We’Re in Danger! Who Will Help Us?: Refugees and Migrants: a Test of Civilization

By James N. Purcell Jr.

Victims of wars, oppression, and famine depend on well-prepared interventions for their basic survival. Yet in the twenty-first century, the world's conscience has gone dormant, and governments have been left free to ignore or trivialize their moral obligations to humankind. Caring societies cannot hide from these daunting humanitarian challenges. As in the past, only experienced, bold leadership can marshal allies for proposed twenty-first century solutions.

We're in DANGER! Who Will HELP Us? is the chronicle of one humanitarian leader's experience working on behalf of civilian victims of war, oppression, and famine, fully revealed in American know-how, initiative, and grit. James N. Purcell Jr. writes from leadership perspectives gained directing global humanitarian organizations and shares his and his team's daring interventions into the humanitarian crisis in Indochina following the Vietnam War and in other world regions—interventions that saved, protected, and restored the lives of millions of refugees. Presidents, feisty congressional debates, and strong volunteer groups helped Purcell and his team marshal allies for twentieth-century solutions, and today he makes the case for the same unyielding spirit for humanitarian crises in Syria, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Central America.

Civilization's new test is whether we can help free the world's conscience and regain a sense of moral outrage, purpose, and resolve to face our responsibilities directly and to act. As caring members of the international community, we must determine our appropriate and equitable roles in solving systemic dysfunctions that bring people to the brink of despair—and help those we can.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Archway Publishing
• Release date: Mar 19, 2019
• ISBN: 9781480868793

James N. Purcell Jr.

James N. Purcell Jr. led American and international refugee and migration programs, serving as director of the US State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs and director general of the Geneva-based International Organization for Migration for most of his career, since 1979. Today he lives in Maryland and works with humanitarian groups.

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Copyright © 2019 James N. Purcell Jr.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced by any means, graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping or by any information storage retrieval system without the written permission of the author except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

This book is a work of non-fiction. Unless otherwise noted, the author and the publisher make no explicit guarantees as to the accuracy of the information contained in this book and in some cases, names of people and places have been altered to protect their privacy.

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent official positions of the United States Government.

Author Photo – Author, UN Palais des Nations, Geneva

Photo Credit: Purcell library

Back Cover –Author at missile site Chechnya 1995

Photo Credit: International Organization for Migration

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ISBN: 978-1-4808-6880-9 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4808-6881-6 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4808-6879-3 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018914887

Archway Publishing rev. date: 3/15/2019

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

AUTHOR’S NOTE

BOOK ONE

AWAKE AND RISE

Desperation Engulfs Warring Indochina

1 Into the Storm

2 Vietnam and Five US Presidents

3 Rescue the Perishing

4 Tragic Triangle

5 Urgent Early Warnings

6 Wreckage Repair

7 From These Ashes, Will I Rise?

8 Weak Foundation

9 Durable Solutions Quest

10 Presidential Decision

11 Signs of Life

12 Existential Threats

13 Recalibrate for Global Response

14 Sharpening whilst Salvaging

15 Survive and Prosper

16 Refugee Act of 1980

17 Dark Clouds

18 Pivotal Startup

19 From the Management Hub

20 The Carter Refugee Record

21 The Significance of Public Service

BOOK TWO

CREATE LIFT

America’s Refugee Exceptionalism

22 Transitional Leadership

23 Struggling to Stay on Course

24 Refugees in the Reagan Years

25 Phase 1. Stabilization

26 Phase 2. Protection

27 Protection—Political Prisoners and Amerasians

28 Phase 3. Reform

29 Phase 4. Solutions

30 The Meaning of Vietnam

BOOK THREE

WE ARE HERE

The World in Danger

31 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

32 Soviet Religious Minorities

33 Africa

34 The Middle East 1979 and Forward

35 Afghanistan and South Asia

36 Central America and the Caribbean

37 Summing Up the Refugee Decade

38 Changes in Direction

BOOK FOUR

AND NOW …

A Test of Civilization

39 Above All, Do No Harm

40 Mystifying Breakdown

41 Is America Still Reliable?

42 Searching a Way Forward

43 Ending War and Moving Ahead

44 A Test of Civilization

NOTES

APPENDIXES

TABLES

DEDICATION

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO TWO COURAGEOUS GROUPS OF people throughout the world, past and present: one, the millions who escaped persecution and torture and those who would no longer accept marginalization by their governments—all made life-changing decisions to change their circumstances; and two, the partners who stepped up to help in their quests.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My special thanks and appreciation to former Secretary of State George P. Shultz for his Foreword to this book, for meeting with me first to discuss the book’s theme and progress, and for encouraging my efforts to write the history of the accomplishments of the Bureau for Refugee Programs in the US State Department. I value his views and will always consider him one of the most influential mentors of my life and career.

