Span Lebanon 1963: Lighting Candles, Not Cursing Darkness

By James Warner Björkman

SPAN had begun in 1948 as a consortium between the University
of Minnesota and about a dozen colleges that cultivated international
understanding through practical academic research. Each year four
(sometimes three) countries were selected as destinations. It was
and is, because SPAN continues todaya self-financed program
through voluntary donations by businesses in the Upper Midwest as
well as by contributions from the participants themselves (known as
SPANners). The program was oriented toward upper classmen (in that
age of gender insensitive terminology) so applicants were usually
students in their Junior (or third) year of undergraduate studies.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Oct 29, 2003
• ISBN: 9781469108759

James Warner Björkman

James Warner Björkman, educated in political science at the University of Minnesota (BA summa cum laude 1966) and Yale University (MPhil 1969: PhD 1976), is Professor of Public Policy and Administration at the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, as well as Professor of Public Administration and Development at Leiden University. Previously faculty member at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Executive Director of the International Institute of Comparative Government in Lausanne, Switzerland, he has held appointments in Sweden, England, Pakistan and India. He has published nine books and approximately seventy articles and chapters in journals and/or edited volumes.

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Copyright © 2003 by James Warner Björkman.

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Contents

Four Decades Later, Seen From The Shore Of The North Sea

The Arab Refugee Problem In Lebanon

Preface

Chapter I -Yesterday: The Balfour Declaration

Chapter II: Today: The Palestinian Refugee

Chapter III And Tomorrow … .

Conclusion

Appendix A Zionist Drafts

Zionist Draft: July 1917

Appendix B Distribution Of Registered Refugee Population In Lebanon According To Category Of Registration And Age As Of June 30, 1962.

Appendix C Camps In Lebanon

Appendix D Unrwa Supplementary Feeding Program In Lebanon: Average Number Of Beneficiaries, 1 July 1961-30 June 1962.

Appendix E Unrwa Milk Program In Lebanon

Appendix F Number Of Visits To Unrwa And Subsidized Clinics In Lebanon, 1 July 1961-30 June 1962

Appendix G Hospital Facilities Available To Palestinian Refugees In Lebanon, 19611962

Appendix H Health Education Programs In Lebanon Carried Out By Four Health Education Officers In The Campus And Villages

Appendix I Progress Of Unrwa’s Educational Program In Lebanon Over The Past Thirteen Years

Appendix J Unrwa & Unesco Elementary Schools In Lebanon (Number Of Pupils By Grades As Of 31 May 1962)

Appendix K Unrwa & Unesco Preparatory Schools In Lebanon (Number Of Pupils By Grades As Of 31 May 1962)

Appendix L Distribution Of Refugee Pupils Receiving Education In Lebanon (As Of 31 May 1962)

Appendix M Unrwa’s Budget For Expenditure In 1963 & 1962 Estimated Expenditure

Bibliography Official Documents

University Youth In Lebanon:

Preface

Chapter I General Introduction: The Middle East

Chapter II General Introduction: Lebanon

Chapter III General Introduction: Role Of Youth

Chapter IV Lebanese Perspective: History

Chapter VI Lebanese Perspective: Social Structure

Chapter VII Lebanese Perspective: Political Order

Chapter VIII Lebanese Perspective: Role In The Middle East

Chapter IX Student Situation: Educational Institutions

Chapter X Student Situation: Position Of The Lebanese Government

Chapter XI Student Situation: Organizational Efforts Of Interest Groups

Chapter XIII The Student Union: History Of L’union Nationale Des Étudiants Du Liban

Chapter XIV The Student Union: History Of L’union Nationale Des Universitaires Du Liban

Chapter XV The Student Union: Reactions

Chapter XVI The Student Union: Structure

Chapter XVII The Student Union: Domestic Goals And Methods

Chapter XVIII The Student Union: International Goals And Commitments

Chapter XIX The Student Union: Contributions To Lebanese Society

Appendix A Lebanese Election Statistics 1943-1960553

Appendix B Pre-Registration Letter

Appendix C Sample Constitution554

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

The Influence Of The Government Upon The Lebanese Secondary Schools

Preface

I Background To Education In Lebanon

II Comparison Of French And Anglo-American Schools

III Basic Problems Faced By Lebanese Secondary Schools

V Proposed Changes In The Educational System

Bibliography

The Heritage And Future Of Education In Lebanon

Preface

Part I Lebanon: A Compromise Between Arabic, French And American Cultures

Part II Statement Of The Problem—The Clash Between French & Anglo-American Philosophies Of Education

Part III The Lebanese Academy Of Fine Arts—

Village Welfare In Lebanon:

