Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and the International

By Richard Higgott

This edited volume explores European cultural diplomacy, a topic of growing interest across the scholarly and applied public policy communities in recent years. The contributions focus on Europe, culture and diplomacy and the way they are interlinked in the contemporary international context. The European Union increasingly resorts to cultural assets and activity for both internal and external purposes, to foster European cohesion and advancing integration, and to mitigate the demise of other foreign policy components, respectively. This calls for an analysis of the strategic role of culture, especially as it relates to the realm of EU external action. The chapters provide a conceptual discussion of culture in international relations and examine how this concept relates to cultural diplomacy and cultural strategy. The authors discuss roles and relationships with the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy and current EU attempts to foster the EU’s political and societal resilience.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
• Release date: Jun 24, 2019
• ISBN: 9783030215446

Book preview

© The Author(s) 2020

Caterina Carta and Richard Higgott (eds.)Cultural Diplomacy in EuropeThe European Union in International Affairshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21544-6_1

1. Introduction: Cultural Diplomacy in Europe: Between the Domestic and International

Caterina Carta¹  

(1)

Department of Political Science, Université Laval, Québec, Canada

Caterina Carta

Email: [e-mail]

1 Introduction: Culture, Strategy and Resilience

The 2016 Global Strategy (GS) produced by the new High Representative Federica Mogherini represented a very much needed platform to rethink the role of an increasingly weakened Europe in volatile international context. In that, despite their consistency and continuity, the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2016 Global Strategy represent two different trajectories for the European Union (EU): one ascending and one descending. In 2003, the EU was still in an expansive stage. Ten years later, both the EU and the entire continent were turned upside-down by a series of crises, e.g. the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, the Ukrainian crisis, the refugee crisis, BREXIT and the rise of populism and anti-EU parties (Caporaso 2018). The difficulty to deal with external crises was further accompanied by a record low support for European integration even in traditionally pro-European countries. Beyond Europe, a less amicable U.S. administration and a less predictable international context made European strategic thinking even more compelling and needed (Biscop 2016; Higgott and Van Langenhove 2016).

This context underscored a loss of international reputation for the EU, and a sense of ‘European fatigue’ (Barroso 2012) has ever since underpinned the EU public rhetoric (Cross 2016). For one thing, institutional discourses have progressively moved from a ‘normative power’ to a ‘principled pragmatism’ rhetoric, which seeks to ground the EU’s ‘idealistic aspirations’ into ‘the realistic assessment of the strategic environment’ (GS 2016: 16). For another, this rhetoric reaffirmed the EU’s intention to play ‘a very strong regional and global role’ (Mogherini 2016).

Not surprisingly, EU institutional discourses have thus progressively conceded the existence of a ‘far from academic’ existential crisis (Duke 2014). The Global Strategy referred to threatening ‘times of existential crisis, within and beyond’ the EU (2016: 5). Van Rompuy acknowledged the existence of an ‘existential test’ while receiving the Nobel Prize in 2012. Junker alluded to it in his ‘State of the Union’ address in 2016. Verhofstadt reiterated the theme of a ‘crossroad in 2017’ that encompasses the ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ populated by Trump, Putin and radical Islam.

More and more, the EU strategic thinkers acknowledged that the EU needs to focus realistically on its objectives and doing so by reflecting about what kind of actor it wishes and can be, both abroad and at home. By analogy with Richard Haass’ book Foreign Policy begins at home (2013), the Global Strategy states that ‘global strategy begins at home’ (2016: 18) and underscored the importance of unifying the domestic and international parts of the external action equation (EEAS 2017). Indeed, the relationship between political cohesion and foreign policy cuts both ways. Just as ‘domestic’ political cohesion is indispensable to have an effective foreign policy, greater cooperation in foreign policy matters can act as a ‘domestic’ confidence building measure. In this context, the concept of resilience—that is, ‘the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to prepare for, to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks without compromising long-term development prospects’ (Council 2013: 1)—acquired increasing popularity among practitioners and policy pundits in Europe (Council 2013; Pawlak 2016; Cross and La Porte 2017) as a key component of the EU domestic/international strategy.