Special thanks and appreciation also go to Arthur E. (Gene) Dewey, my RP deputy and friend for continued close collaboration. I also acknowledge the valuable contributions of deputies Bob Funseth (deceased) and Richard English. I thank Robert (Bob) Gersony, Andy Michaels, Irena Omalaniuk, and Robert (Bob) Paiva for their encouragements and editorial comments on the manuscript.

Special thanks and appreciation for being available for personal interviews and through email and/or work papers, as cited in the text of the book: Elliott Abrams, John Bouche, James (Jim) Bullington, Margaret Carpenter, Priscilla Clapp, Patty Culpepper, Ralie Deffenbaugh, Bruce Flatin, Charles Freeman, Tex Harris, Carol Hecklinger, Doug Hunter, Mary Kavaliunas, Bill Krug, Don Krumm, Jim Lawrence, Paula Lynch, Tom Miller, Doris Meissner, Ann Morgan, Ken Quinn, Anne Richards, Lionel Rosenblatt, Terry Rusch, Phil Sargisson, Frank Wisner, and Lacy Wright. I appreciate the contributions of each of these outstanding professionals and former colleagues and all members of the global refugee team, past and present, who worked on behalf of the world’s persecuted and disenfranchised people.

Treasured colleagues (deceased) that are part of the story and held in memory: John Baker, James Carlin, Judy Chavchavadze, Leo Cherne, Warren Christopher, James Cline, Wells Cline, Hank Cushing, Patricia Darien, Hamilton Fish, Robert (Bob) Funseth, John Glenn, Philip Habib, Poul Hartling, Mark Hatfield, Richard Holbrooke, Daniel Inouye, Bill Jordan, Ted Kennedy, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Shep Lowman, Princeton Lyman, John McCarthy, Clay McManaway, Joe Meresman, Jonathan Moore, David Newsom, Robert Oakley, Ben Read, Peter Rodino, Bruce Sasser, Frank Sieverts, Steve Solarz, Carel Sternberg, Julia Taft, Jerry Tinker, Cyrus Vance, Dick Vine, Ingrid Walters, Jerry Weaver, and Warren Zimmerman. In special memory are my early professor and mentor Ernest Harrill, PhD, political science, Furman University, and professors of The Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

Special thanks to Dr. Latayne Scott for her expertise and encouragement for the book’s proposal; to Tim Beal for his comments and encouragements; and to Carrie Hesson and Lindsay Swisher for splendid technical support. Special thanks and appreciation to the Washington support teams at the State Department, including the research team at the Office of the Historian; the Bureau for Refugee Programs, now called the bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); the International Organization for Migration (IOM); and to Doug Hunter for helping me gain access to the papers of the late George Warren.

I acknowledge and express my eternal love and gratitude to my partner and wife, Jean Purcell, who has been with me every step of this amazing journey of life together and without whom this book would not exist. Also, salutes to daughters Deirdre Reilly and Carole Purcell, son-in-law Fred, and grandsons Fred, Matt, and James for their continuous love and encouragement.

Former Directors of Forty Years of RP/PRM

James Purcell (acting), June to August 1979

John Baker, August 1979 to November 1979

Frank Loy, January 1980 to January 1981

Richard Smyser, January 1981 to July 1981

Richard Vine, October 1981 to July 1982

James Purcell, August 1982 to September 1986

Jonathan Moore, September 1986 to December 1988

Princeton Lyman, September 1989 to June 1992

Warren Zimmerman, June 1992 to March 1994

Phyllis Oakley, August 1994 to November 1997

Julia Taft, November 1997 to January 2001

Arthur E. Dewey, January 2002 to July 2005

Ellen Sauerbrey, January 2006 to December 2007

Eric P. Schwartz, July 2009 to April 2012

Anne C. Richard, April 2012 to January 2017

FOREWORD

ANOTHER HUMAN DISASTER WAS IN THE OFFING IN 1984. Governments and multilateral agencies were failing to sense the gravity of the spreading famine in Africa, which the UN called the most massive catastrophe that has been visited upon the planet. Upwards of 150 million people in the Horn of Africa were trapped in the twentieth century’s worst famine, and as many as thirty million were at risk of starving to death. Turning such a big ship around, even if it could be done, would take too long under normal circumstances. Anyway, if the UN and other multilateral agencies were failing, who else had the capability to step in?