Preface

Introduction

Chapter I Statement Of The Problem—The Need For Development

Chapter II The Traditional Village Culture Imperative In Analyzing Village Welfare Programs

Chapter Iii Agencies And Organizations Involved In Village Welfare

Chapter V Conclusion

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

Sectarianism In The Lebanese Village Of Kab Elias

Preface

Chapter I Introduction

Chapter II Kab Elias—The Village

Chapter III Sectarianism In Kab Elias’ Past

Chapter IV Sectarianism In Kab Elias Today (Part B)

Chapter V Sectarianism And Secularism In Kab Elias

Chapter VI Summary And Conclusion

Appendix A Recent Population Estimates Of Lebanon

Appendix B Geographical Population Of Lebanon As Of December 31, 1944

Appendix C Sectarian Division Of National Offices

Appendix D Results Of Kab Elias" 1963 Village Council Election

Appendix E Data On Persons Formally Interviewed*

Appendix F Population* Estimates Of Kab Elias

Appendix G Data On Kab Elias Village Council (Elected July 21, 1963)

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

The Education Of Handicapped Children In Lebanon

Preface

I The Handicapped Child In Lebanon

II The Special Teacher

III Disability In Receptive Language

IV Disorders In Expressive Language

V Mental Abnormality

VI The Blind

VII The Future—A Conclusion

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

The Political Parties Of Lebanon And Their Impact On Lebanese Politics

Preface

General Introduction And Historical Background

Chapter I

Chapter II Part 1

Chapter II Part 2

Conclusion

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

The Dig At Tell El-Ghassil: Season 1963

Preface

Part I The Context Of The Past

Part II The History Of The Tell

Part III The Dig At Tell El-Ghassil

Conclusion

Epilogue

Appendix The Excavation Diary

Bibliography

Bio-Sketch 2003

Dedicated to Armi and Ruth, who were living exemplars of the SPAN motto that It is better to light one candle than to curse the darkness

FOUR DECADES LATER, SEEN FROM THE SHORE OF THE NORTH SEA

James Warner Björkman

More than forty years ago, in the autumn of 1962, notices appeared in college newspapers and on classroom bulletin boards throughout Minnesota: applications were invited for the Student Project for Amity among Nations (SPAN). SPAN offered an adventurous way to earn course-credits by spending a summer overseas on fieldwork, then writing a thesis. It was a sure-fire combination of academic rigor and personal pleasure.

SPAN had begun in 1948 as a consortium between the University of Minnesota and about a dozen colleges that cultivated international understanding through practical academic research. Each year four (sometimes three) countries were selected as destinations. It was—and is, because SPAN continues today—a self-financed program through voluntary donations by businesses in the Upper Midwest as well as by contributions from the participants themselves (known as SPANners). The program was oriented toward upper classmen (in that age of gender insensitive terminology) so applicants were usually students in their Junior (or third) year of undergraduate studies.

In 1962 the countries on offer were Finland, Lebanon, Brazil and Tanganyika. Although only a lowly Sophomore, I applied—and, after a round of references and interviews, was selected among about a dozen others for Lebanon. Roughly the same number of participants were selected for the other three countries, so the 1963 cohort began with about 50 students. My background as a farm boy from the northern sticks (having been born and raised within a couple miles of the Canadian border) was not unusual in our agricultural state of Minnesota, but most SPANners were somewhat older students from towns and cities—and quite many had already traveled overseas. I had not. However, at the University of Minnesota I was a student activist who had been President of Frontier Hall (a dormitory for about 500 men), then Chairman of the Board of Residence Halls (about 2500 students in six dorms), and also a Senator elected at-large of the Minnesota Student Association. In an age of optimism that knew few bounds, I was ready, willing and eager to undertake such credits earned through foreign research. Little did I know what I was getting myself in for … or the impact the experience would have on the rest of my life.

SPAN was—and remains—a solidly academic program. Our small group met almost every Saturday with our SPAN advisor, Professor Yahya Armajani (of whom more later), in order to study the history, culture, society, politics, economics and international relations of the Middle East. The primary focus, of course, was on Lebanon—that little nugget on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, which is clutched (as it were) in a Syrian fist. Professor Armajani also took us all through a few steps into Arabic in order to provide a few useful phrases (maa-lesh comes to mind: ‘not to worry’) and cultural no-no’s (never circle your thumb and forefinger to signal OK for the gesture conveys quite another meaning). Two members of our group (Kirsten Ingerson and I) enrolled in Beginning Arabic at the University of Minnesota under the tutelage of Professor Thomas Irving (a Scots-Irish Presbyterian who had converted to Islam). Several of us also spoke (or at least had studied) French which, as the second language of Lebanon, provided another advantage.