Current EU references to culture are hence to be situated in the broader discourse on how to overcome the EU’s ‘existential crisis’ (Barroso 2012) and further located in the attempt to foster domestic and international societal resilience. Culture is thus imbricated in a bundle of domestic/international priorities. With its ductile, omnipresent nature, ‘culture’ relates to the economic activities of the European cultural and creative sector (Commission 2016); development (Council 2017); and ‘non-material development and economy’ (European Parliament 2011). Culture in International Relations (CiIR) is seen as a key vector for ‘addressing major global challenges’ (GS 2016: 2) and as a reservoir of ‘immaterial’ antibodies that allow the EU ‘to live up to its values internally and externally’ (GS 2016: 1).

Hence, the relevance of ‘culture’ as a vector of international political strategy draws on three interrelated considerations. First, as with its crucial role in the process of meaning-making (McNamara 2015: 27), ‘culture’ encompasses both domestic and international arenas and goals. Second, if compared to public diplomacy , CiIR offers a platform for ‘long-term’ political projection and programming (Nye 2009), and allows broader relationships which go beyond the realm of so-called ‘high politics’, typically associated with narrow conceptions of security. CiIR thus offers the EU the possibility of going beyond the ‘speaking with one voice’ mantra and to ‘engage with its own diversity’ (Macaj and Nicolaïdis 2014). Finally, linking foreign policy objectives to culture offers the possibility to capitalise on a far less controversial—e.g. seemingly depoliticised—symbolical repertoire. Hence, with the ‘normative pedigree’ of the EU is under strain, ‘culture’ offers a defused way to rebuild its soft power repertoire.

However, strategising CiIR comes with challenges. The EU is a multilayered political system that presents significant coherence-related challenges. The way in which its member states (MSs) organise their cultural policies, both domestically and internationally, has a bearing upon the making of a common EU strategy. Different ‘national ways to CD’ highlight the existence of different practices of ‘doings and sayings things’ (Schatzki 2012: 20; Pouliot 2016; Adler-Nissen 2016), stemming from various material and immaterial cultural heritages, resources, institutional philosophies, structures and strategic conceptions (Lamo de Espinosa and Badillo Matos 2017).

The European Commission’s 2007 Agenda for culture in a globalising world and the Joint Communication ‘ Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations’ bear witness of these reflections. Critically, the documents connected culture and international cultural relations to the concept of strategy, a role further reiterated in both the 2016 European Global Strategy and the 2017 Conclusions on a EU strategic approach to international cultural relations . But what does it mean to approach international cultural relations strategically? And how strategic effectively is the EU in developing its own strategic approach International Cultural Relations?

The EU’s increasing resort to culture for both internal (i.e. fostering European cohesion and advancing integration) and external (i.e. mitigating the demise of other soft power components) purposes calls for an analysis of the strategic role of culture for the EU, especially as it relates to the realm of external action. This book constitutes a step in this regard. It provides a conceptual discussion on CiIR and examines how this concept relates to that of Cultural Diplomacy (CD), International Cultural Relations (ICR) and Cultural Strategy (CS). It then discusses its role and relationship with both the GS and the current EU’s attempts to foster the EU’s political and societal resilience. This book proposes a way of conceptualising ‘culture’ as an object of strategy based on a four-edged act of programming which includes: (a) the definition of the field (encompassing both culture and cultural diplomacy ); (b) the setting up of a network connecting different societal and institutional actors (which proceeds from an act of mapping of both institutional and cultural actors and resources); (c) the prioritisation of global actions (along geographical and/or thematic lines); and (d) the establishment of a wide semantic field around which different narratives can be inlayed.

2 Mobilising Culture in International Relations: Four Strategic Dimensions and Associated Puzzles

All contributors in this volume acknowledge that the deployment of cultural symbols, messages and resources requires a strategy, e.g. a blueprint for mapping, selecting, ranking, mobilising, framing and deploying different (human, immaterial and material) resources in the pursuit of stated goals.

