The Five Forks Campaign and the Fall of Petersburg: March 29 - April 1, 1865

By Edwin C. Bearss and Bryce Suderow

The wide-ranging and largely ignored operations around Petersburg, Virginia, were the longest and most extensive of the entire Civil War. The fighting began in June of 1864, when advance elements from the Union Army of the Potomac crossed the James River and botched a series of attacks against a thinly
defended city. The fighting ended nine long months later in the first days of April of 1865. The Five Forks Campaign and the Fall of Petersburg, March 29 – April 2, 1865, includes the final major operation that turned Lee’s right flank, cut his final railroad lifeline, and resulted in the loss of Petersburg and Richmond. In addition to original maps and photos, this book includes a complete chapter on the April 1 VI Corps “Breakthrough” and a special postscript by historian Chris Calkins on the retreat to Appomattox.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Savas Beatie
• Release date: Mar 12, 2014
• ISBN: 9781611212181

Edwin C. Bearss

Edwin C. Bearss was a world-renowned military historian, author, preservationist, and tour guide best known for his work on the Civil War. The grievously wounded World War II Marine served as the Chief Historian for both Vicksburg National Military Park and the National Park Service, authored dozens of books and articles, and led scores of tours each year. Ed helped discover and raise the Union gunboat USS Cairo from the Yazoo River, now on display at Vicksburg National Military Park. Ed passed away at the age of 97.

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Chapter 1

Prelude to the Five Forks Campaign

Battle of Lewis Farm (Quaker Road)

March 29-30, 1865

Editor’s Introduction

Lieutenant General U.S. Grant’s goal for this, his seventh offensive, was to force the Confederates out of their lines to defeat them in the open, and sever the South Side Railroad, one of the last two major logistical lifeline feeding Richmond and Petersburg. He planned a huge wheeling movement to outflank and turn the Confederate right flank to accomplish it. The Army of the Potomac’s II Corps, under Maj. Gen. A. A. Humphreys, would cross Hatcher’s Run on the Vaughan Road and Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren would form his V Corps on Humphreys’s left at the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker roads. On the far left, Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan, with Brig. Gen. Ranald Mackenzie’s Army of the James cavalry, the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry under Maj. Gen. George Crook (commanding what had been David McM. David Gregg’s cavalry division), and the cavalry from the Army of the Shenandoah, would ride to Dinwiddie Court House.

On the night of March 25, Maj. Gen. Edward O. C. Ord pulled three divisions of the Army of the James out of the Bermuda Hundred and Richmond lines and arrived at Petersburg about 5:00 p.m. on the 28th. His departure was so secretive that Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet did not realize the Federals had left his front. Sheridan, meanwhile, crossed to the south side of the James River March 27. Mackenzie’s cavalry left the Richmond lines on the night of the 28th, arrived in position the next evening and formed in rear of II Corps. Grant gave Mackenzie’s troopers the job of protecting Warren’s V Corps wagon train.

On the evening of March 28, the Union troops were arranged as follows: Three divisions of the XXIV Corps and XXV Corps held the trenches outside Richmond, while another division of the XXV Corps manned the Bermuda Hundred lines; Maj. Gen. John G. Parke’s IX Corps held the ground from the Appomattox River on the right to Fort Davis, with Maj. Gen. Horatio Wright’s VI Corps watching the front extending from Fort Davis to Arthur’s Swamp; on Wright’s left, Humphreys with II Corps held the line from Arthur Swamp to Hatcher’s Run, where the Vaughan Road crossed it; Warren’s V Corps was behind Humphreys, and Sheridan’s cavalry was at Hancock Station on the military railroad; Ord’s Army of the James infantry took the place of II Corps, with its line extending all the way to Hatchers Run.

Grant’s intent was to have the Army of the Potomac, except IX Corps, available for the campaign. The result was that Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, had some 60,000 men ready to go, Ord brought 17,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry under Mackenzie, and Sheridan had 12,000 cavalry from the Army of the Shenandoah and the army of the Potomac. The disposable force available for the capture of Petersburg was 70,000.

