God's Eternal Gift: a History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance

By Guido Stucco

Guido Stucco holds a Ph.D. in Historical Theology from Sait Louis University. He is currently working on a book documenting the developments in the doctrine of predestination, from the Council of Trent to the Jansenist controversy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Jun 20, 2009
• ISBN: 9781469114781

Guido Stucco

Guido Stucco holds a Ph.D. in Historical Theology from Saint Louis University.

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Copyright © 2009 by Guido Stucco.

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CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction

PART ONE: A Brief History of the Forgotten Catholic Doctrine of Predestination during the Semipelagian Controversy

CHAPTER ONE

Augustine and the Massilians

Predestination in Early Church History

History of the Semipelagian Controversy

Phase One: The Hadrumetum crisis

Augustine’s Letter 214 to Valentinus

Augustine’s Letter 215 to Valentinus

Augustine’s Letter 217 to Vitalis

On Grace and Free Will

Rebuke and Grace

Phase Two: The Disagreement with the Massilienses

Hilary’s Letter to Augustine

Prosper’s Letter to Augustine

The Predestination of the Saints

The Gift of Perseverance

Cassian’s Conference XIII: The Protection of God

CHAPTER TWO

Prosper and Arnobius

Phase Three: The Contribution of Prosper of Aquitaine and of Arnobius the Younger

St. Prosper

Poem about the Ungrateful

Against the Lecturer

Answers to the Objections of the Lying Gauls

Answers to the Vincentian Articles

Indiculus Caelestini

The Call of All Nations

Memorandum

Arnobius the Younger

Praedestinatus : Dating and Structure

Praedestinatus: Book I

Praedestinatus: Book II

Praedestinatus: Book III

The Hardening of Pharaoh’s Heart and the Vessels of Honor and Shame

CHAPTER THREE

Fulgentius of Ruspe and Faustus of Riez

Phase Four: Faustus of Riez and Fulgentius of Ruspe

Faustus of Riez

The Grace of God and Free Will

Fulgentius of Ruspe

To Monimus

Letter XV, Epistola synodica

Letter XVII, The Incarnation and Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ

The Truth of Predestination and the Grace of God

Pseudo-Fulgentius’ Book concerning Predestination and Grace

Petrus Diaconus, The Incarnation and Grace of Our Lord Jesus Christ

CHAPTER FOUR

Caesarius of Arles and Orange II

Phase Five: Caesarius of Arles, the Second Council of Orange and the End of the Semipelagian Controversy

De gratia

The Second Council of Orange

Pope Boniface II’s Approval of Orange II

CHAPTER FIVE

Evaluation of the Controversy

Final Remarks Concerning the Writers Involved In the Controversy

Evaluation of Semipelagianism

General Assessment of the Semipelagian Controversy

Three theological features of AS

Pastoral features of AS

PART TWO: Medieval Kaleidoscopic Views of Grace and Predestination

SECTION ONE: Catholic Views of Grace after the Second Council of Orange

CHAPTER ONE

The Legacy of the Semipelagian Controversy

CHAPTER TWO

Early Medieval Views

Pope Gregory

Isidore Of Seville

Pope Hadrian I

CHAPTER THREE

Grace in Three Ancient Sacramentaries

Augustinian Quotes Upholding God’s Efficacious Grace

Introduction to the Sacramentaries

The Leonine Sacramentary

The Gelasian Sacramentary

The Gregorian Sacramentary

SECTION TWO: The Carolingian Dispute over Predestination

CHAPTER FOUR

The Courage of One’s Convictions: The Monk Gottschalk

Paschasius Radbertus (786-860)

Gottschalk’s Life

Gottschalk’s Views on Predestination

Gottschalk’s Views on Limited Atonement

Gottschalk’s Views on Free Will

Gottschalk’s Attitudes and Language

Gottschalk’s Theological Assumptions

Conclusion

CHAPTER FIVE

First Responses to Gottschalk

Rabanus Maurus

Hincmar, Archbishop of Reims

Prudentius of Troyes

CHAPTER SIX

Two Defenders of Gottschalk’s Views

Lupus Servatus

Ratramnus

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Controversy Intensifies

Amulo, Archbishop of Lyon

Florus of Lyon

CHAPTER EIGHT

Two Councils and Two Critics

The Council of Quiercy

Florus’ On Firmly Upholding the Truth of Scriptures

The Council of Valence

PRUDENTIUS Epistola tractoria ad Wenilonem

CHAPTER NINE

The End of the Controversy: Three Councils and a Massive Tome

Synod of Langres

Synod of Savonnieres

Hincmar’s De predestinatione dei et libero arbitrio

Synod of Thusey

CHAPTER TEN

The Erigena Controversy

John Scotus Erigena’s Treatise on Divine Predestination

Florus’ Adversus Johannis Scoti Erigenae erroneas definitiones liber

SECTION THREE: The Foundations of Scholasticism

CHAPTER ELEVEN

XI and XII Century Views on Grace and Predestination

Pope Leo IX

Anselm of Canterbury

Anselm of Laon

Pope Alexander II

William of Champeaux

Honorius of Autun

Peter Abelard

Peter Lombard

Herveus

Conclusion

PART THREE: Predestinarian Views from the Twelfth Century to the Renaissance

CHAPTER ONE

XIII Century: The Golden Age of Scholasticism

The Advent and Development of Scholasticism

Alexander of Hales

Bonaventure

Albert the Great

Thomas Aquinas

Duns Scotus

Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO

XIV Century: The Erosion of the Consensus Concerning Predestination

Peter Aureol

William of Ockham

Landulph Caracciolo

Francis of Marchia

Gerardus Odonis

Thomas Bradwardine

Thomas of Strasburg

Gregory of Rimini

John Wyclif

Conclusion

CHAPTER THREE

The Xv Century: The Renaissance

Jan Hus

The Council of Constance

Gabriel Biel

Denis the Carthusian

Pietro Pomponazzi

CONCLUSION

Appendix A

Some Examples of the Biblical Principle deserunt et deseruntur

Appendix B

A Few Biblical Quotes Concerning God’s Grace

Appendix C

Semipelagian Rendition of Some Prayers Found in the Roman Missal

Appendix D

Arnobius The Younger’s Praedestinatus: Books II and III

APPENDIX E

Auvray’s Review of Fr. Sirmond’s Publication of Praedestinatus (1644)

APPENDIX F

Hincmar’s Claim about the Existence of a Predestinarian Sect

APPENDIX G

Chronology of the Carolingian Controversy on Predestination

Bibliography

Endnotes

I wish to dedicate this book to Frank Pitol, in grateful acknowledgement of everything he has done for us all; to my wife Susan, for all her efforts and good will in our relationship through the years; and to my son Aurelio, in the hope he will appropriate the motto of the Enlightenment: Sapere aude!