In the first place, mobilising CiIR relies on the definition of culture for external purposes, which in turn requires both a definition of what culture and its field of action are supposed to be. Culture is one of the most difficult concepts of the English language (Williams 1983). ‘Culture’ is not a unified system of meaning (O’Sullivan et al. 1994: 68); it does not offer a framework providing ultimate values that shape or orient behavior, but rather ‘a repertoire or toolkit of habits, skills, and styles’ (Swidler 1986: 273). The architrave of things such as ‘national cultures’ or ‘national identities’ is abstract and impersonal, apt to be adapted, imitated and learnt over time and space (Andersen 1983: 155–158). Drawing on such a minimalistic script, these social constructions are discursive representations or habiti, in Bourdieu’s terms (1992), that are constantly adapting to a dynamic context, and to the perception of what is constructed as different. Inherently diverse, culture does not offer any univocal policy script. Engaging in diplomatic activities through the evocation of culture thus implies the representation of a ‘collective cultural agency’, one that is staged through processes of selective elaboration of common stories. ‘CiIR ’, thus, suggests a process of fabrication. The slippery nature of ‘culture’ also comes with policy challenges. As both the concept of ‘art’ and ‘creativity’ are virtually borderless, the decision of what to include and how to prioritise the policy domain is highly relevant since it draws on material and immaterial heritage and strives to allocate scarce resources.

In the second place, as with the cultural multilayered policy framework, CiIR needs to rely on a solid institutional framework and to mobilise and coordinate a high number of public and private institutional and societal actors who intervene in cultural practices to various extents and by virtue of different provisions both within and without the borders of the state. To do so, it has to activate an organisational field, i.e. a ‘heterogeneous set of functionally interconnected organisations’ (Knoke 2001: as quoted in Brown 2012: 7) to coordinate different administrative actors and establish a societal network (Zaharna 2007; Slaughter 2009; Lord 2010). From the institutional point of view, different administrative traditions (Painter and Peters 2010) provide an organisational and cognitive framework around which states design, steer and conduct their CD activities (Katzenstein 1996: 23). Intra- and inter-organisational differences at the national level reflect different beliefs about the nature of the government, administrative structures which deal with cultural policies and ‘objectives regarding the whole area of culture and the art’ (Cummings and Katz 1987: 4). In turn, this organisational and cognitive framework informs the way of organising relations with a plethora of public and private actors that perform both cultural and cultural diplomatic activities, within and without states’ borders. To simplify these differences, we can place the states’ strategic traditions along a continuum indicating whether they tend to adopt (a) a top–down approach (centralised, leading from above) to CD; or (b) a bottom–up (decentralised, leading from behind) approach. At the one end of the spectrum, top–down approaches centralise CD activities around the MFA or the Ministry of culture and reflect a more hands-on intervention of the central government in cultural diplomatic activities. At the opposite end of the spectrum, bottom-up approaches mostly rely on quasi-independent agencies (e.g. Cultural Institutes, CIs) and steer CD indirectly, through both their ability to establish funding and audit schemes, performance indicators and negotiate strategic guidelines. While these mechanisms allow the government some oversight over activities of the CIs, the ‘arm length’ of societal and organisational actors tends to be less intrusive.

Institutionally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) can generally be conceived as the driving force of CD strategies. However, CD functions are ‘spread across multiple organisations’ (Brown 2012: 7). Beyond the MFA, CD avails of the collaboration with other branches of the executive—e.g. the Ministries of Education and/or Culture, Cultural Heritage, Economic Development and Innovation—let alone a plethora of public actors below the central level, like federate states, regions, provinces or cities, universities, theaters, etc. Critically, finding ‘cultural ambassadors ’ in the creative sector requires an act of mapping and selection of private actors that are potentially eligible for sponsorship. By leveraging their control over central funds and taxation revenues, and their ability to act as gatekeepers of CD activities, states strive to sway different public and private actors into their discursive orbit ‘to whatever extent’ they can (Fox 1999: 2–3).

