Why Does God Seem So Hidden?: A Trinitarian Theological Response to J. L. Schellenberg’s Problem of Divine Hiddenness

By Joshua C. Waltman

Why does God seem so hidden, obscure, and silent? Why doesn't he make himself known in a more explicit way to those who dispute his existence? This line of questioning presents a perplexing conundrum for Christian theologians. On the one hand, Christians affirm that God's revelation of himself is sufficient, but, on the other hand, it appears that some genuine seekers remain unconvinced of his existence. In recent decades, philosopher J. L. Schellenberg has proposed an argument for atheism that attempts to exploit this apparent contradiction.
This book offers a new take by approaching the conversation using a Trinitarian theological lens. The character of Trinitarian love shapes the way God communicates in pursuit of relationships. Namely, God desires spiritually oriented, communal divine-human relationships, and this endeavor necessarily entails hiddenness. This work proposes five spiritual criteria that an individual must meet to be open to having a relationship with the triune God, and these are the criteria that atheists have failed to consider. Articulating these five is exactly what is needed to resolve the vexing theological puzzle of divine hiddenness.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pickwick Publications
• Release date: Apr 6, 2023
• ISBN: 9781666760873

Joshua C. Waltman

Joshua C. Waltman is a theologian, Christian apologist, writer, teacher, and librarian. He currently serves as the Coordinator of the Learning Commons at the Jerry Falwell Library and Adjunct Professor in the Rawlings School of Divinity at Liberty University in Lynchburg, Virginia. He holds a bachelor's degree (Philosophy and Religion) and two master's degrees (Theology and Apologetics) from Liberty University, an MSLS degree from the University of Kentucky (Library Science), and a PhD from Columbia International University (Theological Studies). He is a passionate advocate for the radical pursuit of both truth and love in the academy, the local church, and the Christian life.

Book preview

1

Framing the Issue of God’s Hiddenness

Introduction

The phenomenon known as divine hiddenness recognizes that God’s presence is to some degree obscure to his creatures. Scripture captures the pleas of those who have experienced the deep anguish that is often associated with having God’s presence obscured. Most notably, many of the psalms of lament provide model prayers for those who are experiencing calamity, tragedy, or personal crisis and who feel that God’s silence in the midst of these experiences is overwhelming. In the middle of a crisis following a military defeat, for instance, the author of Ps 44 cries out, Awake, Lord! Why do you sleep? Rouse yourself! Do not reject us forever. Why do you hide your face and forget our misery and oppression? (NIV). Concerning the estrangement and abandonment he feels, the author of Ps 88 asks, Why, Lord, do you reject me and hide your face from me? The candid, unfiltered, and at times accusatory prayers of the lament psalms demonstrate the very real existential burden placed on those who find themselves in these sorts of dire circumstances and the desperation that can result from God’s hiddenness.¹ The fact that the lament psalms are the most common type of psalm in the psalter may be taken to demonstrate that these are common feelings within the human condition.

Some Christians may recoil at the notion of God’s hiddenness, quickly recalling the many avenues through which his voice may be heard. To feel the initial weight of the issue, however, one is not hard-pressed to imagine an experience that prompts doubt in God’s love, or even his very existence, on the basis of his lack of manifest presence. The increasingly common active-shooter massacres around the world provide pertinent examples of this. Various theodicies offer explanations of God’s allowance of the shooters’ choices and the moral consequences of sin, but it nevertheless would seem that God could choose to console the families of the victims in a more explicit manner during the subsequent times of inner turmoil and grief. While Christians find meaningful healing through prayer, fellowship, and their convictions during such tragic events, the family members may understandably still plead for God to provide an undeniable glimpse of himself which would in turn ease their suffering. Yet he does not offer universal overt manifestation of his presence, at least not to its fullest extent, for those who believe they are in need of this kind of healing. In fact, it is possible that God’s choice to remain silent in the face of these extreme moments of pain may even seem to create a greater burden for some people than that brought about by the acts of evil themselves. At the very least, a greater manifestation of God’s presence would undoubtedly alleviate the doubt that often arises in the minds of those experiencing great loss or pain. The experience of hiddenness is exacerbated all the more for some unbelievers, especially those who state that they would like to believe in God but cannot find sufficient evidence of his existence.