Preface

This book was born as a result of an intellectual wild goose chase that began in the mid 1990s. One of the two readers of my doctoral dissertation was a Reformed professor at Covenant Theological Seminary in St. Louis, MO. In the course of one of our conversations the topic of predestination came up, arousing my curiosity. Somewhat stereotypically, I thought that only Calvinists upheld what I considered to be an arcane and archaic belief. In an attempt to better understand and argue against this doctrine from a Roman Catholic perspective I read Garrigou-Lagrange’s (the famous Dominican scholar who directed Pope John Paul II’s doctoral dissertation) Predestination: The Meaning of Predestination in Scripture and the Church. This book both surprised and a mildly disappointed me. It surprised me, because I learned that so many Catholic theologians throughout the centuries upheld belief in predestination of individuals to eternal life; it somewhat disappointed me, because the book’s strength does not lie in an in-depth historical outline of the development of the doctrine (for instance, I was appalled by the fact that the Reformed view was discussed in merely six pages), but, very narrowly, on the exposition and defense of the Thomist perspective on some issues related to predestination (e.g., physical premotion, efficacious grace, the motive for reprobation). Seeking more knowledge on the matter, I began researching the patristic and medieval writings mentioned in Lagrange’s book. Rebecca Weaver’s book on the history of the Semipelagian controversy was instrumental in my decision to pursue a historical rather than a systematic trajectory in my research, just as A. McGrath’ s scholarly Iustitia dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification remained an ideal model to emulate, as far as methodology is concerned, more so than J. Pelikan’s most informative multi-volume A History of the Develeopment of Dogma, since the latter was very succint in its treatment of various doctrines, including that of predestination. After reading and translating several unknown Latin texts, my own understanding of the doctrine of predestination began to change. In order to satisfy my readers’ and friends’ curiosity as to what I believe in matters of divine predestination and grace, I want to set the record straight right from the start: I un-ambiguously confess that I have shifted my allegiance from what I now wish to characterize as a Semipelagian perspective, uncritically inherited from my European, post-Vatican II, Catholic parish upbringing and, alas!, graduate theological education, to a moderate Augustinian view exemplified by the Second Council of Orange (529 a.d.). Though I cannot bring myself to regard most Semipelagian views as unforgivable heresies, I now feel uncomfortable with them and have concluded that the biblical data are more satisfactorily and adequately explained by the magisterial interpretation laid out at Orange and by theologians who followed its insights. I have also come to sympathize with Thomas Aquinas’ and Gregory of Rimini’s views on predestination.

I would like to acknowledge a few persons’ contribution to my faith and trust in God’s providence and grace. First of all, the late Fr. Giuseppe Dossetti and his community, La Piccola Famiglia dell’Annunziata, and its current Superior, Fr. Athos Righi, whose wonderful example of love and spirit of reverence for the Scriptures drew me to the Christian faith in the first place. Fr. Andrea Gasparino and his community, Centro Missionario P. De Foucauld, whose love for the Eucharist and the Bible puts to shame the rest of us, average Catholic Janes and Joes. The great catechist and reconciler of divine grace and free will, the late Salesian Fr. Piero Ottaviano, whose catechetical center Didaskaleion was a gem in Torino’s Archdiocese before his untimely death; it was his fault that I began reflecting on the relationship between grace and free will.

Having completed my research, I wish to make my own the prayer of the monk Gottschalk: I give you thanks Lord, triune God, because you have deigned in the past, find it worthy in the present, and I hope in the future as well, for me to believe and confess the Catholic truth about the doctrine of predestination, as you enlighten, encourage and support me.¹

Introduction

In American Protestant theology the doctrine of predestination is usually framed within the ongoing biblical and theological discussion between Arminians and Calvinists. In the past few decades both parties have defended their views and, in the process, produced repetitive literature, hardly breaking new ground.¹ As far as American Catholic theology is concerned, no systematic attempt to recover the meaning of predestination in Scripture and in Tradition has occurred since Fr. William Most wrote a thought-provoking book on the subject in 1963.² Overall, when the doctrine is analyzed from a historical perspective, the scholars’ focus seems to be mostly on its trajectories beginning with Calvin, all the way to Barth; consequently, the important pre-Reformation foundations of the doctrine go largely un-noticed. In order to bypass the theological impasse on this important issue and to fill what I perceive to be a deplorable research gap, I intend to trace the inception and early developments of the doctrine, as well as its medieval developments. More specifically, the purpose of my research is to trace the historical development of the Catholic doctrine of predestination and to present a concise summary of the views expressed by ecclesiastical writers during the Semipelagian controversy that took place in the V and VI centuries, in Part One; of the early medieval views developed during the Carolingian era, in Part Two; and of the Scholastic developments, all the way to the Renaissance, in Part Three. My research will show that in order to appreciate the complexity of the doctrine of predestination it is necessary to go back in time and to follow its development from early Church history through the Middle Ages, which is to say, earlier than the late XVI century intramural Catholic dispute about grace, known as de auxiliis,³ and considerably earlier than the XVII century Reformed dispute between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants.

At this point I wish to explain in greater detail the method of exposition followed in the three parts of my book, beginning with Part One, entitled: "A Brief History of the Forgotten Catholic Doctrine of Predestination during the Semipelagian Controversy. This is a brief history," considering that Rebecca Weaver and, lately, Donato Ogliari, O.S.B., have done an outstanding job in setting forth a detailed history of the Semipelagian controversy.⁴ I intended to capture the essence of the texts these scholars have outlined in painstaking detail in order to introduce the readers to the core issues debated during the controversy; my original contribution in Part One consists in introducing and outlining ten texts that have never been translated into English before, texts that these authors have either not dealt with at all, and in some cases only marginally.⁵ The most important of these works is the Semipelagian Praedestinatus, a text in three books, written by Arnobius the Younger in the first half of the V century: my translation of Books II and III of this work is found in Appendix D.

