The Islamic Movement in Israel

By Tilde Rosmer

Since its establishment in the late 1970s, Israel’s Islamic Movement has grown from a small religious revivalist organization focused on strengthening the faith of Muslim residents to a countrywide sociopolitical movement with representation in the Israeli legislature. But how did it get here? How does it differ from other Islamic movements in the region? And why does its membership continue to grow? Tilde Rosmer examines these issues in The Islamic Movement in Israel as she tells the story of the movement, its identity, and its activities. Using interviews with movement leaders and activists, their documents, and media reports from Israel and beyond, she traces the movement’s history from its early days to its 1996 split over the issue of its relationship to the state. She then explores how the two factions have functioned since, revealing that while leaders of the two branches have pursued different goals, they remain connected and dedicated to providing needed social, education, and health services in Israel’s Palestinian towns and villages. The first book in English on this group, The Islamic Movement in Israel is a timely study about how an Islamist movement operates within the unique circumstances of the Jewish state.

• Language: English
• Publisher: University of Texas Press
• Release date: Feb 22, 2022
• ISBN: 9781477323564

Book preview

The author has received support from the Norwegian Non-Fiction Writers and Translators Association and the Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages, The University of Oslo.

The Islamic Movement in Israel

Tilde Rosmer

University of Texas Press

Austin

Copyright © 2022 by the University of Texas Press

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First edition, 2022

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rosmer, Tilde, author.

Title: The Islamic Movement in Israel / Tilde Rosmer.

Description: First edition. | Austin : University of Texas Press, 2022. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2021003601 (print) | LCCN 2021003602 (ebook)

ISBN 978-1-4773-2354-0 (hardcover)

ISBN 978-1-4773-2355-7 (library ebook)

ISBN 978-1-4773-2356-4 (non-library ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Islamic Movement in Israel—History. | Islam—Israel—History. | Palestinian Arabs—Israel—Religion. | Israel—Ethnic relations.

Classification: LCC BP63.I75 R67 2021 (print) | LCC BP63.I75 (ebook) | DDC 297.8/04—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021003601

LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021003602

doi:10.7560/323540

Contents

Note on Translation and Transliteration

Acknowledgments

Glossary

INTRODUCTION. Palestinian Islamists in the Jewish State

CHAPTER ONE. The Emergence of the Islamic Movement in Israel

CHAPTER TWO. The Split of the Islamic Movement in Israel: Minority Dilemmas in the Jewish State

CHAPTER THREE. A Trifecta of Goals: Religious Sites, Land, and People

CHAPTER FOUR. Resisting Israelization in Israel

CHAPTER FIVE. Activists and Relations with Other Palestinian Citizens

CHAPTER SIX. New Watersheds: The Joint List and a Ban

CONCLUSION. Islamist Palestinian Nationalists Made in Israel

Appendix A: Student Survey, 2012

Appendix B: Map

List of Sources

Index

Note on Translation and Transliteration

Transliterations follow the style of the International Journal of Middle East Studies and are provided by Susan Barhoum at Alpha Omega Consultations ([e-mail]). For names of individuals who are not in the Movement, I have used the transliterations they use so that readers may recognize their names.

Acknowledgments

IN THIS BOOK ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISLAMIC Movement in Israel, I use a contextualized approach in order to explain how and why the Movement developed in the way that it did. Likewise, the contexts in which the research for, and writing of, this book occurred are important.

The principal context of this ethnographic project is, of course, the field. This book is about people, the decisions they took, and the choices they made in response to their predicament. The primary source for the analysis is not ideological treatise or theological text but rather the thoughts and practices of the Islamic Movement’s leaders, activists, and supporters. I must therefore begin by thanking sincerely each of my interviewees. I cannot express in words how much I appreciate the hospitality I have enjoyed, including the many invitations I received to various homes, offices, and favored cafes. Without the support and input of these primary sources, there would have been no book. I shall remain eternally grateful to those who took the time to meet with me and to share their personal stories, as well as their political and religious views during the course of this research. I have endeavored to reflect their ideas accurately in this text and hope that they will recognize this in the pages that follow.

