Ploesti Through The Lens

By Roger Freeman

The Ploesti Raid took place on Sunday, August 1, 1943 and, but for a navigational error which put the leading formation on a course away from the target, the operation might have resulted in the destruction of the seven chosen targets. However, by the time the mistake was realized, the defenses were on the alert and over 20 Liberators were brought down in and around Ploesti. A further 35 aircraft were lost. Although the operation resulted in the award of five Medals of Honor — America’s highest decoration for bravery — the cost was high: 308 airmen lost their lives and 208 were taken prisoner or interned. Out of the 1,753 men who are known to have set out on the mission, a total of 516 failed to return.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Pen and Sword
• Release date: May 30, 2004
• ISBN: 9781399076722

Roger Freeman

Dr Roger Freeman FRCP(C) is Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry at the University of British Columbia and Senior Neuropsychiatrist at the Neuropsychiatry Clinic, BC Children’s Hospital Vancouver, Canada. He is co-founder of the Neuropsychiatry Clinic at BC Children’s Hospital and co-founder and manager of the Tourette Syndrome International Database Consortium, a world-wide clinical dataset on Tourette syndrome. Dr Freeman is the author of numerous papers on Tourette syndrome and is a frequent presenter at Tourette Syndrome Foundation of Canada (TSFC) conferences. He has been honoured as a Clinician of the year (2006) by the TSFC and was given a distinguished service award by the American Academy for Cerebral Palsy and Developmental Medicine.

Book preview

Introduction

Casablanca, January 1943. Although the highlight of the conference between the British and American chiefs led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the declaration that the Allies would only accept ‘unconditional surrender’ from Germany, one of the lesser decisions was to launch an air attack on the oil refining plants centred on Ploesti in Rumania. This is the British delegation. Front row (L-R): Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord; Churchill; Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, the head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington and General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Rear row: Lieutenant-Commander C. R. ‘Tommy’ Thompson, a member of Churchill’s staff; Brigadier Vivian Dykes, (Secretariat); General Harold Alexander, C-in-C Middle East; John Martin of Churchill’s private office; Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations; General Sir Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s Chief-of-Staff; Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport; Harold Macmillan, Parliamentary Secretary Ministry of Supply; Leslie Rowan (private office); and Colonel E. I. C. Jacob (Secretariat). (Brigadier Dykes was killed on January 29, when the Liberator crashed in which he was returning to Britain.)

The low-level bombing raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania has probably attracted more interest than any other United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) offensive operation during the Second World War. It has been proclaimed the most ambitious, the most daring, the most foolhardy, the most disastrous and the most heroic, to name but a few superlatives accorded this extraordinary mission. Operation ‘Tidalwave’ was certainly unique in that on no other occasion was such a large force of high-altitude bombers despatched on a low-level attack over what was then the greatest distance ever flown on a full-scale combat mission. Through the vagaries of war matters did not go according to plan and there is still debate as to whether the bombing results justified the losses.

This volume provides a straightforward historical account and makes no attempt to do other than present the known and reported facts to support its main purpose, a chronological presentation of photographic images relative to the mission. Also researched and presented are the names and fates of all known airmen involved, plus a listing of all participating aircraft and their disposition.

The United States delegation. Front row: General George C. Marshall, Chairman Combined Chiefs-of-Staff; President Roosevelt and Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations; Rear row: Harry Hopkins, the President’s personal envoy; General Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold, Commander US Army Air Force; Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, chief of the War Department’s Services of Supply and Averell Harriman, Roosevelt’s ‘special representative’.

In the joint sessions, Generals Marshall and Arnold (on the left) pressed strongly for the Ploesti operation which it was hoped would help both the Soviet Union and the Allies as they prepared to mount Operation ‘Husky’ — the invasion of Sicily (see After the Battle No. 77). If successful, it would destroy at least a third of Germany’s fuel production facilities, thereby shortening the war.

