Opening to Omnilateralism: Democratic Governance for All, from Local to Global with Stakeholders

By Wolfgang PAPE

Opening to Omnilateralism

After a century of western-inspired multi-lateralism, its much criticised 75-years old stronghold, the UN, needs a new narrative: omni-lateralism. The right vehicle is omnibus - for and by all -, firstly, to widen the way for input of more ideas and good practices of non-Western origin, and secondly, to include non-state actors as legitimate stakeholders in global governance.

Some trends already signal an opening towards omnilateralism: enhancing global governance in the COP by adding Eastern understanding of cycles in nature to protect the environment (e.g. in circular economies) and a wider appreciation of ‘holism’ beyond the rather linear individualistic thinking of Western societies; also accountable groups of civil society - more trusted than officials driven by narrow national interest - increasingly enrich deliberations about climate change and other global problems that need global solutions. These require East-West and North-South cooperation as currently obvious in the urgent cross-border exchanges among experts to combat the pandemic and save lives and livelihood worldwide. Globalisation has elevated millions out of poverty. However, narrow-minded politicians still claim national ‘sovereignty’ and parochial interests against global solutions for the common good while the Westphalian ‘nation’ is becoming a historic aberration.

Almost all governments nowadays claim democracy, but respect for its principles is falling. Democracy must adapt to each level of governance, from local, national, regional to global. More direct democracy may suit the directly informed local stage. The higher the stage and the wider the impact, the more expertise and responsibility with all stakeholders is needed to reach the common global good, i.e. omnilaterally.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse UK
• Release date: Mar 11, 2021
• ISBN: 9781665583152

Wolfgang PAPE

Dr Wolfgang PAPE is currently a free writer after recent Fellowships in Seoul and Taipei. During his service in the European Commission over 30 years, including postings as a diplomat in Tokyo, he was at EU-HQ in Brussels in charge of the ‘Asia Strategy’ and contributed to the ‘White Paper on Governance’ in the Think Tank of EC President Jacques Delors, following a Fellowship at the Brookings Institution in Wash. DC. After graduating from High School in Rochester, N.Y. and his Abitur in Kassel (D), he studied law and economics at the universities of Marburg (D) and Genève (CH), researched during two years at Osaka Gaidai (J), Kyoto University (J) and Harvard (USA) for his Dr iuris in Freiburg (D) in 1981. Before joining the EU, he served as Advisor at the Japanese Embassy in Bonn. His publications in English, German, Japanese and French are ranging from cultural diversity to trade issues and global governance, for which he coined the term of “Omnilateralism.”

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2021 Wolfgang Pape. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse 03/11/2021

ISBN: 978-1-6655-8213-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-6655-8315-2 (e)

Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them.

Dedicated to the Trinitas of TchaTcha, Oli and BoBo for a peaceful and prosperous future!

My sincere thanks to Sensei (先生), friends and colleagues over all continents who have nourished me with a large variety of food for thought! However, its digestion and the humble result remain entirely in my personal responsibility.

CONTENTS

Preface

Abbreviations

About the author

Introduction

Chapter 1 : Europe’s imposition of the ‘nation’ as a historic aberration

A. Nomads with flexible frontiers, but nations with fixed borders

B. Nations and identities in different cultures

C. Japan’s unique nationalism further nurtured by neighbours’ rise

D. Europe’s integration transcending the absolute notion of the nation

Conclusion of Chapter 1

Chapter 2 : Globalisation nets over and above nations

A. Governance beyond government

B. The global net works

C. Regionalisation as a stepping-stone or a stumbling block?

Conclusion of Chapter 2

Chapter 3 : Multi-level governance for the people from the bottom up

A. Mediating a mass of fungible facts

B. All democratic politics is local

C. Provinces provoke not only nations

D. The nation, losing in the long term

E. Reaching regionalism above the nation

F. Multi-lateral means merely by many but not by and for all

Conclusion of Chapter 3

Chapter 4 : Opening East for omnilateralism

A. Tension between globalisation and localisation

B. Asia into focus

C. Washington withdrawing from its Consensus and turning unilateral

Conclusion of Chapter 4

Chapter 5 : From quantity to quality: governing at the global level

A. An Anglo-shock going beyond the EU bloc

B. From self-governing to representative democracy

C. Federalism for multi-level democracy up to the global stage

D. Responsible corporations in global governance?

E. Civil society casting civility

F. Opening global governance, not only re-forming it

G. Stakeholders emerging with evidence

H. Civil society accredited and credibly legitimate?

I. Holding not a numbered share, but a vociferous stake

J. Con-form towards a Group SC and a GA of stakeholders

K. From counting votes to convincing voices

L. Legitimate stakeholder democracy beyond only representation

Conclusion of Chapter 5

Overall conclusion of the Chapters

Capture 1 : Learning from French-German relations

Capture 2 : Learning from non-Western cultures and better practices

Major Literature

About the Author

Endnotes

PREFACE

The global world order is now close to breaking down. It is run as a multilateral system under the control of mainly Western nations. It is no longer fit for purpose. The most recent demonstration of its failure is in the handling of the pandemic, which literally means ‘concerning all people.’ ¹ An only ‘many-sided’ system struggles to overcome a threat that affects all sides. At the height of the health crisis in 2020 the narrow-minded leader of the richest nation on earth blocked payment to the global health body that is most urgently needed to fight the virus worldwide.