Once again, in the first part of my book the readers will find an overview of the relevant texts written by Church Fathers, councils and Popes, an overview that owes much to existing translations. As far as the un-translated Latin texts are concerned, the Migne collection,⁶ despite all of its misprints and imprecise biblical quotations, has truly been invaluable for my research. Through a long and painstaking analysis of these texts I have attempted to document the gradual development, theological assumptions and trajectories of the doctrine of predestination. In Part One, I have outlined the dialectical exchange of views between three sets of participants (Augustine vs. Massilienses; Prosper vs. Arnobius; Fulgentius vs. Faustus): the heated debate between their views eventually came to an end at the Second Council of Orange in 529 a.d.

A few more words about the remaining words of the title: The Forgotten Catholic Doctrine of Predestination during the Semipelagian Controversy. Some readers may be surprised to see the adjective Catholic in relation to a doctrine that has traditionally been associated with Calvinism, Reformed theology and conservative Presbyterian churches. Nonetheless, the origins and development of the doctrine of predestination must be traced to early and pre-Reformation Catholicism. Most Catholics nowadays seem unaware that the doctrine of predestination was once part of the teachings of the Catholic Church’s theologians, saints and bishops. This explains the reason for the adjective "forgotten, to characterize the doctrine. As far as the word Catholic is concerned, it is meant to include all three major views that emerged during the controversy: the Augustinian, the Semipelagian and the Magisterial view outlined at the Second Council of Orange in 529 a.d. Moreover, the adjective Catholic" may ideally be used in contrast to the understanding of predestination that emerged in the works of later writers (i.e., Luther, Calvin, and the early and later Reformers), though a sophisticated elaboration of the differences between such views obviously falls outside the scope of this book.

Finally, as its title suggests, Part One focuses on the doctrine of predestination during the "Semipelagian controversy. Some readers may not be familiar with the term Semipelagian." This term, taken literally, characterizes a certain view or person as half-Pelagian; in other words, it suggests a substantial, though incomplete affinity with the ideas promoted by the British monk Pelagius and by his followers, who were condemned by the Church in the fifth century.⁷ Considering that Pelagianism is a formal heresy, one would naturally assume that Semipelagianism too has become a rejected and forgotten movement in the Church’s long history. As it turns out, this is not the case. First of all, Semipelagian thinkers hardly deserved to be called half-Pelagians, considering that they firmly rejected Pelagius’ views. Against Pelagius, they upheld the doctrine of original sin and affirmed the necessity of divine grace for our sanctification on a daily basis. Throughout my work I have consistently refrained from writing the term semi as an adjective followed by a hyphen, to underscore the fact that these writers were not half Pelagian. Secondly, Semipelagianism was never officially declared by the Church to be a heretical movement, such as Arianism, Nestorianism and Pelagianism. Thirdly, not only the leading Semipelagian thinkers were respected members of the Church who led saintly and ascetical lives, as even their opponents acknowledged; some of their insights were even incorporated into the teachings of the Catholic Church through the centuries. One may argue, for instance, that some Semipelagian views can be found in the contemporary Catechism of the Catholic Church,⁸ as well as in Arminian and Wesleyan theology. As the philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, wrote:

The standard message of the Catholic Church to the faithful is: God wants to help you and indeed does help you to be worthy of salvation, but you have to help him, to put forth your will and make an effort if you are to be saved. We are capable, according to this teaching, of spurning divine aid or accepting it by a free act of assent. And since God refuses his assistance to no one, ultimately our salvation depends on us. This is Semipelagian doctrine.⁹

Building on Kolakowski’s insight, an original contribution of my research consists in showing, in Appendix C, how Semipelagian thinking, far from being a relic from the past, has unintentionally affected the contemporary English translation of several prayers found in the contemporary Roman Missal.

In many theological quarters, especially Reformed ones, the term Semipelagian traditionally carries a pejorative connotation, though this needs not be the case. Interestingly, the term Semipelagianism was never used in antiquity. The words employed up to and during the Middle Ages to refer to Semipelagians were "Massilienses, and Pelagianorum reliquiae." So, when did this term first appear and why? M. Jacquin incorrectly suggested that it was never used before 1580; he claimed that it first appeared in 1594 in a Spanish Church document and that it became common usage since 1610, during the de auxiliis controversy.¹⁰ To be precise, the term appeared as early as 1577, in a Lutheran profession of faith, namely in the Formula of Concord. In Epitome II, 3 (On Free Will) we read: "We also reject the error of the Semipelagians [in German, der halbpelagianer errtum; translated in Latin as semipelagianorum falsum dogma] who teach that man by his own powers can make a beginning of his conversion, but without the grace of the Holy Ghost cannot complete it.¹¹ The term Semipelagianism began to be used regularly in the course of the XVII century Jansenist-Jesuit controversy, as Jansenists used it to discredit their Jesuit opponents. However, even though Semipelagianism" should not necessarily be regarded as synonymous with heresy or perceived with the same suspicion we regard controversial sects of the past, it does not mean that it did not develop several views that the Church eventually ruled to be erroneous, as I intend to document.

In conclusion, what was Semipelagianism? Semipelagianism was not an organized movement but rather a theological trend and a way of thinking about anthropology, hamartiology and God’s grace, that developed in the Western Church during the fifth and sixth centuries. In other words, there was no founder, and no sect devoted to the spreading of a heresiarch’s teachings. Historically speaking, the Semipelagian controversy pitted bishops, monks, theologians and statements from local church councils against each other. The debate between Semipelagian thinkers (e.g., Cassian, Arnobius the Younger, St. Hilary of Arles, Faustus of Riez) and their opponents (e.g., St. Augustine, St. Prosper, St. Fulgentius, St. Caesarius of Arles) was centered mostly around the following four issues:

1) The origin of a person’s faith.

Semipelagians believed that the beginning of faith (initium fidei) and the desire to believe (credulitatis affectus) depend entirely on a person’s decision. In other words, they are not a divine gift but a human achievement. After the decision to believe is made, a decision influenced by God through external means (e.g., the preaching of the Gospel, the testimony of another person, the good example set by believers), God’s grace streams into a person’s life and strengthens his/her resolve. St. Hilary of Arles wrote: To persevere in the faith is a gift from God, but the origin of beginning to believe is up to us. And our will must produce on its own that which is its proper task, namely to will: God will give an increase to him who makes a beginning.¹² Conversely, the Augustinians believed that the beginning of faith is a gift of God and not the work of man. God’s grace works from within a person, inducing him/her to believe and to respond to his calling.