The other context for this book is my academic home at the University of Oslo’s Department of Culture Studies and Oriental Languages. In conducting this research, I was privileged to participate in two research projects hosted by the department: Fault Lines of Islamism: Negotiating Progress, Participation and Patriarchy (2008–2011) and The New Middle East: Emerging Political and Ideological Trends (2011–2016). In both projects, the participating researchers investigated a variety of cases throughout the region, focusing on understanding Islamism as a modern social movement for reform and analyzing political and ideological trends in civil society. Writing this book in such an academic context broadened my horizon beyond the specificities of my own case study and added a regional framework in which to situate my research. There is no doubt that this book is stronger as a result.

There are so many people to thank, but I must start with professor Bjorn Olav Utvik, who headed both of the above-mentioned research projects and was my PhD supervisor. My thanks are due to him for supporting me throughout my academic career and for pushing me to start this book project. Having a mentor like Bjorn Olav has been invaluable to my career development, and I am deeply appreciative of all of the support provided throughout the years!

Each of my colleagues from these two research projects also deserves special mention, including (in alphabetical order) Albrecht Hofheinz, Brynjar Lia, Dag Tuastad, Jacob Hoigilt, Jon Nordenson, Kai Kverme, Pinar Tank, and Truls Tonnesen. In addition to the academic rigor and insight they brought to these projects, having such sociable colleagues has made our trips to the region very enjoyable. I thank them for the good times and the camaraderie!

I must extend special thanks to my excellent research assistants, Ghousoon Bisharat, Manar Makhoul, and Azar Dakwar, each of whom made this project not only possible but also more fun and engaging with their critical comments and different perspectives.

I must also thank the many friends, colleagues, associates, and contacts who gave so generously of their time in helping me to conduct this research, including by making introductions, setting up meetings, and otherwise opening doors to possibility. In particular, I must thank Yoni Mendel for his help at the very initial stage of this project; the indefatigable staff of Adalah, and especially Rina Rosenberg, for her continued support; and the inspirational staff and volunteers at HILA (the Israel Committee for Equality in Education), not least my dear friend Yehouda Amichai. Each of these people has been an inspiration to me in more ways than they could know. A heartfelt mention goes to Tikva Levi, whom I got to know as HILA’s tireless director and who became a dear friend. Tikva’s untimely passing is a loss I cannot express in words.

I am very grateful to my reviewers for giving their time and providing constructive comments that have helped me in the process of putting this manuscript together—and to the staff at the University of Texas Press for their patience!

I must also thank the Norwegian Non-Fiction Writers and Translators Association for its generous support for this project. And Susan Barhoum must be thanked for her excellent translation services. Needless to say, any errors in the final text are entirely my own.

Last, but not least: thank you to my patient husband and our children for enduring all of the time that I spent away on fieldwork or at my desk while working on this project over the years.

Glossary

al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya fi Isrāīl/The Islamic Movement in Israel

al-Ḥizb al-Dimuqraṭi al-ʿArabī/Political party known as the Arab Democratic Party, in Hebrew Miflaga Demokratit Aravit (shortened to Ma’da)

al-Jabha al-Dimuqraṭiyya lissalām walmusawā/Political party known as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Hebrew acronym HaDaSh)

al-Kalām/The pupil and student organization of the Southern Branch of the Islamic Movement

al-Qāima al-Mushtaraka/Knesset list composed of all political parties representing Palestinian citizens of Israel, known as the Joint List

al-Risāla/The pupil and student organization of the Islamic Movement before the split in 1996

al-Tajamuʿ al-Waṭanī al-Dimuqraṭi/Political party known as the National Democratic Assembly (Hebrew acronym Balad)

daʿwa/Islamic religious advocacy

Eqraa/The pupil and student organization of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement could have been transliterated as Īqrʾ, but I use the version used by the organization itself—Eqraa)

ḥamula/clan

Nakba/The Catastrophe; the phrase used to describe the 1948 war and its consequences

sharīʿa/The Islamic codified law

Ūsrat al-Jihād/The Family of Jihad, the first Islamist organization in Israel

Waqf/The communal land and properties of the Muslim community

Zakāat/Charity obligation for Muslims, representing one of the five pillars of Islam