To renew order and to improve the lives of all citizens we must do two things. First, the system must be widened - a horizontal shift - to include the forgotten regions of Latin America and Africa; and to pro-actively incorporate the rising and risen continent of Asia, principally the civilisational powers of India, China and Japan. The West must learn to learn from the East and return the compliment to Asia which has been learning from the West for centuries, especially since the Industrial Revolution. It is time for us to incorporate the insights, experiences and ideas from all non-Western sources; and to share power more meaningfully than the system has so far allowed.

Our second shift should be vertical - to change the level and depth of political control and decision making; moving some powers up to global bodies and stakeholders; moving some down to the very local. Adapting at and beyond the national level. To refashion the concept and role of ‘we the people’ - deepening the idea of the monitoring of decision-making; and including qualified stakeholders in decision-shaping. We need to move from purely quantitative representation to more qualitative processes, from counting votes towards listening to voices.

We have to recognise that as challenges traverse borders and increase in complexity, then democratic forms must adapt. In short, the more complex and broader the issue, the more indirect we need to make the governance structure. A direct democratic process may work well at a very local level where information is clear, immediate and easily shared; but it becomes problematic when we depend on distant, (a)social media of varying quality, particularly facing a complex problem like climate change. Can you imagine a direct democratic decision, a global referendum of 8 billion people, on the Paris Climate Agreement and its long-term consequences? Similarly, policies that used to be driven at a national level - for example economic and financial management or basic scientific research - are increasingly transnational in scale and scope. Let us remember also myriad other concerns that span the world, such as the Internet and Outer Space. Political reflexes that may have served us well in the 19th or 20th century no longer look so well-tuned to the demands of the modern chains of production, finance or telecommunication. We need therefore to think more imaginatively about how we include all legitimate stakeholders and responsible citizens in the global system of the future.

Combining both these shifts I use the all-encompassing term ‘Omnilateralism.’ It is a concept that seeks complementarity between Western and Eastern thought; it is founded upon respect for democratic processes in multi-level governance and the inclusion of people in the decisions that most affect them; and it is mindful of the role of technology and economic change that is transforming the context for our political action at various stages. Omnilateralism also deals with activities that are currently making headlines worldwide beside the pandemic, for example Chinese initiatives beyond borders and the younger generations’ voices against climate change. Omnilateralism: omnibus for and by all, from all sides.

ABBREVIATIONS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

List of major publications:

Das japanische Kartellrecht, in: Reihe Japanwirtschaft, Heft 2, Düsseldorf 1978

Kartellrecht, in: Das japanische Rechtssystem, Eubel u.a., Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung, Bd. 96, Metzner, Frankfurt 1979

Gyoseishido und das Anti-Monopol-Gesetz in Japan, Eine Untersuchung über Praxis, Hintergrund und rechtliche Problematik von „Administrative Guidance", Schriftenreihe Japanisches Recht, Bd. 7, Heymanns Köln 1980, 124 S.

Gyoseishido –Administrative Anleitungen in der japanischen Wirtschaft, Reihe Japanwirtschaft, Heft 9, Düsseldorf 1980

Joint Venture und Gyoseishido, in: Japaninfo Nr.3 vom 6.2.1981 und Nr.4 vom 20.2.1981

Die Beziehungen der EG zu Japan, in: Japaninfo Nr. vom 25.1.1982

Gyoseshido and the Antimonopoly Law, in: Law in Japan, Vol.15, Tokyo/Seattle 1982

Das Verhältnis Japans zur EG, in: Wirtschaftspartner Japan, Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg 1984

ひと (Mann des Tages) 朝日新聞 (Asahi Shinbun), Tokyo 23.5.1985

Japan, EC Locked in a Liquor Label Battle, Asahi Evening News, Tokyo 12.6.1985

日本の消費者を味方に(Als Partner der japanischen Verbraucher), in: 日本経済新聞 (Nihon Keizai Shinbun), 11.7.1985

ほんものの洋酒を！ (Schenkt den wahren Wein aus Europa ein!), in: 正論 (Das richtige Argument), Tokyo August 1985

国際化とコムニケイション (Internationalisierung und Kommunikation), in: 公証取引 (Fairer Handel), Nr.49, Tokyo September 1985

リッチな日本へ愛を込めて (Einem reichen Japan zugewandt) in: 世界週報 (Weltwocheninformation), Tokyo 5.11.1985

ECから日本の消費者を見る (Der japanische Verbraucher aus EG-Sicht), in: 国民生活 (Das Volksleben), Nr.1, 1986, Tokyo

日本-ECにおける貿易関係 (Die Handelsbeziehungen Japan-EG), in: The Sophia Annual of EC Studies, Nr.2, 1986, Sophia University, Tokyo

胎動はじめたヨロッパ (Die Geburtswehen Europas), in: 正論 (Das richtige Argument), Tokyo Juli 1986

EC Brings Shared Traditions to Japan Trade, in: Japan Times, Tokyo 11.10.1986

日本とECの貿易関係 (Die Handelsbeziehungen von Japan und der EG), in: 農政企画職員研修録 (Studienschriften Agrarpolitischer Planer), Tokyo 1986