Professor Armajani—or Armi as he was affectionately known—was a firm but fair task-master, and our preparatory studies were as thorough as any received in a student classroom. Indeed, several of our group dropped out (de-selected themselves is the nicer term) so, by the summer of 1963, only ten SPANners remained in the batch destined for Lebanon. Dr Armajani was born in Iran to a family of Persian Jews—of the biblically renowned lineage of Esther—but was a seeker after Truth who converted first to Shi’ite Islam and then to Presbyterian Christianity. Himself a student radical in his youth, Armi fled Iran in the 1930s, then under the heel of the oppressive elder Shah Pahlavi. He married Ruth, the daughter of a missionary, and moved to the United States where he earned a Bachelor of Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary and his MA and PhD at Princeton University. By the time we met Armi in 1962, he had become Professor of History at Macalester College in St Paul where he was a major fixture in the firmament of Minnesota’s intelligentsia.

This collection¹ of our SPAN theses is dedicated to Armi and Ruth who served not only in loco parentis during our summer in Beirut but also, much more importantly, became lifelong friends. I had the privilege of regarding Armi as my intellectual father and took an additional course from him on World Religions, which the University of Minnesota wisely imported him to teach. In my own quest for Truth, I visited him one evening to ask a (what to me seemed—and still seems to be) profound question, namely what is faith? I must have been in my ‘Doubting Thomas’ phase—before I learned to doubt my doubt. Armi leaned back, puffed on his ubiquitous pipe, and then asked: Jim, when you get on a plane, do you expect to reach your destination? Or do you expect it to crash? I gave the obvious answer and Armi said ‘you see?’ His ability to focus the mind through aphorism was tremendous, and he published extensively too. Armi’s magisterial work was Middle East, Past and Present (Prentice-Hall, 1970) and I still treasure the inscription on my copy: For my friend Jim who started with little Lebanon and went to India and bigger places—with affection, Armi. But I digress.

The point of this little introductory note is to position our SPAN project within the space and spirit of the time—the early 1960s—when the world was ever so much more sanguine about progress toward perfection. The era was that of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, who had resolved the Cuban Missile Crisis and whose assassination occurred after our summer in Lebanon; indeed in November 1963 we were in the initial throes of writing our SPAN theses due 1 March 1964. The era was before the quagmire of Vietnam, before the disastrous Seven Day War, before the hideous Civil War that tore Lebanon apart; it was, in short, an era of good feeling and sunny optimism … an attitude that shines through in the papers that follow. Even when we SPANners reported problems, we readily and optimistically suggested ways to reform and resolve them in the true ‘can do’ spirit of America. Most

SPAN theses have prefaces and/or epilogues that speak for each individual SPANner so, other than urging the reader to read on, more words are not necessary.

This introduction ends by adding that the SPANners to Lebanon of 1963 are celebrating their 40th anniversary by gifting this volume to the American University of Beirut, which had facilitated us collectively in more ways than we may ever know. We hope that the contents of this book might provide some ‘historical’ perspectives on what Lebanon was forty years ago, and perhaps a somewhat bitter-sweet view of ‘what might have been’. At least it will give current students some insights into an earlier age and thereby help them understand their present all the better.

Whenever possible, a brief bio-sketch is provided after each of the nine theses that will indicate has happened to us SPANners of 1963. One of the ten participants from that summer somehow never managed to complete her project. Another who did complete her (today still painful) essay on Palestinian refugees—Patricia Anderson—has, alas, left this mortal sphere. We survivors regard this posthumous publication as our tribute to her memory.

‘Bjork’ April 2003

Notes

¹ Special thanks are due to Ms Susan Wiese at the SPAN office in Minneapolis and to Ms Joy Misa at my Institute of Social Studies in Den Haag (The Netherlands) for assistance beyond reasonable measure in the assemblage of this historical product. And the late Margaret Eliza Smith merits eternal gratitude for her suggestion that our 1963 SPAN theses be compiled into an accessible volume.

THE

ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

IN LEBANON

PATRICIA ANDERSON

Lebanon 1963

Gustavus Adolphus College

St Peter, Minnesota

Submitted March 1, 1964,

in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the

Student Project for Amity Among Nations (SPAN),

as organized under Foreign Study Seminar 161 and 162

at the University of Minnesota

PREFACE

When I began considering topics for my SPAN paper, my ideas came slowly and did not sound too exciting. Then, after my advisor suggested that someone might do a project on the Palestinian refugee problem, I began some research and wrote some letters to likely sources. The more I became involved in the project, the more intriguing it became.