In recent years, atheistic philosopher J. L. Schellenberg has harnessed the phenomenon of hiddenness to create an argument for atheism. The problem of divine hiddenness, as it is known, carries both an intellectual and emotional weight. It draws on the moral intuitions one may have regarding the nature of God’s love and then attempts to demonstrate the apparent inconsistency in the reality of the unbeliever’s experience of divine hiddenness. It asserts that an omnibenevolent and omnipotent God must provide enough evidence of his own existence to convince people who are genuinely willing to believe. Otherwise, this being is either not powerful enough or not loving enough to do so. According to this argument, since there are people who are willing to believe and yet remain without belief, it follows that God does not exist. The argument strikes at the heart of the Christian’s fundamental theological convictions. Namely, it calls into question the nature of God’s love and the extent and efficacy of his revelation. It also has a certain force given the Christian’s affirmation of parental language in reference to God as Father and his people as his children. The argument posits that a good father would not allow such hiddenness to the extent that some experience.

One might propose a number of reasons why his argument has resonated so deeply in the current cultural milieu. Schellenberg attributes the germ of his argument’s inception in precursors such as Joseph Butler, a contemporary of David Hume, who demonstrated the problem of inconclusiveness of evidence for God’s existence.² He also credits Friedrich Nietzsche as providing the impetus for thinking that God must be cruel, if he existed, for not being willing to reveal his intentions unambiguously to his creatures.³ Moreover, the theme of God’s silence has been a matter of great discussion in literature, media, theology, and philosophy throughout the twentieth century.⁴ However, Schellenberg has proposed a number of contributing factors to the attractiveness of the argument in the current philosophical climate. Namely, he suggests the religious diversity and the prevalence of secularism has softened the staunch convictions of rigorous monotheism seen in previous generations. Moreover, the idea of a relational, sensitive, and fatherly love has shaped cultural ideas about masculinity, and a portrayal of God that is less than the cultural archetypal father seems to fall flat for many.⁵ On this front, Schellenberg is quite right that the present cultural ethos has primed the pre-understandings that color the theology proper implicit within his argument.

An effective theistic response will inevitably face these underlying presumptions about God’s nature head on. Since the argument directly addresses the fundamental character and nature of God, a theistic counter-argument may justifiably begin by exploring how the fertile ground of Christian theology proper may shed light on the issue. As Michael Rea points out, One might just as easily take the problem not as a referendum on the existence of God, but rather on the viability of certain ways of understanding the nature of God and God’s attributes.⁶ Moreover, Paul Moser has suggested that the debate should not involve a notion of an amorphous God, but rather the specific qualities and actions of the Hebraic God. He states, The notion of God and God’s purposes suggests what kind of evidence for God one should expect.⁷

In order to provide the specifics needed to address Schellenberg’s argument along these lines, the attributes of the Christian God must be invoked, and the God of Christianity is distinctively triune. As Karl Rahner posited, the doctrine of the Trinity is not an isolated system that is revealed for its own sake so that it might be locked up within itself.⁸ Jürgen Moltmann also suggested that the doctrine of the Trinity is the Christianization of the concept of God.⁹ No doctrine should be divorced from recognizing this fundamental truth about the triunity of God’s being, and this includes the doctrine of revelation. There are reasons to think that there are economical and ontological factors which contribute to how the triune God chooses to reveal and conceal himself. Theologizing, or philosophizing, without taking into consideration the Trinitarian nature of God would thus be tantamount to postulating about a lesser being, and therefore not the divine.

Purpose

This work will attempt to provide a unique response to Schellenberg using Trinitarian theology to construct a counter-argument to the problem of divine hiddenness. This interaction with Schellenberg opens the door to advancing Christian scholarship on both apologetic and theological fronts. Building primarily on the work of the theistic rebuttals of Rea and Moser, the intent is to firstly advance the call to provide a distinctively Christian accounting of hiddenness. While Schellenberg’s work is often touted as a heavy-hitting argument in the field of philosophy of religion, far too few Christian theologians have been introduced to it. Sadly, apart from the problem of evil, systematic and biblical theologians have been less in tune with many of the current debates between atheistic and theistic philosophers of religion and the currents of their discussions. This can lead to the development of blind spots in Christian apologetic efforts due to the lack of contributions from those with expertise in biblical, philosophical, and systematic theology. Christian philosophers, on the other hand, have long held analytic tools which continue to be essential to the apologetic task. This work seeks to be integrative in nature by bridging the gap between philosophers and theologians in order to offer an apologetic argument that is theological in structure, but which engages a philosophical argument.¹⁰

