Soldiers of the Plains

By P. E. Byrne

The Indian was the great soldier of the plains and, in many respects, the greatest fighter the world has ever known. But, unlike the white man, the Indian had no press agency through which to broadcast his story to the world.

And so it comes about that for the most part such knowledge as we have respecting Indian war ventures, for example, comes not from the Indian but from sources having no interest in presenting the Indian point of view—from official government reports and from stories of men actively engaged with those opposed to the red man. The result: almost all reports of Indian warfare were unfavorable to the Indian,—his reasons for war misrepresented; his victories discounted; his acts of heroism, if mentioned at all, carefully flattened out to the level of the commonplace.

In this account an attempt is made to say a word for the red man; to present his side fairly and with sympathetic understanding; to discuss frankly his experience in treaty negotiation; to draw attention to some of his remarkable military exploits; and to touch upon his high qualities as a factor in civilized life. To that extent it supplies a much needed contribution to the frontier history of our time, for we owe to the Indian a fair statement of his case and a just estimate of his qualities as a warrior and a man.

The scope of the discussion is limited. It is concerned mainly with events leading up to and including the battle of the Little Big Horn, March 25-26, 1876. Incidentally something is contributed to a clearer understanding of General Custer’s part in that campaign.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Braunfell Books
• Release date: Mar 30, 2023
• ISBN: 9781805231974

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CHAPTER II — TREATY-MAKING AND TREATY-BREAKING

IT is not difficult to trace the steps leading up to the Indian war which reached its apex at the Little Big Horn, June 25-26, 1876. On the part of the government it is a mottled trail of broken promises ending in lamentable sacrifice of human life and treasure.

In 1868 the government of the United States entered into a treaty with the Sioux Indians. For the United States the treaty was negotiated by a commission composed of Lieut.-General William T. Sherman, Brevet Major-General Alfred H. Terry, Brevet Major-General Wm. S. Harney, Brevet Major-General C. C. Augur, and the following from civil life: N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs; Senator J. B. Henderson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs; John B. Sanborn, a lawyer of eminence from the State of Minnesota; and Colonel S. F. Tappan. The treaty was concluded April 29 et seq., 1868, and proclaimed February 24, 1869.{1}

Article 2 set apart as an exclusive reservation for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians, all of the territory lying within the limits of the present State of South Dakota west of the Missouri. All existing reservations on the east bank of the river were also included.

This exclusive territory, the Great Sioux Reservation, so called, took in the greater part of the Black Hills country. And, in that connection, it may be observed that at the time of the signing of the treaty of Laramie, the government had no idea that the Black Hills was a region of any special value. It was looked upon as a mountainous country suitable only for hunting and grazing. Subsequent knowledge of the vast stores of wealth locked within its bosom called to the venturesome and enterprising white man to seek out its golden treasure, and induced the government to abrogate its treaty obligations by which it was bound to hold inviolate the country for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Indian.

It is true that official government reports referred to the possibility that the Black Hills contained gold, silver and copper; and predictions to the same effect were made occasionally by private individuals. That the official references and the various reports and predictions were not taken seriously, however, is conclusively shown by the negative attitude of the gold hunters of the day.

Of all men the professional gold hunter is the most keenly responsive to the lure of undiscovered gold; and the most eager, resourceful and daring in its pursuit. Yet no advance was made on the Hills in quest of the precious metals until after Custer’s exploring expedition, six years later. Custer’s preliminary report, telegraphed from Fort Laramie in the summer of 1874, gave to the world the first accepted news of the presence of gold; and then began the wild rush which even the army of the United States was unable to stem. In the face of stringent orders from the military, hundreds of miners made their way into the heart of the Hills. Towns sprang up over night; the mining of gold and silver began, and the thousand and one activities of numerous live communities got under way—all quite oblivious of the fact that they were plain trespassers, occupying the lands of the Indian as proclaimed and guaranteed by the government six years before.

Unlawful intrusion by the whites, the government itself being, in fact, the principal offender, was therefore the prime and moving cause of the intermittent war between the white man and the Sioux which for years occupied the military authorities of the United States on the western frontier, and resulted finally in closing forever the long fighting career of the Indian on this continent.

Article 11 of the Treaty had this provision:

In consideration of the advantages and benefits conferred by this treaty, and the many pledges of friendship of the United States, the tribes who are parties to this agreement hereby stipulate that they will relinquish all right to occupy permanently the territory outside their reservation as herein defined; but reserve the right to hunt on any land north of North Platte and on the Republican fork of Smoky Hill River as long as the buffalo may range thereon in such numbers as to justify the chase.

And Article 16 of the Treaty provided as follows:

The United States hereby agrees and stipulates that the country north of the North Platte River and east of the summits of the Big Horn Mountains shall be held and considered to be unceded Indian territory, and also stipulates and agrees that no white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same; or, without the consent of the Indians first had and obtained, to pass through the same.

