An Introduction to Philosophy

By George Stuart Fullerton

Although published a hundred years ago, Fullerton's "Introduction to Philosophy" is still a great resource for a preliminary idea on philosophy. In the book, Fullerton explains what philosophy is, speaks of the nature of reflective or philosophic thinking, gives a general view of the main problems in the philosophy of his time, and gives an account of some of the most important doctrines in philosophy. Being logically structured and simply written, the book aims at the audience's first time meeting this subject.

• Language: English
• Publisher: DigiCat
• Release date: Jun 2, 2022
• ISBN: 8596547045342

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George Stuart Fullerton

An Introduction to Philosophy

EAN 8596547045342

DigiCat, 2022

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Table of Contents

PREFACE

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER II

II. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VII

III. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND

CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER X

CHAPTER XI

IV. SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

CHAPTER XIII

CHAPTER XIV

CHAPTER XV

V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES

CHAPTER XVII

CHAPTER XVIII

CHAPTER XIX

CHAPTER XX

CHAPTER XXI

VI. ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER XXIII

CHAPTER XXIV

Section 6. In justification of the meaning given to the word. philosophy in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of. courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading. universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus of. opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who. differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy.

Section 14. See The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange, System. of Metaphysics, Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is. examined at length, with quotations and references.

Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, The World as Unperceived, and the. 'Unknowable,' where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and. references are given. I think it is very important that the student. should realize that the Unknowable is a perfectly useless assumption. in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever.

Section 26. See Chapter XII, The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space, in my. System of Metaphysics. The argument ought not to be difficult to one. who has mastered Chapter V of this volume.

Section 33. The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist. toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's. Psychology are very interesting and instructive.

Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and. that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded. their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the little pineal gland.. Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended. it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a collateral. product of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the. steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He. made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See System of. Metaphysics, Chapter XVIII, The Automaton Theory: its Genesis.

Section 38. See System of Metaphysics, Chapter XXIV, The Time and. Place of Sensations and Ideas.

Section 43. The Mind-stuff doctrine is examined at length and its. origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the System of Metaphysics,. Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus. It is well worth while for. the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay On the Nature of. Things-in-themselves, even if he is pressed for time.

CHAPTER XI, section 44. See System of Metaphysics, Chapter XV, The. World as Mechanism.

Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, The Place of Mind in Nature.

Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its. difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter. XXXIII, Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism. For a vigorous defense. of Freewill (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the. common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on The. Dilemma of the Determinist, in his volume, The Will to Believe.

Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, Mechanism and Teleology.

Section 1. It is to be had only by sensation.

Section 2. Instance whiteness of this paper.

Section 3. This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be. called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us.

Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers. would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's. Principles of Human Knowledge and his Three Dialogues between Hylas. and Philonous. Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation. of sentiment characterize them throughout.

Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us. asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument. by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good. exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his. Inquiry entitled Of Extension (Chapter V, section 5) , and Of. Perception in General (Chapter VI, section 20) .

Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see. Falckenberg's History of Modern Philosophy (English translation,. N.Y., 1893) . Compare with this the accounts in the histories of. philosophy by Ueberweg and Höffding (English translation of the latter,. London, 1900) . Full bibliographies are to be found especially in. Ueberweg.

CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could. regard himself as a natural realist (the word is employed by him) .. See his Lectures on Metaphysics, VIII, where he develops his. doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know. directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer. all else: Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only. relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing.

CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See System of Metaphysics, Chapter XVI,. The Insufficiency of Materialism.

Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, Why the Mind has a Body. (N.Y., 1903) , advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It. is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on The Nature of. Things-in-themselves, ought to give one a good idea of the. considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists.

Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his. Lectures on Metaphysics, VIII. He writes: Mind and matter, as known. or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities;. as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these. two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere.. The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are. compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the. distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming. incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one.

CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced. in the Meditations. In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his. doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established;. in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find. a good deal of the natural light in the first part of his Principles. of Philosophy.

Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency. in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his. treatment of Substance. Read, in his Essay, Book I, Chapter IV,. section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are. not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class.

CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of. the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: The. question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a. fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by. the adjustment of mutual claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of. which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical. investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical. investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and. preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be. equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to. the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be. secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and. speculative. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into. the metempirical. Handbook of Psychology, Preface, pp. iii and iv.

CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take. extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's Elements of Morality. referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is. significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us. advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the. cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual. conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide. us.

Section 72. Wundt, in his volume The Facts of the Moral Life (N.Y.,. 1897) , tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of. metaphysics; see the Preface.

CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of. several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial. similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped. out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality) , Rational. Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval. landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader. that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the. same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the. different ways of conceiving the One Substance; and bear in mind also. what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word reality.

INDEX

PREFACE

Table of Contents

As there cannot be said to be a beaten path in philosophy, and as Introductions to the subject differ widely from one another, it is proper that I should give an indication of the scope of the present volume.

It undertakes:—

1. To point out what the word philosophy is made to cover in our universities and colleges at the present day, and to show why it is given this meaning.

2. To explain the nature of reflective or philosophical thinking, and to show how it differs from common thought and from science.

3. To give a general view of the main problems with which philosophers have felt called upon to deal.

4. To give an account of some of the more important types of philosophical doctrine which have arisen out of the consideration of such problems.

5. To indicate the relation of philosophy to the so-called philosophical sciences, and to the other sciences.

6. To show, finally, that the study of philosophy is of value to us all, and to give some practical admonitions on spirit and method. Had these admonitions been impressed upon me at a time when I was in especial need of guidance, I feel that they would have spared me no little anxiety and confusion of mind. For this reason, I recommend them to the attention of the reader.

Such is the scope of my book. It aims to tell what philosophy is. It is not its chief object to advocate a particular type of doctrine. At the same time, as it is impossible to treat of the problems of philosophy except from some point of view, it will be found that, in Chapters III to XI, a doctrine is presented. It is the same as that presented much more in detail, and with a greater wealth of reference, in my System of Metaphysics, which was published a short time ago. In the Notes in the back of this volume, the reader will find references to those parts of the larger work which treat of the subjects more briefly discussed here. It will be helpful to the teacher to keep the larger work on hand, and to use more or less of the material there presented as his undergraduate classes discuss the chapters of this one. Other references are also given in the Notes, and it may be profitable to direct the attention of students to them.

The present book has been made as clear and simple as possible, that no unnecessary difficulties may be placed in the path of those who enter upon the thorny road of philosophical reflection. The subjects treated are deep enough to demand the serious attention of any one; and they are subjects of fascinating interest. That they are treated simply and clearly does not mean that they are treated superficially. Indeed, when a doctrine is presented in outline and in a brief and simple statement, its meaning may be more readily apparent than when it is treated more exhaustively. For this reason, I especially recommend, even to those who are well acquainted with philosophy, the account of the external world contained in Chapter IV.

For the doctrine I advocate I am inclined to ask especial consideration on the ground that it is, on the whole, a justification of the attitude taken by the plain man toward the world in which he finds himself. The experience of the race is not a thing that we may treat lightly.

Thus, it is maintained that there is a real external world presented in our experience—not a world which we have a right to regard as the sensations or ideas of any mind. It is maintained that we have evidence that there are minds in certain relations to that world, and that we can, within certain limits, determine these relations. It is pointed out that the plain man's belief in the activity of his mind and his notion of the significance of purposes and ends are not without justification. It is indicated that theism is a reasonable doctrine, and it is held that the human will is free in the only proper sense of the word freedom. Throughout it is taken for granted that the philosopher has no private system of weights and measures, but must reason as other men reason, and must prove his conclusions in the same sober way.

I have written in hopes that the book may be of use to undergraduate students. They are often repelled by philosophy, and I cannot but think that this is in part due to the dry and abstract form in which philosophers have too often seen fit to express their thoughts. The same thoughts can be set forth in plain language, and their significance illustrated by a constant reference to experiences which we all have—experiences which must serve as the foundation to every theory of the mind and the world worthy of serious consideration.

