Iran Supreme Leadership Usurped Power: Shiite Political Controversy Between Arab and Iranian Religious Authorities

By Rasanah

This book explores Khomeini’s position in the Iranian Shiite Hawza before the 1979 revolution and his position in the Shiite Hawza in general. The book is of great importance because it is one of the first to address Iran’s relations with Arab Shiism from a viewpoint that encompasses the controversial political constitutional jurisprudent theory—which is a point of disagreement in post-Khomeini Iran among the Arab jurists and the Marajaya [the Shiite religious authority].
The Authors

• Language: English
• Publisher: Partridge Publishing Singapore
• Release date: Dec 15, 2020
• ISBN: 9781543758948

Book preview

Chapter One

Shiites, Religion, and Politics

The Emergence of Marja’yya [Religious Authority] and its Relationship with the Government in the Establishment Phase

Introduction to Marja’yya Definition

Most early Shiite Imamate jurists during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties renounced politics and did not seek to establish an independent country. On the contrary, they focused on Da’wa (call for religion), guidance issues and scholastic lessons. Most of them did not mind supporting the state in which they were living, or maintaining harmonious relations with the rulers. The Imamate jurists, such as Mufeed, Shareef Murtaza, and Tousi, lived in Baghdad – the capital of the Abbasid dynasty. They established the jurisprudent and scholastic principles of the Imamate Shiites and set up the foundations of Hawza in this city. Then, the usual course of Hawza crystallized when Abu Jafar Tousi left Baghdad for Najaf in 448 AH, establishing the first Shiite school in this city.(¹) Some scholars and students followed him, as did those who felt angered and oppressed in Baghdad or who wanted to receive a blessing through their proximity to the tombs of Ali Ibn Abi Talib and his Son Hussein in Najaf. Before Tousi’s arrival, a literary movement existed in Najaf, though it had not taken the recognized shape of a Hawza. The school of Kufa – the closest city to Najaf – also had a rich history in the Arabic sciences that cannot be disregarded to the extent that some observers said Najaf inherited Kufa.(²)

As time passed and a new generation of scholars and students appeared in the city, institutions formed. The Marja’ became responsible for the Shiite sect and controlled the administration, managing its issues and religious affairs.(³)

Tousi focused on establishing a Shiite school that, via the prohibition of questioning and inquisitive processes, received protection from rhetorical arguments and philosophical disputes. He went beyond the Akhbari’s and, alongside his disciples,(⁴) succeeded in passing the controversial barrier on the permissibility of Ijtihad in Sharia (Islamic law), which transcended the stipulated jurisprudence limits. He adopted various comprehensive principles from the Quran and Sunna (deeds and speeches of the prophet), intellectual evidence and verified principles in the science of jurisprudence. Tousi and his disciples also handled the innovated branches (i.e., new sections of research) and people’s daily issues that were to be solved by religion and that were not mentioned in the Imamate jurisprudence requiring that the process of Ijtihad be overcome. Indeed, Tousi and his disciples extracted rules and made their opinions of these new situations known.(⁵)

The establishment of a Shiite school in Najaf made the city a destination for Shiite students from around the world. It also ensured the withdrawal of the Shiite sect into itself after its integration within the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties in Baghdad before Tousi’s migration. Furthermore, Mufeed and Shareef Murtaza and his brother participated in government and worked in the Caliphate court. This fact serves as evidence that no city had Shiite ghettos; rather, daily dealings between Sunnis and Shiites, including rulers, maintained space for coexistence and convergence among all social segments. Before the establishment of the Najaf School, no central leadership or social incubator existed despite the large number of Shiite senior scholars and jurists in Baghdad and the other districts. After the emergence of the Najaf School at the hands of Tousi, this small city became a melting pot for the Shiite spiritual leadership and a destination for Shiite students seeking to study religious education. Those students became the link and point of attraction between Najaf and the Shiite communities, both east and west. Systematically, the views of Najaf Marja’yya had the final word in any disputes.(⁶)

