Philosophical Bagatelles

By Richard J. Burke

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• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Aug 26, 2003
• ISBN: 9781465333230

Richard J. Burke

Richard J. Burke has been a professor of philosophy at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan since 1959. He was Chairman of the Philosophy Department for 20 years, from 1969 to 1988. He teaches courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of peace and war, philosophy of sexuality, and ancient Greek philosophy. He has published an anthology of readings in Western Civilization, and a number of articles in scholarly journals. His interests have taken him all over the world, from Peru to Afghanistan and from Tanzania to Siberia.

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Contents

PHILOSOPHICAL BAGATELLES

PLURALISM AND OBJECTIVITY

PLURALISM

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS VS. PERSONAL HONOR

DUALISM IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

NEITHER POSITIVISM NOR HISTORICISM

TEACHING ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

METAPHOR

PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDES

LANGUAGE GAMES

GLOBAL ISSUES

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1989

THE FALLACY OF UNIVERSAL NATIONALISM

LINGUISTIC IMPERIALISM

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS

FASCISM

TRAJAN’S COLUMN

THE TERRORIST ATTACKS

AT WAR WITH TERRORISM

CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM?

A REPUBLICAN CON JOB

IS THE EVIL EMPIRE US?

PEACE AND WAR

JUST-WAR PACIFISM

REVISIONISM ABOUT THE COLD WAR

BOSNIA

THE CULTURE OF THE ARMY

WHAT’S HEROIC ABOUT THE MILITARY?

JOHN MCCAIN

THE NORMANDY MYTH

PALERMO

EUROPEAN PACIFISM

PEACE IN PALESTINE?

REGIME CHANGE IN IRAQ

SADDAM HUSSEIN, MONSTER?

BRINGING AMERICA UNDER CONTROL

AMERICAN CULTURE

THE DANGERS OF FALSE DEMOCRACY

THE BODY CULTURE

IS THE U.S. MORE DEMOCRATIC THAN THE SOVIET UNION?

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

NEOANTIDIS ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM

LEADERSHIP

TREASON

WHY VOTE FOR RALPH NADER IN 2000?

MY PROGRAM

THE SELECTION OF GEORGE W

GEORGE W’S COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM

SEPARATION OF BUSINESS AND STATE

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

OUR CULTURE WAR

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA?

CREATIONISM IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM FOR 2004

AMERICAN SCEPTICISM ABOUT PHILOSOPHY

VOTING

RELIGION

THE JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN ETHIC

THERE IS NO GOD

THE DICE AREN’T LOADED

YOU CAN’T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS: GOD AND THE HUMAN SOUL

ORGANIZED RELIGION

RELIGION AND HUMAN DIGNITY

ATHEISM MORE RATIONAL THAN AGNOSTICISM

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

MONOTHEISM

A RADICAL POLICY

TOWARD CHRISTIANITY

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

MORALITY AND RELIGION

CHRISTIANITY AND VIOLENCE

MON-ARCHISM

RHETORIC, RELIGION AND SECULAR HUMANISM

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

IS ISLAM THE ENEMY?

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

THE HOLY SPIRIT

ADAM AND EVE

MARY MAGDALENE

TIBET

E. B. TYLOR

SHAVING

ETHICS

THE CONSENSUS OF PHILOSOPHERS

TELEOLOGY AND DEONTOLOGY

ETHICAL THEORY

QUANTIFYING KANT

DIVINE COMMAND AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM

THE ETHICS OF INSTITUTIONS

A GOOD DEATH

SUICIDE

EUTHANASIA AND RATIONALITY

PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE

SMOKING

ABORTION

CLONING HUMANS

IS PORNOGRAPHY ABUSIVE OF WOMEN?

PORNOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL CLASS

SEX AND VIOLENCE

ONE CAUSE OF RAPE

HOMOSEXUALITY

MARRIAGE

MASCULINE AND FEMININE ROLES

LIBERALISM

LIBERALISM VS. CHRISTIANITY

THE PARADOX OF LIBERALISM

DEMOCRACY

SOCRATES’ REPUBLIC

EACH SHOULD DO WHAT HE DOES BEST

THE GENERAL WILL

LIBERTÉ! EGALITÉ! FRATERNITÉ!

SOCIALISM

SOCIALISM

INVERTED SOCIALISM

IS SOCIALISM STILL TENABLE?

DICTATORSHIP RECONSIDERED

SOCIAL RATIONALITY

DISTRIBUTIONISM

THE RATIONALITY OF ALTRUISM

MONOPOLISM

FRIENDSHIP

CAPITALISM

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIALISM

CAPITALISM AND FASCISM

MARXISM

BIG QUESTIONS

SOURCES OF EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

METAPHYSICS

IS THERE ONLY ONE LANGUAGE?