As I read more about the situation and as I gathered materials, I realized the magnitude of the project which I was undertaking, and the problem of the limitation of the topic began. My original plan for the first chapter of the paper was to give a presentation of the development of the Question of Palestine over the centuries. Such as endeavor, however, proved to be too broad to handle in any unsuperficial manner. As I considered the various aspects of the history of the problem with which I might concern myself. I found that in many topics. I had a very one-sided indoctrination and viewpoint, in addition to various conflicting sources. It was impossible for me to decide which of the sources were most reliable. Such was true of the amount of time.

Special acknowledgment and appreciation is due to the UNRWA headquarters and Lebanon field office, both of which are located in Beirut, Lebanon, for providing me with information and arranging for my visits of the camps; to the representatives of the various volunteers agencies of their time, assistance and interest in my project, to Dr Yahya Armajani, our SPAN advisor, for his interest, counsel and help; to Dr Rodney Davis and Miss Shirley Gibbs, members of the Gustavus Faculty, for serving as my campus readers.

Finally, I am grateful to SPAN—all those who have contributed to it and those who have helped to establish and increase its program—for making this unusual, exciting and enlightening academic experience possible for me.

CHAPTER I

-YESTERDAY: THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

In 1958 an Arab, writing of the problem of the Palestinian refugees, stated:

And talking into consideration that this problem started on the 2nd day of November, 1917, or forty-one years ago with no hope of a solution in the near future the Palestine Arab refugee feel that this alone is another world catastrophe.²

With the advantage of hindsight, this Arab is pointing to the Balfour Declaration which appeared, as follows, in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild, the President of the English Zionist Federation, from Sir Arthur Balfour, then Foreign Secretary of England:

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of his Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish aspirations which had been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:

‘His Majesty’s Government with favour view the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in

Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.’

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.³

The Balfour Declaration, only sixty-seven words in itself, was rather insignificant piece of wartime correspondence when it was written. However, it would take on great significance in the years that followed. In order to understand its later importance, one must consider the goals and growth of Zionism, the development or growth of the Declaration itself, and the reasons that the Declaration appeared in November of 1917.

The spiritual meaning of Zionism—the messianic hope of Judaism—has always been kept alive among the Jewish people as they have lived in the Diaspora for nearly two thousand years. In fact, at their Passover each year, they toasted, Next year in Jerusalem.⁴ Zionism, as a political movement, however, with its goal of the creation of a national state in Palestine, is a comparatively recent phenomenon. The movement had its origins in the writings of Leo Pinsker during the 1880s which were later developed more thoroughly by Ahad Ha’am and Theodir Herzl.⁵

In its beginnings as a political movement, Zionism was not committed to any certain area of the world as a Jewish homeland. However, the Russian and Rumanian Jewry wanted Palestine and outvoted those who were satisfied with another areas; thus, from 1906 on, the World Zionist Organization sought to secure the establishment of a national Jewish state in Palestine.⁶ Yet, at the beginning of World War I, Zionism had only a small following. In Great Britain there were only eight thousand members of the Zionist Federation out of a total Jewish population of six hundred thousand.⁷ In the United States, the situation for the Zionists was even worse. Out of the three million Jews in the United States, there were not more than about twelve thousand members of the Zionist Organization.⁸ However, with the advent of the war, new and more practical possibilities for the success of the Zionist goal appeared. The Middle Eastern power of Turkey, the contemporary occupier of Palestine, joined the Central Powers, largely as a result of the strong German influence in the Turkish army and of the imperial ambitions of that period of the Young Turk Movement.⁹ The Zionists naturally saw possible fulfillment of their goal if they gave their support to the Allies; for if the Allies were victorious, the Ottoman Empire would collapse.

Thus, the fall of 1914 was the time that Zionist Jews throughout the world were most desirous to meet and consult one another.¹⁰ At the same time, however, their international organization was crippled by the division of Europe into opposing camps.¹¹ The executive body of Zionists had trouble making contacts and the center of activity shifted to a few Zionist leaders in England. England was the most likely place for such activity: there Jewry had found the strongest tradition of friendship, and furthermore England was the most likely country to concern herself with the future of Palestine.¹²

The Zionist leaders gathered in Manchester where Dr Chaim Weizmann, who was born in Russia and had become a naturalized citizen of England, was a profession of chemistry at the University of Manchester.¹³ There Weizmann and his disciples, none of whom had personal influence at that time with the government, not without confidence … set about to scale Olympus.¹⁴ Before Britain had even declared war against Turkey, Weizmann had made his and his followers aims known. In a letter to an American, Dr Schmarya Levin, Weizmann said:

As soon as the situation is somewhat cleared up we could talk plainly to England and to France with regard to the abnormal situation of the Jews, having combatants in all armies, fighting every where, and being nowhere recognized. Now is the time when the peoples of Great Britain France and America will understand it … . The moral force of our claims will prove irresistible; the political considerations will be favorable … . ¹⁵

