The New Motivation and Dilemma of China's Soft Power in the Age of Noopolitik

By Zheng Li

Good governance and anti-corruption efforts were expected to enhance soft power overseas. The party-state successfully governed China for decades relying on its controversial governance approaches. The country has visibly demonstrated economic and social development. However, China's growing influence has failed to be recognised as soft power, being viewed rather as sharp power most times. The monograph investigates whether China is mindful of exporting its political ideas and whether it considers its governance model to be the pillar of its soft power portfolio. Through framing analysis of media coverage and in-depth interviews with Australian public diplomacy experts, the monograph presents how Australia, a western country with close economic ties with China, interprets China's intended narrative regarding its governance model and development. Examining the congruity between China's projection and Australia's mediation sheds a new light on the relationship between domestic governance, soft power, and sharp power. By sketching out Beijing’s ambitions and attempts, the monograph draws implications about China's public diplomacy and the future global order.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Anthem Press
• Release date: May 17, 2022
• ISBN: 9781785279591

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The New Motivation and Dilemma of China’s Internal Soft Power in the Age of Noopolitik

The New Motivation and Dilemma of China’s Internal Soft Power in the Age of Noopolitik

Zheng Li

Anthem Press

An imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company

www.anthempress.com

This edition first published in UK and USA 2022

by ANTHEM PRESS

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or PO Box 9779, London SW19 7ZG, UK

and

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Copyright © Zheng Li 2022

The author asserts the moral right to be identified as the author of this work.

All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher of this book.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Li, Zheng, 1990– author.

Title: The New Motivation and Dilemma of China’s Internal Soft Power in the

Age of Noopolitik / Zheng Li.Description: London; New York, NY : Anthem Press,

an imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company, 2022. | Includes bibliographical

references and index. |

Identifiers: LCCN 2022000085 | ISBN 9781785279577 (hardback) |

ISBN 9781785279584 (pdf) | ISBN 9781785279591 (epub)

Subjects: LCSH: Diplomacy. | Government accountability--China. | Political

corruption–China. | China–Foreign relations–21st century. | China–Foreign

relations–Australia. | Australia–oreign relations–China. | China–Foreign public

opinion, Australian. | China–Politics and government–2002–

Classification: LCC JZ1734. L54 2022 | DDC 327.2–dc23/eng/20220211

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022000085

ISBN-13: 978-1-78527-957-7 (Hbk)

ISBN-10: 1-78527-957-2 (Hbk)

Cover image: Sunset Beijing cityscape between ancient chinese architecture, historic buildings and Beijing modern building with sweet sun rise sky, Beijing, China. By iamlukyeee/Shutterstock.com

This title is also available as an e-book.

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

1

THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE DREAM

Widespread corruption and declining authority

Chaotic public opinion and the attenuated media censorship

The anti-corruption campaign and judicial reform

Confidence, pride and nationalism: The Chinese Dream

Justifying the choice of receiving country

Research plan

2

DEBATING GOVERNANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW: CHINA’S NARRATIVE AND IMAGES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES

The rule of law

Good governance

Law, governance and soft power

Rule by law and the rule of law: Debates on China’s judiciary

Good governance and the rule of law

Legitimizing the rule: China Model

China’s impetus and ambition of global influence

The dilemma and new ambitions of China’s public diplomacy

China’s national image in Western press

Propositions and research questions

3

SOFT POWER AND SHARP POWER IN THE AGE OF NOOPOLITIK

Constructivism

Interpretivism

Symbolic interactionism

From power to soft power

Soft power: A constructivist perspective

Constructing soft power: Domestic governance and international norms

Debating soft power, public diplomacy and propaganda

Discourse power competition and the emergence of sharp power

Framing as a communication process

Framing as social construction

Framing as a communication research paradigm

Individual frames and media frames

4

METHODOLOGY

Constructivism and the interpretive approach to framing analysis

Inductive framing analysis of media reports

Identification of framing devices

Methodological framework

Media selection and timeframe

Sampling method for media texts

In-depth interviews

Participants and sampling method

Case study

5

THE FRAMING OF GOVERNANCE: THE CHINA MODEL AND THE CHINESE DREAM

Overview

Socialism with Chinese characters

An alternative path

Overview

China threat

Promising state

Crisis-ridden state

Overview

Successful governance and the complicated country

Unbalanced development and vulnerable individuals

Unpredictable challenge

6

WHEN ‘HOUSE OF CARDS’ MEETS ‘IN THE NAME OF PEOPLE’: FRAMING CHINA’S ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