But there are many persons who cannot attend formal courses of instruction, and who, nevertheless, are interested in philosophy. These, also, I have had in mind; and I have tried to be so clear that they could read the work with profit in the absence of a teacher.

Lastly, I invite the more learned, if they have found my System of Metaphysics difficult to understand in any part, to follow the simple statement contained in the chapters above alluded to, and then to return, if they will, to the more bulky volume.

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON.

New York, 1906.

PART I

INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF THE WORD PHILOSOPHY IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT

1. The Beginnings of Philosophy. 2. The Greek Philosophy at its Height. 3. Philosophy as a Guide to Life. 4. Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 5. The Modern Philosophy. 6. What Philosophy means in our Time.

CHAPTER II

COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT

7. Common Thought.

8. Scientific Knowledge.

9. Mathematics.

10. The Science of Psychology.

11. Reflective Thought.

PART II

PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD

CHAPTER III

IS THERE AN EXTERNAL WORLD?

12. How the Plain Man thinks he knows the World. 13. The Psychologist and the External World. 14. The Telephone Exchange.

CHAPTER IV

SENSATIONS AND THINGS

15. Sense and Imagination. 16. May we call Things Groups of Sensations? 17. The Distinction between Sensations and Things. 18. The Existence of Material Things.

CHAPTER V

APPEARANCES AND REALITIES

19. Things and their Appearances. 20. Real Things. 21. Ultimate Real Things. 22. The Bugbear of the Unknowable.

CHAPTER VI

OF SPACE

23. What we are supposed to know about It. 24. Space as Necessary and Space as Infinite. 25. Space as Infinitely Divisible. 26. What is Real Space?

CHAPTER VII

OF TIME

27. Time as Necessary, Infinite, and Infinitely Divisible. 28. The Problem of Past, Present, and Future. 29. What is Real Time?

PART III

PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND

CHAPTER VIII

WHAT IS THE MIND?

30. Primitive Notions of Mind. 31. The Mind as Immaterial. 32. Modern Common Sense Notions of the Mind. 33. The Psychologist and the Mind. 34. The Metaphysician and the Mind.

CHAPTER IX

MIND AND BODY

35. Is the Mind in the Body? 36. The Doctrine of the Interactionist. 37. The Doctrine of the Parallelist. 38. In what Sense Mental Phenomena have a Time and Place. 39. Objections to Parallelism.

CHAPTER X

HOW WE KNOW THERE ARE OTHER MINDS

40. Is it Certain that we know It? 41. The Argument for Other Minds. 42. What Other Minds are there? 43. The Doctrine of Mind-stuff.

CHAPTER XI

OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND

44. Is the Material World a Mechanism? 45. The Place of Mind in Nature. 46. The Order of Nature and Free-will. 47. The Physical World and the Moral World.

PART IV

SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY

CHAPTER XII

THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

48. The Doctrine of Representative Perception. 49. The Step to Idealism. 50. The Revolt of Common Sense. 51. The Critical Philosophy.

CHAPTER XIII

REALISM AND IDEALISM

52. Realism.

53. Idealism.

CHAPTER XIV

MONISM AND DUALISM

54. The Meaning of the Words. 55. Materialism. 56. Spiritualism. 57. The Doctrine of the One Substance. 58. Dualism. 59. Singularism and Pluralism.