Our answer then was that no new actors were either available or needed. We and other governments just had to muster the gumption to step up and force the multilateral system to work. Out of time and surrounded by government and international bureaucrats who would thwart immediate action, Jim Purcell and his deputy Gene Dewey took the unorthodox action—on my behalf—of going directly to the UN Secretary General to leverage the United States’ vast financial and political contributions to the UN for immediate action on this crisis. With the help of UNICEF’s Jim Grant, who saw the problem as we did, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar established the UN Office of Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) in one afternoon. It worked far better than even we expected, and the ensuing international response spared over six million lives. OEOA became one of the most successful UN operations of its kind and set the standard for multilateral crisis response in that era. Seeing the results, we in the State Department soon hailed the United Nations for clearly demonstrating its capability to make important and unique contributions to international efforts to relieve dire human suffering.

I met Jim Purcell in 1970 on my first day as the new director of the Nixon administration’s Office of Management and Budget. The president had requested a review of the federal budget, and Jim was part of the team briefing me. These discussions factored into the full-employment budget concept that guided the administration’s fiscal policy. A few years later we parted ways, as I was appointed Secretary of the Treasury and Jim ended up in the State Department.

When President Reagan appointed me secretary of state in 1982, I was not surprised to find that my friends Cy Vance and Warren Christopher had turned to Jim to create a new organization in the State Department, the Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) to rescue the hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese allies and colleagues we had left behind after the Vietnam War. For the next three years, as RP’s senior deputy and usually as acting director, he guided America’s humanitarian operations not only in Southeast Asia but also in erupting crises throughout the world.

Knowing of the president’s desire for a victims-first, nonpartisan approach to international humanitarian affairs, I designated Jim as one of my earliest appointees to be the permanent director of RP, and I gave him wide latitude for independent, quick-response maneuvering.

President Reagan had made known his passionate commitment to refugees from the outset. He spoke of it at the end of his July 17, 1980, speech accepting the Republican nomination:

I have thought of something that is not part of my speech and I’m worried over whether I should do it. Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this land, this island of freedom, here as a refuge for all those people in the world who yearn to breathe freely: Jews and Christians enduring persecution behind the Iron Curtain, the boat people of Southeast Asia, of Cuba and Haiti, the victims of drought and famine in Africa, the freedom fighters of Afghanistan and our own countrymen held in savage captivity. I’ll confess that I’ve been a little afraid to suggest what I’m going to suggest—I’m more afraid not to. Can we begin our crusade joined together in a moment of silent prayer. [Minute of Silence] God bless America.

He reiterated his conviction later when he said, A hungry child knows no politics. I could sense from our many private discussions about world humanitarian crises over the years that his passion to help refugees never diminished.

We’re in Danger! Who Will Help Us? traces the remarkable history of those years and recounts seemingly intractable human crises around the world that were plucked from the ashes of defeat and misery and moved toward humane and durable solutions by the State Department’s refugee team. By motivating the United Nations to lead and by holding its feet to the fire to assure high performance, the State Department enabled remarkable results that all could see.

Indochina was the first refugee crisis the global humanitarian community addressed after World War II. It started with the hasty withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam in 1975 and the scramble to save as many Vietnamese colleagues as possible in those last few hours and days. It continued through the surge of dramatic boat and land departures from Vietnam a few years later and through the devastating spillover impacts that the war had on neighboring Cambodia and Laos. Over the next twenty years, the international community, with the United States in the lead, would devise new and creative approaches to complex humanitarian responses as it worked toward lasting durable solutions. No one could have expected that so many more humanitarian crises in other regions would cry out for similar efforts and that the knowledge gained in Indochina would become so valuable.

A major contributor to the eventual solution was the Indochina review panel that I set up in 1985 under the leadership of former governor Robert Ray of Iowa. His report charted the path forward, and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees used its recommendations to bring the affected governments, including Vietnam, to agreement on a humane solution.

The clearest illustration of putting victims first was President Reagan’s work to rescue Soviet Jews, even as he and President Gorbachev were working their way toward groundbreaking understandings on arms control, trade, and human rights. As we talked about Soviet–American relations, I sensed that the president wanted to move forward but, as he had never met with a Soviet official, he was unsure about the best tactics to use. As a start, I arranged his first-ever meeting with a Soviet official by inviting Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin for a White House chat with Reagan in 1983. With a wide range of problems confronting the world’s two superpowers, Reagan dominated the meeting with his concern over human rights, refuseniks, and religious freedom.

