysis. My analysis of the Enlightenment period aims to acknowledge rather than ignore this perspective by proposing a dialectical historiography.

I’ll turn now from the Enlightenment as a period to Enlightenment as an innovative mode of thought, which will involve a summary account of, and challenge to, the criticisms that have been lodged against it. I’ll abstract from this discussion a conceptual framework that’s also a chronological framework for understanding Enlightenment thought as it emerged from tradition and precipitated modernity. I’ll then summarize several period developments selected from the following chapters that clearly exemplify this framework, as well as significant criticisms of Enlightenment thought that are specific to these exemplary cases. Along with these exemplary cases, I’ll underscore several others that exemplify the failure of the Enlightenment to pursue its distinctive program of innovation. These are not exceptions that prove the rule. Some may be seen as failures to overcome, or even to identify, the tacit force of traditional thought. In others, Enlightenment thought may have aggravated the dogma of tradition by assimilating it to contemporary practice. I don’t think these failures countermand the distinctive program of innovation I advance as a corrective to fundamental misconceptions of Enlightenment thought. I mark them here because I think no revisionary effort can succeed without the will to specify what lies beyond revision.

Understanding Enlightenment Thought

Let me recall the terms I used to summarize the critical denunciation of Enlightenment thought: analysis, division, reduction, abstraction, objectification, quantification, universalization. These principles are criticized for imposing on human experience a dominating structure of dichotomous opposition. In this view, rational and empirical analysis reduces and abstracts the full variety and rich multiplicity of existence to one model. Objectification fragments the fluid continuity of experiential process into static products divested of their ties to each other and of their generative, often subjective, sources. Quantification—spatiotemporal measurement, statistical computation, experimental method, commodity exchange—sacrifices concrete qualitative difference to a universal standard of comparability and knowledge. The effect is to make differences absolute and irreconcilable except in quantitative terms. Enlightenment claims to inclusiveness and universality, made in the guise of egalitarian pluralism, are belied by the actual effects of methods like these, which erase difference and promote the entrenchment of traditional prejudice and privilege in the name of change, aggravated by the pretense of actual innovation and reform. Taken together, these elements of Enlightenment thought are condemned as having transformed knowledge as inquiry into power as domination.

The proponents of Enlightenment thought saw things differently. Based on the cognitive premise that knowledge is the product of our sensible experience and our empirically valid inferences—in related terms, the product of our logically cogent discernment and the judgments it dictates—Enlightenment thought excludes what fails or evades these empirical and rational trials. It directs us toward what can be known empirically and rationally, and away from what, although justified by tradition, custom, and other kinds of authority, cannot. Enlightenment quantification created not a problem of partiality but a solution to it, because it vastly improved on the results of assessing the whole according to one or another standard that are qualitatively different and therefore inevitably partial.

The Enlightenment emerged in reaction against a traditional wisdom that took knowledge to be an integral whole whose integrity was entailed in the qualitative priority and determinacy of one of its parts, commonly religion or theology, or any part that fostered the being and purpose of the whole, over all others.⁹ The rule of that part was taken to be self-evident; Enlightenment thought asked if its rule was affirmed by an independent standard of evaluation that was separable from its own tacit conviction, providing grounds for comparing it with other parts. The impulse of Enlightenment thought was to reduce phenomena to their simplest and smallest units, or (what amounts to the same thing) to abstract phenomena from the context or practice that they exist in but that are not integral to them. In other words, Enlightenment thought disintegrated the presumed integrity of traditional cognitive wholes by applying rational and empirical standards to their analysis. Tradition tacitly assumed that the being and purpose of the parts that composed these wholes subserved only the greater being and purpose of those wholes. Enlightenment partialization found that this assumption obscured or denied the integrity of the parts themselves, which were knowable and epistemologically self-sufficient wholes, in their own right. Subsumed under greater wholes, the particular qualities and character of what traditionally were deemed mere parts of wholes were rendered not simply insignificant but invisible.

Traditional and customary authorities are tacit and total: they go without saying and possess the self-evidence of what’s taken for granted as true. To analyze authority is to make the tacit explicit, dividing its supposedly irreducible integrity into parts in order to discover their relationship to each other and to the whole.¹⁰ In their self-evidence, traditional wholes are absolute abstractions and preclude the acknowledgment of their concrete parts; or, in other terms, they’re concrete abstractions. Enlightenment knowledge abstracts the parts that compose abstract wholes and thereby gives them concretion. Another way of figuring the difference between traditional and Enlightenment knowledge is in terms of their epistemological procedures. Tradition begins at the top of the hierarchy of what can be known and derives all lower knowledge from that premise. Enlightenment begins at the bottom, where the actual units of knowledge have been rendered indivisible, and derives all higher knowledge from this lowest level.