Thus it will be seen that Article 2 of the treaty fixed definite boundaries to certain territory which, thenceforth, was to be considered the Indian’s undisputed property: his exclusive domain, his personal homestead, so to speak. And Articles 11 and 16 specifically stipulated that the adjoining territory—that is, the country north of the North Platte and extending from the Great Sioux Reservation on the east to the summits of the Big Horn Mountains—should remain unceded Indian territory; that until further negotiations, at least, it was to be the Indian’s exclusive hunting country, and that no white person or persons should be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same; or, without the consent of the Indians, first had and obtained, to pass through it.

It is important to a clear understanding of the case that those provisos be kept in mind while considering subsequent developments.

The guaranty here insisted upon by the Indians against settlement or intrusion by the whites was not the result of mere idle whim. The preservation of the game seemed of first importance to the red man. Essentially a hunter, he had always depended upon the wild game for his food and clothing and shelter. He knew that unless the whites were kept within bounds the game was due to disappear very quickly. It was for that reason the guaranty was demanded, and for that reason the Indian fought bitterly against all subsequent intrusion by the white man.

That the fears of the Indian regarding the disappearance of the game were well founded, the experience of a few years amply proved. In his report to the Secretary of War (1878) General Sherman referred to the Indian country of 1868 as the pasture-fields of millions of buffalo, elk, deer, antelope and other game; and added, Having traversed the plains ten or fifteen times since that date, I can bear personal testimony that where, in 1868, millions of buffalo could be found, not a single one is now seen.

The white man had stepped across the line, and wholesale destruction of the wild game had followed in his footsteps.

The consent of the Indians to this treaty was not secured without considerable difficulty. The commission was appointed under authority of the Act of Congress, approved July 20, 1867, and began its labors in August of that year. At once notice was sent to the hostile Indians of Dakota and Montana that the commission would meet them at Fort Laramie on September 13, 1867. Reaching North Platte on September 11, 1867, they received word that the Northern Sioux, who were then waging war on the Powder River, would not be able to meet the representatives of the government at Fort Laramie at the time set for the meeting. The commission thereupon postponed the meeting until November 1st.

Arriving at Fort Laramie on that date, the commission was sorely disappointed at not finding Red Cloud, then considered the most influential chief of the Sioux. But Red Cloud was somewhat suspicious of the real motives behind the new activities of the government. He concluded to make haste slowly and study matters at long range before making any approach. He sent word, however, that his war was to save from the intrusion of the white man the only hunting ground left to his people—the valley of the Powder River; and that when the military garrisons at Fort Phil Kearney (Wyoming) and Fort F. C. Smith (Montana) were withdrawn, the war on his part would cease.

As it was then late in the year, an adjournment was taken; and, in the meantime, word was sent to Red Cloud and his people that the commission would meet them the following year for purposes of negotiation. The commission also asked for a cessation of hostilities until the council could be held.

Red Cloud readily consented to these propositions; that is, to discontinue hostilities for the time being, and to meet the commission in the spring or summer of 1868.

In the spring the commission resumed its labors, and by April 29th had formulated the first draft of the treaty, which was then and there signed by a number of the chiefs and head men of different bands; but it required more than six months of constant parleying before the signature of Red Cloud was obtained. Postponements were taken from time to time to meet his demands; and, finally, after obtaining a number of important additions to the treaty, among which was the exclusive right of his people to hunt in the unceded territory outside the reservation proper, he sent word that when the military forces were actually withdrawn, he would come in and sign.

Notwithstanding that Article 16 of the treaty expressly agreed that within ninety days after the conclusion of peace with all the bands of the Sioux nation, the military posts now established in the territory in this Article named (that is, in the country north of the North Platte River and east of the summits of the Big Horn Mountains) shall be abandoned, and that the road leading to them and by them to the settlements in the Territory of Montana shall be closed, Red Cloud would not budge an inch until the abandonment and removal had been consummated. He still had misgivings as to the intentions of the commission and demanded substantial evidence of its pacific designs. The white man’s word was as the idle wind. It no longer had value, and he would not listen to it. His experience of 1866 was still too fresh a memory to be overlooked or ignored. That year, which the white man had reason to remember with bitter sorrow, Fort Phil Kearney and Fort F. C. Smith had been established. The Indians, noting the signs of military settlement, protested and served notice that the occupation of the Indian country by the whites would be resisted. But the warning was unheeded. By a resort to diplomatic strategy the government sought to avoid serious trouble; but in the meantime the authorities made sure that there was no cessation in the building operations, and the posts were steadily pushed to completion.

In council the Indians demanded the evacuation of the country before treating; but the troops remained. Although some of the chiefs submitted and signed the treaty, Red Cloud refused and withdrew from the council. Placing his hand upon his rifle, he declared: In this and the Great Spirit, I trust for the right.

Then war blazed forth, and the Indian and the white man paid the awful toll in human life.

What is known as the tragedy of Fort Phil Kearney was one of the incidents of that strife. A party under military escort had gone out for a supply of lumber needed in the completion of the fort. The wood party was attacked by Red Cloud’s Indians under the leadership of the daring young war chief, Crazy Horse. Reinforcements under Colonel Fetterman were sent to the relief of the wood party, and Fetterman’s entire command (81 in number) were slaughtered to a man.