Then, on November 5, 1914, Britain declared war against Turkey. Prime Minster Asquith, four nights later at a banquet, declared that Britain now included the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire as one of her war aims.¹⁶ The next day in the Cabinet, Lloyd George, then chancellor of the Exchequer, mentioned briefly the ultimate destiny of Palestine.¹⁷ Next, Weizmann met Mr. Herbert Samuel, who was President of the Local Government Board in Asquith’s Ministry, and found in him a friend.¹⁸ Shortly thereafter, Sir Edward Grey was approached by Weizmann who suggested to the Foreign Secretary:

The jealousies of the great European powers would make it difficult to allot [Palestine] [sic] to any one of them … perhaps the opportunity might arise for the Jewish people, and the restoration there of a Jewish State … . Britain influence ought to play a considerable part in the formation of such a State [since] [sic] the geographical situation of Palestine, and especially its proximity to Egypt, would render its goodwill a matter of importance to the British Empire.¹⁹

On December 14, 1914, Dr. Weizmann had an appointment with Balfour, who was not yet a member of Asquith’s government. This appointment was not their first meeting for they had talked briefly in 1906 during a general election, at which time Balfour had expressed a definite sympathy for the Zionist ideology which appealed to him as philosopher and impressed him as a student of history.²⁰ This second conversation continued on the same lines with Balfour reaffirming his support for the Zionist cause. Balfour asked if he could help Weizmann in any way, to which Weizmann replied: Not while the guns are roaring. When the military situation becomes clearer I will come again. Balfour countered: "Mind you come again. It is a great cause you are working for: I would like you to come again and 21 again. 21

Weizmann did not come again until the year 1915 had passed. However with Weizmann’s encouragement, Mr. Samuel circulated a memorandum to the Cabinet in January of 1915 in which he advocated encouragement for Jewish settlement and a British Protectorate for Jewish settlement and a British Protectorate for Palestine.22 After talking to Lloyd George about the memorandum, Lord Reading wrote to Samuel:

I had a talk to Lloyd George about the matter before his departure for Paris. He is certainly inclined to be on the sympathetic side. Your proposal appealed to the poetic and imaginative as well as to the romantic and religious qualities of his mind.²³

Weizmann and Lloyd George confronted one another later that year at the Ministry of Munitions, when the brilliant Scientist Weizmann had began work to produce a process for the manufacturer of acetone which was vitally needed on the battlefront.²⁴ Weizmann made a successful discovery and Lloyd George recorded the following conversation in his Memoirs:

I said to him: ‘you rendered great service to the State and I should like to ask the Prime Minister to recommend you to His Majesty for some honor." He said, ‘There is nothing I want for myself.’ ‘But is there nothing we can do as recognition of your valuable assistance to the country?,’ I asked. He replied, ‘Yes, I would like you to do something for my people’, He then explained his aspirations as to the repatriation of the Jews to the sacred land they had made famous. That was the fount and origin of the famous declaration about the National Home for Palestine.²⁵

However, this final assertion concerning the origin of the Balfour Declaration is open to dispute. Lord Samuel in his Memoirs qualifies the statement, saying:

Long before he Lloyd George had to cope with a shortage of acetone he had taken a close interest in the Palestine question and had shown a full understanding of its significance. From the beginning he had been unwavering in his support of the policy that was ultimately embodied in the Balfour Declaration. As Prime Minister his approval insured its adoption.²⁶

One of Balfour’s biographers concurs with the assertion made by Samuel:

Mr. Lloyd George is not quite accurate in describing British policy in Palestine as a kind of quid pro quo for the patriotic action of the Zionist leader. The Balfour Declaration was not part of a bargain, nor a reward for services rendered.²⁷

Evidence produced earlier and later in this chapter would indicate that the criticism of Lloyd George’ assertion is valid. ²⁸

In 1916 Balfour was serving as the First Lord of the Admiralty, and Weizmann was engaged in work at the Admiralty Laboratories.²⁹ Thus, in a sense, Weizmann came again, for contacts between the two were readily made. On one day after discussing official business, Balfour said: You know, Dr. Weizmann, if the Allies win the War you may get your Jerusalem.³⁰

More important, however, than these individual conversations and thought was the official movement in 1916 of the Zionists into the world of politics. In January of 1916, a political committee made up of leading members of the World Zionist Organization was appointed at an international conference of Zionist Leaders.³¹ In October of 1916, this committee submitted proposals to the British Foreign Office for consideration in the event that Palestine should fall under British administration after the end of the war. These proposals, in fact, did not mention a Jewish state, but rather amounted to the creation of a state within a state. They demanded among other things, the recognition of a separate Jewish nationality or national unit in Palestine; the participation of the Jewish population of Palestine in local self-government, insofar as it affected all the inhabitants without distinction; autonomy in exclusively Jewish maters—educational, communal, religious, judicial; local self-government; local taxation; and the establishment of a Jewish-chartered company for the resettlement of Palestine for Jewish settlers.³²

The choice of the date for the presentation of these proposals was carefully made. In the first months of 1916, the Zionist had begun to make contacts with the various departments of the British Government, whose goodwill would be at least as necessary as the sympathy of the Ministers when the moment came for them to step into the arena of Allied politics.³³ And throughout the year the Zionists won more and more over their sympathy.