Grant’s orders to Sheridan for this offensive were issued on March 24:

You may go out the nearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched positions, but to force him out if possible. Should he come out and attack us or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow... as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side railroad between Petersburg and Burkesville and destroy it to some extent.

¹

Note that Grant’s first priority was to force the Confederates out of their lines so Sheridan could defeat them. The destruction of the railroad was a secondary objective to be accomplished only if the first was not possible. Also note that Grant promised to come to Sheridan’s aid: Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. Once having destroyed the railroad, Sheridan could either return to Grant’s army group or ride south and join Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, who was advancing north through North Carolina toward Virginia.

Three days later on March 27, Meade dictated Grant’s orders for the campaign to the Army of the Potomac. In essence, the plan called for the cavalry and the II Corps and V Corps to cross to the west side of Hatcher’s Run. The infantry would push the Confederates into their lines and keep them from sending troops west to oppose the sweeping cavalry. Meanwhile, XXIV Corps and XXV Corps troops from the Army of the James—which had slipped away undetected from Longstreet’s front outside Richmond north of the James River—would hold the ground vacated by the II Corps.

It is impossible to explain what trick of mental gymnastics enabled Grant to issue orders that said one thing to Sheridan (Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate) and something very different to Meade that essentially immobilized the Army of the Potomac in front of Lee’s trenches (with the possible exception of Wright’s VI Corps)? How could Meade assist Sheridan with his entire force if it was pinned down in front of the Confederate lines?

This offensive was the same basic plan that had failed time and again during Grant’s previous offensives. In each case, instead of sending a mobile column strong enough to achieve his goal, Grant immobilized all but a fraction of his infantry by advancing them as close to the Confederate lines as possible. This strategy had two goals. First, Grant hoped that if the Confederates weakened their line to oppose the turning movement, he would be close enough to attack and break through. Second, he hoped that by pressing against the Confederate lines, he might fulfill the opposite goal of keeping the Confederates pinned down in their trenches while a relatively small command, a corps, for example, tried to turn the enemy flank to get to the South Side Railroad. In each previous effort, while the Federal flanking force floundered through woods, swamps, and along difficult road and paths, or waited in trenches for the Rebels oppositie them to strip their lines so they could assault, the Confederates did in fact strip their lines, assemble a strike force, and attack the flanking force. And so every previous effort failed. The Virginia Campaign of 1864-65 is replete with examples of Grant attempting to achieve too many goals with too little force, and failing to achieve any of them.

The first battle of what should be viewed as the Five Forks Campaign took place on March 29 at the Lewis Farm, when Warren and his V Corps attempted to approach the Confederate entrenchments as Grant had ordered. Warren was attacked there by Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson, but repulsed him. The second battle of the campaign took place two days later on March 31 when Warren attempted to advance on the White Oak Road. Under Gen. Robert E. Lee’s watchful eye, Anderson attacked and routed two of Warren’s three divisions, but the Federals eventually repulsed the attack and stood their ground.

Sheridan, meanwhile, moved to Dinwiddie Court House and was also expected to advance to the White Oak Road. Warren was continually instructed to extend his left flank and be ready to cooperate with Sheridan when he moved up to the road. Meade’s orders on the 29th to both Warren and Humphreys concerning movements set for the 30th included the following: The object of this movement is to force the enemy into his line of works and develop the same, and if he is found out of his line to give battle. Meade later acknowledged that Warren had accomplished this object in the fighting along the Quaker Road. By the end of the day on the 29th, however, Grant had still not informed Meade of the changes he was making in his operational plans. Sheridan told Grant that he would move up to the White Oak Road on the morning of the 30th to a position east of Five Forks. When Warren was informed of this move, he ordered a division under Romeyn Ayres to move toward the White Oak Road supported by another division under Samuel Crawford with the intention of cooperating with Wesley Merritt’s cavalry of Sheridan’s command. As it turned out, Merritt did not move as Sheridan indicated he would, but rode instead farther west. Although Sheridan reported him to be in possession of Five Forks that afternoon, this was not the case.

In making his plans for this offensive, Grant seems to have not taken into account what General Lee might do. Did it occur to Grant that Lee might do the same thing he himself had done with Ord’s infantry divisions—pull men from the lines farther north? What would prevent Lee from shifting a division of infantry from north of the Appomattox River or from outside Richmond?