CHAPTER XV

RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM

60. Rationalism. 61. Empiricism. 62. Criticism. 63. Critical Empiricism. 64. Pragmatism.

PART V

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES

CHAPTER XVI

LOGIC

65. Introductory; the Philosophical Sciences. 66. The Traditional Logic. 67. The Modern Logic. 68. Logic and Philosophy.

CHAPTER XVII

PSYCHOLOGY

69. Psychology and Philosophy. 70. The Double Affiliation of Psychology.

CHAPTER XVIII

ETHICS AND AESTHETICS

71. Common Sense Ethics. 72. Ethics and Philosophy. 73. Aesthetics.

CHAPTER XIX

METAPHYSICS

74. What is Metaphysics? 75. Epistemology.

CHAPTER XX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

76. Religion and Reflection. 77. The Philosophy of Religion.

CHAPTER XXI

PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER SCIENCES

78. The Philosophical and the Non-philosophical Sciences. 79. The study of Scientific Principles and Methods.

PART VI

ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER XXII

THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

80. The Question of Practical Utility. 81. Why Philosophical Studies are Useful. 82. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion.

CHAPTER XXIII

WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

83. The Prominence given to the Subject. 84. The Especial Importance of Historical Studies to Reflective Thought. 85. The Value of Different Points of View. 86. Philosophy as Poetry and Philosophy as Science. 87. How to read the History of Philosophy.

CHAPTER XXIV

SOME PRACTICAL ADMONITIONS

88. Be prepared to enter upon a New Way of Looking at Things.

89. Be willing to consider Possibilities which at first strike one

as Absurd.

90. Do not have too much Respect for Authority.

91. Remember that Ordinary Rules of Evidence Apply.

92. Aim at Clearness and Simplicity.

93. Do not hastily accept a Doctrine.

Footnote

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTORY

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF THE WORD PHILOSOPHY IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT

I must warn the reader at the outset that the title of this chapter seems to promise a great deal more than he will find carried out in the chapter itself. To tell all that philosophy has meant in the past, and all that it means to various classes of men in the present, would be a task of no small magnitude, and one quite beyond the scope of such a volume as this. But it is not impossible to give within small compass a brief indication, at least, of what the word once signified, to show how its signification has undergone changes, and to point out to what sort of a discipline or group of disciplines educated men are apt to apply the word, notwithstanding their differences of opinion as to the truth or falsity of this or that particular doctrine. Why certain subjects of investigation have come to be grouped together and to be regarded as falling within the province of the philosopher, rather than certain other subjects, will, I hope, be made clear in the body of the work. Only an indication can be given in this chapter.

1. THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY.—The Greek historian Herodotus (484-424 B.C.) appears to have been the first to use the verb to philosophize. He makes Croesus tell Solon how he has heard that he from a desire of knowledge has, philosophizing, journeyed through many lands. The word philosophizing seems to indicate that Solon pursued knowledge for its own sake, and was what we call an investigator. As for the word philosopher (etymologically, a lover of wisdom), a certain somewhat unreliable tradition traces it back to Pythagoras (about 582-500 B.C.). As told by Cicero, the story is that, in a conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius, in the Peloponnesus, he described himself as a philosopher, and said that his business was an investigation into the nature of things.

At any rate, both the words philosopher and philosophy are freely used in the writings of the disciples of Socrates (470-399 B.C.), and it is possible that he was the first to make use of them. The seeming modesty of the title philosopher—for etymologically it is a modest one, though it has managed to gather a very different signification with the lapse of time—the modesty of the title would naturally appeal to a man who claimed so much ignorance, as Socrates; and Plato represents him as distinguishing between the lover of wisdom and the wise, on the ground that God alone may be called wise. From that date to this the word philosopher has remained with us, and it has meant many things to many men. But for centuries the philosopher has not been simply the investigator, nor has he been simply the lover of wisdom.

An investigation into the origin of words, however interesting in itself, can tell us little of the uses to which words are put after they have come into being. If we turn from etymology to history, and review the labors of the men whom the world has agreed to call philosophers, we are struck by the fact that those who head the list chronologically appear to have been occupied with crude physical speculations, with attempts to guess what the world is made out of, rather than with that somewhat vague something that we call philosophy to-day.

Students of the history of philosophy usually begin their studies with the speculations of the Greek philosopher Thales (b. 624 B.C.). We are told that he assumed water to be the universal principle out of which all things are made, and that he maintained that all things are full of gods. We find that Anaximander, the next in the list, assumed as the source out of which all things proceed and that to which they all return the infinite and indeterminate; and that Anaximenes, who was perhaps his pupil, took as his principle the all-embracing air.

