Yom Kippur War: Suez Canal

By Dhirubhai Patel

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, or October War also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to 25, 1973, by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel.
Yom Kippur War
Index
Chapter 1: The war Story
1.1 Events leading up to the war
1.2 War objectives and areas of combat
1.3 Lead-up to the surprise attack
1.4 Egyptian and Syrian military exercises
1.5 Lack of Israeli pre-emptive attack
Chapter 2: Course of the war
2.1 Egyptian attack
2.2 Failed Israeli counter-attack
2.3 Temporary stabilization
2.4 The Egyptian failed attack
2.5 Israel planned attack considerations
2.6 Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal
2.7 Securing the bridgehead
2.8 Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing
2.9 Israeli forces across the Suez
2.10 The ceasefire and further battles
2.11 Egypt's trapped Third Army
2.12 Post-war battles
2.13 Final situation on the Egyptian front
2.14 War in the Golan Heights
2.15 Successful defense of the Quneitra Gap by the 7th Armored Brigade
2.16 Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan
2.17 The collapse of the 188th Armored Brigade
2.18 Israel retakes the southern Golan
2.19 Naval War
Chapter 3: Atrocities against Israeli prisoners
3.1 Egyptian atrocities
Chapter 4: Participation by other states
4.1 Aid to Egypt and Syria
4.2 Soviet active aid
4.3 Soviet threat of intervention
4.4 Other countries
4.5 US-Soviet naval standoff
Chapter 5 : Weapons
5.1 Home front during the war
5.2 Casualties
Chapter 6: Post-ceasefire
6.1 Disengagement agreement
6.2 Response in Israel
6.3 Response in Egypt
6.4 Response in Syria
6.5 Response in the Soviet Union
Chapter 7: Long-term effects

• Language: Middle english
• Publisher: Lulu.com
• Release date: May 26, 2021
• ISBN: 9781008918160

Book preview

Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War, or October War also known as the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to 25, 1973, by a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria against Israel.

Index

Chapter 1: The war Story

1.1 Events leading up to the war

1.2 War objectives and areas of combat

1.3 Lead-up to the surprise attack

1.4 Egyptian and Syrian military exercises

1.5 Lack of Israeli pre-emptive attack

Chapter 2: Course of the war

2.1 Egyptian attack

2.2 Failed Israeli counter-attack

2.3 Temporary stabilization

2.4 The Egyptian failed attack

2.5 Israel planned attack considerations

2.6 Israeli breakthrough – Crossing the canal

2.7 Securing the bridgehead

2.8 Egyptian response to the Israeli crossing

2.9 Israeli forces across the Suez

2.10 The ceasefire and further battles

2.11 Egypt's trapped Third Army

2.12 Post-war battles

2.13 Final situation on the Egyptian front

2.14 War in the Golan Heights

2.15 Successful defense of the Quneitra Gap by the 7th Armored Brigade

2.16 Syrian breakthrough in the Southern Golan

2.17 The collapse of the 188th Armored Brigade

2.18 Israel retakes the southern Golan

2.19 Naval War

Chapter 3: Atrocities against Israeli prisoners

3.1 Egyptian atrocities

Chapter 4: Participation by other states

4.1 Aid to Egypt and Syria

4.2 Soviet active aid

4.3 Soviet threat of intervention

4.4 Other countries

4.5 US-Soviet naval standoff

Chapter 5 : Weapons

5.1 Home front during the war

5.2 Casualties

Chapter 6: Post-ceasefire

6.1 Disengagement agreement

6.2 Response in Israel

6.3 Response in Egypt

6.4 Response in Syria

6.5 Response in the Soviet Union

Chapter 7: Long-term effects

Yom Kippur War

Chapter 1: The war Story

The war started with a gigantic and successful Egyptian intersection of the Suez Canal. Egyptian powers crossed the truce lines, at that point progressed basically unopposed into the Sinai Peninsula. Following three days, Israel had assembled a large portion of its powers and stopped the Egyptian hostile, bringing about a military impasse. The Syrians facilitated their attack on the Golan Heights to concur with the Egyptian hostile and at first made compromising increases into Israeli-held region. Inside three days, notwithstanding, Israeli powers had pushed the Syrians back to the pre-war truce lines. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at that point dispatched a four-day counter-hostile profound into Syria. Inside seven days, Israeli big guns started to shell the edges of Damascus, and Egyptian President Sadat started to stress over the trustworthiness of his significant partner. He accepted that catching two key passes found further in the Sinai would make his position more grounded during post-war arrangements; he accordingly requested the Egyptians to backpedal in all out attack mode, however their attack was immediately rebuffed. The Israelis at that point counter-attacked at the crease between the two Egyptian armed forces, crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt, and started gradually propelling southward and westward towards the city of Suez in longer than seven days of weighty battling that brought about substantial setbacks on both sides.