Indeed, CD aims to ‘steer’, ‘shape’ and ‘channel’ cultural products and relations that grow organically within society (Lenczowski 2011: 162). In this regard, CD is not to be confused with a closely related concept, that of ‘International Cultural Relations’ (ICR). The definitions of ICR and CD substantiate both the inherent co-presence of spontaneous and institutionally led cultural practices and the need to conceptually distinguish them. ICR alludes to ‘relations between national cultures… lodged in any society’ that ‘cross borders’ (Arndt 2005). In turn, CD has been alternatively regarded as ‘the linchpin of public diplomacy ’ (Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy 2005), that draws on ideas, arts and creativity to ‘win foreigners voluntary allegiance’ (Schneider 2006: 3), either by fostering ‘mutual understanding’ (Cummings 2003: 1); or manipulating ‘cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes’ (Barghoorn 1960: 10). Hence, while ICR occurs spontaneously and disorderly, CD provides ICR with an overarching framework.

In the third place, not dissimilarly from any external and foreign policy activity, CD entails the definition of areas of geographical/thematic priorities and rests on the ability to make sense of the partners’ organisational culture and structures and the composition of their private cultural sector. In terms of thematic priorities, the attempt is made to operationally bridge domestic and international EU cultural initiatives, even though in terms of access and strategic designs this is not always the case (Lisack 2014). In terms of prioritising global partners, both the preparative actions and the ensuing country reports reflected a mix of regional and global ambitions. On the one hand, priority was given to Southern and Eastern neighbouring countries. On the other hand, the EU designed specific strategies targeting its so-called Strategic Partners (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the USA).

Lastly, instead of directly shaping CD messages, a CS strives to articulate an overarching discursive framework that seeks to give meaning to the different actors, activities and messages that compose a given ‘national culture’. To this end, institutional attempts to strategically deploy CiIR messages are to be conceived as flexible discursive themes, which allow various symbols, messages, scripts and actors to move freely within a pre-established semantic template. Indeed, international actors articulate an overarching discursive framework that seeks to give meaning to the different actors, activities and messages that make up a country’s culture. In other term, states try to strategically develop core cultural narratives , as instruments ‘to extend their influence’ (Miskimmon et al. 2013: 2). Micromanagement is to be avoided. A CS works better without formal or specific instructions (e.g. the diplomats coordinate, but do not impose either the contents or modes of representation, Fisher 2007). Hence, ‘the measure of power is connectedness’ (Slaughter 2009), that is, the ability to draw on ‘values webs’ in which ‘suppliers become partners and, instead of just supplying products, actually collaborate in their design’ (Slaughter 2009).

Hence, much like Public Diplomacy , CiIR activities reveal that states and other entities strive to acquire ‘influence through impression management’ ‘as an integral part of the policy planning’ (Mor 2006: 157). This reflection underscores the importance of strategic communication in the making of international public relations and public diplomacy (Van Dike and Vercic 2009). The term strategic communication refers to a method ‘that maps perceptions and influence networks , identifies policy priorities, formulates objectives, focuses on doable tasks, develops themes and messages, employs relevant channels, leverages new strategic and tactical dynamics, and monitors success’ (US Office of the Under Secretary of Defence 2004: 2). International strategic communication constitutes an all-encompassing approach—ranging from public diplomacy to public affairs, from international broadcasting to military information operation—that strives to achieve long-term stated goals through the planned used of three factors: the message, the media channels and the audience(s) (Bockstette 2008).

In this framework, culture is a ‘good’ that carries ‘values’ (Hillman-Chartrand 1992: 135): it draws on a diversified and dynamic societal source, allows to communicate with a wide audience and potentially serves and enhances various goals in parallel. CiIR can be strategically used to maximise an entity’s international influence, by means of ‘enlarg[ing] the circle of those able to serve as influential interpreters between this and other nations’ (State Department, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 1973, quoted in Scott-Smith 2008: 173). They can serve an economic rationale, i.e. by promoting activities that generate economic returns to one’s constituency (Grant and Wood 2004). Moreover, they underpin cultural cooperation, build trust (Higgott 2017) and promote intercultural understanding (Luke and Morag 2013). The co-presence of different goals bears no contradiction: ‘culture’ is a polysemous concept which offers an extremely fluid semantic repertoire serving a variety of purposes. While CiIR does pursue a variety of goals, the relations between CiIR and foreign policy objectives is rarely manifest. Self-projection or ‘the desire to create a good impression’ (Demos 2013: 13) avails of a far wider symbolic toolkit and transcends immediate goals (Nye 2009). CiIR is thus an instrument of foreign policy, but its goals, messengers, semantic repertoire and scope of action is wider and more diffuse.