Overview

In the name of people

Political reform

Overview

Power

Response

Australia references

Overview

Curb corruption and response to the public will

Political considerations

7

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Congruity of the frames about China’s domestic governance

Congruity on the issues about China’s governance approach

Congruity of the frames about the anti-corruption campaign

Views on China’s domestic governance

Views about China’s anti-corruption campaign

Corresponding to propositions

Theoretical implications

Significance and limitations of the study

Future research

Notes

References

Index

Figures and Tables

Figures

1Merchandise imports to China and the United States

2Relationship between the four elements in the research process

3Easton’s system model of political life

4A process model of framing, modified from Scheufele (1999)

5Integrated Framing Process Model (Claes H. de Vreese, 2005)

6A model of the news framing process

7Flowchart representing the theoretical basis for the research

8Process of framing devices identification

9A model for national image study

10 Attitudes toward ‘China model is a role model’ in China’s newspapers

11 Themes in the Australian newspapers regarding China’s governance

12 Congruity of frames about China’s governance approach

13 Australian newspapers account for the motivations of the anti-corruption

14 Congruity of frames about the anti-corruption campaign

15 The theoretical framework for internal and external soft power

Tables

1 Conditions of good governance

2 Methodological framework of this project

3 Participants background

4 Frames in China’s newspapers regarding China’s governance

5 Frames in Australian newspapers regarding China’s governance

6 Frames in China’s newspapers regarding the anti-corruption

7 Frames in Australian newspapers regarding the anti-corruption

8 Participants’ attitudes towards the anti-corruption campaign

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Chapter 1

THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN AND THE CHINESE DREAM

As the world’s second-largest economy, the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China) has begun to play an increasingly important role in the international community. Being susceptible to suspicion in the international community because of its military development and the size of its economy, China has invested heavily in developing its capacity to influence attitudes and discourse by using its soft power resources. The most notable projects are based on the promotion of traditional culture (Confucius Institute) or the expansion of media agencies. This monograph focuses on the impact of China’s domestic politics, especially some of the latest developments in soft power projection that have occurred during the fifth-generation leadership.

Chitty (2017, p. 27) argues that soft power has two vectors: internal and external. Good governance and the rule of law represent high-quality internal soft power that generates external soft power as a by-product. The main task of this study is to examine China’s soft power in Australia regarding its own domestic politics, particularly in terms of its governance model and the rule of law. The anti-corruption campaign and the targeted poverty alleviation were selected as cases to examine if China’s soft power was enhanced. The research involves an empirical analysis of Chinese and Australian media as well as in-depth interviews with Australian public diplomacy experts. The congruity between China’s promotion of its soft power and Australia’s interpretation of it offers a better understanding of the interplay between domestic politics and soft power in international communication.

The Social Background and Challenges

There is no doubt that it is challenging to govern a state like present-day China, a country with a fast-growing economy and a rapidly changing society. China has made great economic progress since the reform and open-door policy began in the late 1970s. The reform has accelerated the process of modernization and urbanization. But compared with the economic development, the work in social reforms and political reforms has not been as smooth. The economic reform and the internet brought on challenges that previous generations have not ever faced.

Widespread corruption and declining authority

First, there were some changes in the government and among the public. In addition to the economic reforms, changes to the political systems, such as collective leadership and inner-party democracy, were ushered in after 1978 (Lampton, 2014b; Zheng and Shan, 2015). It is argued that individual Chinese leaders have become progressively weaker after the economic reform. As one Chinese diplomat commented, ‘The current leaders must consult rather than arbitrarily decide’ (Lampton, 2014b).