Die politisch-gesellschaftliche Verflechtung des Unternehmens, in: Das Industrieunternehmen in Japan, Berlin 1986

国際化玄関先だけ (Internationalisierung nur an der Pforte), in: 毎日新聞 (Mainichi Shinbun), Tokyo 13.4.1987

不正商品と誤認表示の場合 (Ein Fall verfälschter Waren und irreführender Auszeichnungen), in: 輸団連弘報 (Nachrichten des Importvereins), Tokyo August 1987

Das Verhältnis der EG zu Japan, in: Festschrift zum 25.Jubiläum der DIHK in Japan, Tokyo September 1987

日本人はマネーマニアか (Leiden die Japan an einer Kopier-Mani?), in: 週間東洋経済 (Weekly Oriental Economist), Tokyo 29.9.1987

EC Official Cries Foul over Way ‚Non-Imports’ Packaged in Japan, in: Asahi Evening News, Tokyo 14.12.1987

Japanese Imitate Again With Home-Grown ’Imports’, in: The Asian Wall Street Journal, Tokyo 21.12.1987

„Der Geschmack Deutschlands" lockt Käufer für japanische Produkte, dpa-Interview, Tokyo Januar 1988

ガット勸告の速やかな実現を求めて酒税法改正 (Alkoholsteuerreform fordert prompte Ausführung der GATT-Empfehlungen), in: Wands, Tokyo Februar 1988

ニセモノの国際化がはびころニッポン (Japan, wo die Internationalisierung der Nachahmungen wuchert), in: プレイボ-イ (Playboy), Tokyo 19.4.1988

92年市場統合を目指すヨーロッパ 共同体 (Die EG und die Marktintegration von 1992), in: ラジオたんぱ (Die Radio-Kurzwelle), Tokyo April 1988

真実は酒にあり(In Vino Veritas), in: たる (Das Fass), Tokyo April 19

ニセ物天國にメス (Das Skalpell im Paradies der Nachahmungen), in: 読売新聞 (Yomiuri Shinbun), Tokyo 14.5.1988

日本は貿易の過剰防衛国である (Japan ist im Handel übermäßig defensiv), EC Hot Line, in: Avant, Nr.1, Tokyo Mai 1988

商標等に見る日本人とマネーマニア (Kopier-Manie der Japaner bei Handelsmarken etc.), in: ジュリスト (Der Jurist), Tokyo Mai 1988

日本は文化を輸出すべきだ (Japan sollte Kultur exportieren), in: 経協未来２１ (Manager-Zukunft 21), Yamagata Juni 1988

まなぶことはまねることなんてとんでもない認識だ！ (Lernen ist noch lange nicht gleich nachmachen!), EC Hot Line, in: Avant, Nr.2, Tokyo Juni 1988

EC hails liquor tax change reducing high-grade rate, in: The Japan Economic Journal, Tokyo 25.6.1988

日本での弁護士活動を妨げる巧妙なる障壁を怒る！(Die Verhinderung der Anwaltspraxis in Japan als schlaue NTB!), EC Hot Line, in: Avant, Nr.3, Tokyo Juni 1988

EC—そのシステムと目指すもの (Die EG – Ihr System und ihre Merkmale), in: CAT (Cross and Talk), Tokyo August 1988

閉鎖的な日本の流通制度 (Japans verschlossenes Distributionssystem), EC Hot Line, in: Avant, Nr.4, Tokyo August 1988

Das wird hier viel zu heiß gehandelt, in: Hessische Allgemeine, Kassel 6.8.1988

Der lange Weg zur Öffnung Japans, in: Börsenzeitung, Frankfurt 2.9.1988

消費者の経済的な利益 (Der wirtschaftliche Vorteil des Konsumenten), in:アドバイザ (Adviser), Tokyo Herbst 1988

東欧の輸出は欧州統合の先がけになる (Der Aufbruch Osteuropas als der Bahnbrecher der europäischen Einigung), in: 公正取引 (Fairer Handel), Nr.472, Tokyo Februar 1990

Nichttarifäre Handelshemmnisse in Japan, in: Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft, Heidelberg September 1990

Nichttarifäre Handelshemmnisse in Japan, in: Japaninfo Nr.16 vom 26.11.1990, Nr.17 vom 17.12.1990 und Nr.1 vom 14.1.1991

Japans Dumping – Kein Zufall, sondern Backpfeifen, in: Japaninfo Nr.3, vom 25.2.1991

Dumping by Japanese Companies, in: Revue de Droit des Affaires Internationales, No.4, Paris Juillet 1991

Europeans in Japan – Not a fast buck, but a stable Ecu in the offing, in: European Affiars, Amsterdam October 1991

The Cultural Barriers to Japan´s Universalism, in: International Minds, London Winter 1992-3, Vol.3 No.4

Wettbewerb auf japanisch? Geschichte der Giganten im Handel, in: JAPAN aktuell, Bonn Februar/März (I), April/Mai (II) 1993

Europas Antwort auf die Herausforderung Fernost, in: Wirtschaftsmacht Japan - Ohnmacht Europas? Reihe Tagungsberichte Band 13, München 1993