2) The relationship between human free will and God’s grace, and the respective roles of these two elements in a person’s salvation.

Semipelagians taught that a person is saved as a result of the cooperation between grace and free will (soteriological synergism). According to them, both elements work in unison. The will is not subjected to grace, but remains an equal partner to God’s grace. As the XVII century Jesuit theologian Molina remarked, while we journey here on earth our salvation is always placed in the hands of our free will; consequently, the possibility that a true believer may backslide and be lost is very real. Augustinians, on the contrary, believed that a person is saved, sanctified and infallibly led to heaven by God’s grace. Our will is free, but subordinated to the prompting of God’s grace. By following grace’s initiative, the will is freed from sin, and a person is saved (soteriological monergism). After God has accomplished his regenerative work in a person, the human will is going to cooperate with the divine initiative in the life-long process known as ‘sanctification.’ Far from being a joy-ride to heaven, this process is filled with that κόπος, or toil, mentioned by Paul in his letters, which will be compensated by a future divine wage (1 Cor 3:8).

3) The basis for the biblical doctrine of predestination.

Semipelagians argued that predestination is nothing else but God’s a-temporal foreknowledge of the decisions a person will make in his/her life. In other words, it is the reward and retribution for the faith and faith-filled behavior people exhibit here on earth, which God has eternally known would take place. Augustinians claimed instead that a person is predestined in virtue of God’s unconditioned will, good pleasure and foreknowledge of what he himself is going to do in a person’s life.

4) The first and ultimate cause of final perseverance.

Semipelagians believed that final perseverance is a gift that God offers to every believer without exception; it is effective only if a person cooperates with that gift. However, Augustinians pointed out that the gift of final perseverance is the means through which God brings about his decree of predestination of the elect. Not every believer receives or is entitled to receive that gift.

In what may easily be regarded as the most informative essay on Semipelagianism, E. Amann outlined in eight phases its history and development:

1. The first discussions among Augustine’s disciples;

2. Early controversies in the Massilian milieu;

3. Prosper’s defense of St. Augustine;

4. Theological controversies;

5. The Augustinians’ response;

6. The revival of anti-Augustinianism;

7. Semipelagianism in difficulty;

8. The Council of Orange and the defeat of Semipelagianism.

As Amann explained: The Semipelagian controversy knew two paroxysms. The first, around 430, shortly after Augustine’s death; the second, dth century and the beginning of the sixth. It eventually ended with the decrees of Orange II in 529.¹³ In my research, I have narrowed his eight phases of the controversy down to five, and described them in four chapters: 1. Augustine and the Massilians; 2. Prosper and Arnobius; 3. Fulgentius of Ruspe and Faustus of Riez; 4.Caesarius of Arles and Orange II. I will first summarize each phase; then proceed to outline it in greater detail through an analysis of the relevant texts. Finally, in the last chapter of Part One, I will draw tentative conclusions, introducing some systematic and biblical reflections to the attention of the readers.

By the time the Semipelagian controversy ended, following the Second Council of Orange in 529, many important theological views about grace and predestination had been intensely debated. Some insights were formally ratified by the Magisterium and became official Catholic doctrine (e.g., the necessity and gratuity of divine grace and its primacy and priority over man’s free will). Some insights promoted by Augustinian rigorists were outright rejected and anathematized, such as predestination unto damnation, or positive reprobation, and the theory of limited atonement, which claims that Christ did not die for those who are going to hell (this theory will be fiercely debated again in the IX century, in the clash between Gottschalk and Hincmar). Other views were never officially endorsed by the Church but were upheld by individual theologians in the next few centuries as a matter of personal opinion (e.g., predestination of individuals to glory; the basis for predestination to glory being found in either God’s will or foreknowledge; and whether God’s abandonment of the non-elect ensues from personal foreseen sins or as a consequence of original sin which plagues every person born into this world). Finally, some views (e.g., the irresistibility or efficaciousness of grace; the role of human will in the process of justification, i.e., synergism vs. monergism) were vigorously debated again, hundreds of years later, during the Middle Ages, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. The main Semipelagian views that not only survived the Church’s condemnation but eventually became official Catholic doctrine were: a) the universality of God’s grace and his real, vehement salvific will; b) the possibility of salvation for some of the unevangelized; and c) a greater role for the human will in the process of salvation (i.e., synergism, or the notion of cooperari, upheld at the Council of Trent, in 1562).

Despite the magnitude and importance of the Semipelagian controversy, it is surprising that very little has been published in the English language to document its inception and content. Most literature about Semipelagianism is in French, German and Italian. The two doctoral dissertations, one by Rebecca Weaver, published in the Patristic Monograph Series, and the other by Donato Ogliari, are possibly the only texts available in English on this topic. Weaver summarized very aptly the various points of view of the participants in the controversy. She also brought to the forefront the importance of their social, cultural and religious milieu. As she put it: The difference in the membership of their respective social contexts must assuredly have affected the character of their questions and their answers.¹⁴ Weaver reminds us that the Eastern monastic tradition, exemplified by Evagrius and Origen, deeply influenced the monasteries of Lerins, of Marseilles and of Provence in general. Thus, the main Semipelagian figures, such as Cassian, Arnobius the Younger, Hilary of Arles, Vincent and Faustus, remained faithful to this tradition by emphasizing the role of free will and human choice in the process of salvation. Although Weaver has made a valuable contribution by putting the Semipelagian controversy into a historical context, she did not take sides or adjudicate on the validity of the arguments presented by the parties involved, though it is possible to read between the lines a certain degree of sympathy for the Semipelagian thinkers. This neutrality is respectable in an historian, but I think she could have furthered the discussion on the topic of predestination by making nuanced judgments and comments on the arguments advanced by the parties involved. On this account Ogliari did not disappoint, since he neither held back his personal views about the subject matter, nor minced words. Respectfully and yet relentlessly, he took Augustine to task on the following accounts: a) faulty biblical exegesis; b) betrayal of the established theological tradition; c) exceedingly negative anthropology; d) unbalanced and unwarranted emphasis on divine sovereignty at the expense of free will. At the end of Ogliari’s research, Augustine emerged with a black eye, with great satisfaction of his modern critics and to the dismay of people like me, who still cast their lots with the saint’s theology. My only two objections to Ogliari are methodological in nature: 1) Why didn’t he mention extensively the views of Augustine’s scholarly supporters? Are these scholars so few and far in between, as to fit in a phone booth? For example, why are there no references to the great theologian Garrigou-Lagrange and to the Italian scholar Gaetano Lettieri’s foundational work L’altro Agostino (2001)? Such omissions are indeed un-excusable; and 2) Is Origen’s doctrine of apokatastasis Ogliari’s operative bias? If it was, it would certainly explain why he was so harsh in his criticism of Augustine’s soteriology.¹⁵