Now, in 1868, Red Cloud again demanded the abandonment of the posts as an earnest of the white man’s good faith. And while messages to and from the Great Father at Washington kept the wires busy, the distinguished members of the Indian Peace Commission were compelled to mark time until a decision on the question of immediate abandonment could be reached by the Department. Meanwhile Red Cloud kept his own distance and calmly awaited the outcome.

After weeks of delay his demands were fully acceded to. The troops were withdrawn, the posts vacated; and when the last sign of military occupation had disappeared, he came in and signed the treaty.

The incident was looked upon as a diplomatic victory for Red Cloud; yet, in signing the treaty he aroused the hostility of those among his own people who had pinned their hopes on his steadfast opposition. They bitterly opposed any compromise, and a number broke with him when he finally surrendered to what they considered the blandishments of the white man, and consented to barter away the birthright of the Indian.

He accepted the treaty; but he did so at the cost of military leadership. It was as though he had actually signed his own formal abdication as the great war chief of the Sioux. From that moment his prestige as a military leader began to wane, and as he gradually went into eclipse, the younger and more warlike appeared upon the horizon. Gall, Black Moon, Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull and men of that stripe replaced the older chief, for better or for worse. And, while his moral influence quietly exerted may have lent encouragement to subsequent hostilities, as an active fighting leader his sun had set for all time. Never again did he lead his people in battle.

The Peace Commission had commenced its labors in August of 1867. It was November, 1868, before Red Cloud consented to sign. Fifteen months devoted to the work of treaty-making, and most of that time given over to the job of formulating and completing one treaty—that to which the Chief Red Cloud had, at last, given approval!

In connection with the negotiations, great care had been taken that the interests of the government should be amply safeguarded. It was represented by the most efficient group of men to be found in the country for such a task, whereas the Indian stood alone, his own exclusive treaty ambassador, without expert counsel or advice. On one side, men trained in the arts of war and treaty-making; men who knew the Indian characteristics intimately; civilians high up in official life, and of wide and varied experience; men learned in the law, in practical statesmanship and diplomacy. Opposed, the unlettered savage whose diplomacy hitherto had been the diplomacy of the warpath: the diplomacy that could be expressed only in terms of armed conflict.

It is true that towards the close of the negotiations Red Cloud scored something of a spectacular triumph in having the military posts removed before consenting to sign; but, after all, that was a minor affair. In all the essentials, the treaty was the white man’s treaty. Into it he had written the terms which he had set out to secure; and later, he sat in judgment to insure that the Indian observed those terms. As a matter of course, the Indian was expected to obey strictly every proviso intended to safeguard the white man’s interests under the treaty; but there was a difference when it came to exact from the white man similar respect for the provisions intended to protect the rights of the Indian.

It is a strange anomaly that, after putting forth such extraordinary effort to secure the treaty, the government should so soon disregard its own solemn obligations there-under. In that respect, however, it met the common fate of Indian treaties: it was honored more in the breach than in the observance.

Scarcely was the document signed before the military authorities embarked upon a campaign of coercion well calculated to arouse the bitter hostility of the Indian and bring discredit upon our oft-repeated professions of peace and good will.

The treaty was proclaimed by the President on February 24, 1869. On July 29, 1869, General Sheridan issued an order which, among other things, contained the following:

All Indians when on their proper reservations are under the exclusive control and jurisdiction of their agents;...outside the well defined limits of the reservation they are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authority; and as a rule will be considered hostile.

At that time General Sheridan was in command of the Department of the Missouri. Undeniably he was a great warrior; but, to some extent he lacked the qualities of tact and diplomacy which we should expect in the finished soldier. He was at his best and mightiest when his task lay straight ahead; but when the course led through devious paths, he was plainly out of his element.

It was because of this lack that he had been unsuccessful in handling the after-the-war problems in Louisiana and Texas in 1866-67, and was replaced by General Hancock. Hancock had failed to register a pronounced success in the frontier war against the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, so he was sent to Sheridan’s post to deal with reconstruction problems, while Sheridan, the ready and successful cavalry leader, was given Hancock’s job to bring the Indian to time. Here Sheridan was at home. He had chafed under the restrictions imposed upon him in connection with his Louisiana assignment; but in his new sphere of activity, the problem was one of war, and that he could understand and carry through to success.

The condition of affairs, following the final acceptance of the Laramie treaty, called for the most careful handling; and it was perhaps not altogether fortunate that Sheridan, in the capacity of department commander, was, at that moment, so closely associated with the administration of affairs touching the Indian. He was for a stern policy of repression and impatient of any halfway measures.

In truth, his order of June 29 was an open, defiant, trouble-breeding pronouncement, in letter and spirit contrary to the guaranties of the Laramie treaty which specifically recognized the right of the Indians to hunt in the unceded Indian country: nay, practically demanded its exercise as a duty; for the treaty contemplated that the Indian should hunt in order to assist in providing himself food—thus, partially at least, relieving the government from the obligation of doing so.

We have the word of General Sherman himself (1878) that nearly all the Indian treaties were made on the theory that the government would have to furnish only a part of the food for the Indian, and that he would procure half or quarter of the necessary meat by hunting. And, he