With the Soviet economy tanking, Gorbachev needed arms control relief and trade. These issues were hotly debated in four Reagan–Gorbachev summits between 1985 and 1988 in Moscow, Reykjavik, Washington, and Geneva. But Reagan refused to budge while Soviet Jews were still denied the right to emigrate. I used every possible occasion to make clear the president’s policy during those hectic negotiations, including a speech I delivered just prior to a critical meeting of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: Until there is substantial progress in the vital area of human rights, advances in other areas of the relationship are bound to be constrained. Token gestures for short-term lowering of barriers will not suffice.

By holding firm, both sides won as summit agreements led to a major de-escalation of the arms race, free emigration for Jews who wanted to leave the Soviet Union, and full cultural, religious, and educational rights for those who remained in Russia. Eventually, almost a million Jews left the Soviet Union for Israel, America, or other countries.

As the world witnessed, the United States put victims at the center of foreign policy decision-making, and many lives were spared and enriched. Even though emigration from the Soviet Union was at first quite limited, Jim and his organization kept the US welcome mat out and let it be known that we supported Freedom of Choice for Soviet Jews and were ready to receive all who could get to the United States.

These principles were applied with equal caring and firmness in refugee crises in other regions as well, in Africa and the Middle East (where the refugee program worked hard to avoid tilting), in South Asia, and in Central America and the Caribbean. The US approach did not necessarily result in more refugees reaching America. Far from it. Our response in most crises was to stabilize and protect refugees in their home regions until more permanent durable solutions were available right there. Resettlement in the US was reserved for those for whom no other safe solution was available. This approach reflected the skyrocketing growth of the world refugee population from six million to almost fifteen million during what we came to call the refugee decade, all during a period of federal budget reductions to deal with growing deficits.

As much as anything, the value of this book is its demonstration that programs that solve critical problems and save lives can be conducted by governments in professional and caring ways. Jim’s book reveals intrigues and dynamics behind the scenes. From Ford to Carter to Reagan, the refugee program kept victims at the center of foreign policy decision-making and achieved consistency and spectacular results in a nonpartisan spirit. I regard this as one of my major achievements as secretary of state during the Reagan administration.

Why write or read a book like We’re in Danger! Who Will Help Us? so far removed from contemporary life? I will answer the same way I responded to the American Jewish Historical Society in 2007 discussing Soviet Jews:

The reason to record and remember how Soviet Jews were saved is to be prepared to act again when the need arises. If we are ever to live in a civilized world, what was accomplished for the Soviet Jews must become the rule rather than the exception. We must not only preach the doctrine of human rights, we must learn how actually to be our brother’s keeper.

As we scan today’s headlines—with literally millions of at-risk refugees dispersed throughout the Middle East, hundreds of North African migrants and refugees drowning in the Mediterranean, and tens of thousands more contemplating the same journey—we should not fail to recall that the same kinds of problems were faced and resolved in the 1980s. We should keep lessons learned in that decade uppermost in mind as life-saving responses are developed for today’s crises.

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Secretary of State 1982–88

Hoover Institution, Stanford University

AUTHOR’S NOTE

THE HISTORIC PERIOD COVERED IN WE’RE IN DANGER! WHO Will Help Us? has been called the refugee decade, 1979–89. The book also treats what I will call the Syrian refugee era that began in 2011.

Major humanitarian crises erupted simultaneously in every region of the world during the refugee decade, needing new domestic and international response machinery. The US effort was led by the State Department’s Bureau for Refugee Programs, known as RP, a humanitarian organization I played a leading role in creating and directing for most of that decade.

The contributions of RP in domestic and international refugee matters during the refugee decade are the principal subject of this book and are used to discuss implications for the Syrian crisis that began in 2011.

The book deals with the key events and people behind the building of a new organization from the ground up after the Fall of Saigon and the speedy withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. The spreading upheavals around the world led US policymakers to confront human threats like the ones that nations face today. In We’re in Danger! Who Will Help Us? I show how those existential threats were ably defeated, primarily because of political leadership. That leadership valued crisis victims and assured they had a central place in foreign policy decision-making. Our leaders recognized that governments, like individuals, are charged by civilization to rescue the perishing, especially victims of war, famine, disease, and government corruption. They insisted that we keep victims central in programs and initiatives undertaken on their behalf. Collectively, we were to be our brothers’ and sisters’ keepers.

The American presidents at the front of the global refugee responses of that era were Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan. Their leadership helped motivate public- and private-sector leaders around the world eager to join a coalition of the willing. Rather than simply managing problems and responses, those global leaders insisted that diplomacy forge cooperative responses and burden-sharing solutions. Results of joint actions could be seen throughout the world, in Southeast Asia with the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, in the USSR through gaining the freedom and emigration of almost a million Jews, in Africa in the saving of millions from famine, wars and corruption, in the Middle East by assuring the survival of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees, and in potentially destabilizing humanitarian crises in South Asia (Afghanistan) and Central America. The results those joint efforts produced would not have been possible had the US State Department been denied the necessary diplomatic tools to do the job.