How to Overcome Stereotype Images of Japan, in: Kyoto Conference on Japanese Studies, Kyoto 1994, vol. III, p.141-144

CHINA - A Production Site and Market of Enormous Opportunities for Europe, in: Sino Euro Review, Vol.2 No.10, Athens March/April 1994

Elements of Integration in Europe and Asia, in: Regional Economic Strategies in East Asia, Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo 1994

Kulturelle Barrieren für einen japanischen Universalismus, in: Japaninfo Nr.8, 13.6.1994

Das Japanische im japanischen Kartellrecht, in: iudicium, Monographien aus dem Deutschen Institut für Japanstudien der Philipp-Franz-von-Siebold-Stiftung, (Ed.) Heinrich Menkhaus, München 1994

EU Trade Policy vis-à-vis Japan: From Confrontation to Cooperation, in: Europe-Asia-Pacific Studies in Economy and Technology, Waldenberger (Ed.), The Political Economy of Trade Conflicts, Berlin Heidelberg 1994

La Révolution silencieuse du Japon, von: Karoline Postel-Vinay, Paris 1994, fiche de lecture, in: Bulletin de l’Association Nord Japon, Août-Sept. 1994, p. 5-7

Japanese production in Europe: why it came, where it’s going, in: Euro Japanese Journal, Vol.1 No.2, August-November 1994

Europe and Japan: Toward Mutually Beneficial Cooperation, in: NIRA Review, Tokyo Autumn1994 p.9-14 and Winter 1995 p.13-17; www.nira.go.jp/publ/review/94autumn/pape.html

Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen der EU zu Japan, in: JAPAN 1994/95, POLITIK und WIRTSCHAFT, Institut für Asienkunde Hamburg, (Ed.) Manfred Pohl, Hamburg 1995

情報への遅い足取り(‚Joho haiuei‘ he no osoi ashidori; Später Schritt auf den ‚Information Highway‘), in: 産経新聞Sankei Shinbun, Tokyo 21.1.1995

La coopération euro-japonaise, in: L’état du Japon, Editions La Découverte, Paris 1995

(Ed.) Shaping Factors in East Asia by the Year 2000 and Beyond, Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg 1996, 260 pages

Europas Netzwerk mit Japan, in: Schriftenreihe des Asien-Pazifik-Instituts für Management, Hannover 1996, S. 1-22

Die EU und Ostasien, in: Handbuch der europäischen Integration, Strategie-Struktur-Politik, Wien 1996, S. 564-579

Stereotype Images of Japan, on: http://www.jmission-eu.be/club/imajap.htm#Pape, June 1997

Europas Omnilateralismus -- allseitig zwischen Amerika und Asien, in: Japaninfo Nr.13, 22.9.97

Life-long Learning for the Information Society and the East Asia Advantage, in: EC-Japan Roundtable on Education at Universiteit Leuven 1996, Brussels June 1997, p. 42-44

Omni-lateralism with Europe in the Middle, in: Carrefours Newsletter, No.6, Brussels September 1997, p.8-9

(Ed.) 東アジア、２１世紀の経済と安全保証、ヨロッパからの警告Higashi Ajia, 21seiki no keizai to anzenhosho, Yoroppa kara no keikoku (Ost-Asien, Wirtschaft und Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert, Mahnung aus Europa), Toyo Keizai, Tokyo 1997, 232 pages

L’omnilatéralisme et le rôle de médiateur de l’Europe, dans: Carrefours, Lettre d’information No.6, Cellule de Prospective, Bruxelles, Septembre 1997, p.8-9

The European Union and the United States in East Asia: The Need for Omnilateralism, A Personal View by a European, in: World Affairs, New Delhi, July-September 1997, p. 94-109

Europas Omnilateralismus – allseitig zwischen Amerika und Asien, in: Japaninfo Nr.13, 22.9.1997

Des mutations dans l’économie japonaise, dans: Reflects Perspectives de la vie économique, Tome XXXVI, 3ème trimestre, 1997, p. 77-83

Comparison of East Asia Policies of the USA and the EU, in: Leng Zhan Ho Der Dong Fang Yue Shi Fang – Shue Zer Der Duei Hua (East and West in the Post-Cold War Era – Dialogue among Scholars), Beijing November 1997, p.428-438

Die Asien-Krise hat den europäischen Zusammenhalt weiter gestärkt, in: Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf 31.12.1997

(Review) Andreas Huber, China und die ASEAN Staaten, in: China Information, Vol.XII, No.3, Winter 1997-98, p.156-157

(Ed.) East Asia by the Year 2000 and Beyond - Shaping Factors, Curzon Press, Richmond, UK 1998, 268 pages (also: St.Martin’s Press, New York, USA 1998)

Values and Religion in Relation to Progress, in: The Message of Manila, Manila 1998, p.97-128

East Asia and the ‘Information Society’ -- A Comparative Advantage to Bridge the Communication Gap? in: Johoshakai Shiron, Vol.3, Tsukuba, 31.7.98

Opening for Omnilateralism, A European View, on: http://www.jmission-eu.be/club/omnilat.htm, August 1998

Europe in Northeast Asia, in: Northeast Asia towards 2000: Interdependence and Conflict? Nomos, Baden-Baden 1999, p.107-113