Part I

General U.S. Grant Prepares for Action

Following the battle of Bentonville, General Sherman’s Army Group moved to Goldsboro, North Carolina. Here, Sherman’s troops rendezvoused with the forces commanded by Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield. After arranging to have his troops take a well-merited rest, Sherman proceeded to General Grant’s headquarters at City Point, Virginia.

At meetings on March 27 and 28, also attended by President Abraham Lincoln and Admiral David D. Porter in the wardroom aboard River Queen, Sherman explained the plan of operations which he had previously broached to Grant in a letter. Sherman stated that in case it became necessary to bring his Army Group to the Petersburg front to encompass the defeat of the Confederates, he would be ready to march by April 10. If he were required to make this movement, Sherman proposed first to threaten an attack on Raleigh, North Carolina. After executing this feint, Sherman’s Army Group would veer to the right, striking the Roanoke River near Weldon, North Carolina, 60 miles south of Petersburg. At Weldon, Sherman’s troops would be in an excellent position to move to Burke’s Station, the junction of the South Side and the Richmond and Danville railroads. The occupation of Burke’s Station would enable Sherman’s Army Group to intercept General Robert E. Lee’s Confederate army in the event that it should be compelled to fall back on either Danville or Lynchburg. If, in the meantime, Lee’s hard-fighting Confederates continued to hold Grant at bay, Sherman would join the Union armies operating against Petersburg and Richmond.

Grant authorized Sherman to carry out his master plan. This was conditioned on the stipulation that Sherman received no further instructions. Grant, in turn, explained to Sherman the plan of operations that he had matured. The lieutenant general commanding stated he hoped his plan would lead to an early evacuation of the Petersburg lines by Lee’s army. The meeting then adjourned, and Sherman returned to North Carolina.²

By the afternoon of March 28, Grant had completed his dispositions. The various units of his mobile striking force had moved into their advance staging areas and the troops were eager to take the offensive. At a staff meeting in Grant’s City Point headquarters, a series of orders were drafted. Grant hoped these would set into motion a chain reaction which would force General Lee’s army to abandon the fortifications guarding the approaches to Petersburg. Once the Confederates were driven out of the Petersburg defenses, the Union generals believed that their superior numbers and mobility would ensure the destruction of Lee’s veteran army.

In accordance with the plan of operations outlined by Grant, the commander of the Army of the Potomac, General George G. Meade, prepared a set of instructions to guide his corps commanders. Maj. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys was to hold the troops of his II Corps in their camps until 9:00 a.m. on the following day, unless previously notified that the Army of the James was in position. On moving out of the investment lines, Humphreys was to take position with his right resting on or near Hatcher’s Run and his left extending to the Quaker Road. Combat patrols would then be advanced. If the Confederates were discovered outside their works, Humphreys was to attack and drive them into their fortifications. The II Corps’ train was to be parked near the Cummings house.³

Major General Gouverneur K. Warren’s V Corps was alerted to be ready to march at an hour designated by Meade. Warren was admonished not to proceed beyond the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads until Humphreys’ troops had reached their initial battle station. After he had received information that Humphreys was in position, Warren was to advance along the Boydton Plank Road. The V Corps was to take position on Humphreys’ left with his left flank refused. Warren, like Humphreys, was to throw forward a strong force of skirmishers. These would be charged with the task of driving in the Confederate outposts.

The two other corps (the VI and IX) which constituted the Army of the Potomac were to remain where they were. At the moment, these two corps were holding the investment lines east and south of Petersburg. In case the Rebels should pull troops out of the Petersburg defenses to meet the Union turning movement, the VI and IX Corps were to attack.