Following the rise of nationalism in the Balkans during the 19th century, the map of eastern Europe was redrawn with the emergence of independence from the Ottoman Empire: for Serbia in 1817; Wallachia and Moldovia in 1829 and Greece in 1830. Rumania came into being in 1861, additional territory being added after the First World War with the annexation of Transylvania following the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The map shows the frontiers as they existed just prior to the Second World War.

Oil and the ‘Halpro’ Raid

Rumania’s long-term prosperity — and vulnerability in time of war — was assured with the discovery of Europe’s largest oil deposits centred in a field beneath Ploesti, 50 miles north of the capital Bucharest. Oil production in 1860 was only 8,500 barrels (the unit of measurement widely used in the oil industry, one barrel equalling 42 US gallons or 35 Imperial gallons), but it was the invention of the internal combustion engine in 1882 which was to vastly increase demand for petroleum. German, British and Dutch capital developed the field so that by 1937 production had been increased to 53 million barrels, two thirds of the next largest producer, Iran The largest refinery was the Astra Romana, pictured looking north-west in 1935.

Mineral oil became the critical resource of industrialised societies during the 20th Century, largely due to the development of internal combustion engines. Sites of oil extraction may have been widespread but the main reserves were concentrated in the Middle East and the Americas. The only major source in Europe lay in Transylvania, south of the Carpathian mountains, where in 1857 the world’s first commercial crude oil refinery was opened near the town of Ploesti (spelt Ploiesti in recent years). Foreign investment, primarily British, in refineries gradually provided the predominantly peasant society of Rumania (now Romania) with a valuable export industry, which by the late 1930s made up near half the value of the country’s exports. Even so, such was their growing dependency on oil that most European countries relied on imports from the United States, Venezuela and Iraq at this time.

Throughout history, combatant nations have often sought to deprive enemies of the materials that supported a war effort, most notably by naval power. With the coming of powered flight a new and promising means was added, in that aircraft could dispense ordnance on war production targets far behind the enemy’s battle lines. In the final year of the 1914-1918 conflict, Britain’s Royal Air Force had formed a special organisation specifically to conduct bombing attacks on German industrial targets. The planners of this strategic campaign were aware of industry and transport’s growing need of oil, although this commodity did not feature in their initial plans before hostilities ceased. Influenced by its original commander, Hugh Trenchard, the RAF looked to the bomber aircraft as the most promising use of air power, a development thwarted by severe post-war budget restrictions. Nevertheless the British Air Ministry did not lose sight of strategic bombing objectives and oil eventually topped the list where Nazi Germany was concerned.

The rather crude plan comes from the briefing file.

In 1919, the International Communist Organisation Comintern was created to spread Leninism around the world, and ‘popular fronts’ were soon established in the Balkan states. The Italian Fascist movement also attempted to spread its influence in the area, and the ‘Iron Guard’ was established in Rumania under Corneliu Codreanu in 1928. To counter aspirations against them by Hungary, in 1921 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia — both countries created in the aftermath of the First World War — formed a diplomatic alliance with Rumania (the so-called Little Entente). This was followed in 1934 by the Balkan Pact which allied Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Rumania against attempts by Bulgaria to revise its frontiers. Britain and France offered to guarantee Polish and Rumanian territory but these pledges were seen to be worthless when Germany attacked Poland in September 1939 (see After the Battle No. 65) with Stalin’s co-operation. As a result, Rumania had to give Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union in June 1940, part of Transylvania to Hungary in August that year and southern Dobruja to Bulgaria the following month (see map). King Carol abdicated on September 6 in favour of his son Michael, and General Ion Antonescu became dictator. He promptly invited German forces to enter Rumania in October and was awarded the German Ritterkreuz (Knight’s Cross) on August 6, 1941. Here he is pictured inspecting a Rumanian airbase.