This trio constitutes the Ionian school of philosophy, the earliest of the Greek schools; and one who reads for the first time the few vague statements which seem to constitute the sum of their contributions to human knowledge is impelled to wonder that so much has been made of the men.

This wonder disappears, however, when one realizes that the appearance of these thinkers was really a momentous thing. For these men turned their faces away from the poetical and mythologic way of accounting for things, which had obtained up to their time, and set their faces toward Science. Aristotle shows us how Thales may have been led to the formulation of his main thesis by an observation of the phenomena of nature. Anaximander saw in the world in which he lived the result of a process of evolution. Anaximenes explains the coming into being of fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth, as due to a condensation and expansion of the universal principle, air. The boldness of their speculations we may explain as due to a courage born of ignorance, but the explanations they offer are scientific in spirit, at least.

Moreover, these men do not stand alone. They are the advance guard of an army whose latest representatives are the men who are enlightening the world at the present day. The evolution of science—taking that word in the broad sense to mean organized and systematized knowledge—must be traced in the works of the Greek philosophers from Thales down. Here we have the source and the rivulet to which we can trace back the mighty stream which is flowing past our own doors. Apparently insignificant in its beginnings, it must still for a while seem insignificant to the man who follows with an unreflective eye the course of the current.

It would take me too far afield to give an account of the Greek schools which immediately succeeded the Ionic: to tell of the Pythagoreans, who held that all things were constituted by numbers; of the Eleatics, who held that only Being is, and denied the possibility of change, thereby reducing the shifting panorama of the things about us to a mere delusive world of appearances; of Heraclitus, who was so impressed by the constant flux of things that he summed up his view of nature in the words: Everything flows; of Empedocles, who found his explanation of the world in the combination of the four elements, since become traditional, earth, water, fire, and air; of Democritus, who developed a materialistic atomism which reminds one strongly of the doctrine of atoms as it has appeared in modern science; of Anaxagoras, who traced the system of things to the setting in order of an infinite multiplicity of different elements,—seeds of things,—which setting in order was due to the activity of the finest of things, Mind.

It is a delight to discover the illuminating thoughts which came to the minds of these men; and, on the other hand, it is amusing to see how recklessly they launched themselves on boundless seas when they were unprovided with chart and compass. They were like brilliant children, who know little of the dangers of the great world, but are ready to undertake anything. These philosophers regarded all knowledge as their province, and did not despair of governing so great a realm. They were ready to explain the whole world and everything in it. Of course, this can only mean that they had little conception of how much there is to explain, and of what is meant by scientific explanation.

It is characteristic of this series of philosophers that their attention was directed very largely upon the external world. It was natural that this should be so. Both in the history of the race and in that of the individual, we find that the attention is seized first by material things, and that it is long before a clear conception of the mind and of its knowledge is arrived at. Observation precedes reflection. When we come to think definitely about the mind, we are all apt to make use of notions which we have derived from our experience of external things. The very words we use to denote mental operations are in many instances taken from this outer realm. We direct the attention; we speak of apprehension, of conception, of intuition. Our knowledge is clear or obscure; an oration is brilliant; an emotion is sweet or bitter. What wonder that, as we read over the fragments that have come down to us from the Pre-Socratic philosophers, we should be struck by the fact that they sometimes leave out altogether and sometimes touch lightly upon a number of those things that we regard to-day as peculiarly within the province of the philosopher. They busied themselves with the world as they saw it, and certain things had hardly as yet come definitely within their horizon.

2. THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY AT ITS HEIGHT.—The next succeeding period sees certain classes of questions emerge into prominence which had attracted comparatively little attention from the men of an earlier day. Democritus of Abdera, to whom reference has been made above, belongs chronologically to this latter period, but his way of thinking makes us class him with the earlier philosophers. It was characteristic of these latter that they assumed rather naïvely that man can look upon the world and can know it, and can by thinking about it succeed in giving a reasonable account of it. That there may be a difference between the world as it really is and the world as it appears to man, and that it may be impossible for man to attain to a knowledge of the absolute truth of things, does not seem to have occurred to them.