Economic reform brought about a revolution in the state–society dynamic and created space for administrative corruption. Due to the inadequate cadre management system, bureaucratic corruption became the primary source of domestic social discontent (Cole et al., 2009; Dong and Torgler, 2013; Fewsmith, 2016; He, 2000; Manion, 2016). Corruption emerged as a major concern for citizens, and the social outrage provoked by corruption also undermined the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. At the 17th National Congress, the general secretary warned party members that corruption was the ‘most dangerous factor’ that enervated the party’s claim to rule (Tom, 2012).

The corruption problem was commonly blamed for the state of China’s political institutions and its sociocultural impacts. It was argued that the pressure of economic growth and low wages resulted in the widespread corruption of local administrations (O’Brien and Li, 2006). Viewing from a sociocultural perspective, Fewsmith (2016) and Edin (2003) associated the cadres’ corruption with the fading political faith, which was affected by favouritism and cronyism of the Guanxi culture. The increase in corruption is commonly related to weak rule-based governance and the degradation of the rule of law. China’s judiciary has long been criticized for its inadequate autonomy. He (2008) indicated that the financial dependence on local government eroded the independence of the judiciary in fighting corruption. In the same vein, Xu commented that the excessive workload, low salaries and inability to resist administrative intervention caused judges’ frustration (Xu, 2016). Moreover, practitioners in the legal fraternity were unprofessional. The government was dedicated to train and prepare well-educated, professional and qualified practitioners for the legal system. However, many young judges still had poor career prospects resulting from the current institutional hierarchy that favours their older, often less-capable colleagues (Cohen, 2016).

Chaotic public opinion and the attenuated media censorship

Apart from the weakening in authority and consequent apathy of the ruling class, there were profound changes in the social context and experience of citizens. The social situation became more complicated with the advent of reforms. The significant increase in grassroots activism had given rise to a wealthier, well-educated, informed and organized population than ever before. It was becoming increasingly difficult to gain public satisfaction and trust under the previous simple and opaque governance approach. An institutional and transparent administrative process was being increasingly demanded. A provincial bureaucrat complained that ‘work experience added hardships year after year’ (Lampton, 2014a, 2014b; Li, 2016).

This is not the only challenge. Internet technologies empowered citizens and offered them a powerful tool for social networking and communication. It is well known that the government is running a wide-ranging censorship system for media and public opinion in order to control its use. As Zhao indicated (1998, p. 49), all news is ‘monolithic and predictable propaganda crafted by party journalism’. The proliferation of online services brought about by the internet posed problems for the government (Kristof, 2005; Zhang, 2012). China now has over 1.3 billion mobile phone users. The social media platform Weibo has overtaken Twitter in terms of active monthly users and has become the largest online community (He, 2016). Communication between individual users created a new agenda-setting institution of its own, which made it harder for the government to control the dissemination of information as compared with that in the age of traditional media. Widespread corruption was exposed by Weibo before it came out in official communication outlets. Cases such as the ‘Guo Meimei’¹ scandal and the ‘Brother Wristwatch’² affair demonstrated the social media platform’s ability to act as a watchdog for corruption. The Weibo community became a significant arena for corruption supervision. The phenomenon was also named ‘Weibo anti-corruption campaign’ (Hu, 2011; Nip and Fu, 2016, p. 128).

Technologies reduce the cost of communication and empower self-expression. It is widely believed that the prevalence of the internet could threaten authoritarian regimes and bring about democracy, as the internet can break the censorship of mass media and form a community of netizens (Barber, 2003; Bryan et al., 2002; Mowlana, 1997; Rheingold, 2007; Swett, 1995). Whether the internet will radically transform China’s political regime eventually remains to be seen, but it did challenge the authority of the party-state at that time. The credibility of state-run news agencies had declined sharply, and many people had begun to consider Weibo as the primary source of information. The appearance of ‘citizen journalists’ provided for an alternative information channel to the state-owned media (Chang, 2013; Shen et al., 2009; Zhang, 2011, Rawnsley, 2015b). According to Bolsover (2013), Weibo became the most influential platform for public opinion, followed by news agencies and individual blogs, which means official media were losing the monopoly in respect of guiding public opinion. Compared with official propaganda, Weibo’s information was diverse and cynical, or even extremely scathing and disparaging in nature to the bureaucracy. Represented in both explicit and oblique forms, the voice of social media was filled with resentment and grievances towards the state and society (King et al., 2013; Tang and Bhattacharya, 2011; Yang, 2009). The government was trapped in a dilemma in choosing between embracing the latest technologies and concern about political instability (Lu and Weber, 2007).