3 The Contributions to This Volume

The atypical status of the EU adds an additional layer of challenges to a coherent international cultural strategy (Helly 2017; Isar 2015). The EU needs to coordinate the activities of its sovereign MSs in an area that intercepts two core symbolic fields (e.g. foreign policy and culture). For one thing, ‘culture’ as an object of policy intercepts the work of different Directorates Generals (DGs) within the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) and is discussed in various Council configuration. ‘Speaking culture strategically ’ requires not just the ability of establishing virtuous networks of public and private actors, but also the ability of bridging policy areas that straddle the domestic/international distinction. For another, European attempts to ‘speaking culture strategically’ reflect different national understandings of how ‘strategy’ applies to external goals, which in turn translates into different organisational philosophies and ways of setting up, managing and relating to cultural networks .

Hence, while the EU offers its MSs the possibility of drawing on extra funds, visibility and resources, it also comes with an extra layer of institutional complexity. The difficulties of defining the borders and rules of the organisational field are amplified by both the inherent plurality of national institutional stakeholders and the segmentation of arts, heritages and the creative sectors across the MSs. In this framework, at most, the EU ‘contributes, encourages and, if necessary supports and supplements’ cooperation between the MSs in areas of ‘dissemination of the culture and history of the European people’; ‘cultural heritage of European significance’; ‘non-commercial cultural exchanges’; and ‘artistic and literary creation’ (art. 167 TFEU). ‘Speaking culture’ thus requires the ability to unite a fragmented and decentralised policy-making environment and to bridge policy areas that straddle the domestic/international distinction.

The contributions to this volume acknowledge both these challenges and the crucial role of ‘culture’ to foster both the EU’s and its partners’ political and societal resilience. They further acknowledge that culture as an object of strategy entails a four-edged act of programming which includes: (a) the definition of the field (encompassing both culture and cultural diplomacy ); (b) the setting up of a network connecting different societal and institutional actors (which proceeds from an act of mapping of both institutional and cultural actors and resources); (c) the prioritisation of global actions (along geographical and/or thematic lines); and (d) the establishment of a wide semantic field around which different narratives can be inlayed.

Accordingly, the book is composed of two parts. Part I—Setting Up the Institutional Machinery: Tuning the Different Voices of European Cultural Diplomacy —explores the institutional and organisational designs that underpin the current attempt to develop a strategy to mobilise CiIR. It glances over the mechanisms of cooperation, the strategies adopted to mobilise the cultural network and offers case studies of the EU’s action on the ground.

In his contribution, Richard Higgott delves into the global and institutional constraints on the European strategic approach to ICR in the wake of the 2016 Joint Communication and the 2017 adoption of a strategy for ICR. He examines opportunities, but more pertinently the constraints on the development of a European strategy for ICR and CD . It identifies three types of constraints—structural (politico-economic context), ideational (defining the appropriate normative agenda for ICR-CD) and agential (the role of people and institutional agents).

Stuart MacDonald and Erik Vlaeminck look specifically at the symbolic and discursive dimension of the current attempts to develop a strategy for ICR. Their contribution focuses on two key aspects of a successful strategy: the definition of the field, and the need for a shared discursive framework within which the many policies, cultural and other actors involved can generate a shared sense of purpose and shape strategies. They notice that the terminology used in key documents often reflect the need to produce texts which can be agreed upon, rather than systematic terminology which is subject-field driven. This inhibits the development of strategies as important sites for ‘narrating the EU into existence as an actor’.