Sustainability of Societal Development in East Asia, in: Carrefours Newsletter, Forward Studies Unit, EC, Brussels, No.11, October 1999, p.2-5 (aussi en français)

Orientierung am Omnilateralismus (ins Chinesische übersetzt), in: Deutschland-Studien der Tongji-Universität, Shanghai 1999, Nr.3, S.22-24

Socio-Cultural Differences and International Competition Law, in: European Law Journal, Vol.5, Issue 4, Blackwell Publ. Oxford, December 1999, p.438-460

Generating Public Space for our Common Futures: Models of Integration in Asia and Europe, Forward Studies Unit, Brussels, Working Paper 2000, 22 pages

グロバルセイションからオムニラテラリスムへGurobaruseishion kara omuniraterarisumu e (From Globalisation Towards Omnilateralism), in: 21 seiki shisutemu to nihon kigyo, Tokyo, May 2000, p.129-141

‘東洋’統合は地域主義から’Toyo’ togo wa chiikishugi kara (‘Asia’ - Integration from Regionalism), Mainichi Shinbun, Tokyo 1.2.2001, p.6

(Ed.) Models of Integration in Asia and Europe: Generating Public Space for Our Common Futures, Forward Studies Series, Luxembourg 2001, 157 pages

Opening for Omnilateralism : A European View, in: Japan and Multilateral Diplomacy, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, p. 48-61

S’ouvrir à l’omnilatéralism / Opening for Omnilateralism, in: ACCES International, Brest 2002, p.17-20, 228

これからはオムニ主義時代Kore kara wa Omuni-shugi jidai (From Now Onwards an Era of Omnilateralism), in: Mainichi Shinbun, Tokyo 27.12.2002

„Liebeserklärung an Kassel" – Schnee von gestern? in: Leben in Kassel, Euregioverlag Kassel 2003, p. 156-160

EU in der Welt – Wandel auch jenseits vom Handel, in: Zuckerindustrie 128 (2003) Nr.8, p.762

‚Orientalism’ is politically incorrect in West, in: New Strait Times, Kuala Lumpur, 19.10.2003

The EU and Its Relations with Asia, in: AEI News, Volume 2, No.1, Kuala Lumpur, January 2004

Die EU-Erweiterung und die Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Asien – Ein Blick aus Brüssel (also in English), in: Asienhaus-Rundbrief 5/2004 Essen, 4.3.2004

Oshu ni okeru tatekina Gabanansu to Shiminshakai (A European View of Multi-Level Governance and Civil Society), in: GenRon Burogu Bukkuretto, vol.013, Tokyo, 10.10.2008, p. 62-85

Obama as an Omnilateralist – is he open to all? in: New Europe, Brussels, June 7-13, 2009

European integration and East Asia – Learning from each other towards Omnilateralism, in: European Social Integration – A Model for East Asia? Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2009, p.289-299

Unseen Union in East Asia? in: New Europe, Brussels, April 18-24, 2010

Unseen Union, Part 2, in: New Europe, Brussels, June 10-16, 2010

Fukushima clears East-West Divide? in: New Europe, Brussels, April 17-23, 2011

Asian economic unity likely a model for Europe, Shanghai Daily, 8.11.2011

欧州におけるフランスとドイツの関係Oushu ni okeru furansu to doitsu no kankei (German-French Relations within Europe), in: Noriko Yasue, EU to furansu (EU and France), Horitsu Bunka Sha, Kyoto, 2012, p.171-191

Japanese ‘Peace Boat’ as business model for ‘EUR-Boat’? in: New Europe, Brussels, May 10-16, 2012

European Development Policies at the Crossroads, in: 2011 KIEP Visiting Scholars’ Papers Series, Seoul, Korea, October 2012, p.221-276

The EU’s chance to change Japan? in: New Europe, Brussels, November 3, 2012

The EU’s chance to change Japan? (Part 2) in: New Europe, Brussels, November 25, 2012

FDI and Market Access Issues in Japan for EU-SMEs, in: Towards a New Role for SMEs in EU-Japan Relations, EU-Japan Centre, Brussels, 2013, p.10-21

Interview on importance of Chinese script in East Asia, Antwerp University, 2013 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85ys3BCoBok

EU-Korea relations to promote regulatory cooperation in economic policies, in: EU-Korea Relations in a Changing World, KU Leuven, 2013, p.269-288 https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/books/rapport-ggs-eu-korea-relations-in-a-changing-world.pdf

The Evolving Integration in East Asia - Too many reservations? in: Economic Policy, CEPS Essays, 29 April 2013, http://www.ceps.be/book/evolving-integration-east-asia-too-many-reservations, 15 p.

East Asia ahead with visualization, in: Chinese for Europeans, Antwerp, 7 June 2013, p. 167-173, http://www.chinese4.eu/docs/china-language-culture-business-chinese4eu.pdf

East Asia: visually faster informed? In: New Europe, Brussels, January 12, 2014 http://www.neurope.eu/article/east-asia-visually-faster-informed

The meaning of competition, in: The Economist, London, 29 March 2014 http://www.economist.com/news/letters/21599739-cronyism-competition-defence-policy-china-takeovers-prostitution-solar-power-senators

European law could help Taiwan, in: Taipei Times, April 26, 2014 www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2014/04/.../200358890

Is Taiwan’s growth hampered by European ideas? In:...China Post, Taipei, April 28, 2014, www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/letters/2014/04/28/.../Is-Taiwans.ht...