The emergence of cyber communities broke the barrier of information monopoly and changed the media system. The new situation of information dissemination led to the decline of official ideology but formed new public discourses (Fewsmith, 2016). The former minister of Propaganda Department, once stated: ‘Many cadres, and especially our young ones, are not willing to watch our news reports, nor to read our theoretical articles, nor to listen to our speeches’ (Brown, 2014, p. 204). Public opinion on the internet was divided into two factions: ‘rightists’ and ‘leftists’. The rightists are inspired by the ‘right protection movements’ that came about as a result of the Sun Zhigang case, pertaining to the death of migrant worker Sun Zhigang in Guangzhou in 2003 as a result of physical assault while he was detained under China's detention and repatriation (C&R) system. The issue garnered widespread attention in Chinese media and on the Internet, prompting the national government to abolish the C&R system. These rightists generally admire the success of America. They focus on individual rights and espouse liberal democracy and the rule of law. The leftists, by contrast, are deeply influenced by patriotic values and nationalism. They advocate a stable regime and expect an independent and rising Chinese state (Fewsmith, 2016). Although there was no middle ground between the leftists and rightists, both factions were discontented with the social situation as was observable from their views expressed on Chinese social media (Fewsmith, 2016). Furious debates raged within the cyber community, which was ideologically confusing not only for the public but also for the top-level cadres of the party (Ferdinand, 2016).

In response to the conflict and ideological problems, leadership constantly changed the approach towards governance. The previous leaders began to attach importance to public opinion and social fairness (Fewsmith, 2016; Lampton, 2014b). Economically, the abolition of agricultural taxes and the project of ‘Building a New Socialist Countryside’ reflected the intention of bridging the gap between urban and rural areas. However, the problem of chaotic public discourse remained unsettled. The policy of maintaining a ‘harmonious society’, approach to solving social conflicts, which was known as the strategy of ‘stability maintenance’, failed to solve social discontent.

According to official reports, funding for public security dramatically increased between 2000 and 2009, which indicated a broader social control (Xie, 2013). However, the ‘harmonious society’ policy was criticized as conservative, suppressed and illegal. Under the rubric of social stability, local administrations and courts preferred to eliminate social complaints by mediation or use of funds, rather than by litigation (Li, 2016; Liebman, 2014; Zheng and Shan, 2015). The overemphasis on stability harmed the development of China’s judicial system. Minzner (2015) argued that ‘stability maintenance’ portrays the legal system as incapable of adapting to social needs and makes the courts a routine tool for political manipulation. This resulted in a severely negative impact on the authority of the judiciary and lawyers. Many judges viewed mediation as a subversion of their career (Liebman, 2014). Overall, this ‘stability maintenance’ policy reflected the leadership’s concern about the social order as well as the state’s indeterminate attitude towards the role of law in domestic governance.

The Rule of the New Leadership

In the early 2000s, the state faced several challenges, including widespread corruption and the new situation of expression of public opinion, especially in cyberspace. In the following sections, I highlight how the authorities attempted to restore their image by launching the anti-corruption campaign and introducing new ideological discourse.

The anti-corruption campaign and judicial reform

Fight ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’: The top-down anti-corruption campaign

As is suggestive, the campaign targeted ‘tigers and flies’ (i.e. the campaign focuses not only on senior leaders but also on low-level cadres). According to the report, during the first five years of the campaign, 1.34 million officials from all levels were punished. Four officials were arrested per week, most of whom belonged to low-level cadres. The impacts on officials’ mentalities and behaviours were profound. The withdrawal of privileges, such as vehicles, housing and festival gifts along with the increased risk of being investigated, led to a decrease in the number of college graduates applying for government jobs (Zheng and Shan, 2015). Bureaucrats were reluctant to begin new projects, which also damaged the economy and led to a decrease in local investment. Many officials were willing to forego promotion in order to ensure job security. The official media even began to pay attention to the negative impacts caused by this new passive working attitude, which they described as ‘lazy governance’, a new form of punishable corruption (Tian, 2017). Despite the negative impacts, it should be acknowledged that for the provincial cadres, the age of using power and the intervening judiciary process recklessly is provisionally over. As Yuen (2014) indicates, the anti-corruption campaign has created a supportive environment for China’s judiciary reform.