We’re in Danger! Who Will Help Us? is divided into four books covering the refugee decade and offers comment on lessons learned for the future.

Book One, Awake and Rise, highlights the groundbreaking work of Presidents Ford and Carter to rescue trapped American allies following the Vietnam War and the corresponding impacts on the nations of Southeast Asia and other helping partners. This book also covers simultaneous crises arising in the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

Book Two, Create Lift, reveals the work of the Reagan team to cope with destabilizing Indochina refugee problems and to set in place protection, reform and solution mechanisms that eventually led to comprehensive durable solutions.

Book Three, We Are Here, covers RP’s problem-solving work in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Book Four, And Now…, brings my work as founder and director of the Department of State’s Bureau for Refugee Programs to a conclusion with observations about contributors to the successes our team enjoyed. In Book Four, I also posit the solutions compact strategy of the refugee decade as a sustainable and flexible approach for current and future humanitarian crises.

We’re in Danger! Who Will Help Us? is my story, written in my own voice, entirely by myself, from the perspective of where I sat. It is based largely on recollections of closest colleagues and my own and on documentation I saved, found, or others offered. I believe I have recalled events and stories accurately. I alone am responsible for the book’s contents.

If I left out the contributions of any, it was inadvertent. I hope that did not happen. Writing this history took far longer than I had imagined, as life kept intervening. For that, I do not apologize, and trust colleagues will understand.

My narrative shows the bureau I helped create at the center of events in which others played critical and central roles. My goal has been to include the actions of many. I have not tried to rewrite history or to use knowledge gained later to go back and settle scores. Rather, this roller-coaster journey covers key historic events of a heartfelt era and warns of human risks we face once again—our test of civilization. I hope you will glean a new appreciation of that era defined by the suffering of innocents on a grand scale and the exceptional efforts to rescue them. Survivors rebuilt their lives with much courage, as you will see.

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BOOK ONE

AWAKE AND RISE

Desperation Engulfs Warring Indochina

1

INTO THE STORM

VIETNAM. THAT EMBATTLED AND WAR-WEARY COUNTRY first showed up on my professional radar during the Nixon administration’s first year. Hopes had risen and then stalled over Nixon’s campaign promise to end the Vietnam War through a secret plan.

Like many Americans, I saw the war as a painful chapter in America’s history that just needed to end, and fast. I was thirty-one years old, a husband and father with a fast-rising career in fiscal management and budget analysis. For a year, I had worked on Vietnam and other budget items in the president’s budget office, the Bureau of the Budget, or BOB. We were in a grand old building next door to the White House West Wing, on the opposite end from the Treasury Building. Our outfit was an energized, elite group. Our work was demanding, and I loved it.

White House Press Briefing, 1969

Joe Laitin, Budget Bureau counterpart to the White House press secretary, called to ask a question: Jim, do you want to go to a White House press conference today?¹ Nixon’s first supplemental appropriation request to Congress would come up, Joe said, knowing I had coordinated the supplemental proposal; I jumped at the chance to go over to the White House. The last thing on my mind was the Vietnam War, although I knew war problems had ended President Johnson’s run for a second term.

Joe stopped by, and when I jumped up to grab my coat, he commented, It’ll be a good experience for you to witness this press conference. I don’t think they will have major questions about the supplemental; it’s straightforward.

We reached the press room early, and I could sense the big import of that small space. There was the BOB deputy director Sam Hughes and White House Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, who sat in the front of the room at a small U-shaped desk, a phone in each hand. Ziegler spotted Sam and Joe and motioned them forward. I heard Joe tell him we were there as back-up on budget matters. I’m glad you’re here, Ron said. Take a seat and I’ll call on you if I need help.

When Ziegler got off the phones, he moved to a lectern and signaled an aide to open the door. The press corps flooded in, and I recognized faces from television and names from newspaper bylines. Ziegler read a list of administration announcements and initiatives and then played verbal ping pong with the press over different issues. He explained a budget item in Sam’s bailiwick, but he did not call on him. Sam left, and Joe and I stayed, engrossed in the back and forth between Ziegler and the press.

As the briefing wound down, Joe leaned over and said: Things seem to be going well. I’m going back to the office. Jim, I’m sure nothing will come up about the supplemental.

I said nothing but took note that Sam had left and now Joe was leaving. About thirty minutes later, Ziegler announced that the president had signed his first budget supplemental appropriation request that day, and it was on its way to Congress.

There’s nothing controversial here, just routine business. Copies are on the back table.