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Commentaries, 23 June 2014, http://www.ceps.be/book/care-old-rather-sleepwalk-war-east-asia

Is the ‘American lake’ drying up in the China Sea? In: Foreign Policy, CEPS Commentaries, 31 July 2014, http://www.ceps.be/book/%E2%80%98american-lake%E2%80%99-drying-china-sea

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China’s Omnilateralism (in Chinese translation:中国的全边主義), CIRD, Haikou, Hainan, December 2015

http://www.chinareform.org.cn/open/view/201512/t20151228_241375.htm

Economic Integration and National Identity in Northeast Asia: A European Perspective, in: Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal, Vol.2, No.1, April 2016, pp. 173-217

(http://icaps.nsysu.edu.tw/files/11-1122-13594.php?Lang=en)

TV-interview on Tour about Brexit in UK-Eire, NVTV Belfast, 1.10. 2018

http://www.nvtv.co.uk/shows/the-round-up-monday-1st-october-2018/

From Pure Quantity to Broader Quality in Multi-level Governance, in: The Crisis of Democracy? ed. by Carmen Schmidt, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, 2020, pp. 273-288

Taiwan’s Chance to Move Towards Omnilateralism, in: Taiwan News, 30.4.2020

https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3925015

オムニラテラリズムの実現へ向けた国連 (UN towards the realisation of Omnilateralism), in: Global Peacebuilding Association of Japan, 15.5.2020 http://www.gpaj.org/ja/2019/07/23/18067 3.

UN75+25: The Pandemic as another Chance for Opening towards Omnilateralism, in: Katoikos, 12.10.2020

https://katoikos.world/dialogue/un7525-the-pandemic-as-another-chance-for-opening-towards-omnilateralism.html

See also my BLOG The Omnilateralist at http://omnilateralism.blogspot.com/

INTRODUCTION

Opening towards Omnilateralism² –

A Memo-Thesis³ on Democratic Governance: from Local to Global

Whenever there is an opening, new ideas can enter and create opportunities for progress. ⁴ But many today are cautious about embracing change. Several influential thought leaders (albeit mainly Anglo-Saxons, such as Elon Musk, Martin Rees and the late Stephen Hawking) doubt whether we ought to open up to new technologies like AI. Such technological wildcards risk taking us out of the path of Darwinian selection. However, the viral speed at which those technologies spread widens the gap between the fast technological advances of our civilisation and the slower cultural evolution of our species. We now live longer than ever before and with more material wealth. However, we struggle mentally and physically to adapt to our world. Hence the increased occurrence of ‘diseases of civilisation’ such as cancer, chronic back pain and skeletal problems. The recent coronavirus pandemic demonstrates our vulnerability most drastically.

The many cultures in the world enjoy a common technological endowment. Yet each adapts to it in its own way. thereby sustaining the world’s diversity. As Anglo-Saxon hegemony abates, so too diminishes its technological dominance. Now myriad Eastern and other cultures add their own technological sparkle to global civilisation (for instance a Japanese satellite spraying 花火hanabi, i.e. literally ‘flower fire,’ in 2019 over Hiroshima in memoriam).

It is therefore the broad variety of cultures on the globe – partly a result of geographic and historic differences -- that makes opening to others so enriching; we can learn how and why others think and create differently.

This essential diversity is also reflected in the natural world. We now see how important the principle of biodiversity is to our own survival. By analogy, we can also greatly enrich our social relations and thus public governance by learning from good practices in societies elsewhere. (Governance here understood broadly: encompassing political action by citizens, not merely as individual consumers; and decisions beyond those of a market or an executive.) This is particularly true for the top layer of our multi-level political system. For global governance, all should come together to find the best solutions for the world as a whole. This is especially true now, since the UN is falling short; it is essentially unreformed after 75 years of life.

The current ‘multilateral’ system – i.e. only many-sided – is scarcely open to all sides (omnilateral). It is primarily based only Anglo-Saxon values, drafted in the Atlantic Charter by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941. No wonder then that this narrow system’s functioning, with its illusion of absolute national sovereignty ⁵ emanating from the Westphalian Treaties of 1648, has come under great strain: from the rise of Japan economically; from Islam spiritually; from China geo-politically; and from globalization in general, which has reduced the practical power of nation-states to control things beyond borders. Furthermore, European integration, pooling power across states, fundamentally challenged the idea of indivisible sovereignty. After generations of devastating wars over borders, Europeans now experience a level of peace, convergence and interpenetration from P2P to B2B ⁶ that have no equal between states elsewhere in the world. This is particularly true of the Franco-German rapprochement at the heart of the EU.

With increasing interdependence worldwide comes a vital need to open up the multi-lateral system to ‘omni-lateralism’ (from the Latin omnibus which means for and by all). ⁷ We must go beyond the dependence on western-only cultures and the old concept of the sovereign nation which the west imposed on the rest of the world. We must include the voices of civil society in a multi-level model of governance.