Introduction

PALESTINIAN ISLAMISTS IN THE JEWISH STATE

IN 2006, I WAS ON THE FEMALE-SEGREGATED SIDE of a large football stadium in Um al-Faḥim surrounded by tens of thousands of Palestinians from all over Israel who had gathered to welcome Shaykh Ra’ed Ṣalāḥ, the leader of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement, as he returned home following his release from prison. The crowd encompassed all ages and, seemingly, an array of lifestyles. The atmosphere was ecstatic. To me it felt like a pop concert, but in place of a band was a tall leader who somehow projected an air of being both humble and imposing simultaneously. On the stage with him were secular politicians and Christian religious leaders representing the diversity of the Palestinian community inside Israel. My own group was made up of Palestinians working in the human rights NGO sector, including lawyers from Adalah (the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel), some of whom, to my puzzlement, were also active in the Islamic Movement. Thus far, my interactions with Palestinian citizens of Israel had been mainly with individuals from this sector and with parent activists working with the Israel Committee for Equality in Education (HILA) who were engaged in activism seeking equal rights to educational resources for their children.

That evening, I was struck by the appeal of this Islamist leader and the reception given to him by Palestinians across religio-secular and political divides. The event afforded me a small glimpse into an important component of the Palestinian community in Israel that I knew little about, despite having studied Israeli society and lived there for research purposes on and off for several years. At the same time, I recognized the potent mixture of fervor, protest, and communitarian togetherness connecting the audience from an event I had attended six years prior and at which I was also an observer: the tent protest set up by supporters of the Jewish religious party-movement Shas, in front of the prison in Ramle where their leader, Aryeh Deri, was imprisoned in 2000.

To the uninitiated, The Islamic Movement in Israel—al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya fi Isrāīl—may sound like an oxymoron. Nevertheless, it exists, has thousands of followers across Israel, participates in local and national elections, and is the largest grassroots movement among Israel’s Palestinian citizens. Since its establishment in the 1970s, the Islamic Movement has grown from a small, religious, grassroots-oriented organization focused on strengthening the faith and observance of Muslim individuals and the community at large to a countrywide, Islamist, sociopolitical movement. Its trifecta of goals focuses on protection of the Palestinian people, land, and religious sites, mainly in Israel and occupied East Jerusalem. Gradually, the Movement has built a network of religious and social institutions across Israel, catering to the needs of its constituency.

Through its steadily growing network of self-reliant institutions, the Islamic Movement quickly grew into a local political power center, and from the mid-1980s it began to participate in local elections. It has since run various municipalities and seen some members gain power in several local authorities.

The Movement split in 1996 due to a disagreement over whether or not to stand for national elections to Israel’s parliament (the Knesset). Since 1996, there have been two branches broadly referred to as the Movement, each named after their respective leader. One branch was, until 2015, led by Shaykh Ra’ed Ṣalāḥ and was commonly referred to as the Northern Branch. The other branch is led by Shaykh Abu Daʿābis at present (and was formerly led by Shaykh Darwīsh and Shaykh Ṣarṣur). This branch of the Movement is commonly referred to as the Southern Branch.

From 1996 to 2015, the two branches have operated as parallel mirror organizations, each of which offered religious, social, and educational services and assistance to Palestinian citizens of Israel across the country. The split naturally caused tension within the community, as well as competition for supporters and funding.

From 1996 onward, the Southern Branch has participated in national elections and has had representatives in the Knesset on al-Qāʾima al-ʿarabiyya al-Muwaḥada (the United Arab List, known by its Hebrew acronym Ra’am [Reshima Aravit Me’uhedet]), a joint parliamentary list with other parties who also represent Palestinian citizens of Israel. Of the 120 members of the Knesset, the United Arab List secured four seats in 1996; five seats in 1999; two seats in 2003; and four seats in 2006, 2009, and 2013 (Knesset website). It was the largest list representing Arab Palestinians in the Knesset from 2009 until the March 2015 elections.

In 2014, four parties with a predominantly Palestinian leadership and support base created a new list—al-Qāima al-Mushtaraka (the Joint List; in Hebrew, HaReshima HaMeshutefet). Thus, the Joint List includes many ideological currents and is unified only by the centralizing force of ethnic minority identity and status. The Joint List secured thirteen seats in both the 2015 and September 2019 elections and fifteen seats in the March 2020 elections, making it the third-largest list in the Knesset at the time of writing.