China’s efforts to enhance the rule of law mainly focused on the perfection of laws, the education of legal professionals and public legal education (Liebman, 2014). However, the overreliance on political power and deficiency in institutional reform made anti-corruption efforts fruitless and unsustainable (Yuen, 2014; Zhu and Zhang, 2017). Previous efforts to promote the rule of law failed to enhance the authority of the court, especially its independence from local governments. The anti-corruption campaign, however, went further and focused on more than these two aspects.

Local interference was the main problem for judicial branches when it came to investigating corruption. Some believe that there are certain historical reasons involved. In the Chinese ancient political system, legal and political issues were closely related and judicial and administrative powers were inextricably interwoven. Therefore, not only do the officials feel obliged to solve conflicts at their discretion, but even the general public prefers to seek justice from cadres of the administrative system (Li, 2016; Liebman, 2014; Lubman, 1999; Qian, 1982). Judicial processes were often interceded by security departments, especially in many criminal cases. This made room for corruption and led to unjust judgements. Especially in the period of Weiwen, social stability was the top priority; so local governors were under pressure to strangle petitions and protests. This considerably weakened the court’s authority even more (Lubman, 1999). In 2014, the Central Committee Plenum claimed to enhance judicial professionalism and strengthen the role of courts and judges (Liebman, 2014). Li (2016) examined the campaign’s influence on public security departments. He argues that the declaration of the former Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission as guilty indicates the leadership’s intention to weaken the public security system. In the same vein, Liebman (2014) commented that the trial reflects an intention to avoid power abuse in the name of stability.

Curbing local protectionism is essential to enhance the rule of law in China (Li, 2016; Zheng and Shan, 2015). Just as important, unlike local governments, the central government was still trustworthy and respectable in the eyes of the public. A survey by Pew indicated that administrative corruption was a significant concern among the Chinese citizens (increasing from 39 per cent to 50 per cent), while Saich’s research (2011) notes that over 95 per cent of citizens had trust in the central government. This reveals a sharp distinction between how the public perceives the central government and local governments. The central government still maintained its authority. Thus, an eye-catching top-down anti-corruption campaign launched by the central committee is an appropriate solution to curb local protectionism and rebuild trust among the public (C. Minzner, 2015; Zheng and Shan, 2015). As Li (2016) indicated, centralizing the judiciary was not just a means of strengthening its power but also of enhancing the state’s capacity to rule the country.

The controversial issues in the anti-corruption campaign

Despite the positive impacts, there have been some concerns about professionalism as well as human rights issues in the ‘Tiger and Flies’ anti-corruption campaign. Using the party institution, rather than state legal organs, as the principal agency of the anti-corruption drive is one of the most contested issues (Cai, 2014; Liebman, 2014; Manion, 2016; C. Minzner, 2015; Yuen, 2014). The driving force of the campaign was assumed by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), an agency that belongs to the party rather than the legal system. With its investigative approach and dual designation, it is also armed with powers of detention outside of the legal system. This raised concerns about the campaign’s potential to violate human rights and to replace judicial authority with political power.

In comparison to its economic achievements, China’s actions in political and legal arenas seemed to be unremarkable. Although the rule of law had been mentioned since 1949, it was not introduced into the national constitution (and nor did it become an established national strategic goal) until 1999 (Zheng and Shan, 2015). Many difficulties are affecting the progress of China’s rule of law. Zheng and Shan (2015) blamed the traditional culture, arguing that the rule of law somehow contradicts China’s political traditions: Confucianism and Legalism. Confucianism advocates the role of virtue and morality in governance; Legalism stresses the role of law in regulating the people rather than supervising the emperor. The state has long been embracing the role of virtue in governance. In 2000, the President emphasized the integration