I thought Zeigler looked pleased as he called the conference to a close, before a voice from the back called out, I’ve just scanned the supplemental appropriation document and there’s a proposed reduction of $140.7 million for Southeast Asia operations in DoD. What’s that for?

Ziegler looked down at briefing documents I had prepared. It’s just routine housekeeping. DoD has found miscellaneous savings in its Southeast Asia operations. They can be used to help reduce pending appropriations requests in other parts of the defense budget. That’s it.

To the press, Southeast Asia operations meant Vietnam, with immediate suspicions. For months, news organizations had waited for information about the new president’s campaign claim—a secret plan to end the Vietnam War.

What specifically is being cut? Which line items? another reporter asked.

Other questions flew fast, and the orderly meeting devolved into pandemonium. A nearby journalist whispered, I hear the national security advisor has scheduled a press conference soon.

Keen ears missed nothing, and a spontaneous chorus arose: This is probably the budgetary impact of the secret plan they’ll be revealing!

Ziegler looked uncharacteristically befuddled. Things had been going well and now were unraveling. And then he pulled a straw out of thin air: We have a representative from the BOB here, who put this package together. He can come up and explain this item. Ron Ziegler’s straw had my name on it.

My bosses had already left, right? I held my breath and somehow made it to the lectern. I read the words in the supplemental, but the hungry press was not satisfied. I tried to explain that all federal operations are reviewed monthly, and those of DoD’s size inevitably develop miscellaneous savings. They are bundled together and, where possible, offered as reductions to pending multibillion-dollar appropriations requests. And so on.

My reasonable answer fueled more suspicion. A powerful groupthink seemed to take over, a conviction that Nixon’s secret plan was about to be revealed. This supplemental appropriations request represents the secret plan’s first budgetary implications. I could almost hear them thinking. The national security advisor Henry Kissinger’s notional press conference in coming days reinforced the idea.

Ziegler turned to me again and directed, Call DoD for clarification.

Instead I called my boss, Ray Clark, who was amazed to learn about the ruckus. He kept me on hold and called Ellis Veatch, chief of the national security division of the president’s budget office. Back with me, Ray said Ellis had grumbled, It’s just routine business. Tell them I’m not going to bother the secretary of defense with such trivia.

When I returned to Ziegler empty-handed, the uproar had not died down, and Ron seemed eager to welcome me back. I reminded the press corps of the normalcy of this situation, but they stood firm in disbelief.

A list of specific line-items proposed for reduction will be available for you soon, I said, while knowing they probably saw me as the career stooge put out there to keep them in the dark. Addressing the front press row, I said, Believe me, folks, if the president and national security advisor have a secret plan, they wouldn’t use me to unveil it. I just work here.

Ziegler called a close to the meeting and motioned for me to come to his lectern. Sorry, he said, but that’s the press corps. They believe little and question everything.

Back to Base

When I returned to my office, I was summoned to see the director, Bob Mayo. I wondered whether he was concerned that John Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman, tough Nixon aides, might come after him because of the press briefing. However, with a serious look, he said, Good job, Jim.

Ray Clark said, I think you had better take a few days off, Jim, and let this cool down. Phone calls from the press were flooding the White House, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Department of Defense (DoD). Incoming calls to the bureau included requests to interview me.

My thoughts rambled that evening on my one-hour drive home to the rented townhouse in Rockville, Maryland. I walked through the front door in a state of dismay and concern. Jean and I had company for dinner, and later I confided to her, I believe I may have just lost the Vietnam War. And I might have ruined my career.

I stayed at home a few days to wait for an all clear. Eventually, speculation about a secret plan in the budget lost steam. When I returned to work, the situation was hectic, and President Nixon revealed no special plan, secret or otherwise, to end the Vietnam War, which would grind on for six more cruel years.

After that White House press briefing, my boss promoted me to deputy director of the budget preparation staff.² One late question about a Southeast Asia budget item had shone a light directly on me, and I naturally paid more attention to the tumult that Southeast Asia and Vietnam topics could generate.

Forward to 1975—Delayed Evacuation Planning

Five years after the notable White House press conference, President Nixon resigned in disgrace, and the vice president Gerald Ford succeeded him, inheriting the ongoing war in Vietnam.

By early 1975, many diplomatic, defense, and intelligence officers accepted that a disastrous military defeat could be in the offing; most informed analysts regarded continuation of the war to be useless. Yet, the ambassador to South Vietnam Graham Martin and the secretary of state Henry Kissinger kept up the drumbeat.