General Grant himself signed the order detailing the cavalry’s role in the projected offensive. Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s troopers were to be on the move at the earliest possible hour on the 29th. The cavalry’s line of march was not to be confined to any particular road or roads. Grant, however, suggested that Sheridan march by the nearest roads passing to the rear of the staging area occupied by the V Corps. To outflank the Confederates, Sheridan, after having passed beyond the left flank of the V Corps, was to strike for Dinwiddie Court House. Grant observed that it was not his intention to attack the Rebels in their entrenchments, but to force them to abandon their powerful fortifications to avoid being encircled. In case the Southerners should leave the protection of their works and attack the cavalry column, Sheridan was to hurl his entire force against them. Grant promised Sheridan that the remainder of the army will engage or follow the enemy as circumstances will dictate.

If the Confederates refused to take the field, Sheridan was authorized to cut loose from his base and strike for the Richmond and Danville Railroad. Furthermore, if it should prove feasible, Sheridan was to wreak havoc on the South Side Railroad at some point between Petersburg and Burke’s Station. After having wrecked the two railroads, Sheridan was given two alternatives: he could either rejoin Grant’s Army Group using a route to the south of his line of advance, or he could join General Sherman’s forces in North Carolina.⁴

After reading his instructions, Sheridan walked out of Grant’s cabin. The general followed, desiring to have a private conversation with the cavalry leader. A glance convinced Grant that Sheridan seemed to be somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two armies (Lee’s and Johnston’s) of the enemy. Speaking up, Grant said, General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind. Grant then informed Sheridan that he expected the movement that was about to begin to result in the Federals’ passing around Lee’s right flank. This would force the Confederates to evacuate Petersburg and Richmond and lead to an early end of the long bloody conflict. Continuing, Grant remarked that the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. Grant informed Sheridan that the reason he had included the passages pertaining to the cavalry joining Sherman was that unless his plan proved successful it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat.⁵

Under cover of darkness on the 27th, a portion of General Ord’s Army of the James had been withdrawn from its camps on the north side of the James River. As the success of Ord’s movement depended in great measure upon its secrecy, the general took a number of precautions. Several days before the projected operation, Ord quietly withdrew from the front lines most of the troops detailed to accompany his expeditionary force. After making a demonstration against the Confederate earthworks in the Darbytown road sector, Ord concentrated, in camps calculated to be concealed from the eyes of the Rebel scouts, the units slated to march to the Southside. The troops that were to be left behind were kept constantly on the move. Camps were shifted. Combat patrols sent out at frequent intervals to harass the Confederate outposts. To deaden the sound of the marching columns, the pontoon bridges across which the troops were scheduled to pass were covered with moist straw and compost.

When the XXIV Corps moved out, Maj. Gen. John Gibbon took two of his three divisions with him. Brig. Gen. Charles Devens’ division was left behind to hold the line of works. Brig. Gen. William Birney’s division of the XXV Corps also accompanied Ord when he moved to the Southside. Crossing the James River at Deep Bottom, the troops of the XXIV Corps—Brig. Gen. John W. Turner’s division in the lead—marched to Broadway Landing on the Appomattox River. To avoid congestion, Birney’s black division crossed the James River at Varina. Birney’s troops rendezvoused with Gibbon’s column at Broadway Landing.⁶

By 7:40 a.m. on the 28th, the last of Ord’s infantry had crossed the Appomattox River. Turner’s division, which had the lead, pushed on toward the Petersburg lines without resting. Both Gibbon’s other division commanded by Brig. Gen. Robert S. Foster and Birney’s division were badly jaded by the night march. Ord, therefore, permitted these two units to halt until noon. Recent heavy rains had turned the roads into ribbons of mud. Consequently, the Army of the James’ trains were much delayed. It was a number of hours before the last of the heavily loaded wagons rolled across the pontoon bridge.⁷

After the troops caught their second wind, the march was renewed. Before the afternoon was over, Foster’s troops overtook Turner’s division. At dusk, Gibbon’s troops went into camp near Fort Siebert; and Birney’s people bivouacked near Humphreys’ divisions. The ground occupied by the Army of the James was immediately in the rear of the II Corps’ staging area. General Gibbon was pleased with the way his troops had conducted the 36-mile march. He reported that his soldiers had performed one of the most remarkable marches on record with very few stragglers.⁸

