The Concept of Unbelief: As Expounded in Kant and Fichte

By Albert Mitchell Ph.D

The Concept of Unbelief is examined according to the ethical
teachings of Immanuel Kant. Kants notion of the idea of God (as a
moral postulate) is used as a foil to the agnostic position to further clarify
Kants concept of unbelief. This stance by Kant is contrasted with the
concept of unbelief in Johann Fichtes Attempt at a Critique of
All Revelation.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Aug 8, 2013
• ISBN: 9781483676951

Albert Mitchell Ph.D

Since Junior High School, the author has been collecting his favourite quotes, proverbs, and witty sayings. To say something in an unusual way, that is both stimulating and informative, has been his life-long fascination. In this first of a series of volumes on Quotations (hence, an "Encyclopedia"), the author reveals arresting quotes from both the wise and the profane. Dr. Mitchell has also written other books to include: "The Concept of Unbelief" and "The Concept of Religious Passion" (both published by Xlibris). Dr. Mitchell completed his Ph.D. Degree at the University of Oklahoma (Norman).

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Copyright © 2013 by Albert Mitchell, Ph.D.

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Unbelief: Kantian and Non-Kantian

Kant and ‘Belief in God’

Conceptualization

Kant and Fichte: Unbelief

Narrow Unbelief

CHAPTER II

FICHTE AND UNBELIEF

Goal of Fichte’s Revelation

Unbelief in Fichte (During the 1790s)

True Test of Acceptance

Rational Faith

Revelation in Natural and Revealed Religions

Theory of the Will

CHAPTER III

KANT AND UNBELIEF

Goal of Kant’s Religion

Unbelief in Kant (During the 1790s)

Rational and Moral Beliefs

Value of Revelation

Moral Faith Superior to Revelation

Doctrine of Conversion

CHAPTER IV

UNBELIEF IN KANT AND FICHTE

Similarities

Fundamental Differences

Conclusion

APPENDIX A

A CHRONOLOGY OF KANT’S WORKS

APPENDIX B

A CHRONOLOGY OF FICHTE’S WORKS

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

ENDNOTES

And when he [Jesus Christ] came to his disciples, he saw a great multitude about them, and the scribes questioning with them. And straightway all the people, when they beheld him, were greatly amazed and, running to him saluted him. And he asked the scribes, What question ye with them? And one of the multitude answered and said, Master, I have brought thee my son, which hath a dumb spirit; And wheresoever he taketh him, he teareth him: and he foameth, and gnasheth with his teeth, and pineth away: and I spake to thy disciples that they should cast him out; and they could not. He answereth him, and saith, O faithless generation, how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? bring him unto me. And they brought him unto him: and when he saw him, straightway the spirit tare him; and he fell on the ground, and wallowed foaming. And he asked the father, How long is it ago since this came unto him? And he said, Of a child. And ofttimes it hath cast him into the fire, and into the waters, to destroy him: but if thou canst do anything, have compassion on us, and help us. Jesus said unto him, If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth. And straightway the father of the child cried out, and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.

(Mark 9:14-24; King James Version)

The IDEA of God

The concept of such a Being is not of substance—that is, of a being which exists independent of my thought—but the idea (one’s own creation, thought-object, ens rationis) of a reason which constitutes itself into a thought-object, and establishes synthetic a priori propositions, according to principles of transcendental philosophy. It is an ideal: there is not and cannot be a question as to whether such an Object exists, since the concept is transcendent.

Immanuel Kant (Opus Postumum, 231)

FOREWORD

As the title of this book suggests, the argument presented herein does not chiefly concern belief, disbelief, or nonbelief, per se, but focuses on unbelief. Nor does this work concern itself with unbelief as a general epistemic concept. On the contrary, a specific treatment of unbelief in Kant and (the early) Fichte is addressed in terms of Kantian and non-Kantian unbelief. Non-Kantian unbelief (or, wide unbelief) refers to the traditional use of the term as religious unbelief; whereas, Kantian unbelief is further divided into moral and narrow unbelief. Moral unbelief, is but a disbelief in Kant’s view of what is moral. Narrow unbelief, however, is treated under the umbrella of Kantian moral belief, specifically with regard to Kant’s Ideals of Reason (i.e., the moral postulates of God, freedom, and immortality)—as a restriction of a wide faith or belief. It is unbelief in the sense that it is not a part of religious faith or religious belief in the traditional sense; but set apart from it: hence, from the religious point of view it is understood as a species of unbelief.