An unofficial group of young Foreign Service Officers (FSO) could not tolerate failure to make evacuation plans for Vietnamese allies and colleagues. They dissented through the only channel then available, clandestine meetings—most often as a lunch group in the cafeteria or a conference room—to discuss evacuation planning. At their first meeting, January 1975, were Frank Wisner, director of plans and management in the bureau of Public Affairs; Paul Hare, deputy director of Press Relations; Kenneth Quinn, NSC; Lionel Rosenblatt, deputy secretary’s staff; Craig Johnstone, director of the secretariat staff; Jim Bullington, Vietnam desk officer; and Parker Borg, of Secretary Kissinger’s staff. Evacuation planning, in their view, was imperative.³

As the Vietcong kept Saigon and victory in their sights, the young rebels led the American government to pursue, unofficially, dual but contradictory plans regarding future intentions in South Vietnam. A two-track policy, never publicly articulated, guided the last months of the war.⁴

In one direction, official policy continually reaffirmed American steadfastness with its South Vietnam allies. Officially, there could be no talk of planned evacuation. South Vietnam, struggling to stay afoot, would likely collapse if the resolve of their American partners was brought into the slightest question. Kissinger detected the dissatisfaction within his ranks and ordered that no officer was to travel to Saigon to assist evacuation. State’s public affairs official, Frank Wisner, later told me that to plan evacuations would be to admit defeat and would amount to pulling the tent pole out, leading to the collapse of the whole tent.

Yet, dissenters at the State Department believed it imperative that evacuation planning proceed immediately, even as military losses piled up fast, to save lives.

On March 10, 1975, the South Vietnam highland city of Ban Me Thuot fell, soon followed by sister cities Hue and Da Nang. About seventy thousand people fled Da Nang, most to Cam Ranh Bay. Untold numbers perished. Nha Trang was in panic mode by early April, when senior South Vietnamese officers self-evacuated to Saigon by helicopter, leaving behind loyal and unprotected troops. Cam Ranh Bay, a mighty US Navy base about 200 miles north of Saigon, was abandoned.⁵

2

VIETNAM AND FIVE US PRESIDENTS

MILITARY RADAR HAD BEEN ON VIETNAM FOR AT LEAST FIFteen years by 1969, my first year at the federal budget bureau. In 1954, the small country alongside the South China Sea had won independence from French colonization at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Afterward, as northern and southern factions bitterly slugged it out, a United States–Vietnam accord in Paris led to a cease-fire and a temporary partition between north and south; elections on reunification or continuing partition were to be held within two years. While both factions sought independence, their conflicting ideologies distinguished them. The Soviet Union backed North Vietnam, and America backed the South. Most observers accepted that the North Vietnamese later provoked the breakdown of the cease-fire, which led to full scale civil war. US leadership watched these events and commiserated with South Vietnamese allies. It was a time of US-USSR Cold War power struggles.

In a 2009 Newsweek article, Evan Thomas and John Barry traced key US actions covering the insertion of troops to Vietnam in 1959 and continuing through their withdrawal in 1975. For example, in 1959, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a retired five-star general and World War II hero, remained concerned about Vietnam, yet he did not want US forces at war. He sent a few military advisors to Southeast Asia with the mission to help train the new South Vietnamese army. The first American casualties at the hands of North Vietnam from that mission were Major Dale Buis and Sergeant Chester Ovnand. Three years later, 1962, the new president John F. Kennedy kept military advisors in place in Vietnam. He also sent the vice president Lyndon Johnson to make an assessment. On return, Johnson recommended increased US assistance. After the Vietcong, the North’s ally, won the battle of Ap Bac, a dispirited South Vietnam military (abetted by surprising US acquiescence) assassinated their president, Ngo Dinh Diem. The next year, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Texas, and Lyndon Johnson became the president.

The Evan Thomas and John Barry article in Newsweek included events that led to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.¹ I have summarized it.

Gulf of Tonkin Resolution

North Vietnamese torpedo boats reportedly attacked US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964, leading President Johnson to ask Congress to enact necessary measures to defend Southeast Asia. Sen. J. William Fulbright (D-AK) was the floor manager for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that became a declaration of war, authorizing direct military action (P.L. 88–408). (But the senator later had other words to say, in public, about that experience.)

As media coverage of military setbacks increased, and the nation divided over the war, President Johnson decided not to run again in 1968. In President Richard Nixon’s first year in office, 1969, the press conference I attended had shown me the intense press sensitivities toward Vietnam.