On October 22, a United Nations–handled truce unwound, with each side accusing the other for the penetrate. By October 24, the Israelis had advanced their positions significantly and finished their enclosure of Egypt's Third Army and the city of Suez. This improvement prompted pressures between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a second truce was forced agreeably on October 25 to end the war.

The war had extensive ramifications. The Arab world had encountered embarrassment in the disproportionate defeat of the Egyptian–Syrian–Jordanian coalition in the Six-Day War yet felt mentally vindicated by early accomplishments in this contention. The war drove Israel to perceive that, regardless of amazing operational and strategic accomplishments on the war zone, there was no assurance that they would consistently rule the Arab states militarily, as they had reliably through the prior 1948 Arab–Israeli War, the Suez Crisis and the Six-Day War. These progressions prepared for the resulting harmony measure. The 1978 Camp David Accords that followed prompted the arrival of the Sinai to Egypt and standardized relations—the main tranquil acknowledgment of Israel by an Arab country. Egypt proceeded with its float away from the Soviet Union and in the end left the Soviet range of authority completely.

The war was important for the Arab–Israeli struggle, a progressing debate that has included numerous fights and wars since the establishing of the State of Israel in 1948. During the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel had caught Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, generally 50% of Syria's Golan Heights, and the regions of the West Bank which had been held by Jordan since 1948.

On June 19, 1967, not long after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government casted a ballot to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in return for a perpetual harmony settlement and a disarmament of the returned territories. It dismissed a full withdrawal to the limits and the circumstance before the war, and furthermore demanded direct exchanges with the Arab governments instead of tolerating arrangement through a third party.

This choice was not unveiled at that point, nor was it passed on to any Arab state. Despite Abba Eban's (Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1967) demand that this was to be sure the situation, there is by all accounts no strong proof to authenticate his case. No proper harmony proposition was made either straightforwardly or in a roundabout way by Israel. The Americans, who were informed of the Cabinet's choice by Eban, were not approached to pass on it to Cairo and Damascus as true harmony proposition, nor were they given signs that Israel expected a reply.

The Arab position, as it arose in September 1967 at the Khartoum Arab Summit, was to dismiss any quiet settlement with the territory of Israel. The eight taking part states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, and Sudan—passed a goal that would later get known as the three no's: there would be no harmony, no acknowledgment and no arrangement with Israel. Before that, King Hussein of Jordan had expressed that he was unable to preclude a chance of a genuine, perpetual harmony among Israel and the Arab states.

Furnished threats progressed forward a restricted scale after the Six-Day War and swelled into the War of Attrition, an endeavor to wear out the Israeli situation through long haul pressure. A truce was endorsed in August 1970.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt kicked the bucket in September 1970. He was prevailing by Anwar Sadat. A harmony drive drove by both Sadat and UN delegate Gunnar Jarring was postponed in 1971. Sadat set out to the Egyptian Parliament his aim of orchestrating a break understanding as a stage towards a settlement on February 4, 1971, which broadened the conditions of the truce and conceived a returning of the Suez Canal in return for a halfway Israeli pullback. It took after a proposition freely made by Moshe Dayan. Sadat had motioned in a meeting with The New York Times in December 1970 that, as a trade-off for a complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was prepared to perceive the privileges of Israel as an autonomous state as characterized by the Security Council of the United Nations. Gunnar Jarring fortuitously proposed a comparative drive four days after the fact, on February 8, 1971. Egypt reacted by tolerating quite a bit of Jarring's recommendations, however varying on a few issues, with respect to the Gaza Strip, for instance, and communicated its eagerness to arrive at an understanding on the off chance that it additionally carried out the arrangements of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This was the first run through an Arab government had opened up to the world proclaiming its preparation to consent to a harmony arrangement with Israel.

Also, the Egyptian reaction incorporated a proclamation that the enduring harmony couldn't be accomplished without withdrawal of the Israeli military from every one of the regions involved since 5 June 1967. Golda Meir responded to the suggestion by shaping a board to look at the proposition and vet potential concessions. At the point when the council collectively reasoned that Israel's advantages would