The Beginning of Political Theory in Hawza

Before Tousi’s establishment of the Najaf School, some Shiite jurists in Baghdad tried to redefine the relationship between the jurist and the ruler. In the same context, Mufeed (338-413 AH) said, It is permitted to assist the unjust rulers on righteousness and obey them, but it is not allowed to work for them without the permission of the Imam of the age; it is also allowed to adopt their trends that do not harm the believers and to earn from them.(⁷) Mufeed’s disciple, Shareef Murtaza (355-435 AH), said of the obligation of obeying the ruler: If the unjust ruler is in control of the country, all citizens should obey and glorify him out of obligation of obedience. He added, The obeyed, majestic, and generous president is inclined to good deeds and is abstinent from bad ones; during the times of carelessness and anarchism people go too far in wrongdoings and live in chaos and disorder.(⁸) In addition, Shareef Murtaza excluded the idea of the state,(⁹) authority, and government from the Shiite mentality during the occultation of the Infallible Imam by saying, We do not have to instate princes in case of helplessness of the Imam or instate the Imamate at all. Instating the Imam and electing him is neither of our duties nor are we asked to establish laws because by doing so, we take the blame in case of disregarding them.(¹⁰)

Shareef Murtaza’s disciple, Tousi (385-460 AH), followed the same path. He legalized dealings with the government even if doing so was unjust and usurped the Infallible Imam’s right of authority: No time shall be devoid of president. Tousi added, It has been proven (presidency) to be logically and rationally permitted and has become an obligation like knowledge on all mature people.(¹¹) Tousi took the path of his sheikh in supporting the obligation to obey the ruler even if he was unjust: The practices of the usurper of the nation’s affairs – if the nation refrain from declining his rule out of fear – this usurper will have the same right of the righteous ruler in terms of earning money he has control of, marriage of hostages and the like despite – by doing this – he is sinful and will be exposed to punishment.(¹²) Based on that assumption, Tousi permitted the just establishment of governments and laws over people who followed unjust rulers,(¹³) which meant completely integrating and dealing (including by his own faction) with the de facto authority.(¹⁴)

Initially, the Najaf Hawza was established based on Mufeed, Shareef Murtaza and Tousi’s political jurisprudent theory, which did not clash with the de facto authorities and allowed for dealings with them even if these authorities were unjust and usurped the Imam’s rights.(¹⁵) The Najaf Hawza did not believe in establishing a state. Its goal was to participate in politics, as well as create common factors and collaborate with the existing authorities. At that time, the Shiite jurisprudent mentality did not have the jurisprudent realization to establish a state or rebel against the existing one because this was not of the jurist’s responsibilities, as Shareef Murtaza stated.

At the same time, the Qom Hawza was much more withdrawn into itself than the Najaf Hawza. It represented the traditional line in Shiite jurisprudence and research and emerged during the smaller occultation of the Imam (260-329 AH), entirely relying on text.(¹⁶) This line is represented by Qom contemporary school jurists like Ahmad Ibn Issa Sheikh Qomieen, Sa’ad Ibn Abdullah, Abu Qassem Jafar Ibn Mohammad Ibn Qoulawiah Qomi, Ali Ibn Ibrahim Qomi, Ali Ibn Hussein Ibn Babaweih Qomi and his son Sadouq Abu Jafar Mohammad Ibn Hassan Ibn Babaweih Qomi, and others. This school established a special path for jurisprudence and its research. The religious text – especially the clear Sunna (speeches and deeds) of the Infallible Imams – is considered the final framework of jurists and commoners alike. This school clung to recitations and narratives, immersed in the waiting culture away from politics, and rejected the legitimacy of the existing states during the time of Occultation, either Sunni or Shiite.(¹⁷) At that time, Qom Hawza was a strict Akhbari school that did not believe in politics or the legitimacy of any state – Shiite or Sunni – outside the Infallible Imam cycle.

The Najaf Hawza believed in dealing with the de facto authorities and declined to oppose them. It rejected calls to establish any political regime during the time of Occultation. Meanwhile, the Qom Hawza did not believe in politics at all during the Occultation of the Infallible Imam and did not legitimize any existing political regime. Based on these assumptions, we understand that no room existed for the Supreme Leadership theory or any religious government based on the idea of representing the Infallible Imam. This theory began partially during the Safavid dynasty and completely during the Khomeini era (as will be discussed later). This reflects a total reversal of Shiite political jurisprudence.