The opinions set forth in the last chapter of Part One are the result of my study and research, and are intentionally aimed at evoking a critical response from my readers. One last word about the method adopted by various theologians described in Parts One and Two of my research: in every chapter the reader will come across numerous biblical texts used by various parties to prove their point. While the modern Catholic theological sensibility may not particularly appreciate ongoing proof-texting, it is important to understand that the doctrine of predestination outlined in Parts One and Two was debated primarily on exegetical grounds, and therefore any attempt to understand the genesis of this doctrine and the controversy surrounding it on purely historical grounds will not yield satisfactory results; worse yet, such an approach would run counter to the mind-set of all the participants in the debate, as they recognized God’s Word to be the final authority when determining the truthfulness of their arguments (the authors discussed in Part Three, instead, analyzed the doctrine of predestination mainly from a philosophical and logical point of view, with minimal reference to Scripture).

Part Two of my book is entitled: "Medieval Kaleidoscopic Views of Grace and Predestination. When God’s grace is perceived by the human mind, which I compare to a kaleidoscope, and filtered through the lenses of the human imagination, which contain loose colored beads or pebbles (i.e., ideas and beliefs), certain patterns begin to emerge. In the eleven chapters of Part Two, I documented how, as various scholars approached the topics of grace and predestination, the slight modifications they introduced became the equivalent of a spin or rotation of a theological kaleidoscope," causing the patterns of colors, namely the Church’s understanding of these doctrines, to change. In the course of writing this Part, I had to plough through at least a dozen un-translated Latin texts, without the benefit of consulting any foreign translations: once again, I am responsible for any possible mistranslations or imprecise interpretations. The three main references that helped me orient myself among the various medieval views were: 1) Aage Rydstrom-Poulsen’s The Gracious God: Gratia in Augustine and the Twelfth Century (Copenhagen, 2002); 2) J. Pelikan’s Chapter Beyond the Augustinian Synthesis, found in the third volume of his A History of the Development of Doctrine (Chicago, 1978); and 3) the unsurpassable, multi-author summary of the history of the doctrine of predestination in the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique.

Part Three, entitled "Predestinarian Views from the Twelfth Century to the Renaissance," was the easiest to write, considering that most of the texts I consulted had already been translated into English, French or Italian. However, it was during this period that the consensus around the doctrine of predestination began to crumble. I documented this shift in the writings of several theologians, by translating and summarizing their views.

I gladly leave to others the cumbersome task of showing how the historical, political, social and economic circumstances affected, influenced and shaped the various understandings of the doctrine of predestination that evolved through the centuries. My avowed objective in this work of mine was to uncover, translate and summarize numerous texts dealing with this doctrine; assess their contents; and submit a very tentative conclusion to my readers. Thus, I hope future critics’comments will not be directed at the book I should have written, but rather at the book I avowedly set out to write. On a pessimistic note, I am aware that my research will likely be snubbed by Historical Theology scholars because it fails to supply an account of the historical, political, geographical, sociological and economic circumstances in which the doctrines of grace and predestination developed. For instance, one criticism voiced by an anonymous reviewer of the first draft of Part One, claimed that: The most interesting work in fifth and sixth century scholarship on Christianity is much more engaged with the larger historical context of changing roles and identities as the Roman world was being transformed. The present work is more in the model of old-fashioned histories of dogma. My response? So be it! I remain completely un-deterred by this criticism, un-repented about my approach, and disdainful of the skeptical and agnostic stance of many historical theologians who have surrendered any desire and/or hope to make any kind of claim (even tentative ones) concerning systematic theological issues. Moreover, I feel vindicated by the following statement found in an important work of the doyen of Historical Theology studies, Jaroslav Pelikan: "We are also continuing our practice in the first two volumes of paying attention only to the history of the doctrine [emphasis mine], even at the expense of fascinating and important questions outside the area of doctrine."¹⁶

At this point, as a way to introduce the readers to the heart of the controversy surrounding predestination, I would like to set up an artificial scenario. Jonathan is a modern day college student. He was raised in a nominally Christian home. One day, as a result of his studies and personal intellectual quest, he claims to be a free thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment. Moreover, he regards himself an agnostic and rejects the theistic world view he was raised in. However, after reading some works by William James, he sheds his agnosticism. In particular, one paragraph from one of James’ essays, makes a deep impression on him. James, after arguing that believing enriches our lives in a way that unbelief does not, encourages the readers to embrace a faith, any faith, and to live their lives in accordance with it:

Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living and your belief will help create the fact. For ‘scientific proof’ that you are right may not be clear before the day of Judgment (or some stage of being which that expression may serve to symbolize) is reached. But the faithful fighters of this hour, or the beings that then and there will represent them, may then turn to the faint-hearted, who here decline to go on, with words like those with which Henry IV greeted the tardy Crillon after a great victory had been gained: Hang yourself, brave Crillon! We fought at Arques, and you were not there!¹⁷

At this point, Jonathan begins to yearn for faith, for a personal relationship with God. But how is one supposed to befriend God and relate to him? Yearning to find God, and yet confused, Jonathan knocks at the doors of a Benedictine monastery and participates in a month long retreat. When Jonathan tells the retreat’s spiritual director that he is not a Christian, the Benedictine monk challenges him, by appealing to a pragmatic version of Pascal’s Wager, to adopt the Christian worldview as a working hypothesis. The advice Jonathan receives is that if he found the Christian worldview to yield spiritual and ethical results in his everyday life, he should adopt it in full. Jonathan likes the suggestion, as it neatly fits with what he read in William James. While staying at the monastery he reads the Bible for the first time, from cover to cover. Moreover, he begins to pray and asks God to reveal his will for his life, on the basis of Mt 7:7-11: Ask and it will be given you; seek and you will find; knock and the door will be opened to you. For everyone who asks receives, and the one who seeks, finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened (NAB). But what if his spiritual experiences were merely the product of his unconscious wishful thinking? What if he was falling under the spell of a self-induced delusion, as Freud would have it? Finally, having overcome his fears and doubts, Jonathan decides to join the RCIA program offered at a local Catholic parish in the Fall.