I’ve been invoking empiricism and the empirical in the familiar terms of a knowledge based on experience and derived from our sense impressions of the material world around us. On the authority of nothing less than Enlightenment thought itself, empiricism is customarily opposed to the notion that knowledge is innate and a priori, based in an extrasensory, indwelling or transcendent, realm of pre-existent ideas. This understanding of empirical knowledge conceives it in terms of its source, which I point out not to question it but to observe that empiricism also involves, less familiarly but consequentially, a method of knowing. And to make this point I intervene in my exposition of Enlightenment thought because empirical method is another way of characterizing the method of making tacit knowledge explicit. This principle has an importance that invites overstatement: empiricism is not matter but method, not content but form, not the actual but the virtual. As I’ll elaborate later on in this volume, its Enlightenment proponents practiced empirical method on phenomena, beyond actuality, that inhabited the virtual realm of the ideational and the mental. And as a practice, empiricism entailed the analysis of wholes into increasingly particulate units that were susceptible in turn to further breakdown. The fundamental difference between experience and experiment in the Enlightenment theory of scientific method might seem, by implication, to separate the experimental attitude of active attention from the undiscriminated mass of brute experience on which it focused its systematic inquiry. But experience and experiment have the same root; and whereas the French language has no separate word for experiment, the English separation intimates the conflationary impulse that is already implicit in experience itself as a dialectical negation of what’s truly unsusceptible of analysis by virtue of its a priori givenness.

To return to my exposition: arguing the negative consequences of Enlightenment partialization, the critique of the Enlightenment evokes as its alternative the traditional vision of wholeness. Yet the positive standard of this critique—the value of difference, multiplicity, particularity, quality, subjectivity, and the like—is not the traditional and tacit norm of the integral and overarching whole, but the modern norm of Enlightenment partialization and the integrity of the part. And on reflection this isn’t surprising, because anti-Enlightenment thought is also modern, devoid of the tacitness of tradition and armed with the instruments of explicit and self-conscious analysis that it has learned from the Enlightenment to deploy. In other words, the critique of the Enlightenment affirms the traditional vision of a singular wholeness, but in the partializing terms of that vision’s critique. Are the Enlightenment and its critique, although different in substance, therefore epistemologically equivalent?

The partiality entailed in Enlightenment thought is not absolute but operational and heuristic, which is to say that its negative aim of exclusion predicates a positive consequence of inclusion. The Enlightenment analysis of the traditional whole excludes the presumption of its integrity in order to disclose and include the integrity—the existence and coherence—of the part-turned-whole that the tradition’s presumption renders invisible. But Enlightenment partiality does not thereby exclude the traditional whole as such from epistemological understanding. Rather, it mobilizes the rational and empirical method of inquiry that reframes traditional and analyzes emergent knowledge through the experimental interplay of parts and wholes, which entails simultaneously the negative exclusion and the positive inclusion of knowledge. The Enlightenment reframing of tradition’s tacit whole results, moreover, in a new and dynamic whole, a totality composed of multiple wholes and subject to ongoing totalization fueled by this ongoing experimentation.

Anti-Enlightenment partiality that criticizes Enlightenment partiality precludes the movement from negative exclusion to positive inclusion. Its critical focus on the Enlightenment is absolute because, paradoxically, it can conceive no alternative to it. Derivative of what it criticizes, anti-Enlightenment is itself the positive future that it cannot conceive because it is immobilized, one foot still rooted in the period it would negate. But anti-Enlightenment is also compromised by its opportunistic endorsement of a past, the wholes of tradition, that is recommended by little more than its repudiation by the Enlightenment and therefore offers no ground for positive inclusion. Hence the need to historicize the historical period of the Enlightenment by historicizing anti-Enlightenment.

The difference between tacit and explicit conceptual relations clarifies why the new whole of Enlightenment knowledge can be figured as a totality subject to ongoing totalization. Traditional knowledge is tacit in that it acknowledges distinctions between the parts of a whole but not their separability. Enlightenment separation has several consequences. Most important, only when parts are detached and separated from each other sufficiently to be conceived as such can they be entered into active relation. Moreover, because the nature of the relationship between parts contributes to their meaning, their separation subtly alters and sharpens their semantic and substantive force. Enlightenment separation creates the conditions for a new sort of power, the self-constitution of knowledge. Once separated, conceptual parts become subject to actively willed reconception and resituation in relation to other parts, whether in reciprocal mutuality or competitive conflict, but in either case as parts of a whole that is new by virtue of its ostensive, self-conscious fabrication. This may enable the resolution of old problems that had not been amenable to solution, but also the conceptualization of new problems that couldn’t have risen to awareness under the aegis of tradition.

So, if we step back from the Enlightenment partialization of categories that traditionally were distinguishable but not separable from each other, we gain perspective on how, in its analytic division of distinction, separation creates the conditions for innovative conflation that, because knowingly undertaken, cannot be taken for granted but is subject to debate and ongoing reconception and resituation. The fruit of Enlightenment thought is therefore not only division or separation but also the innovative conflations that are consequent on separation. By conflation I mean convergence not blending, which might suggest an illusory revival of a whole consisting of distinct but inseparable parts. The result of Enlightenment conflation is instead a dialectical category, a self-standing whole that’s both divisible into its component parts and subsumable into a greater whole of which it constitutes one part. I hope to show that the broad historical trajectory from tradition to enlightenment is defined in conceptual terms by the schematic movement from tacit difference to explicit separation, and then, sometimes quite punctually, to conflation. If the foregoing account strikes some readers as an idealization of Enlightenment thought, I urge them to recall that my aim is just that: to define the body of ideas that distinguish Enlightenment thought in itself, and as it sought to distinguish itself from tradition.