Omnilateralism, in a nutshell, means first opening up global governance to non-western cultures and good practices. Secondly, to serve omnibus, it must include non-state actors. The system was traditionally built on supposedly sovereign ‘nations’ - artefacts and concepts imposed worldwide through European imperialism and western hegemony (even creating a system of United Nations). However, we must now embrace civil society and other influential trans-border non-state actors, like the online giants of GAFA in America and their Chinese counterparts BATX etc. We must bring them in as responsible and accountable stakeholders in an open, transparent process.

Waves of globalisation have demonstrated that the absolute sovereign nation is as an aberration of history. The nation, ‘Made in Europe’ was imposed on everyone else through colonialism. Having bequeathed the world the Westphalian system, Europeans then sought to remake it, after suffering a series of devastating conflicts between nations. With a vision of making war impossible between them, Europeans began to pool sovereignty, which relativised the role of the nation. They created a supranational European Union, an unprecedented historical achievement and an example on which others can build. Moreover, there are other regional integration organisations from ASEAN and AU to Mercosur, each of which in their own way can serve as stepping-stones in a move to an omnilateral system.

However, for global governance to be truly omnilateral in its decision-making (‘for and by all’), it would require democratic input-, throughput- and output-legitimacy. Over the second half of the 20th century, we saw a fast, world-wide increase in the number of democracies, whilst at the same time a fall in the respect for democratic practices. To be effective, stable and legitimate, democracy must differentiate itself according to the level of governance, from local to global. In multi-level governance, direct democracy is more appropriate for local decisions and municipal referenda etc. As one moves higher, from provincial, national, regional and then to the global level, representation and decision-making becomes more indirect. This is because, at the higher levels, issues tend to be more complicated, have wider impacts and longer time frames. To take such decisions, people are inevitably dependent on others’ expertise, information from the media and other sources of knowledge.

Reliance on (often un-)social media and other murky information, highly susceptible to increasingly monopolistic market forces, has grown exponentially. To guard against this, it is ever more necessary to increase the expertise available to parliaments and other indirect civilising filters ⁸ of volatile and emotion-driven public opinion. Recent examples of direct democracy at the national level, especially the Anglo-Saxon votes for Brexit and Trump, but also direct elections of presidents in Turkey, the Philippines and so on, clearly show the risks of such mass-mediated decision-making, frequently founded on ‘fungible’, fuzzy facts and manipulation.

There are already signs of opening up to omnilateralism. In terms of learning from non-western partners, this has been partially accelerated in reaction to the impulsive and in the long-term self-destructive unilateralism of President Trump. Counter-balancing initiatives by Japan and China to defend the current multilateral system have brought them closer to the Europeans (see the ASEM Summit 2018 in Bruxelles; the EU-Japan FTA; the Belt and Road Initiative by China; connectivity platforms). These initiatives essentially give substance - ‘walk the talk’ - to Eur-Asian connections. They strengthen global governance by adding an East Asian understanding on issues ranging from climate change to cyber space. Thus, while the west is presently split by the Channel and the Atlantic on many trans-border policies like trade and the environment, a timely window of opportunity is opening for Europe to move towards omnilateralism with input from non-western cultures. This can help fill the void left by the disorientation of the Anglo-Saxons (so-called ‘Westlessness.’) ⁹ From these new sources we can refresh our basic understanding of the natural cycles of life and systems and appreciate the idea of ‘holism.’ We can cultivate the knowledge of more sustainable economies beyond the narrow linear thinking of the West.

In addition, a more omnilateral system can blend the private and public. Observe the idea of 公私kou-shi in Japan and the group-orientation of Asian society in general. It could reduce the illusion of our ultimately divisive concept of ‘privacy’. These trends contrast with American individualism and might promote a more ‘sharing’ mindset, even in international politics. This is already apparent as the generations change in the West. The broad reach of the Internet (and its opportunity to share knowledge), the intrusion of social media and phenomena like ride sharing, couch surfing and more, show new patterns of communal consumption and the blurring of private and public in ownership.

A similar opening up in governance is shown by the increasing engagement in global issues by non-state actors. This includes private business and has focused in particular on climate change. As long ago as the year 2000, the United Nations Global Compact reached beyond the UN’s constituent members, (i.e. only nations) with a ‘call to action’ based on the voluntary commitments of leading CEOs. They signed-up to ten UN principles, covering human rights, the fight against corruption and the protection of the environment, albeit not without criticism still twenty years later.

The problems of the environment and climate change make the most obvious and concrete case for omnilateralism. There are also other issues of the global commons. They range from Deep Sea mining ¹⁰ all the way to Outer Space. Likewise, here the so-called United Nations fails to sufficiently unite nations. (In particular, but not only, due to its rejection by the USA.) The UN needs to involve more and more influential non-state actors from civil society and the corporate world. In 2004 the Secretary General of the UN declared non-state actors as ‘prime movers in today’s world’ and a report to him argued for a ‘paradigm shift in how the UN sees itself.’

This on-going shift has become most evident in the process of the Conferences of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC sees the mobilisation of subnational and non-state actors as crucial for its success. Such an opening up of the UN process to other actors, not only in the most urgent issue facing humankind -- that is climate change -- but also in other matters, sends a very strong signal. It encourages the participation of the emerging economies, above all Asia and China with their fast growing, globalising middle-classes.