In addition to offering a contribution to Christian apologetics, this work is also meant to advance Christian understanding of divine love and revelation. The doctrine of the Trinity affirms a divine love that exists in tri-unity between the persons of the godhead, and then is extended to creatures through means of revelation. In creating a counter-argument to Schellenberg, the goal is to also explicate the various nuances of how interpenetrative perichoretic triune love is manifest to God’s creatures. This will hopefully bring elucidation to reasons that God has chosen to allow himself to be hidden to the extent that he has. It will also help to correct false notions about divine love which are smuggled into the discussion through means of methodological presuppositions which attempt to redefine the character of God’s love as best defined according to Christian doctrine.

Trinitarian theologians have long sought to recognize the limits of human comprehensibility of the divine, and drawing on their work, this book is thirdly intended to help ferret out an explanation of hiddenness that meaningfully balances transcendence and immanence. Certainly, this will further expose methodological differences between the Christian theologian and the atheistic philosopher. Furthermore, this will hopefully bring clarity in pinpointing fundamental points of disagreement between Schellenberg and Christians. Moreover, theologizing on hiddenness will further iterate the limitations of natural theology while simultaneously positing a counter-argument for the problem which demonstrates the plausibility of the truth of special revelation, thereby upholding its authority.

Fundamental Terms and Concepts

In order to enter into dialogue with Schellenberg’s scholarship, his vocabulary and terminology must first be delineated as they pertain to the argument. Below are the terms that ought to be understood in order to avoid the easily accessed ideological rabbit trails, which could render any proposed counter-argument off course. While the structure and content of Schellenberg’s argument will be presented in chapter 2, these terms will begin to lay the groundwork for the debate. It should also be noted that Schellenberg has criticized his detractors for misunderstanding his argument and therefore missing the mark entirely in their rebuttals.¹¹ In many cases, it would appear that Schellenberg is correct in this criticism of some theists. Contributing to the difficulty of the subject is the murkiness of the concept of how God’s hiddenness has been treated in Christian scholarship historically, and subsequently how those theological discussions should be brought to bear on the atheist’s objection to the faith. That is, much ink has been spilled by Christian theologians on the mysteriousness of God’s will, for example, but Schellenberg’s arrow has targeted the very existence of God. Theologians must ensure that they are not importing other connotations into Schellenberg’s terms. Comprehending Schellenberg’s precise verbiage, therefore, is key to meaningful engagement.

Hiddenness

First, Schellenberg uses the title of the argument in a very specific sense. There may be some inclination for theologians to disregard the argument for atheism on the basis of the verbiage which appears to assume God’s existence, despite his hiddenness. Though theologians have discussed the Deus absconditus for thousands of years, the term hiddenness in Schellenberg’s vernacular refers to the idea that God’s existence is not universally apparent. Using this notion, he then argues philosophically that if Christianity is true, then there must be clear evidence that God exists for those who are willing to receive and accept such evidence. God’s existence must be readily apparent and recognizable to these individuals. In other words, the language of the argument, and the wording of the argument’s title, is not meant to concede that God does exist but just remains hidden. Rather, Schellenberg is clear that the problem of hiddenness is only a problem for theists.¹² Hiddenness is only an issue, according to him, if the Christian worldview is assumed.

Likewise, there is less concern from the atheistic perspective with the more traditional theological areas of inquiry regarding hiddenness. As Schellenberg states, The notion of God’s hiddenness can be interpreted in at least three ways: as referring to the obscuring of God’s existence, the incomprehensibility of God’s nature, or our inability to detect the exact pattern of God’s activity in the world.¹³ Schellenberg is really only interested in the first sense of the matter, as ultimately this sense renders the other two irrelevant if it is determined that atheism is true. However, this work will seek to challenge such hard lines drawn regarding these three senses. The nature of God will be shown to have much bearing on the mode of his revelation and the corresponding means of detecting his activity in the world, thus making all three of these senses interconnected.