Although Kant does refer to various aspects of belief as well as various kinds of faith, this book concerns itself mainly with Kant’s view of the gradual evolution of all faiths into moral faith. The missing link between faith and morality (as intended by Kant’s term, moral faith) is supplied by (my interpretation of) Kantian narrow unbelief. Narrow unbelief (as I have defined it for this work) is neither (pure) moral belief, nor (pure) moral faith, although the concept of morality does relate to all three terms. It involves a restriction of belief in one’s faith to the point that it may be deemed as a form of unbelief, a constraint of belief which has little to do with religious faith altogether. Narrow unbelief is as much a hybrid of moral faith and moral belief (and the lack of belief in religious faith) as is Kant’s view of morality as synthetic a priori in nature (which definition involves both concepts of synthetic and a priori judgments yet the end result is neither truly synthetic, nor truly or purely a priori in nature, but a third creation, or concept).

In Chapter I, unbelief in the narrow sense of Kantian unbelief (i.e., as narrow unbelief) is defined more technically than Kant ever did define unbelief, albeit in a language that Kant himself would most likely approve. In Chapters II and III, the charge of unbelief laid against both Kant and Fichte (in the 1790s) is examined according to: 1) the literary context of their separate philosophies, and 2) the historical context of the Enlightenment.

Lastly, in Chapter IV, it becomes evident that Fichtean thought—after 1793—is separate from Kantian. As the summary and conclusion of the argument reaffirms, narrow unbelief (with respect to religious faith) can consistently be thought of as Kantian in view of Kant’s philosophy and of the Enlightenment.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Unbelief: Kantian and Non-Kantian

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the term unbelief was traditionally understood as religious unbelief, in the derogatory sense of an unbeliever. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814), who were both accused of religious unbelief, denied the justification for such an appellation.

In this work, dogmatic unbelief (e.g., religious unbelief) will be considered as non-Kantian unbelief, whereas Kantian unbelief will be divided into moral unbelief and narrow unbelief. Moral unbelief (as will be demonstrated later) is disbelief in Kant’s idea of what constitutes morality. Narrow unbelief can be treated as a species of Kantian moral belief, specifically with regard to Kant’s Ideals of Reason (i.e., the moral postulates of God, freedom, and immortality).¹ Narrow unbelief—whereby agnosticism, for example, is critically distinguished from atheism (as neither nonbelief, nor disbelief)—will be considered as (Kantian) unbelief in the narrow sense. Dogmatic unbelief—e.g., religious unbelief which fails to critically distinguish agnosticism from atheism, thereby equating nonbelief and unbelief with disbelief—will be considered as (non-Kantian) unbelief in the wide sense.

In view of Kant’s opposition to both skepticism and dogmatism in favor of the critical path, the term skeptical may not be the most accurate way of describing Kant’s position in the matter of unbelief.² After all, Kant wrote his first Critique as an answer to the rational dogmatism of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and his disciple Christian Wolff (1679-1754), his second Critique as an answer to skepticism, and his third Critique as an attempt to combine the two opposing points of view. As Kant’s moral position may be loosely thought of as positive agnosticism, the key difference between a Kantian and non-Kantian unbelief would be the application (or lack of application) of Kant’s critical philosophy, whereby philosophy confines itself to universal concepts.³

As with David Hume’s (1711-1776) distinction between the opinions of the vulgar vis-à-vis those of the false philosophy and those of the true,⁴ so Kant and Fichte argued in their own defence against the charge of unbelief with reference to a third viewpoint in addition to that of belief and disbelief. The Age of Enlightenment in which both men lived was noted for its third options: for example, the middle-class—as a third option—evolved as a direct product of the Enlightenment (to offset the bipolarity in society of feudal lords and their peasants).⁵ Moreover, the concept of man itself was no longer understood as confined to geographical or political boundaries, but transcended these boundaries to become universal man. For instance, the rights of the Frenchman were no longer to be compared to the rights of the Englishman, but the focus would be on ‘liberty, fraternity, and equality’ for all men, agnostic or believer, German or Italian.⁶

In a similar way, the concept of unbelief (as interpreted by the so-called scholars—i.e., men of letters—who were the driving force behind the Enlightenment)⁷ was no longer confined to the unbelief of Catholics as opposed to that of the Protestants, but began to be considered as a universal concept—in the epistemic (or, formal) sense. This approach to the concept of unbelief would entail a somewhat different interpretation of a familiar and well-used term.

To introduce new terminology into philosophy was not unusual, especially during the Enlightenment. Kant had introduced his argument for the noumenon-phenomenon distinction, and Fichte—the entirely novel concept of the ego as the I that posits itself.⁸ In addition to introducing their own terminology, both Kant and Fichte gave different meanings to traditional terms such as: religion, faith, revelation, God, morality, and unbelief.