Appreciating the critical situation that could arise over oil supplies if engaged in hostilities, in the late 1930s Germany had seen fit to stockpile crude oil and commence synthetic production from coal, a programme that was accelerated with the outbreak of war. Understandably Hitler’s attention had been drawn to the major source of European natural oil, the Ploesti fields which, unfortunately for him, were in a neutral country and largely controlled by British, French and American interests. An upsurge of nationalism in Rumania during this period, with calls to restrict foreign involvement in oil production, was temporally muted in 1939 when Britain and France gave the Rumanian government financial assistance and a guarantee of military aid if attacked. For Britain and France this was an effort to thwart any German ambitions, although the Rumanians were more concerned with Soviet Russia demanding the return of provinces ceded to Rumania at the conclusion of the First World War.

The Western Allies’ efforts to keep Ploesti oil out of German hands were in vain. While the Rumanians attempted to maintain their neutrality this was soon undermined by a fascist party led by General Ion Antonescu who eventually took power. With the fall of France and Germany’s dominance of western Europe, Antonescu turned to Hitler for support against the Soviet threat. The request was met with an agreement to allow German military forces to occupy certain defensive positions and that Rumania expel all the British oil industry personnel. There had been a secret plan to destroy a large number of oil refineries if Hitler’s forces arrived but the scheme had fallen into German hands during the invasion of France. Any British attempts to implement the plan were forestalled by the arrest of those who were to carry out the task.

In effect Hitler had achieved control of Rumania without hostilities. The immediate centre of attention were the Ploesti oil fields and refineries. With Rumanian government acceptance, a German company was formed, ostensibly to assist the Rumanians in taking over the British and French owned refineries and increase production; the overriding purpose was to ensure Ploesti oil fed the Nazi war machine. German control was also exercised on the transportation system. Sensitive to Rumanian nationalism, the German presence was not heavy-handed, and there was little need with the ruthless Antonescu in power to swiftly crush any opposition. Despite the acquisition of their commercial interests, the British endeavoured to maintain a diplomatic presence in Rumania, finally accepting early in 1941 that this was no longer tenable.

It is rather odd that Antonescu is not wearing the award in this photograph although the picture must have been taken after he received it because General Mihail Lascar (second from right), commanding the Rumanian 1st Mountain Brigade, is wearing his Ritterkreuz which he was given on January 18, 1942. In fact the photo has to be dated between January and November that year as Lascar has not yet added the Oakleaves which were awarded to him in November 1942.

By December 1940 the RAF in the Middle East had already prepared target maps for the oil installations in the Ploesti area. [1] Astra Romana Refinery; [2] Phoenix Orion Refinery; [3] Unirea Sperantza Refinery (sometimes referred to as Phoenix Unirea); [4] Standard Petrol Block Refinery; [5] Pumping station for Constanza pipeline; [6] Romana Americana Refinery; [7] Dacia Romana Refinery; [8] Redeventa Refinery; [9] Cometa Refinery; [10] Concordia Vega Refinery; [11] Xenia Refinery; [12] Colombia Aquila Refinery; [13] Lumina Refinery; [14] Sidings and marshalling yards for Astra group; [15] New tank farm belonging to Astra Romana; [16] Factory buildings under construction; [17] Creditul Minier Refinery; [18] Assembly yards for rail tank wagons; [19] Boosting station for Steaua Romana Refinery (Campina) (off map to the north-west); [20] Pumping station for Giurgiu pipeline; [21] Fratia Refinery; [A] Distillation plants (McKee the more easterly plant); [B] Cracking plant; [C] Power house; [D] New lubrication oil plant; [E] Fractionation column; [F] Stabilising plant. (Anti-aircraft sites are indicated by the half circles.)

Well aware that the Ploesti oil installations were an inviting target for air attack, the German air attaché in Bucharest was given the task of organising defences. In fact, Colonel Alfred Gerstenberg (later promoted) skillfully increased the German military presence while placating the Rumanian leadership. Although there was the potential for an RAF raid it was thought improbable in view of the fact that nearest British-controlled territory was over 1,000 miles distant. More likely it would be the Soviets who struck at Ploesti and, three days after Hitler launched his attack on the USSR, this proved to be the case. On the nights of June 25, 26 and 27, 1941, a small number of Soviet bombers included Ploesti in their attacks. The few bombs dropped only caused minor damage to one oil installation but, on the evening of July 14, six Russian aircraft carried out a surprise attack from an optimum 2,500 feet on the Phoenix Orion refinery near the town, destroying 18 storage tanks and disrupting production for several weeks. Thereafter the Soviets were too involved in meeting the Wehrmacht blitzkrieg to pay further attention to Ploesti, besides which loss of forward airfields soon put most of their bomber aircraft out of range.