In conclusion, Jonathan’s case exemplifies what the participants in the Semipelagian controversy fiercely debated. Why has he become a Christian? Will he die one? Where does the faith that he has developed come from? Is it a personal accomplishment or the result of God’s unmerited favor? Why did he become a Christian, though his family and friends did not? Is it because, as his unbelieving father once said, paradoxically: I did not receive the gift of faith, whereas Jonathan did? However, if that is true, would not that mean that God is partial to some people? Again, why did Jonathan have a desire to know God, while so many people seem to go through life totally oblivious to him? The following three theological systems would interpret Jonathan’s conversion experience in different ways:

PELAGIANISM: Jonathan was born without original sin and therefore he did not inherit a weak and corrupt nature. He always had before him the choice of good and evil, truth and falsehood, right and wrong. When he became an agnostic, it was because it pleased him to be one. When he became a Christian, it was because he decided to be one: to believe or not to believe, after all, is a matter of personal choice. The reason why his father and friends are unbelievers is because they chose not to believe. All the circumstances and people that led Jonathan to belief were in place not because God had so arranged, but because he himself brought them into his life through his own choices and lifestyle. Jonathan likes traveling; he respects knowledge and learning; he yearns for authentic religious experience: this is who he is. This explains why he read James and went on a retreat. Thus, his conversion was the logical outcome of his lifestyle. Jonathan will die a Christian as long as he perseveres in the faith through his will power and determination. More specifically: has he been predestined by God to go to heaven? If this is indeed the case, it is only because God has infallibly foreknown before all time that he would persevere to the end of his life, thanks to his strong will.

SEMIPELAGIANISM: Jonathan was born with original sin. Following his Easter baptism at the end of the RCIA program, Jonathan stands before God with a weak but intact will. He decided to believe because he sensed that faith and the things of God appealed to him. Reading William James persuaded him of the importance of believing in God and of shedding his agnosticism. In a sense, he is better off than his father and friends because he made the right choice, while they did not. He wanted to believe, and so he did. However, after Jonathan maneuvered himself into faith through some intelligent choices, God helped him with his grace, without which he could not attain eternal salvation. In other words, Jonathan still needs the help of God in order to retain his faith and to grow in it. In his specific situation, it was Jonathan who decided to develop a relationship with God and to go on a retreat at the Benedictine monastery, but it was God who strengthened his resolve with his grace in all these circumstances, though only after Jonathan made all the right decisions. As far as predestination is concerned, God will keep his name in the Book of Life mentioned in Rev 3:5, as long as Jonathan’s free will continues to cooperate with the grace God has given and will continue to give him. Just like Pelagians, Semipelagians would claim that Jonathan’s predestination is rooted in God’s foreknowledge that Jonathan will persevere to the end by cooperating with divine grace (a grace without which he could not be saved).

AUGUSTINIANISM: God’s grace led Jonathan to believe, by anticipating his every move. Everything he read and did, and every person he met was instrumental in his conversion, which occurred as a result of God’s grace working in his soul and heart rather than just exercising a mere moral and external influence on him. It was God who gave him the desire to read William James; it was God who induced him, through his grace, to go on a retreat. Just as Jonathan needed the empowerment of grace to believe, he also needs grace to persevere in the future. But this grace is not earned by anything he does. It is the unmerited and efficacious gift of God: a gift that is not bestowed on everybody, and, apparently, not on his family and friends. Without God’s grace, all of his efforts to love and follow him could not even take place. God’s grace infallibly led him to Christ. Jonathan does not know with absolute certainty whether he is in the number of the elect, whether he will persevere to the end or not. However, the fact that he believes, relies on God in his daily life and prays, are hopeful indications that he is and will. Predestination, if indeed Jonathan is predestined (which, again, is something that he will never have absolute certainty about while on this earth), means that from all time God, for reasons unknown to us human beings, decided to save him and to lead him to heaven. He will do this without fail because Jonathan’s salvation and final perseverance are based on God’s will and good pleasure and not on his foreknowledge of what Jonathan himself is going to do in life.

The participants in the Semipelagian controversy set forth very clear answers to the questions I have raised as a way of example. It is time to turn to them and learn what they had to say.

PART ONE

A Brief History of the Forgotten Catholic Doctrine of Predestination during the Semipelagian Controversy

Chapter One

AUGUSTINE AND THE MASSILIANS

Predestination in Early Church History

The Greek verb προορίζω, translated in English as to predestine, or to determine beforehand, or to foreordain, is a rare word in the Bible: it only appears six times in the New Testament. Out of these six instances, two texts stand out as the loci classici of the doctrine of predestination. The first text is Rom 8:29,30: "For those God foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the likeness of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. And those he predestined, he also called; those he called, he also justified; those he justified, he also glorified. The second text is Eph 1: 4-6: For he chose us in him before the creation of the world to be holy and blameless in his sight. In love he predestined us to be adopted as his sons through Jesus Christ, in accordance with his pleasure and will—to the praise of his glorious grace, which he has freely given us in the One he loves." In virtue of these two brief and yet poignant references alone there can be no doubt that the idea of divine predestination indeed enjoys biblical support. However, one should not think that these two isolated verses support by themselves the entire theological structure of the doctrine of predestination: one needs also consider the theological doctrines of divine election and grace, which, in turn, are supported by numerous scriptural references. Granted that belief in predestination can and should be upheld by a believing Christian, the question remains: how should it be understood? During the past sixteen hundred years, a great number of theologians have studied, debated, defended this doctrine and rejected their opponents’ view of it. The object of my overall research is to investigate how Christians who lived from the V to the XV centuries understood it, and what conclusions they reached about it.