Najaf remained isolated from the successive central governments until the Ottoman dynasty. Najaf reported to Karbala until the beginning of World War I. In 1918, Najaf belonged to the Shamiah city. It returned to the Karbala city after the 1920 revolution. The administrative instability in Najaf stemmed from its distance from Baghdad and the Ottomans’ weak control of the city, which gave Najaf a kind of autonomy under the leadership of ancient families like Kashif Ghita’ and Kammounah.(¹⁸)

The Hawza adopted the Mosque Teaching Method, in which the sheikh sits in the mosque and explains his book to his disciples, as in the Sunni universities of Azhar in Egypt and Ez-Zaitounah in Tunisia. Then it took the form of a school. As a result, jurisprudent schools were built, and Marja’s competed to spend on schools and private Hawzas for each one’s disciples. The great Marja’ became the one whose Hawza included many students, and that was able to support them scientifically and financially. This serves as evidence that the financial revenues of the great Marja’ are larger than those of any other, and that his followers number more than those of the other Marja’s.

In the Hawza, students go through three stages: Pre-trail, Preparatory, and Jurisprudence.

Pre-trail Stage: In this stage, the student studies the principles and basics of sciences: language, rhetoric, logic, theology, jurisprudence, and Kalam (the speculative theology). The most important books taught in this stage are: Alfiyat Ibn Malik with Ibn Aqil explanation, Qatr Nada in syntax, Mughni Labeeb for Ibn Hisham, Hashiat Mullah Abdullah for logic, and Sharai’ Islam and Tabsirat Muta’alimeen for Helli.

Preparatory Stage: The student studies more in-depth books under the supervision of his sheikh, who guides the student in solving problems. The most important books taught at this stage are: Ma’alim Addin for Helli, Sharh Lam’ah Demashqiah for Shaheed Thani, Kifayat Osoul for Akhvand Khorasani, and Makasib and Rasa’il for Sheikh Ansari. This stage is characterized by difficulty and more mental textbooks and relies heavily on reasoning. In addition, students study these books to understand the scientific issues they include. The student is also obligated to write what his sheikh dictates to him in terms of opinions of and comments on these books.

During the first two stages, the teaching process includes one, two or more students under a senior student who masters the book he is teaching after they agree on the book, time and place.

Jurisprudence Stage: Students at this stage take lessons from the senior Marja’ but not from the junior ones in the Hawza. This is the final stage; after it, students become jurists, knowing that the transformation from one stage to another does not align with specific educational rules and scientific standards. On the contrary, students determine when to move from one stage to another, as they may believe they are qualified to advance to the next stage earlier than expected.(¹⁹)

At this stage, the student becomes a disciple of the Marja’ and a follower of his political and religious views. Hence, when Qom Marja’s, for example, approved of and believed in the Supreme Leadership, his jurisprudence disciples and others took this fact for granted and considered it from their sheikh’s point of view. This applies to Khomeini when he nationalized Qom Hawza, took control of it and created the unilateral Marja’yya (as will be discussed later). Qom Hawza expanded to include Shiite students and sheikhs from throughout the world. The Marja’s influence expanded to all countries, including Shiite communities that are not committed to the Marja’s in their home countries but have the ability to transfer from one Marja’ to another in other countries. By understanding the formation and internal structure of Hawza, we can understand the character and psychology of the sheikhs and clergymen, as well as their scientific and intellectual foundations, and their tendencies in religion and life.

Marja’yya Sources of Finance and Their Impact on its Intellectual and Political Tendencies