The Northern Branch participated in local elections in Um al-Faḥim until 2013. This branch fell under increasing pressure from the government, and its leader, Ra’ed Ṣalāḥ, has been convicted in Israeli courts on several occasions, including for connections with Ḥarakat al-Muqawama al-Īslāmiyya (the Islamic Resistance Movement, whose acronym in Arabic is Ḥamās), inciting violence, and spitting at a police officer. Shaykh Ra’ed Ṣalāḥ, as he is widely known, has also received travel bans on several occasions. The offices of this branch have been searched and ransacked by state authorities on multiple occasions. Finally, in November 2015, the government outlawed the Northern Branch, claiming that its leadership incited violence and maintained ties to Ḥamās.

Despite lacking membership statistics or other ways to assess numbers of supporters, and notwithstanding the outlawing of the Northern Branch in 2015, it is fair to estimate that the Islamic Movement remains the largest religio-political movement among the Palestinian minority in Israel. In fact, there is no competing religious movement among Palestinian citizens, whether in the Muslim, Christian, or Druze communities. As for the balance between the two branches, according to academic sources, prior to its forced dissolution the Northern Branch was the most popular (Smooha 2010) and was in many people’s minds synonymous with the Islamic Movement at large, enjoying the support of approximately 57 percent of Palestinians in Israel (Ali 2015b).

The popularity of the Islamic Movement is evident from both its performance in local and national elections and from the large numbers who have participated in events arranged by both branches of the Movement. To illustrate, over the years tens of thousands of supporters have been reported by the media as participating in the annual event al-Āqṣā fi khaṭar (al-Āqṣā Is in Danger), which was held between 1995 and 2015 in Um al-Faḥim (Ha’aretz staff 2004; Levine 2009; Roffe-Ofir 2010; Shaalan 2013).

The event focused on the perceived threats to al-Āqṣā mosque, the third-holiest site in Islam to which Muslims initially directed their prayers. Because this mosque is located in occupied East Jerusalem, it has multiple levels of meaning to Palestinians in Israel: in addition to its status as a holy site, Jerusalem symbolizes both Palestinian nationalist aspirations for independence and self-determination and also Israel’s successful obstruction of this agenda through its continued occupation of Palestinian territory. Holding Israeli citizenship puts these Palestinians in a special position because they have access to the site, which most Palestinians (those living under Israeli occupation in the occupied Palestinian territory, beyond East Jerusalem, and those living in the diaspora), as well as most Muslims worldwide, do not enjoy. This positions the Movement at one of the religious centers of the world and bestows its activism with both regional and global relevance.

Another indication of the Movement’s popularity is the success of the student movements associated with the Northern Branch, which have won elections to the Arab Student Councils at several Israeli university campuses between 2008 and 2015. This is especially significant because it is widely acknowledged that the Palestinian student body on Israeli campuses is a microcosm representing future trends in the Palestinian community (Rabinowitz and Abu Baker 2005, 125; see also chapter 5).

A CONTEXTUALIZED APPROACH

This is the first book about the Islamic Movement in Israel in English. The main objective is to introduce readers to the history, development, and praxis of the Movement. It traces the development of the Movement from its establishment in 1983 to 2020, with a particular focus on the years 2008–2015. This Islamist religio-sociopolitical movement by and for Palestinian citizens of Israel is analyzed here contextually, focusing on the interrelation between the two main points of reference for the development of the Movement: the Israeli state and society in which it operates, and the Islamist ideology that likewise informs its methodology.

The Israeli context provides certain possibilities and also certain limitations, and the Islamist approach provides a distinct lifestyle and vision, as well as a methodological and ideological framework. This analysis aims to explain how the leaders and activists of the Movement take advantage of the possibilities and navigate the limitations provided by their context, as well as to clarify how they interpret and instrumentalize Islamist theory and practice in pursuit of their aims.

Through a critical examination of the agenda and praxis of the Islamic Movement’s countrywide network of religious and social organizations, this book examines the ideas and the identity transmitted through these institutions and organizations. By investigating the Movement’s social and political praxis, this study introduces its changing relationship with the Israeli state and society, including other groups and parties who seek to represent the interests of Palestinian citizens of Israel.