When Hitler reneged on his August 1939 Non-Aggression Pact with Stalin by attacking the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Russians were quick to retaliate. Within days, the Ploesti refineries were targeted by Soviet bombers with fires being started in both the Vega refinery of the Concordia Company (RAF Target No. S.102) and the Phoenix Orion refinery (Target S.105). Both fires burned for more than 24 hours and were visible for many miles, but for some reason the Russians failed to follow up with further attacks until the fires had been extinguished.

Following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor which brought the United States into the war on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt was anxious to mount a retaliatory raid on Japan. When Churchill and the British war chiefs arrived in America later that month for the Arcadia conference, Air Chief Marshal Portal told General Arnold that the only way of bombing Tokyo was by adopting the same method that the Japanese had used: transport aircraft to within striking range by aircraft carrier. Admiral King said he was already proposing to allocate three carriers to the North African landings later in the year, one of which he thought could transport bombers and their munitions. General Arnold noted that ‘We will have to try bomber take-offs from carriers. It has never been done before but we must try out and check on how long it takes.’ Captain Francis S. Low, an officer on Admiral King’s staff, was already looking into the possibility with King’s air operations officer, Captain Donald B. Duncan. He thought the only way it might be possible was to use modified North American B-25s on the Navy’s latest carrier, the USS Hornet. Duncan believed that her deck could accommodate 16 aircraft packed nose to tail and she could steam at 25 knots, so reducing the take-off distance required. Both King and Arnold were enthusiastic and Major (as he was then) James H. Doolittle was put in charge. Three months later the idea became reality when 16 B-25s and 80 crewmen were taken to within 500 miles of the coast of Japan. The plan was that after the aircraft had bombed, they would fly on to land in China.

Meanwhile the British had not lost interest in mounting an attack but the main problem at the time was the RAF’s lack of bombers capable of the 2,100 mile round trip from Middle East bases. Nevertheless, future attention was given to the building of comprehensive intelligence files on the oil installations and their supply routes. The enthusiasm for raiding the Rumanian oil refineries was shared with USAAF observers and, following the United States entry into the war in December 1941, the feasibility of conducting such an operation was given serious consideration. The Consolidated B-24 Liberator, a fourengine heavy bomber then coming into service, had sufficient range — but only just — to attack from either bases in Britain or the Middle East.

In April 1942 the British Air Ministry made a proposal to destroy six major refineries at Ploesti to hinder the suspected German offensive in the USSR during the summer. It would be necessary to put the six refineries out of action for three months to have the desired effect. A low-level daylight attack using long-range Beaufighters with armourpiercing incendiary shells was the plan but the critical situation that developed in the Middle East put an end to these ambitions.

The US military attaché in Cairo, no doubt influenced by the British interest in Ploesti, enthused about its strategic importance, and his views were soon endorsed by the USAAF’s Operational Plans Division. With the many calls on the US war effort, and the critical situation in several war zones — not least the Middle East — no plans for an attack on Ploesti could have immediate attention. However, in the spring of 1942, a small force of B-24 Liberators was assembled for special duties in the Far East, an attack on the Japanese capital from Chinese bases being the foremost objective. Such an attack would be more of a national morale booster in retaliation for Pearl Harbor than bombing for strategic achievement. A similarly motivated mission, employing B-25 medium bombers, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, was launched from an aircraft carrier in April.

Doolittle’s aircraft led the raid. L-R: Lieutenant Henry A. Potter (navigator); Lieutenant Colonel Doolittle (pilot); Staff Sergeant Fred A. Braemer (bombardier); Lieutenant Richard E. Cole (co-pilot); Staff Sergeant Paul J. Leonard (engineer-gunner). Although the material damage from the raid