By religion, both Kant and Fichte did not intend to include the term church but nevertheless did intend to exclude all so-called religious considerations that were not Christian. Faith for both Kant and (the early) Fichte referred to rational postulates as determined by (Kant’s definition of) practical reason. In both Kant’s book on Religion and Fichte’s on Revelation, the common reference is made to pure rational faith.⁹ Kant also speaks of pure religious faith, ecclesiastical faith, historical faith, saving faith, and moral faith.¹⁰ All forms of faith, Kant holds, could eventually culminate (via a conversion process) into moral faith if one would but follow the dictates of the moral law.¹¹

Similarly, Kant speaks of different beliefs, such as: contingent belief, necessary belief, pragmatic belief, and doctrinal belief. These beliefs culminate, as well, into one ultimate belief—moral belief (which belief, Kant stresses must conform in all points to the moral law).¹² In defining belief, Kant states that:

The term belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence in that furthering of the activities of my reason which confirms in the idea, and which yet does so without my being in a position to give a speculative account of it.¹³

(Moral) faith is distinct from belief, for Kant, in that moral faith involves the moral justification of a belief that is not epistemically justified.¹⁴ Kant explains the nature of this (moral) faith in his argument for the necessity to presuppose a highest intelligence in order to further the highest good in the world, as follows:

To assume its existence [i.e., the existence of God as a ‘highest intelligence’] is thus connected with the consciousness of our duty, though this assumption itself belongs to the realm of theoretical reason. Considered only in reference to the latter, it is a hypothesis, i.e., a ground of explanation. But in reference to the comprehensibility of an object (the highest good) placed before us by the moral law, and thus as a practical need, it can be called faith and even pure rational faith, because pure reason alone (by its theoretical as well as practical employment) is the source from which it springs.¹⁵

Moral faith is considered to be of greater import (by Kant in his moral argument) than moral belief in that (the demands for) knowledge (to include the acquisition of beliefs based upon sufficient evidence) must make room for faith.¹⁶ This viewpoint is consistent with Kant’s claim that the pious (who are of good will) can be gradually weaned away from redundant religious rituals into one religion, the core of which is reason alone.¹⁷ For Kant, religion is hidden within and has to do with moral disposition. Although there can be faiths of several kinds, Kant says, there is only one (true) religion.¹⁸ Fichte’s viewpoint on faith, on the other hand, changed dramatically shortly after the (second) publication of his book on Revelation (in 1793).

As with religion and faith, so Kant argues there can be only one universally applicable morality although there can be several kinds of ethics.¹⁹ Common to all the new concepts introduced above is the argument held by both Kant and Fichte that the moral law (i.e., as reason within morality) is the underlying basis and justification for beliefs involving any of the aforementioned concepts. For example, religion must be founded upon the moral law (and not vice versa) in order to be true religion. Revelation could not be true revelation, if it was not completely in harmony with morality and reason. Even the concept of God (which Fichte states must be presupposed a priori)²⁰ has merit solely because it is intrinsic to the rational nature of morality as understood by both Kant and Fichte. For there could be only one religion that is moral, as there could be only one God.²¹

In keeping with the spirit of the Enlightenment, the term unbelief could not (rationally) be used to include the variant meanings of disbelief and nonbelief. For to do so would oppose the very purpose of that Enlightenment which was to encourage one to use one’s own ability to reason—as an individual. In failing to distinguish unbelief from disbelief and nonbelief, one would be indirectly acquiescing with the religious powers of the time which demanded an ‘all or nothing’ allegiance.

For faiths (or what Kant sometimes calls churches) intent upon obtaining converts, (neutral) nonbeliefs would not be tolerated. Nor would they tolerate such a thing as an unbelief (as that held by an agnostic) that was not a disbelief (as that held by an atheist). To suspend judgment in determining one’s religious affiliation would be seen not only as an act of unbelief, but of disbelief. That is, a suspension of judgment—for whatever reason (however rational)—was interpreted as an act of disobedience. And hence persecution, penalties, and even death could be the lot of those who were thus deemed to be unfaithful. Unquestioned obedience was required, for to hesitate was to be lost.

Kant could not disagree more with such undignified behavior. Not only was it allowable, it was deemed a duty—in Kant’s eyes—to discover in Scripture that sense which harmonizes with the most holy teachings of reason. Kant further adds:

And we can remind ourselves of what the wise Teacher said to His disciples regarding someone who went his own way, by which, however, he was bound eventually to arrive at the same goal: Forbid him not; for he that is not against us is for us [Mark 9:39-40].²²

If to use one’s own reason is to be guilty of (religious) unbelief (i.e., to include the negative judgment of disbelief), Kant understood that such a charge of unbelief did not truly condemn the accused—only the accuser. As he states in the Religion: it bespeaks a culpable degree of moral unbelief not to acknowledge as completely authoritative the commands of duty—commands primordially engraved upon the heart of man through reason.²³ Dogmatic unbelief, after all, wars against morality.²⁴

In the lifetimes of Kant and Fichte, however, (religious) unbelief was considered to be an intolerably deviant, or negative, condition always in need of careful explanation, at the very