According to Keddie, there were three watershed years that shaped the political religious history of the Middle East in the twentieth century: 1928, which marked the establishment of the Jamāʿat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; 1967, when Israel defeated the Arab states and occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, bringing an end to the ascent of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism; and the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Keddie 1998). For the Islamic Movement in Israel, I would add four other significant events, each of which is specific to its context: the War of 1948, known to Palestinians as the Nakba (Catastrophe), which saw the establishment of the State of Israel and the displacement of most Palestinians from their homeland; 1983, when the Islamic Movement in Israel was established; 1996, when the Islamic Movement split over parliamentary participation and when its Southern Branch entered the Knesset; and 2015, when the Northern Branch was outlawed and the Southern Branch became one of the founding parties standing for Knesset elections on the Joint List. These events will be covered in the following chapters in chronological order.

IDEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONTEXT: ISLAMISM

As Ayubi puts it: More than anything else the general Islamic resurgence represents a reaction to alienation and a quest for authenticity. . . . For those resisting foreign dominance (political and/or cultural), Islam can provide a medium of cultural nationalism that is both defiant and self-assuring (Ayubi 1994, 217).

Ayubi explains that Islamists want a cultural revolution inspired by the Divine Word and that Islam can therefore serve as an effective weapon against the ‘cultural dependency’ that often results from the Westernization policies passed off by various Middle Eastern rulers as developmental policies (Ayubi 1994, 217–218). In the case of the Palestinian Islamists in Israel, the rulers are the successive governments of the Jewish Israeli state that to many Palestinians represents a form of domination (Westernization through Israelization). In the case of the Islamic Movement, Islamism is not only an ideology and methodology for cultural advancement and renewal but also a variant of a Palestinian political nationalism. Therefore, I propose to describe the Islamists in Israel as Islamist Palestinian nationalists: they are fighting for their rights as a Palestinian national minority group while employing an Islamist approach and methodology. This is evident in their trifecta of goals: to protect the Palestinian people, land, and holy sites from the foreign Jewish state. It is also evident in what the Movement describes as their circles of belonging, consisting of three related identification processes: Arabization, Palestinization, and Islamization, which represent a localized form of resistance to Westernization (i.e., Israelization).

By introducing the facts and contextualized development that have made the Movement what it is today, this study adds to the larger study of regional Islamist movements, which has generally overlooked this particular Islamist movement (al-Atawneh and Hatina 2019, 111). Based on this case of political Islam, we see how the political and ideological development of this Islamic, religiously inspired movement is reflective of the political and social contexts in which it has developed and to which it has modified its goals and methodology. In accordance with the approach advocated by Asad, this study seeks to avoid the essentialization or disintegration of Islam and treats this religion as a discursive tradition that links the past, present, and future in various ways, and not as a distinct social structure nor a heterogenous collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs and morals (Asad 1986, 14). As such, this study also follows the advice of Abu-Lughod to study the interplay between . . . ​everyday practices and discourses and the religious texts they invoke, the histories of which they are part, and the political enterprises of which they partake (Abu-Lughod 1989).

At the outset, it is important to differentiate the Islamist Movement in Israel from Ḥamās, the most popular Islamist movement in the occupied Palestinian territory. They are not the same movement; nor do they represent the same Palestinian population. Israeli spokespersons do sometimes conflate Ḥamās and the Islamic Movement in Israel in an attempt to delegitimize the latter, as the Israeli government has been successful in persuading many other states to categorize Ḥamās as a proscribed terrorist organization. The suggestion that the Islamic Movement in Israel has ties with Ḥamās in the occupied Palestinian territory is used by Israeli authorities to legitimize police raids on the offices of both branches of the Movement; confiscation of their property; as well as scrutinization, censorship, and sometimes the forced closure of newspapers and publications. In 2015, it was also part of the reasoning behind the government’s decision to outlaw the Northern Branch.

In comparative terms, Ḥamās and the Islamic Movement in Israel share Islamist ideology and a Palestinian nationalist perspective. In addition, the two movements were established in the same decade and operate in close geographic proximity. However, there are significant differences between each. First, Ḥamās operates under Israeli military occupation, whereas the Islamic Movement operates as an organization representing the interests of citizens of the State of Israel. Second, Ḥamās has adopted armed struggle in its resistance to the occupation, whereas the Islamic Movement in Israel purposely avoids violence. When Ḥamās was established in December 1987, it was with the expressed priority to confront the Israeli occupation by Palestinian leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Jensen 2009). Its establishment, coinciding with the start of the (first) Intifada (Uprising) in the late 1980s, can be considered an auxiliary causal factor for [the] popular rebellion (Hroub 2002, 36). Relations with Ḥamās will discussed in chapter 2.