The contribution of Caterina Carta and Ángel Badillo offers a platform for analysing the cultural diplomatic models in Europe in a comparative perspective. It focuses specifically on the French, German, Spanish and UK models, as indicative of larger trends in Europe. Their chapter, hence, looks at cultural policy and diplomacy from a state’s perspective and discusses the criticalities that such differences impose over the making of a coherent EU’s cultural strategic approach.

Riccardo Trobbiani and Lina Kirjazovaite seek to provide an analysis for the practices of intercultural cooperation developed in the framework of the EU relations with the Middle East and North Africa. They notice that, in the absence of a single institutional framework, the EU and its MSs have put in place initiatives for cultural cooperation with the MENA based on ‘variable geometries’—creating various fora, programmes, platforms and networks managed by different actors.

Joachim Koops and Silviu Piros glance into Education Diplomacy . Although education diplomacy is often not referred to as a direct component of CD , their effects are mutually reinforcing. Their chapter takes steps from the consideration that the 2016 Global Strategy acknowledges the role of education in building societal resilience, both in the near-abroad and beyond. They hence zoom into the case of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which provides a framework for supporting reform and modernisation of higher education through EU-Easter Partnership institutional cooperation. The chapter thus explores the role and relevance of institutional reform and capacity building in the field of higher education, as enablers of EU education diplomacy and long-term tools to strengthen societal resilience. In particular, it analyses the role of TEMPUS in the EaP countries of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia.

Part II—The Role of Intra-European Cultural Diplomacy in the Age of Populisms—glances into current attempts to deploy culture as a tool to increase European societal resilience and as an antidote to current populist challenges.

Richard Higgott explores the nature of ‘the populist beast’ and the extent to which it has infiltrated the European political and policy process. He pays particular attention to the role of emerging communication technologies and practices as a key enabler of the what he calls the Populist Nationalist Zeitgeist (PNZ). His chapter investigates trends and practices of populist movements. It focuses specifically on the cultural dynamics of foreign policy and the degree to which actors (from both government and civil society) can develop strategies of cultural resilience against the populist nationalist urge.

Virginia Proud delves into the rhetoric and actions of nationalist parties in Hungary and Poland. She highlights the way ‘culture’ is used strategically to fuel a climate of suspicion of the ‘Other’, specifically against refugees and migrants. However, she also shows how independent voices in the arts and culture communities are currently reaching out for international collaboration as a means of survival, and to EU and international networks as a source of resilience.

Caterina Carta and Elenora Belfiore explore both the potentials and limits of cultural policy and cultural diplomacy as policy-instruments in the post-Brexit relationships between the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU (EU). Their contribution provides a general mapping of the reactions of the cultural policy and diplomacy world to the Brexit, by specifically looking into both strategic assessments and specific initiatives promoted to mend the rip between the UK and the EU, both at the political and at the societal level.

Part III—Perspectives on the Future assesses the challenges associated to the EU’s current attempt to develop its strategic approach to ICR.

The contribution of Riccardo Trobbiani and Andrea Pavón-Guinea draw on recent developments to perform a Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threat (SWOT) Analysis of the EU’s strategic approach. They identify several factors that could potentially impact over the future of EU ICR. These range from the rise of populist and nationalist forces both within and outside Europe to the challenges this rise imposes to intercultural trust and tolerance at the global level. The chapter argues that, notwithstanding the uncertainty and volatility that characterise the current international scenario, investing in stronger EU cooperation in ICR remains a priority for EU leadership. Drawing on the distinction between CD and ICR, they suggest that an EU strategic approach to ICR rooted in development policy and intercultural dialogue bears the promise to facilitate cooperation among EU institutions, MSs and their cultural institutes, as well as broader cultural networks based on innovative models.

Finally, the conclusions critically address the question on how ‘strategic’ and integrated is the EU in the making of its approach to ICR, by drawing on the conceptual and empirical findings highlighted by the contributions to this book. They recap and critically discuss the main findings of the various contributions and advance policy recommendations in the four elements of CS that the book has identified.

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