October of 1916 offered itself as the ideal time for the Zionists to test the sympathy which they had been acquiring. At this point, Palestine remained a Turkish province, but other significant events were taking place in the war.

Russia was drifting out of the war. There were signs that the United States would soon be pulled in. More than half the Jews in the world lived in those two countries. Never again would Jewish opinion be a matter of more concern to all the belligerent states. ³⁴

Thus, the Zionists presented their proposals. At this point, however, the Asquith government was in no position to take any official action because of earlier secret agreements they had made—the McMahon-Hussain correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement.

In Palestine in 1914 there were about eight-five thousand Jews and six hundred thousand Arabs.³⁵ The British were thus anxious to secure as much support as possible from the Arabs. The Turks suspected little of the negotiations carried on between Sherif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, during 1915-16. The promise conveyed in this correspondence from McMahon to Hussein was that of political independence and freedom to the Arabs if they cooperated with the Allies in their campaign of driving the Turks out of Palestine, Syria and Arabia. The details and scope of the promise, however, were valued and thus interpretations vary. An Arab writer stated:

For their cooperation the Arabs were to secure British assistance and recognition of an independent Arab state. It is quite clear from the Sherif’s letter of July 14, 1915, to Sir Henry McMahon that the Arab State under discussion was not to include Hejaz only. But all Arabic-speaking territory in the Near East, which naturally meant Palestine [Boundaries were temporarily set but certain areas were disputed because of French interests]. In order to save precious time and to seize the opportune moment for launching the attack on the Turkish forces, King Hussein accepted in principal Great Britain’s pledge for the establishment of an independent Arab Kingdom … and left the disputed points for future settlement. Accordingly, the Arabs declared war on Turkey, joined the Allies, and played an important role in freeing their country from Turkish rule.³⁶

In contrast, a writer for the British Information service stated:

The British Government has always maintained that the whole of Palestine west of Jordan was one of the regions excluded from the pledge given to the Arabs in 1915.³⁷

The question remains as to what exactly were the intentions at that date. Nevertheless, while, on the one hand, Britain had promised support Arab independence (at least to some degree), she also entered into the Sykes-Picot agreement with France and Russia.³⁸ Negotiated secretly in May of 1916 by Sir Mark Sykes, the head of the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office, the agreement stated how the Allies had agreed to carve up the Turkish Empire in the Middle East into French and British zones. Britain was to take over Haifa and Acre; the northern territory was to go to France; and the south and the Holy Places were to be internationally developed and administered.³⁹ Thus, Palestine was excluded from the proposed Arab State and was to be placed under international administration. These two secret agreements entered into during Asquith’s administration perhaps coerced him to refrain from the encouragement of a third conflicting agreement which would back Zionist goals.

Then in December of 1916 came the overthrow of the Asquith government and the establishment of a new war coalition led by Lloyd George as Premier and a small War Cabinet, which was to be dominated by four leading Gentile Zionists—Lloyd George, Balfour, Milner and Jan Smuts.⁴⁰ Zionist spokesmen had discussed their goals with these members since the beginning of the war. However, the discussions were held on an informal and unofficial basis until February 2, 1917, when the Cabinet selected Sir Mark Sykes to work with the Zionists.⁴¹ About two weeks later (February 17, 1917), Sykes gave his sympathetic support to Zionist aims at a meeting in London: however, he made no mention of the Sykes-Picot agreement whose whole contents were as yet unknown to the Zionist leaders.⁴²

The Zionist realized that there would be difficulties arising from the French and Italian claims in Palestine. In an interview with Dr. Weizmann in March, 1917, Balfour suggested that if an agreement could not be reached with France, it might be best to aim at a joint Anglo-American Protectorate.⁴³ Weizmann had doubts about the success of such a joint project; however, by now news had leaked out concerning the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Zionists were alarmed. The Zionists made their appeal to France and on April 24, 1917, it was announced that the French Office had agreed that an Allied victory in the Middle East would mean recognition of Zionism.⁴⁴