President Nixon began early small troop withdrawals from the more than one-half million US troops in Vietnam. After the tragic anti-war protests at Kent State University in 1970, troop levels were dropped to about 215,000.²

In 1971, I was responsible for oversight of several international affairs agencies—including the US Information Agency (USIA)—at the Bureau of the Budget, which by then had been renamed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on USIA funding chaired by Sen. Fulbright, I heard the senator voice skepticism about the alleged Gulf of Tonkin attack that had spawned the resolution. A USIA witness responded there had been no choice but to accept President Johnson’s view of the attack that led to the war resolution. I watched in stunned amazement as Sen. Fulbright slammed his fist against his podium desk and bellowed: I didn’t know he (President Johnson) was lying either!

President Nixon ordered more air campaigns in 1972. He approved the bombing of Vietnam’s neighbor, Cambodia, as enemy attacks proliferated and American military and public resolve for the war weakened further. US troop levels were about thirty-five thousand by then. News of the bombings over Cambodia fell flat at home.

In January 1973, a cease-fire agreement signed in Paris by the US secretary of state Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnam negotiator Le Duc Tho meant more reductions of US forces. The North Vietnamese returned 591 American POWs, welcomed home in Operation Homecoming. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger regrouped, and then a domestic scandal called Watergate intervened. President Nixon resigned on August 9 the following year, and the vice president Gerald Ford was sworn in.

In 1974, Congress threatened to halve the administration’s $722 million request for Vietnam operations. Appropriations Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-MS) told Secretary Kissinger to … send someone out there to appraise it. Kissinger sent Jim Bullington, Vietnam desk officer, on December 20, 1974, for a three–week assessment. Commenting on Bullington’s trip report, Henry Kissinger said, He pointed out that even a supplemental of $300 million would only just barely cover expenditures for consumables and would leave no funds for replacements. A minimum of $1.3 billion would be needed for the same purpose in 1976. By then, the replacement of damaged and destroyed equipment could no longer be delayed. Kissinger added, Bullington concluded that, without the supplemental, South Vietnam’s position was hopeless. We had reached the point where, if the supplemental failed to materialize, only one option would be left to mitigate our country’s dishonor: to save as many Vietnamese as possible.³

As Bullington told me, his earlier assessment had found that as many as one million people might need to be evacuated if American forces withdrew, including Americans and Vietnamese allies at risk. He also concluded that without replenishment, at the rate resources were being consumed, the war effort could not continue beyond the middle of 1975.

Key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee went to the White House for a face-to-face with President Ford on April 14, 1975. They talked about his budget request for $722 million to stabilize the military situation in Vietnam. The senators—including Jacob Javits (R-NY), Frank Church (D-ID), and Joe Biden (D-DE)—clarified to the president that no additional funds would be provided to continue the war, only funds for evacuation.⁴

In early 1975, Phuoc Binh, formerly a safe area of cassava and sweet potato farming, fell to the Vietcong, who bombed it in violation of the Paris agreement. President Ford met the breach with silence, and US troops did not reengage the enemy.

April 1975 Was a Cruel Month

As perceptions of a crumbling South Vietnam government mounted, concern heightened over the fate of over seventy thousand Vietnamese orphans. What would happen to them if the government collapses? Through the persistence of the deputy assistant secretary for human development Julia Taft of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare a rescue program was activated on April 3, 1975. President Ford announced that the United States would fly seventy thousand orphans out of Vietnam using two million dollars available from a special foreign aid children’s fund. The evacuation would be named Operation Baby Lift.

Ann Blackman’s biography of Julia Taft, Off to Save the World, described the harrowing departure of the first flight the following day as it left Tan Son Nhut airport at four in the afternoon with 328 children aboard. Twelve minutes into the flight a staggering disaster struck, an on-board explosion. The plane broke apart when the pilot landed in a rice paddy; over 150 passengers perished. This tragic accident brought anguish and tears throughout the world, but it did not halt evacuations. Over the next few weeks, Operation Baby Lift carried three thousand children safely out of Vietnam, before American troops left and the program came to a quick end.

The discreet pleadings of the young rebels emboldened the State Department’s under secretary for management Larry Eagleburger to create the Interagency Task Force on Indochina Refugees (IATF) on April 14. Four days later, President Ford officially approved the task force, and evacuation planning for Vietnam became public. The IATF marked a significant move forward for official evacuation planning, with Ambassador L. Dean Brown in charge. Immediately joining were Frank Wisner, Julia Taft, Clay McManaway, and Gerald Rose. Eventually, over one hundred officials drawn from State, Defense, Labor, Central Intelligence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare came on board. As Clay McManaway later related to me, evacuation planning and operations were in twenty-four seven mode.

On April 17, 1975, Secretary Kissinger gave the order to the ambassador Graham Martin in Saigon to expedite the withdrawal of nonessential American personnel and top Vietnamese officials. Five days later, immigration requirements were waived to