The Islamic Movement in Israel has modeled its nonviolent activism on the example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the first such movement and whose establishment dates to 1928. The Muslim Brotherhood has historically pursued nonviolent actions and, prior to its outlawing in Egypt in 2014, participated (directly or indirectly) in elections while also building a mass movement with the aim of spreading a certain Islamic lifestyle and improving the socioeconomic status of its community.

Like the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement, the Islamic Movement in Israel can be described as a modernizing force among Muslim Palestinians in Israel. Whereas Islamism is often portrayed as a reaction against, or at best a belated accommodation to, modernization, Utvik has demonstrated that the Egyptian movement promoted modernization by studying its engagement with social and economic change in Egypt (Utvik 2006). In the case of the Islamic Movement in Israel, modernization is reflected in the Movement’s efforts to mobilize its constituency to participate in local and state-level elections and in its provision of an alternative identity that relates to both historic context and the current predicament. The Islamic Movement in Israel empowers its constituency as individuals and, more significantly, as a community by basing political mobilization on a shared ideology and lifestyle and in opposition to traditional family and clan-based politics.

Also similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Movement in Israel’s approach is to provide social services under an Islamic umbrella, through which it provides its community with a comprehensive system that encompasses all things material, spiritual, social, individual, political and personal (Clark 2004, 14). Using a social movement theory approach, Clark argues that the success of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood lies in its Islamic social institutions and the services these offer, combined with the associational networks of horizontal social ties that this system creates.

In addition to these services and networks, the Islamic Movement in Israel also offers a source of motivation beyond the material. This positive motivation takes the form of Islamic ideas that are encapsulated in the concept of daʿwa. Daʿwa is the call or invitation to God that is based on the Prophet Muḥamad’s outreach to the polytheists in Mecca and that, over the centuries, has been approached in diverse ways in various places and at different times. According to Wickham, for the modern Islamists, daʿwa is the new activist interpretation of the Islamic faith (Wickham 2002, 15). Based on this interpretation, Wickham analyzed how Islamists in Egypt created a parallel Islamic sector that operates mosques independent of state authorities; Islamic volunteer associations and organizations; and Islamic-style business models (Wickham 2002, 94–97). Most research on Islam and Muslims in Israel has focused on political empowerment and has either ignored or paid little attention to communal activities and the religious activism of daʿwa through fieldwork methodology (al-Atawneh and Hatina 2019). This study aims to begin to address these gaps by conducting ethnographic research on such activities in relation to their political, social, and religious motivations.

The Islamic Movement in Israel’s activities are here studied in a similar manner to the way in which Starrett studied religious education in Egypt, using an approach that focused largely on what it is that adults want and expect children to know and believe (Starrett 1998, xii). The aim here is to understand what it is that the leadership of the Islamic Movement’s associations and organizations want their supporters to learn and practice, as well as why; and to understand the logic behind their focus and approach. Additionally, this study aims to understand how the approach of the Movement’s leadership is related to the Movement’s goals and what methods are applied to reach their community.

Academic publications published to date in English on the Islamic Movement in Israel have focused on specific and different political issues, including (in chronological order) the type of fundamentalist threat that the Islamic Movement in Israel poses to the Israeli state and society (Israeli 1999); the Movement’s stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Amara 1996; Asʻad Ghanem 2001, chap. 6; Ali 2004); the Movement’s split in 1996 (Rekhess 1996; Aburaiya 2004; Rayan 2012); the Movement’s struggle over al-Quds/Jerusalem (Dumper and Larkin 2012); the state’s relationship with the Northern Branch (Pascovich 2013); and the Movement as a populist undertaking as assessed using deradicalization theory (As’ad Ghanem and Mustafa 2014).

The present study draws on, and also critiques some of, this prior scholarship. In particular, much of the prior work employs terminology such as radicalism and moderation to describe the Northern and Southern Branches of the Movement respectively, a juxtaposition that is advanced and exacerbated by Israeli media produced in Hebrew