The British Zionists next tried to get American support. The United States’ Zionists had realized at the outbreak of the war that as citizens of the most powerful neutral nation, they could play a leading role in the affairs of world Zionism whose organization had members fighting for both the Central and Allied powers. In August of 1914, a Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs was created in New York with Louis D. Brandeis as chairman. Brandeis, then a prominent Boston lawyer, would soon be appointed to the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.⁴⁵ In May of 1917 Foreign Secretary Balfour visited Washington and conferred with Brandeis who expressed emphatically the desire of American Zionists to see a British administration in Palestine.⁴⁶ Brandeis’s influence, however, was not strong enough to win the support of American Jewry to the idea of a British protectorate in Palestine and to the support of the ideas of Zionism.⁴⁷ The problem of American approval of Zionism was increased by Wilson’s attitude that the United States was at war with Germany but was neutral towards the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the United States should not show concern for the division of this empire.⁴⁸

In the summer of 1917, Balfour, with Lloyd George’s support, began negations with Lord Rothschild, the president of the British Zionist organization. On July 18 Lord Rothschild, on behalf of the British, French and United States Zionists, submitted to the British Foreign Office for Cabinet consideration the Zionist draft of a declaration:

1. His Majesty’s Government accepts the principle that Palestine should be reconstituted as the national Home of the Jewish people.

2. His Majesty’s Government will use its best endeavours to secure the achievement of this object and will discuss the necessary methods and means with the Zionist Organization. ⁴⁹

In August two drafts—one by Balfour, one by Milner—both of which offered revisions, were presented to the Cabinet.⁵⁰ At this point it seemed that the end of three years of negotiations was in sight. Yet there was delay, accountable enough at first, less so as the weeks ran on.⁵¹ Opposition arose in and out of the Cabinet. The most vehement, opposition in the Cabinet came to the fore on September 3 when a draft declaration was presented at a meeting. Neither Lloyd George nor Balfour was present at the gathering which gave Edwin Montague, Secretary of State for India, an opportunity to deliver an indictment of Zionism. He objected to the phrase a National Home for Jews, insisting that the Jews were really only a religious community. He insisted that the use of the phrase … . would vitally prejudice the position of every Jew elsewhere.⁵² All my life, said he, I have been trying to get out of the Ghetto. You want to force me back there."⁵³

And from outside the Cabinet came opposition, especially from the wealthy Jews who were afraid that if a Jewish National State were established they might lose their own status as citizens of the countries where they and their ancestors had prospered.⁵⁴

On October 4 a meeting of the War Cabinet was scheduled. About a half hour before the beginning of the session, Milner asked Leopold Amery is he could draft something which would go a reasonable distance to meeting the objections both Jewish and pro-Arab without impairing the substance of the proposed declaration.⁵⁵ Known as the Milner-Amery draft,⁵⁶ it was read to the Cabinet and enthusiastically supported by Balfour:

Balfour warned of a new German drive to capture the Zionist forces for the enemy side, and he claimed that though some rich Jews in Britain might oppose the ideas of Zionism, it was enthusiastically backed by those in America and Russia. On whose side were these influential people to be ranged? There was no inconsistency whatever in having a Jewish National Home and Jews being members of other States. The French Government was sympathetic to the ideas, and so, as he personally knew, was President Wilson.⁵⁷

Opposition arose; augments ensued; the meeting was adjourned without a decision. As October days passed by, the Zionists were becoming restless. Lord Rothschild, particularly, who had been in correspondence with Balfour since the middle of July, was beginning to wonder if anything was going to happen in the War Cabinet, for … .

Decidedly, something was happening in Palestine. The British army was marching in. After three years’ hold-up 80 percent of it by Turkish bluff (the considerable contribution of British Army Intelligence in accepting it must not be overlooked), or far more powerful forces in Egypt had began to take the offense against a war-weary enemy, who now counted as many deserters as troops remaining in their battle strength. ‘Jerusalem by Christmas’ Lloyd George had demanded of General Allenby, in appointing him to the Egypt Command in the summer of 1917. Now Allenby had crossed the desert from Egypt and turned the weak Turkish line at Gaza by a brilliant maneuver [sic] and was moving on to the Holy City.⁵⁸

Finally the day arrived when the stamp of approval of the Balfour Declaration in its final draft was given. On October 31, Balfour announced the introduction of the question of the National Home once again and argued:

How could its establishment possibly prejudice Jews elsewhere? Surely, on the analogy of a European immigrant to the United States, it would help that they had a recognized land of origin.⁵⁹

And Balfour also emphasized the propaganda advantages that would arise from the immediate issuing of the Declaration—the winning of support among the American Jews and the rallying of the Jews in Russia to revolt against the Bolsheviks. No debate followed, aside from the discussion of minor amendments. And, it was decided, for no clear reason, to issue the declaration in the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild.⁶⁰ The next day Lloyd George presented the draft to eight leaders of British Jewry—four accepted it, one was neutral, three were hostile.⁶¹ And in a letter dated November 2, 1917, Balfour sent the Declaration to Lord Rothschild.