The early Church did not fully develop the idea of predestination found in Paul’s letters. The reason for this negligence is that during the first three centuries Christian theologians engaged in polemics against pagan fatalism (championed by Stoicism and by the neo-Pythagoreans), astrological determinism, Gnosticism, Marcionism, and, later on, Manichaeism. The Church, through her theologians, firmly opposed any theory that denied human freedom and responsibility, thus subjecting human beings to the whims of either impersonal cosmic forces or of an unsympathetic, unfeeling deity. Instead of speculating on the mysterious, hidden causes responsible for human beings’ salvation or damnation, Christian writers decided to put the spot-light on the beneficiary of God’s salvific action, namely humankind, and on its participation in the divine work of redemption as well as on its sinful opposition to it. In the writings of the early Fathers, especially in the Greek Fathers, human freedom; its response to God or its cooperation in the process of salvation; the value of virtue and of ascetical pursuits (i.e., praying, fasting, reading Scriptures, participating in the liturgy), were all regarded as crucial and necessary elements in an orthodox understanding of Paul’s brief references to divine predestination.

In their valuable outlines of the history of the doctrine of predestination, the Dictionnaire apologetique de la foi catholique and the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique have documented how this doctrine was relatively under-developed and only briefly mentioned in the writings of Greek and Latin Fathers alike, before Augustine turned his gifted mind to it. The Greek Fathers, unlike their Latin counterparts (especially those who lived from the IV century on), were inclined to theologize about the effects of God’s providence rather than about its mysterious causes. In other words, they preferred to write about sanctification, the pursuit of virtue and eschatology. H.D. Simonin claimed that the Greeks "ont manifeste’ une repugnance invincible et qui parait bien etre delibere’"¹ for speculation about inscrutable divine decrees, such as predestination before or after foreseen merits; predestination of individuals to glory; and divine predilection for some fortunate souls, whom God allegedly loves more than others. In any event, as far as God’s predestination is concerned, the Greeks were in agreement on the following four points: first, it stems from God’s universal salvific will, extending to every person who has ever or will ever live. Second, it is based on God’s foreknowledge of human, freely performed deeds. Third, it is a corporate reality: in other words, it applies to the ecclesial body, the church, rather than to individual believers. Fourth, it grants an important role to human initiative and its ability to respond to God’s election. Since men and women have the power to cooperate with the divine initiative, the reward of heaven or the punishment of hell are entirely contingent upon the choices they make here on earth.

Somewhat hesitatingly, Simonin suggested that the contribution of early Greek theology to the understanding of the doctrine of predestination may appear to be "quelque peu rudimentaire et imparfait,"² if not begging the question altogether. And yet, in the history of this controversial doctrine, some supporters of Augustine have attempted to recruit the Greek Fathers to their side, by claiming that the latter really upheld predestination by grace and not by human merits. I will not discuss the validity of their claim in this context, but rather press on and briefly review the opinions of some of these Fathers concerning predestination based on God’s foreknowledge of human choices.

Origen, for instance, in De principiis, went as far as suggesting that merits and demerits from a previous life are the reason why God predestined Jacob but rejected Esau. Moreover, in order to emphasize that he was not applying this principle only to these two individuals, Origen went on to say: The same reason, as it seems to me, which is raised concerning Jacob and Esau, may be raised regarding all celestial and terrestrial creatures, and even those of the lower world as well.³

According to the unanimous consensus of the Eastern Fathers,⁴ God would certainly consider people’s meritorious choices before predestining them to heaven. This view of predestination based on God’s foreknowledge of human merits, or post praevisa merita, became fashionable and widely accepted in the early Church. Again, in Origen’s words:

Owing to causes that have previously existed, a different office is prepared by the Creator for each one, in proportion to the degree of his merit, on this ground, indeed, that each one, in respect of having been created by God an understanding, or rational spirit, has, according to the movements of his mind and the feelings of his soul, gained for himself a greater or lesser amount of merit, and has become either an object of love to God, or else one of dislike to Him.⁵

Once again, with the exception of isolated phrases in Marius Victorinus, Athanasius,⁶ Cyprian and Ambrose,⁷ the only predestination known to theologians prior to Augustine was predestination based on God’s a-temporal foreknowledge of what human beings are going to do. Other Greek fathers, like John Chrysostom, talked about man’s good use of free will to keep the divine law as something that has already been foreseen by God. Others, like Ambrosiaster, preferred instead to talk about a person’s foreseen faith (Those whom God foreknew would believe in him he chose to receive the promises. But those who appear to believe yet do not persevere in the faith are not chosen by God, because whoever God chooses will persevere, PL 17, 466). Pelagius, Augustine’s arch-nemesis, in his commentary to the Letter to the Romans, upheld such view; he suggested that to predestine is the same thing as to foresee (praedestinare idem est quod praescire). In other words, those whom God from all eternity foresaw would obey him, he decreed would conform to his Son.⁸

Virtually all the Greek Fathers, notably Origen and his followers, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria and, a few centuries later, John Damascene, unanimously understood the purpose (πρόθεσις) of Rom 8:28 (We know that all things work for good for those who love God, who are called according to the purpose NAB) as referring to the disposition of a person’s heart rather than to God’s good will and pleasure, thus emphasizing human beings’ role in their own salvation and basing predestination on divine foreknowledge.⁹ Tyconius, Augustine’ fellow African, remarked: Clearly God foreknew that the peoples whom he promised to Abraham would come by free will or that they would not. Again, according to Tyconius: This saying, ‘if you had obeyed me, Israel’ (Is 48:18), is a reminder of God’s justice and a configuration of the promises designed to keep anyone from thinking that it is by divine disposition, rather than by free will, that some are made for death, some for life.¹⁰

And then there were the views outlined by Augustine himself in two of his works, the first written before his ordination to the episcopacy, around 394, and the second after his ordination, around 396. In commenting upon Rom 9:11-21, Augustine in his Expositio quarundam propositionum ex epistola ad Romanos suggested that the reason why God chose Jacob but rejected Esau is the foreseen faith of the former. Augustine concluded:

God in his foreknowledge did not choose somebody’s works, which he himself would one day donate, but rather chose their faith, so that he may elect one who he foreknew would believe in him one day and give him his spirit, so that by doing good works he may attain eternal life . . . Thus, God does not choose those who do good, but rather those who believe, so that he may make them do good. It is up to us to believe and to want, but it is up to God to give to those who believe and want the faculty to do what is good through the Holy Spirit.¹¹

A few years later, in question sixty-eight of his De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII ad Simplicianum (Simplician was the newly appointed bishop of Milan, succeeding Ambrose), Augustine claims that grace is not given to us on account of good works we perform (nullis nostris meritis praecedentibus). However, Augustine refers twice in this question to occultissimis meritis (most hidden merits) as the reason why some people are abandoned by God and reprobated, while others are elected and predestined to eternal life, since God cannot possibly be unfair or act capriciously.¹² In conclusion, this was the ecclesial tradition which Augustine’s opponents accused him of subverting, as he pursued the novel idea of predestination based on God’s will, or without consideration of previous merits (sine praevisis meritis).¹³

History of the Semipelagian Controversy

This chapter deals with the first two phases of the history of Semipelagianism, namely the Hadrumetum Crisis and the Disagreement with the Massilienses, in which Augustine played the leading role.