THE SELF

DECISIONS, DECISIONS

QUESTIONS

PHILOSOPHICAL BAGATELLES

Here are 125 short essays, which I call bagatelles. A bagatelle is a plaything, and some of these essays may seem too serious to go by that name. But play can be serious. In fact, I think serious play is among mankind’s most important activities: think of art. literature, science, exploration in general, philosophy. Beethoven used the word bagatelles for a group of late, short, deceptively simple musical compositions. I hope these have the same qualities.

I used to write longer philosophical pieces, in which I tried to support everything with references and explanations. But I seldom convinced anyone anyway, so for the past decade or so I have followed a policy of State the idea—and stop. The reader can take it from there.

To give you some idea of what to expect, I am an atheist, a socialist, and a pacifist—like Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, two of my heroes. I am therefore quite out of step in America these days, even among philosophers, and my views on contemporary issues may seem extreme to some readers. But I know there are others out there who will think I tell it like it is, and it is for them I write.

Richard Burke February 2003

PLURALISM AND OBJECTIVITY

PLURALISM

For years I have been persuaded by pluralism in philosophy, meaning that there is no one true metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, or even logic. I also tend to accept approaches which postulate a conflict of basic principles: polytheism rather than monotheism, the tragic view of life, Weber’s sociology, Freud’s psychology, a rhetorical approach to argument, etc. When someone says All religions are basically the same, for example, my instinct is to deny it, and point to the enormous human differences between Greek Orthodox Christianity and Unitarianism, or between either and the cult of Kali. When someone complains about the inability of capitalists and communists to agree, or blacks and whites, or males and females, or rich and poor, or over-30s and under-30s, or Arabs and Israelis, or Protestants and Catholics, or Democrats and Republicans, I point to the real differences of background and interests between the parties, and stress that harmony among people is not natural, but must be created. The lesson of history, it seems to me, is that as soon as conflict is resolved in one area, it breaks out somewhere else. I don’t share the faith of Hegel that these conflicts are gradually being overcome; the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche seems more realistic.

This view implies its own ethics, of course. The realization that one’s enemies are probably partly right leads to tolerance (see Mill’s On Liberty), and humility, and compassion, and these values are especially dear to me, while their counterparts—aggressiveness, pride, ambition—leave me cold. Why do I have these values? Is it really impartial reflection, or have I been judgment, but I am still interested in all these arguments, and I continue to teach courses about them. Is my pluralism about religion anti-religious? Most people would say so, but I don’t agree. I started the Religious Studies program at Oakland because I wanted students to think more about religion: not as an all-ornothing commitment, but as an interesting field of study akin to both literature and philosophy.

My distaste for monism depends largely on which of two kinds it is. Already monism finds the unity already given; eventual monism sees it at the end of a long process. Already monism tends to be dogmatic; eventual monism can encourage pluralism for the time being, to prevent our overlooking any important part of the truth. Since we are engaged in a common task, tolerance is eminently practical. In fact, eventual monism cultivates the same virtues as pluralism, and may be indistinguishable from it. I prefer to affirm pluralism, though, I’m not sure why.

My teaching tends to take the following logical form:

1.   The view in which you students have been raised—Christianity, American patriotism, positivism or relativism in philosophy, etc.—is only one of several alternatives;

2.   A good case can be made for each of the other alternatives too;

3.   Therefore one should suspend judgment on these issues, tolerate disagreement, and cooperate with the enemy. Above all, one should not be dogmatic.

Thus a pluralistic philosophy underlies my teaching, my lack of religious affiliation, and I might add my politics too: I’m both might argue that there must be One Truth, since there is One World. Most Western philosophers might agree; but this does not follow. It might be impossible to express the One World in one language, with one style and one purpose. Certain modern philosophers might see a kinship between my philosophy and their own—Collingwood, Karl Jaspers, William James—but theirs is questionable too.

Another modern thinker whose position seems similar to mine is Chaim Perelman. But he calls it new rhetoric rather than philosophy. He distinguishes between arguments designed to persuade particular audiences (rhetoric proper) and those directed at the universal audience (science and philosophy). Philosophy may aim at this, but it usually falls short: witness the mutual near-unintelligibility between European phenomenology and Anglo-American analysis.

Eventual monism can assign the all-important role of creating a dialectical synthesis of knowledge to philosophy, and can argue effectively against both rhetoric and scientific positivism as methods of achieving unity. (See my article in Philosophy and Rhetoric.) My pluralism must concede that science is more objective than philosophy, and must fall back on a humanist rhetoric (Johnstone) to achieve harmony. The more I think about it, the weaker my position seems, both in its grounds and in its probable consequences. For if one accepts the ancient saying of Protagoras, that there are two [equally valid] sides to every question, then freedom and tolerance are no more justifiable than their opposites, and even violence on behalf of dogmatism can be justified too.

Help!