By fostering a more open, omnilateral system, one can avoid a new wave of discord and dominance as has happened in the past, when hegemons change, the so-called ‘Thucydides Trap’. When British power in the 19th century yielded to American in the 20th century it was messy, but a hand-over without war. Now the USA is faltering. Let us avoid the USA’s unilateral approach of national confrontations and bring in and make accountable non-national actors. Let us open to the East and others. Omnilateralism can soften the effects of the change in power as China and other emerging societies inexorably rise.

In tackling climate change, we can see positive democratic developments. There are moves from purely quantitative voting (a challenge identified by Alexis de Tocqueville in his ‘Tyranny of the Majority’ in 1835) to include qualitative voices in decision-making and consensus-seeking. It is an emerging form of stakeholder democracy at the global level. One example is the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), who face existential threats from global warming. They have successfully had their voices heard in spite of their relatively tiny populations (for example Nauru has a ratio of only 1:145,000 of the inhabitants of China). How? By arguing that as the most affected stakeholders from this threat, they have qualitative concerns which are prioritised over the pure numbers of people/or nations concerned. This is analogous to the increasingly untenable ‘one nation one vote’ (ONOV) principle in the UN General Assembly, where the most populous state China formally weighs as much as tiny Nauru. So, the formal principle of quantitative equality in votes is softening to include the concept of having a vital stake in the issue at hand.

Many more stakeholders have started to join these small states. School children in the campaign of ‘Fridays for Future’ have taken to the streets to massively protest against the inaction of their elders in the fight against climate change. Though most do not yet have a right to vote, they have mobilised millions in their cause. Their voices rightly claim with conviction that their very future is at stake, and they seek action at all levels of governance.

This path towards a qualitative stakeholder democracy can widen to apply to other global issues like the rules on high-sea fishing or deep-sea mining. It can also extend to Outer Space where common long-term values should outweigh purely short-term national interests in order to yield truly omnilateral flourishing, that is for and by all.

Chapter 1 of the book explains how the concept of the sovereign nation developed from European origins following the collapse of the Roman Empire. The nation was shaped by economic competition and sharpened by wars of religion. To mitigate the destructive effects of such rivalry, the Westphalian state system was set up and the concept of national sovereignty strengthened. However, peace did not last long. A pattern of conflict and apparently endless wars between nations ensued and was exported to the world, via European colonisation. The globe was then carved up and borders drawn on maps, often in complete disrespect of local cultures, affinities and a sense of belonging. On top was created a set of ‘inter-national’ laws and imposed with the novel concept of the nation, often based on myths.¹¹ This was highly problematic. In Asia, for example, the notion of the ‘nation’ has remained a mere translation; for example in Chinese/Japanese its character 国 has multiple meanings. Only far-away island-countries like Japan were able (mostly) to conserve their identities. Nippon however copied the Western colonialists in some respects; it sought an overseas empire and fell into a militarised mania until cut back by the Americans.

The ‘aberration of the nation,’ was then promoted by the USA who took over the hegemony of the international system from the British. The outdated concept of ‘national sovereignty’ they embedded first in the League of Nations and then in the predominantly Anglo-Saxon inspired United Nations, which still today struggles to reach beyond its nation-only organisation and orientation.

Meanwhile the Europeans, having created nations, then began to transcend them, having learned from the disastrous wars of nationalism. They created supranational institutions, now called the European Union, by pooling their sovereignty and opening up their borders, economies and societies to one another. At the core was the reconciliation between France and Germany; and they helped evolve a new type and level of governance that can be a stepping-stone towards global rule-setting.

Chapter 2 focuses on globalisation and the increasing interdependence it has thrown like a net over economies ever since the dawn of civilisation. The process has accelerated in the last century, due to enhanced communications and logistics technology and the steady linking up of markets. Globalisation saw a first peak around the turn of the 20th century before WWI and then again in the first decade of the 21st before the Financial Crisis.

Globalisation is currently paused, a phenomenon dubbed ‘slowbalisation.’ The pandemic has aggravated this. People now look to regional institutions and organizations to help. Regional nodes of these global nets like the EU, ASEAN, RECP are pulling the strings of their value chains tighter together. But even their wider reach cannot solve growing urgent global issues like climate change, public health emergencies, the Internet with the dominance by GAFA and BATX firms and a footloose international financial system. In contrast to the global giants in business and banking, nations -- still aberrantly assumed to be sovereign -- constantly hit the limits of their power at national borders. They are losing influence downstream, where citizens demand more direct participation in governance; and upstream, where they need to share power by agreeing to global standards and rules (a precondition for the efficient functioning of global markets).

In Asia, the growth of trade (notably until 2008 and again resuming after the crisis), particularly in services, has boosted regional economic integration. So too has the growth in Asian multinationals’ value chains (often in opposition to Trump’s naïve attempts to ‘divide and rule’). Important trade agreements have been struck, namely the CPTPP and the RCEP. Unlike the messy terms of only bilateral deals (the so called ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ of rules and regulations between just two partners that can actually hamper wider global trade) these regional arrangements are healthier for the world overall.

Whilst many markets have globalised, the politics and rule-setting around them are lagging. To build this up there