Marja’yya [Shiite religious authority] funds come from the annual income it earns from its followers, merchants and Bazar owners under the One Fifth right and Zakat [tax on income].(²⁰) Some researchers say that the Hawza is an independent form of government, as it has its own source of finances. Because of its exclusion from governmental expenditures, Marja’yya has tied itself to the public and its approval in most cases. Often, this submission to the public will has diverted jurisprudence from the Hawza platform to the line of public gratification. For example, the founder of the Qom Hawza, Abdulkarim Haeri Yazdi, decided to teach the English language to Hawza students so that they would be familiar with a modern-day language and prepared to spread Islam in foreign countries. In response, the powerbrokers of merchants and others sent a message to Qom saying, The money people pay as legitimate rights is not to be spent on the language of infidels. In addition, they threatened to cut off the Hawza’s funding sources.(²¹) Murtaza Motaheri brought attention to this problem as follows:(²²) The clergyman society suffers from a disease resulting in the stagnation and standstill of its work. It is the disease of reporting to the Public,(²³) which is a serious disease that results from the financial system of the religious institution that relies on the legitimate rights of funds provided by the people.(²⁴) As a result, this institution is obliged to compromise and go in conformity with the Public who do not, in most cases, have high educational standards, and must respond to their pressures, and adapt to their superficial inclinations. This problem is deep and rooted in the Politicized Shiite School in general. Ahmad Katib handled this problem under the title, Marja’s Follow Commoners when he said, there are a lot of clerics and jurists in Hawzas but not everyone can become a religious Marja’. Many of them die without being known because Marja’yya is like political leadership. Nobody can reach it unless he takes its path and owns its tools, and typically anyone who wants to reach this status must enter a kind of competition and conflict that, at times, becomes severe. Each cleric or jurist wants to become Marja’ or a higher ranking one. However, to do so, he must establish schools, gather students, establish a cortege of followers and provide monthly salaries. This obliges him to accept money from people who give to those in harmony with their ideas and tendencies. In fact, to achieve his interests, popularity, and money, the Marja’ must align with people’s ideas, decline his own reformist ideas, and avoid sharp criticism of people’s ideas, practices, beliefs and superstitions.(²⁵)

On the other hand, Shiite Hawza cannot achieve full independence from governments. Its properties amount to billions of USD in Iraq, Iran, and other countries. Coordination is required between the Marja’s and governments in these countries to preserve properties – cash in markets, stocks and companies – from damage, nationalization or excessive political decisions against the Hawza. For example, in 1918 Britain released a report stating that the grants, charity, and properties that Najaf had received from Iran as annual income amounted to about two million pounds; according to the report, this was the religious shrines’ point of strength.(²⁶)

In 1925, Reza Khan (1878-1944) came to power and prevented Iranian visitors from visiting Najaf and Karbala. He also cut off all financial support to the Najaf Hawza. Khan’s decisions put clerics and scholars in a difficult situation; they had to find new financial sources and cover expenses related to the Hawza schools, students, and projects. For the Najaf Hawza to continue receiving funding, Khan set up conditions, such as listing the names of people who would receive these funds. Esfahani and Na’ini complained about the non-arrival of the funds and legitimate rights from Iran. All they had received came from Afghanistan and Zanzibar. This led to significant confusion in the Hawza’s financial status, which itself resulted in the migration of many of its students, whose numbers decreased remarkably.(²⁷)

For a clearer idea about the financial status of Hawza, one can consider the historic visit of Nasir Uddin Shah (1831-1896) to Najaf. Mirza Shirazi refused to meet him, while the other Najaf jurists welcomed the Shah for economic reasons only. Because of Shirazi’s intransigent position towards the Shah, his relationship with many other jurists suffered. Tawfeeq Seif commented on this incident as follows: We must not ignore the worries of the city leaders from the possible consequences of Shirazi’s position. Najaf economics and its image as center of Iraq and Iran and its uniqueness over other cities under the Ottoman Empire, was to a large extent, a fruit of the visits of some leaders and prominent personalities; a quick read of the history of holy cities shows that the key constructional projects in these cities were the fruit of such leaders’ visits – especially the Kings and Princes of Iran.(²⁸)

This reveals the importance of economic and political issues in the usual course of the Hawza. By understanding this factor, we can comprehend the ability of a group of clerics in a small city like Najaf to confront another religious group that controls the money, sect, and power in Iran in the post- Khomeini era. Indeed, the Iranian authorities employ divergent and complex pressure tactics against the Hawza, similar to those Reza Khan practiced when he disagreed with the Najaf clerics.

Endnotes

(1) Sheikh [master] of the sect Mohammad Ibn Hassan Tousi (385-460 AH). He had lived in Bagh- dad since 418 and studied at the hands of Mufeed and Shareef Murtaza. He stayed in Baghdad until the Seljuk conquered it and witnessed sectarian conflicts. Then he moved to Najaf in 448, see: Mohsen Ameen: A’aian Shia 9/159.

(2) See: Ibrahim A’ati Najaf: Center of Shiism and Marja’yya, p176, (study in the book, The Iraqi Shiites: Marja’yya and Parties, Misbar edition 2011).

(3) See: Mohammad Jafar Hakim, History of Jurisprudence and Foundations in Najaf Ashraf Hawza, issue/Arif Publishers, Najaf.