Unsurpassable Greatness

The second term requiring a definition is Schellenberg’s understanding of God’s qualities as being ones of unsurpassable greatness. Schellenberg’s more broad philosophical term for this idea is called ultimism. Theism gives personhood to that which is ultimate in the universe. The idea of God defined through the language of Schellenberg’s argument is a being who exemplifies the ultimate expression of the following elements—metaphysics, axiology, and soteriology.¹⁴ To expound, he defines God as a being who is the fundamental explanation for the existence and state of the universe, the being who explains the value of the universe, and the being who acts to transform humans into something inherently good.¹⁵ This is a definition that should resonate with the Christian. It is not altogether unlike the definition of God established by Anselm of Canterbury as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.¹⁶ God is the unsurpassably great being by definition, and thus he must be the greatest being in all conceivable ways.¹⁷ Therefore, any action or motivation that fails to meet the criteria of ultimate greatness would fail to describe the God being referenced in the problem of divine hiddenness.

Nonresistant Nonbelief

The third term that is fundamental to Schellenberg’s argument is nonresistant nonbelief. By this, Schellenberg means a certain openness to the existence of God. Nonbelief in this context simply refers to the fact that someone does not believe in God’s existence, and non-resistance refers to a posture of cognitive and volitional neutrality that would allow a person to believe if there was enough evidence to convince him. It is easy to conceive of nonresistant nonbelief by way of example. Suppose a seeker desires to believe in God, consults religious authorities, researches the matter extensively, cries out in exploratory prayer, and then still doubts God’s existence. In this case, Schellenberg thinks it appears that the person was perfectly willing to believe, but the lack of evidence for God’s existence prevailed.¹⁸ It also seems experientially true that in some circumstances people fall away from their faith despite their stated desire to do otherwise. They claim that they want to believe in God, but they just do not see enough reason to continue to do so. Ergo, it would seem to reason, according to Schellenberg’s argument, that the people in these scenarios are not resistant to belief in God’s existence.

Inculpable Doubt

Schellenberg’s body of works attempt to justify doubt, and religious skepticism more broadly, as the appropriate response to the question of God’s existence. As he states in his monograph dedicated entirely to this subject, the responses (i.e., response types) to ultimism of belief and disbelief should be avoided by thinking persons aware of the relevant facts—that there is a better response to religious claims than either of these, at least at the stage of human development in which we find ourselves: we should, that is, be skeptical as to whether any religious claim is true.¹⁹ As it pertains to divine hiddenness, the notion is used primarily in relation to demonstrating the lack of culpability for the unbelievers’ nonbelief. This is not to say that he asserts that all doubt is rendered inculpable. Rather, his definitional claim is that S is inculpably in doubt about the truth of G if (1) S believes that epistemic parity obtains between G and not-G, and (2) S has not knowingly (self-deceptively or non-self-deceptively) neglected to submit this belief to adequate investigation.²⁰ To clarify, Schellenberg suggests that culpability is directly connected to one’s intentionality in the investigation of the truth of a proposition. As the second component of his definition states, one must voluntarily neglect investigation of the belief in order to be held culpable for the belief. If one were to refuse to subject one’s beliefs to scrutiny (as a result of either willful resistance or a self-deception that is voluntarily imposed), this would indicate culpability.²¹ However, if there is no reason to suppose this sort of resistance, one is not culpable for their doubt, and subsequent lack of belief, if the evidence available does lead one to conclude that neither the proposition God exists nor that it is epistemically preferable to the alternative.²²

Presuppositions and Methods

In a certain sense, the entirety of this work is a demonstration that philosophical and theological methods and presuppositions dictate one’s conclusions about God’s existence; moreover, unjustified philosophical presumptions applied a priori toward theology proper inevitably produce flawed conclusions at some point or another. It is unarguably the case that Schellenberg’s argument stands on premises that are attractive because of some common underlying assumptions held by both unbelievers and believers. In fact, he even states outright that he need not defend many of his assertions. These include the claims that God must be the source of all created beings, God must be personal, God must be all-powerful, God must be all-knowing, and he must be perfectly good. Schellenberg assumes the vast majority of theologians and philosophers of religion would agree with these statements.²³ So far, so good. However, while there is much overlap between the Christian’s theological commitments and the propositions embedded in the philosopher’s argument here, the epistemic means of ascertaining these truths becomes the dividing line that is key to deconstructing the argument’s plausibility. As such, a juxtaposition between the philosophical method of Schellenberg and the theological method of the researcher will now be addressed.