The fifth century before Christ was, in Greece, a time of intense intellectual ferment. One is reminded, in reading of it, of the splendid years of the Renaissance in Italy, of the awakening of the human mind to a vigorous life which cast off the bonds of tradition and insisted upon the right of free and unfettered development. Athens was the center of this intellectual activity.

In this century arose the Sophists, public teachers who busied themselves with all departments of human knowledge, but seemed to lay no little emphasis upon certain questions that touched very nearly the life of man. Can man attain to truth at all—to a truth that is more than a mere truth to him, a seeming truth? Whence do the laws derive their authority? Is there such a thing as justice, as right? It was with such questions as these that the Sophists occupied themselves, and such questions as these have held the attention of mankind ever since. When they make their appearance in the life of a people or of an individual man, it means that there has been a rebirth, a birth into the life of reflection.

When Socrates, that greatest of teachers, felt called upon to refute the arguments of these men, he met them, so to speak, on their own ground, recognizing that the subjects of which they discoursed were, indeed, matter for scientific investigation. His attitude seemed to many conservative persons in his day a dangerous one; he was regarded as an innovator; he taught men to think and to raise questions where, before, the traditions of the fathers had seemed a sufficient guide to men's actions.

And, indeed, he could not do otherwise. Men had learned to reflect, and there had come into existence at least the beginnings of what we now sometimes rather loosely call the mental and moral sciences. In the works of Socrates' disciple Plato (428-347 B.C.) and in those of Plato's disciple Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), abundant justice is done to these fields of human activity. These two, the greatest among the Greek philosophers, differ from each other in many things, but it is worthy of remark that they both seem to regard the whole sphere of human knowledge as their province.

Plato is much more interested in the moral sciences than in the physical, but he, nevertheless, feels called upon to give an account of how the world was made and out of what sort of elements. He evidently does not take his own account very seriously, and recognizes that he is on uncertain ground. But he does not consider the matter beyond his jurisdiction.

As for Aristotle, that wonderful man seems to have found it possible to represent worthily every science known to his time, and to have marked out several new fields for his successors to cultivate. His philosophy covers physics, cosmology, zoölogy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, psychology, politics and economics, rhetoric and poetics.

Thus we see that the task of the philosopher was much the same at the period of the highest development of the Greek philosophy that it had been earlier. He was supposed to give an account of the system of things. But the notion of what it means to give an account of the system of things had necessarily undergone some change. The philosopher had to be something more than a natural philosopher.

3. PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDE TO LIFE.—At the close of the fourth century before Christ there arose the schools of the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics. In them we seem to find a somewhat new conception of philosophy—philosophy appears as chiefly a guide to life. The Stoic emphasizes the necessity of living according to nature, and dwells upon the character of the wise man; the Epicurean furnishes certain selfish maxims for getting through life as pleasantly as possible; the Skeptic counsels apathy, an indifference to all things,—blessed is he who expects nothing, for he shall not be disappointed.

And yet, when we examine more closely these systems, we find a conception of philosophy not really so very different from that which had obtained before. We do not find, it is true, that disinterested passion for the attainment of truth which is the glory of science. Man seems quite too much concerned with the problem of his own happiness or unhappiness; he has grown morbid. Nevertheless, the practical maxims which obtain in each of these systems are based upon a certain view of the system of things as a whole.

The Stoic tells us of what the world consists; what was the beginning and what will be the end of things; what is the relation of the system of things to God. He develops a physics and a logic as well as a system of ethics. The Epicurean informs us that the world originated in a rain of atoms through space; he examines into the foundations of human knowledge; and he proceeds to make himself comfortable in a world from which he has removed those disturbing elements, the gods. The Skeptic decides that there is no such thing as truth, before