Apr. 6-22, 1974

UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS VS. PERSONAL HONOR

The Salman Rushdie affair brings out a problem with the liberal approach to ethics. Among human rights is always listed personal liberty, defined as moral freedom to express one’s values and pursue one’s lifestyle, so long as it does not harm others or prevent them from exercising their rights. Article 19 of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights (1948) says much the same thing. In the world press, Ayatollah Khomeini is generally condemned for flagrantly violating Rushdie’s rights by sentencing him to death. (World Press Review, April 1989, has quotes to that effect from London, Paris, Rome, Frankfurt, Cairo, Bombay, Johannesburg, Rio de Janeiro, and others.)

But did Rushdie harm others with his book? Muslims everywhere perceived it as an insult to their faith. In many cultures, a public insult is not only a harm, but such a serious harm that to not respond to it is to lose one’s honor. And one’s honor is even more important than one’s life, because it lives on after you are dead. In such a culture, if someone says to you, Your mother is a whore, and you respond, You are mistaken, sir, but you are entitled to your opinion, you have committed moral suicide: your honor is dead. A culture in which this would be an appropriate response is to them a decadent culture, lacking a true sense of honor.

This is not the same as an eye for an eye (lex talionis), which would be even worse than an insult to one’s mother, a defenseless woman who is dependent on you for protection. Not to respond strongly to Rushdie’s book, given that it is perceived as insulting Islam, would be unthinkable for a Muslim.

A believer in such a moral code may well grant that Rushdie is free to speak his mind, but he will insist that if he insults the honor of others, he must be prepared to take the consequences. It is hard to understand a right of free speech in that context. Freedom of religious belief is hard to formulate in a Muslim context as well. As stated in Western countries since the Enlightenment, it seems to presuppose that no one knows whether any religion is true; which of course no devout believer will admit.

Perhaps universal human rights can be articulated meaningfully in the face of cultural differences like these. I hope so, but I’m afraid this philosophical task remains to be done.

May 2, 1989

DUALISM IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

The mind-body problem is a familiar one in philosophy of mind, with dualists and materialists squared off ever since Plato and Democritus, and functionalists claiming to offer a third alternative ever since Aristotle. Today the debate has migrated also to philosophy of science, where the question is whether statements about conscious mental activity (in psychology and in everyday discourse) can be reduced to statements about the brain.

There is a parallel issue in the philosophy of the social sciences, or social philosophy. Prior to Hegel¹ historians assumed that ideas were the prime causes of events and trends in human behavior: either those of great leaders, writers, and philosophers, or those of groups or movements, like Christianity or the Enlightenment. In other words, human consciousness is the independent variable in history, and all other changes and continuities result from this one. Hegel seems to be a continuation of this idealism—indeed Marx accused him of this—because he says that Ideas rule history. But Hegel used the word Idea as Plato did, misleadingly, to refer to a kind of non-physical but not necessarily conscious reality. The cunning of Reason actually fools people into thinking they are controlling what happens,

Little-noticed predecessors of Hegel were Vico, Montesquieu and Herder.

independent variable (which Hegel would have called one kind of Idea), and calling these matter rather than spirit.²

In its Marxist formulation, this reductionism has become one of the dominant paradigms in modern social theory. We try to explain the ideas of groups, and even of individuals, as resulting from their culture, their class, their race, their gender, etc. Sociology of knowledge is just the most explicit statement of this position; it is also widely presupposed by practicing anthropologists, political scientists, social psychologists. Sociobiologists take it a step further, reducing our conscious behavior to our genes.

Max Weber was opposing this position when he argued that capitalism would not have developed unless Protestantism, a more individualistic and this-worldly interpretation of Christianity, had developed first. Once developed, however, capitalism in turn molds our consciousness, as Marx said. So how we think affects how we act, and also vice versa: an interactionist (and therefore dualist) model. Both conscious ideas and unconscious practices can be independent variables, and both can be dependent too. This position is also presupposed by many (other) social scientists. It seems to me to better fit the facts.

Thus a similar issue, about the independent causal efficacy of

Lenin’s actions implied that the capitalist stage could be skipped by an informed and dedicated elite imposing a temporary dictatorship. He was thus an anti-Marxist, a pre-Hegelian idealist.. The failure of his Communism could thus be interpreted as a vindication of Marx. Or as support for a Weberian approach (see below).

1997

NEITHER POSITIVISM NOR HISTORICISM

In America philosophers tend to believe that philosophy, like the social sciences, has achieved (when it is done correctly) a kind of objectivity, so that its findings are independent of who said them, and where and when. I will call this positivism. In Europe philosophers tend to believe that only the natural sciences can achieve this, so the study of philosophy (and of social studies) should be the study of its history: who said what, where and when. I will call this historicism.

My own view is closer to the European one, because there does not seem to me to be any one way to do philosophy correctly. But it