Schellenberg’s Philosophical Presuppositions and Method

The method of Schellenberg’s philosophical reasoning is self-described as being from below rather than from above. That is, he postulates on God based on what must be true of an unsurpassably great being, rather than what must be true on the basis of common human experience or other features of the world.²⁴ So, his method extrapolates characteristics and attributes that must be ultimate based on reason applied in various contexts. Specifically, ultimism provides the verbiage used to refer to this type of greatest being or reality. Something that is ultimate is the perfect manifestation of the attribute in reference. In philosophical terms, this relates to that which is metaphysically ultimate, that which brings value to creatures, and that which is inherently valuable.²⁵ On this method, unsurpassable greatness can be known, to a sufficient degree, through human reason, at least in all of the ways which are pertinent to proving his argument.

Given his philosophical approach, Schellenberg is less than confident in the role of theology as arbiter of objective truth. He states that his intention is not to attack theology directly, and he recognizes that the divine being on which he philosophizes may very well not be the divine being of historic Christian theology.²⁶ However, theology for Schellenberg is constraining because it too often takes on a confessional flavor, revealing pre-commitments to certain religious assumptions.²⁷ He further states that conventional theological commitments need to be loosened up to alternative ideas which can be better substantiated through philosophical postulation using an expanded imagination.²⁸ His perspective on this can best be summarized as follows:

Theology starts off by accepting that God exists and so has to make God fit the world: in a way, that is its job. But our job as philosophers, faced with the question of God’s existence, is to fight free from the distractions of local and historical contingency, to let the voice of authority grow dim in our ears, and to think for ourselves about what God and a God-created world would look like. When we think at the most fundamental level about the idea of God, we cannot assume that probably God’s nature is in accord with the actual world, and so we cannot take as our guide a picture of God fashioned by theology over the centuries on that assumption. We must be open to the possibility that the world would be completely different than it is if there were a God. For the properties we ascribe to God have implications, and these place constraints on what the world could be like if there were a being with those properties.²⁹

No doubt Schellenberg admits that evaluation of theological conclusions may bear philosophical fruit on a case-by-case basis.³⁰ However, it would appear that he believes a theological methodology skews one from objectivity, and the philosopher’s discipline allows for a freer epistemology detached from those commitments.

While Schellenberg does not claim that philosophers are able to achieve objectivity outright, he is overly confident in the ability of human reason to achieve any semblance of cognitive, affective, and spiritual neutrality toward the proposition that God exists. Of course, this critique will become a major reoccurring theme throughout this work. While this work will serve to justify this critique of Schellenberg on a number of fronts, in some ways the rejection of neutrality is a fundamental presupposition of the research as well. So, preliminarily, it must be stated that this work rejects the possibility of approaching a topic as grandiose as that of the nature and love of God as though it can be detached from the claims of God’s special revelation in the manner that Schellenberg wants. As will be shown from within the scholarship of Trinitarian theology, there are real limitations to conceptualizing God apart from special revelation. Frankly, any sense that philosophy possesses some sort of epistemic neutrality is altogether false as the pre-commitments of the philosopher will inevitably color his worldview and the epistemological framework therein.

The Researcher’s Theological Presuppositions and Method

This work will recognize three presuppositions which will characterize the research as a work of evangelical theology.³¹ The first is the primacy of Scripture’s authority to provide theological knowledge. While this assumption is clearly not shared with the atheist, this presupposition will nevertheless provide the recognized authoritative footing from which a response will be crafted. Secondly, the research must uphold the role of philosophy as theology’s handmaiden in terms of formulating an epistemological response to Schellenberg. Since all truth is God’s truth, there is every expectation that the issue must be handled with logical consistency, a measurement to which both the Christian and atheist must adhere. While Scripture is the primary source for specific knowledge of God, philosophy aids in its ability to bring coherence to the inquiry.³² The third presupposition of the research is that there are indeed limitations of natural theology that must be respected in any foray into the subject matter. Namely, there is a certain expectation that the mystery of God would be veiled