Ord’s Cavalry, led by hard-riding Brig. Gen. Ranald S. Mackenzie, departed from its encampments on the north side of the James River on the evening of the 26th. Crossing the James at Varina and the Appomattox at Point of Rocks, the cavalrymen reached Humphrey’s Station at daybreak.⁹

The departure of the three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry division cut the Union strength north of the James River into two divisions. With this greatly reduced force, Maj. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel was expected to pin Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s Corps in position, while the Army of the Potomac and Sheridan’s cavalry turned the Confederate right. In an effort to deceive the Southerners, the regimental bands were left behind and they played as usual. On the night of the 27th and for several nights afterwards, men detailed by Weitzel kept the fires going in the camps of the troops who had accompanied Ord

Before leaving for the Southside, General Ord, feeling certain that Grant’s attempt to turn the Confederates out of their Petersburg defenses would be crowned with success, left written instructions for Weitzel’s guidance in case Richmond was evacuated. Weitzel was informed as to the route he was to follow to avoid Rebel torpedoes (land mines) when he marched his men into Richmond.¹⁰

When General Meade received reports indicating that Ord’s troops would reach the area behind the II Corps by dusk on the 28th, he re-adjusted his time table. Humphreys was alerted to have his troops on the road by 6:00 a.m. Upon receipt of this news, Humphreys drafted orders which would govern the II Corps’ movements on the 29th. In accordance with Meade’s directive, Humphreys announced that his troops would be ready to move at the designated hour and Vaughan Road would serve as the corps’ line of advance.

Brigadier General William Hays’ division would take the lead. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Hays was to deploy his troops north of the Vaughan Road. Hays’ right flank was to be close enough to the stream to be covered by artillery posted at the point where the Vaughan Road crossed the river. Hays’ division would also cover Dabney’s Mill Road.¹¹

Major General Gershom Mott’s division followed Hays. After crossing Hatcher’s Run, Mott’s troops were to form north of the Vaughan Road. The left flank of the division was to be extended in the direction of the Gravelly Run Friends’ Meetinghouse. Major General Nelson A. Miles’ division would march behind Mott’s. Once Miles’ division had reached the right bank of Hatcher’s Run, the general was to post his troops on Mott’s left. Miles’ battle line was to extend from the vicinity of the Gravelly Run Friends’ Meetinghouse across the Quaker Road.¹²

Each division commander was to cover his flank with a strong skirmish line. After the divisions had completed their deployment, the skirmishers were to advance and drive the Confederate outposts back inside their works.

Humphreys informed his subordinates that he expected troops from General Gibbon’s XXIV Corps to relieve their outposts about 5:00 a.m. If Gibbon’s troops failed to show up, Hays’ people were not to delay their march. Miles and Mott, however, would each leave a brigade behind to hold the lines until Gibbon’s soldiers put in an appearance.¹³

The commissary, ordnance, and quartermaster departments spent a busy day supplying the men of the II Corps. Each soldier was issued four days’ rations of hardtack, coffee, and sugar. Salt meat to last one day was rationed to each individual. Enough cattle to last the Corps for three days were cut out from the army’s herd. These would be driven with the division herds. In addition, sufficient hardtack, coffee, sugar, and salt to subsist the Corps for another eight days was loaded into the division supply wagons. Beef on the hoof calculated to last for ten days was allotted to the Corps herd. Forage for eight days was to be carried along on the expedition.

Instead of the usual 40 rounds of ammunition, each soldier would carry 50 on his person. Furthermore, enough ammunition to supply every soldier with another 20 rounds was loaded into the division wagons.

Since the army expected to move light and fast, the amount of artillery to be taken along was limited. One four-gun battery of 12-pounder Napoleons and one four-gun battery of 3-inch rifled artillery were to be allotted to each division. The three batteries that were to be left behind were to report to the IX Corps’ chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. John C. Tidball.¹⁴

Meanwhile, General Warren had drafted instructions to govern the movements of his corps. Initially, Warren worked out his plans in accordance with a directive issued by Meade on the 27th. This memorandum, for some unexplained reason, was not delivered to Warren until the following afternoon. Maj. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres’ division was scheduled to take the lead when the V Corps took the field. Two batteries and the Corps’ pontoon train would follow close on the heels of Ayres’ infantry. After breaking camp at 5:00 a.m., Ayres’ troops were to cross Arthur’s Swamp. Gaining the stage road, the division was to seize the crossing of Rowanty Creek near the Perkins farm. As soon as a bridgehead could be established, the pioneers were to lay a double bridge. After the two batteries had crossed the pontoon bridge, Ayres’ division would proceed to the junction of the Vaughan and Monk’s Neck roads.