Phase One: The Hadrumetum crisis

During this stage of the controversy Augustine dealt with the objections leveled against his views on grace and free will by some monks from the monastic community of Hadrumetum, located in modern Tunisia. The issue at stake was the relationship between divine grace and human free will. Augustine upheld the priority and primacy of grace, which he regarded as a gratuitous gift rather than as something God owes us as a reward for the good deeds we perform. Although divine grace comes to our help, our will is free and needs to cooperate with God’s work in us; hence, the importance of correction and rebuke, which God uses to accomplish his will. Augustine also introduced the idea of predestination as a way to explain why some people persevere to the end of their lives while others do not. Augustine devoted three letters and two treatises, which also were originally written as letters, namely Grace and Free Will and Rebuke and Grace, articulating his views on these important matters.

Augustine’s Letter 214 to Valentinus

(Easter 426 or 427 a.d.)

Two monks from the monastery of Hadrumetum came to visit Augustine and brought him the news that a quarrel had broken out in the Hadrumetum monastery between those who said that at the Last Judgment people will not be judged according to their deeds, and those who sought to strike a balance between grace and free will. Although the monks were in a hurry to return home to celebrate Easter with their community, Augustine played gracious host and explained to them subtle doctrinal points about God’s grace. The monks asked him several questions about a controversial letter, the contents of which had been made public. Augustine had written this letter to a Roman deacon and future pope, Sixtus (Epistle 194, dated 419 a.d.). In this letter he upheld against the Pelagians (whom he called enemies and dangerous opponents of God’s grace) the primacy of grace over human effort, its gratuity, and divine predestination based on God’s will. Augustine prepared the monks to go back home, entrusting them with a letter for their abbot Valentinus. In his letter Augustine also asked to meet a certain Florus, a monk from Hadrumetum, who had expressed reservations about the African bishop’s views on grace and free will. Augustine emphasized that both grace and free will are needed (Neither deny the grace of God, nor so uphold free will as to sever it from the grace of God),¹⁴ though grace always enjoys primacy over human works. It is God’s grace, he claimed, that moves people’s hearts, leading them to wisdom, salvation and understanding. On the contrary, the new heretics (i.e., the Pelagians), who believe that people are justified through their own efforts, claim that the grace of God is given to people as a reward for their works, prayers or faith. Some of the scriptural passages that Augustine pointed out to Valentinus, in support of his view, include Ps 118:25: O Lord grant salvation!; Lk 24:25, in which Jesus remarks about people’s sinful minds and wills: How foolish you are and how slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken!; and James 1:5: But if any of you lacks wisdom, he should ask God who gives to all generously and ungrudgingly, and he will be given it (NAB).

Augustine’s Letter 215 to Valentinus

(Easter 426 or 427 a.d.)

The Hadrumetan monks ended up spending Easter with Augustine, and even stayed a few weeks afterwards. Augustine wrote this letter and an entire book, De gratia et libero arbitrio. He also gave the two monks some copies of the decrees of the Councils of Carthage and of Numidia; a five bishops’ account of a local council; a copy of the plenary Council of Africa’s report to Pope Zosimus, which was attended by 203 bishops (May 418 a.d.); and Cyprian’s treatise On the Lord’s Prayer. Augustine ended his letter urging the Hadrumetan monks not to deviate to the right (i.e., emphasis on unaided free will) or to the left (i.e., to emphasize grace to the point of antinomianism), but to steer the middle course (i.e., to grant primacy and priority of divine grace working together with free will).

Augustine’s Letter 217 to Vitalis

(426 or 427 a.d.)

Vitalis was a learned layman in Carthage who claimed that right belief in God, faith and commitment to the Gospel were the outcome of human will and not the fruits of God’s grace. In his letter, Augustine makes two main objections to Vitalis. First, if faith and right belief were the product of the human will, and if all we need to do to convert people is to preach the Gospel, how then do we explain the church’s liturgical practice to pray for unbelievers so that God may convert them? Is that a vain and perfunctory prayer or is it really the case that God can turn a person from unbelief to belief?¹⁵ Secondly, Augustine encourages his opponents to read Cyprian’s On the Lord’s Prayer, which clearly states that we need God’s grace in everything we do.

Augustine claims that faith is not the reward for something virtuous we have done, but rather the unmerited gift of God. This grace is needed for separate acts, and is not given as a general condition in the divine law or even in man’s nature. In support of his view, Augustine quotes Phil 2:13: For it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure (NRSV). The reason why we are in need of grace is that We have lost the freedom of our will to love God by the magnitude of the first sin.¹⁶ Thus, the will is prepared by antecedent grace, but grace is not given through antecedent merit of the will.¹⁷ Toward the end of the letter Augustine argues that we also need grace to persevere in faith. God does not want us to know for sure whether we are among the number of the saved, because he wants us to remain humble and pious. Next, Augustine introduces twelve marks of what he considers an authentically Catholic view on grace and free will. These features show that the will of man is forestalled by the grace of God and is prepared by grace rather than rewarded in receiving it.¹⁸ Augustine encouraged Vitalis to write to him if he disagreed with any of these points.

This letter also contains a brief exegesis of 1 Tim 2:4: God wills all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of the truth. According to Augustine, all does not mean everybody without exception, considering that in 1 Cor 15:22 we read: In Christ all will be made alive. Augustine argues that if all, in this case, should not be understood in a universalist manner, extending to Christians and pagans alike, neither it should be in the case of 1 Tim 2:4. Moreover, in the case of children who die before being baptized, we should not think that God, by foreseeing the future, is able to predict whether that person, had he lived longer, would have been saved. As a matter of fact, Augustine calls this view an execration and mockery for the erroneous opinion that men are to be judged according to their future will—which dying men will not have.¹⁹ In conclusion, according to Augustine, the initium fidei or the beginning of belief is the gift of God and not a