Enlightenment Separation and Conflation: Some Examples

In the following chapters I’ll offer arguments and evidence to support the thesis that Enlightenment thought across a range of fields¹¹ underwent the kind of development that’s schematically represented by the movement from distinction to separation and, to different degrees, conflation. I’ll now sample several examples of this conceptual development.

And because it’s important that the reader have a concrete sense of the anti-Enlightenment criticism that I’m responding to, I’ll also sample excerpts of that criticism keyed to the relevant examples of conceptual development. One appraisal holds that While the Enlightenment has enabled emancipation, human rights, democracy, and freedom through its much-celebrated exercise of reason, it has also led to colonialism, imperialism, slavery, and crimes against humanity, ironically through the same ‘reasoning’.… Enlightenment rationalism and empiricism also created ‘scientific racism’ consolidated by a power and knowledge system used to justify colonialism and subjugate other knowledges.¹² Another critic speaks of the Enlightenment’s faith in a universal Reason, the transcendent subject of Enlightenment theories, totalizing and universalistic theories such as those of the Enlightenment.¹³ In the words of another, One finds in the writings of the Frankfurt School a clinging to the Enlightenment notion that freedom depends on the reason of the individual and the individual can exercise reason best in a condition of autonomy.… By excluding mental operations from the domain of historical materialism, Marx remains within the traditional, Enlightenment metaphysic.¹⁴ Another critic maintains that privileging abstraction over historical accounts of difference, I suggest, is one of the forms of mystification that characterizes all Enlightenment ‘knowledge.’ ¹⁵ And the judgment of another is that The legacy of the Enlightenment, of the scientific and critical effort of the Enlightenment … to separate fact from the values of a crumbling tradition, separated fact from all values—bequeathing a world in which fact is a measurable quantity while value is man-made and illusory.… It was when superior individuals of eighteenth-century intellect discovered in themselves the new imaginative faculty that they became romanticists.¹⁶

There’s a broad consistency in anti-Enlightenment critique. In one appraisal, Enlightenment thinkers … understood difference as only an external phenomenon and therefore inconsequential and ephemeral, while the internal structure of the mind and reason were universal, eternal, and essential.… Governed by epistemological interests in order and knowledge produced through a largely taxonomic discourse, Enlightenment thinking focuses on the empirical study, the Cartesian paradigm.¹⁷ Another thought that scientific method epitomized the problem, because it entailed the belief that the more metaphysically comfortless and morally insignificant our vocabulary, the likelier we are to be ‘in touch with reality’ or to be ‘scientific,’ or to describe reality as it wants to be described and thereby get it under control.¹⁸ But the following critic argues that at the heart of the problem was the fallacy of enlightenment itself. From the seventeenth century onwards it was a commonplace that, unlike the scholastics and Aristotle, we moderns … had stripped away interpretation and theory and confronted fact and experience just as they are. It was precisely in virtue of this that those moderns proclaimed and named themselves the Enlightenment.… The Enlightenment is consequently the period par excellence in which most intellectuals lack self-knowledge.¹⁹

Some of these denunciations betray the influence of the two best-known misconstructions of the Enlightenment. Because their critiques are unrivaled in their celebrity I’ll take the liberty of going beyond citation to summary, and summary refutation.

The first, Max Horkheimer’s and Theodore W. Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, holds that the Enlightenment promotes the universality of ideas, a domination in the conceptual sphere [that] is raised up on the basis of actual domination.²⁰ Horkheimer and Adorno partialize the Enlightenment and confuse it with the tradition it would replace—and it’s a confusion on which they insist: The Enlightenment recognizes as being and occurrence only what can be apprehended in unity.… Its rationalist and empiricist versions do not part company on that point. The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual.… Abstraction, the tool of enlightenment, treats its objects as did fate.… It liquidates them. The whole as whole … necessarily leads to the execution of the particular (7, 13, 22). The execution of the particular describes from the other end the universality of ideas that is in their view the Enlightenment project. To affirm this reduction of Enlightenment thought to an a priori and unqualified universality requires that the critics erase the recourse to particularity that grounds universality in empirical rationality. Moreover, the dominant conventions of science are the same conventions [that] define the notion of linguistic and conceptual clarity, the false clarity of what is actually an impoverished and debased language (xiv).

Like my Historicizing, their Dialectic observes the relation between the Enlightenment and enlightenment as such, but only to render it absolute. It is not merely the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century that … is relentless but … the advance of thought itself. By this logic, the Enlightenment only exemplifies the problematic nature of knowledge as such: all thought, by construing, enclosing, incorporating, universalizes and thereby dominates, in its implacable progression, what it thinks about. Speciously indicting the Enlightenment of a transhistorical claim to universality, Dialectic of Enlightenment is really a universalizing polemic against the historicity of knowledge (20). Moving swiftly from Homer to Sade, the culture industry, and fascist antisemitism, the