(4) The Deconstructive School argues that Tousi, Sheikh of the sect, rejected the philosophical course. It differentiated between philosophical research and recital and rational research. Thus, it supported recital and rational research as a supporter of extraction, unlike philosophical research, which aligns with the context.

(5) Wa’id Zadah Khorasani, Tousi’s life and his influence, in the Massages of Tousi p48.

(6) Tawfeeq Seif: Against Oppression, the Shiite Political Jurisprudence in the time of Occultation, issue1, the Arabian Cultural Center 1999, p23.

(7) Mufeed: The Initial Articles, the Islamic Book Publishers edition, Beirut 1983, p41.

(8) The Messages of Shareef Murtaza 2/294.

(9) Shareef Murtaza Alam Huda (355-436 AH). He was the younger brother of Shareef Radhi (au- thor of Nahj Balagha). In his book titled Shafi Fi Imamah, he responded to the speeches of Judge Abdujabbar, head of Mu’tazila (Isolationists) at the time. To Shiites, Murtaza has a higher position than does his brother, Shareef Radhi.

(10) Shareef Murtaza Ali Ibn Hussein: Shafi Fi Imamah, 1/112. See also: Ali Fayyadh (Ph.D.), Theories of Power in the Shiite Political thought p124.

(11) Tousi: Occultation, Aal Al Bait Institution, Beirut 1412, p3.

(12) Tousi: Shafi Summary, Najaf 1383, investigated by Hussein Bahr Oloum, 1/158.

(13) Tousi: Mabsout Fi Feqh Imamah, Razavi Library, Tehran 1387, p283.

(14) See in details: Tawfeeq Seif against Oppression, p175 and after.

(15) See: Ali Fayyadh (Ph.D.), Theories of Power in the Shiite Political Thought, edition2, the Cul- ture Center for Developing the Islamic Thought 2010, p120 and after.

(16) To Imamate Shiites, the Smaller Occultation began after the death of the Eleventh Imam, Hassan Askari. They believe he begot his elder son, Mahdi, who disappeared and contacted Shiites through the four representatives/ambassadors. They believe this contact continued until the death of the last representative in 329 Hijri date. Then the Great Occultation began.

(17) Tawfeeq Seif: Against Oppression, p173 and after.

(18) See: Najaf Scholastic Hawza in the Ministry of Interior paperwork, Sada Najaf Website: http:// cutt.us/5PZmj

(19) See: Haidar Nizar: The Religious Marja’yya in Najaf, p92 and after.

(20) In Shiite jurisprudence, the one fifth is divided into two parts. The first is for the masters and Ashraf. It is paid to poor people who belong to the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his family (Descendants of Hashem). The second is the Imam’s part. It is paid to the jurist who has all the power to spend this money for the sake of God. (Motaheri: Criticizing the Religious Though, mar- gin, p114).

(21) Motaheri: Criticizing the Religious Thought, margin, p109.

(22) He was born in 1340 AH/1919 AD in Khorasan. He started his elementary education in the city of Mashhad, then moved to Hawza to continue his Islamic education. He studied under Brojerdi, Khomeini and Tabatabei, then moved to Tehran in 1952 to become a professor in the Divinity and Islamic Knowledge College in Tehran University. He was arrested in 1963 for conducting reli- gious and political activities. He also participated in the 1979 revolution and became a member of the Revolution Command Council. In the first year of the revolution, he was assassinated by the Forqan group. See: Majeed Hameed, Direction of the Modern Religious Thought, translated by S. Hussein, p101.

(23) The same note is reported by Ali Wardi (Ph.D.), who said, We do not blame commoners in this, but the clerics that know this and do not stop them from doing so. It seems they want to please commoners and do not care about anything else. To them bread is more important than the fact. Fiasco of the Human Mind p287.

(24) Motaheri: Criticizing the Religious Thought, margin, p110. Motaheri believes that the spiri- tual leadership’s reluctance to present important initiatives during the constitutional revolution goes back to the religious authority’s reliance on Zakat (charity) and the one-fifth it receives from many countries. This led the religious authority to care about its interests in promoting the sta- bility and security necessary for economic activities and, then, providing the necessary finances. While these sources helped liberate the religious authority from the official authority,