Major General Charles Griffin’s division was to march behind Ayres’ batteries. The remaining batteries and the wagons with the entrenching tools were to follow Griffin’s soldiers. Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford’s division would come next. The Corps’ trains would bring up the rear.

After entering the Vaughan Road, the Corps would proceed as rapidly as possible by way of J. Kidd’s to Dinwiddie Court House. If the enemy was encountered, he was to be attacked. To expedite the march, officers were admonished to see that the men remained in the ranks and did not straggle. Warren warned any man may be justifiably shot who . . . falls out without permission from the division commander.

As in the case of Humphreys’ Corps, Warren’s was stripped down so that it could travel light and fast. In this respect, Warren announced that as a battle was expected the command must be as little encumbered as possible and prepared for action so that nothing will have to be sent to the rear when the fighting begins.¹⁵ Only five four-gun batteries (three smoothbores and two rifled) would accompany the corps. The corps’ four other attached batteries would be left behind.¹⁶

To keep the Confederates in the dark for as long as possible, Warren ordered the musicians to be left behind. After sounding reveille at the usual hour, the musicians would rejoin their units.¹⁷

Shortly after Warren had issued these orders, he received an important message from Meade’s headquarters. Opening the dispatch, Warren discovered that Meade had changed his plans. The V Corps was not to go beyond the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads until General Humphreys was in position. Upon being informed that Humphreys was ready, Warren would resume his advance. Turning into the Boydton Plank Road, Warren would take position with his right anchored on Humphreys’ left.

Several hours later the thoroughly confused Warren received a third message from Meade’s headquarters. Scanning the dispatch, Warren learned that Humphreys was uncertain of his corps’ ability to reach the Quaker Road. Accordingly, Humphreys had been directed to place his right within supporting distance of General Ord . . . . Humphreys would then deploy his corps, letting his formation determine where his left flank would rest. In view of these circumstances, Meade thought it would be best if Warren’s corps moved up the Quaker Road instead of the Boydton Plank Road.

This placed Warren in a quandary. He had one message directing him to advance up the Quaker Road and another up the Boydton Plank Road. Worse, Warren did not know that Humphreys’ starting time had been changed. Warren calculated that if Humphreys marched at 9:00 a.m., the V Corps would reach the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads long before the II Corps could get into position. Warren, therefore, determined to take up a strong position west of Rowanty Creek. Here he would wait while Humphreys completed his dispositions. As a result of his previous visit to the area in February at the time of the battle of Hatcher’s Run, Warren was familiar with the terrain. He knew that there was a commanding ridge on the Hargrove farm. This was one-half mile east of the Boydton Plank Road. To be prepared to meet either eventuality, Warren determined to occupy this ridge with a strong detachment. He would hold the junction of the Vaughan and Quaker Roads with the remainder of his Corps.¹⁸

General Sheridan likewise spent the afternoon of the 28th reviewing his plans. General Crook’s division was to be in the saddle at 5:00 a.m. Riding along the Jerusalem Plank Road, Crook’s troopers were to march by way of Gary’s Church and Ream’s Station. A detachment of pioneers with three pontoon boats would accompany Crook’s column. The cavalry planned to cross Rowanty Creek at Malone’s Bridge. If necessary, the pioneers would throw a bridge across the stream. After crossing the creek, the Federals would strike for Dinwiddie Court House. Sheridan’s two other divisions, Brig. Gens. George A. Custer’s and Thomas C. Devin’s, were to hit the road as soon as Crook’s cavalrymen had cleared the area. Custer and Devin would report to Maj. Gen. Wesley Merritt.

All the cavalry’s wagons were to be assembled on the Jerusalem Plank Road. They would be organized into a convoy and escorted by a brigade to