Possible reasons for the appearance of the Declaration at that time vary in the views of authors. However, there are certain reasons which most agree upon. The virtual loss of Russia as an ally and its repercussions are examples of such reasons. As Arnold Toynbee pointed out:

The Western Powers were tantalizingly inhibited from playing the Palestinian card as long as they had any hope of keeping their Anti-Semitic Russian partner in the firing-line; and it is no wonder that the Balfour Declaration was published as soon as the last Western hopes of further Russian collaboration had expired.⁶²

Russia’s position had been weakening since the general mutiny of the army on March 10, 1917. Her armies, on which the Allies had depended for manpower, had nearly disintegrated under the revolutionary forces. The Russian Revolution also brought forth a number of Jews into key government and public-opinion-forming positions.⁶³ There was a strong sentiment in Russia for leaving the war which was attributed to the Jews by both the British Foreign Office and the German General Staff.⁶⁴ Both the Allies and the Central Powers feared that the co-religionists [of these Jews in Russia] would support the revolutionary cause rather than the anti-Semitic tsarist regime whom the Allies backed. Germany proceeded to make an effort to gain Jewish support by putting pressure on her Turkish ally to grant concessions to Jews in colonizing Palestine.⁶⁵

Britain too sought Jewish support, for the Allied position was wavering, as Lloyd George described in his war Memoirs:

Hindenberg was able to effect a concentration against the Italians, which led to the disaster of Caporetto in October, necessitating a diversion of French and British troops from the Western Front. On the seas, the German U-boats had brought starvation in the country within measurable distance.⁶⁶

The Allies needed stronger allies. One writer expressed this idea rather bluntly and impressively:

We wanted friends and allies to help us win; and the people we wanted as friends could drive hard bargains, with the Kaiser at our doors … We wanted friends, and somebody thought of fourteen million Jews all over the world, many of them able to lend sinew of war.⁶⁷

There was the hope that perhaps German and Austrian Jewish support could be evoked and thus they would turn their loyalties and sympathies from their governments to the Allies cause. As far as Russia was concerned, perhaps such a declaration would win the favor of the new anti-war Bolshevik government.⁶⁸ Thus, it appears that one importance reason for the issuance of the Balfour Declaration at that time was its value as a war measure against the Central Powers.

Other weaker justifications are set forth. One writer attributed the appearance of the Declaration to the present success of General Allenby’s advance.⁶⁹ Another stated that the presence in nearby territory of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, friendly to the British, was regarded by the war cabinet of Lloyd George as security measure for Suez.⁷⁰ Another asserted that British has always been sympathetic towards the Zionist program and that the Balfour Declaration was but the most recent step in the fulfillment of historic wrongs.⁷¹

Thus, it appears that the Declaration was not presented solely in gratitude to the brilliant chemist Weizmann nor was it brought about by the persuasiveness of the Zionist leaders alone. Although these factors were without a doubt present, there were those other rather pressing considerations that have just been surveyed briefly.

On November 9, the Declaration was given to the press. Ironically enough it received little notice because the main news of the day was the entry of the British Army into Gaza and the beginning of the Bolshevik coup d’état in Russia.⁷² But reactions, nonetheless, were, imminent. The British Consul at Odessa sent a description of a two-miles-long procession of Jews marching past the Consulate, their bands alternately playing ‘God save the King’ and the Hatikvah, the Jewish national Anthem.⁷³ But the significance of this display was dimmed by an article appearing in the November 16 issue of the Jewish Chronicle in which the Petrograd correspondent reported that a meeting of the Bund at Home had condemned Hebrew as an ‘aristocratic language’ which therefore had to be opposed along with any religious or Zionist bases of Jewish life.⁷⁴

The declaration caused demonstrations showing approval in other Allied countries. One writer credited the support of a great number of Christians to the propaganda put forth that the Balfour Declaration as an obvious fulfillment of biblical prophecy.⁷⁵ Yet this type of support came from the masses, not the leaders. In the United States, opposition was heard from three hundred rabbis, representing the largest synagogues in the nation. At a meeting they issued a statement that said that the Central Conference of American Rabbis … .

denies that the Jews are ‘a people without a country’, and even refuses to ‘subscribe to the phrase in the declaration which says, ‘Palestine is to be the national home-land for the Jewish people.’⁷⁶

Nor was the United States Government quick to give its approval. When in mid-December the question of White House endorsement of the Declaration arose, Secretary of State Lansing advised the President against it and instead sent a telegraph to the United States Ambassador in London which said: Investigate discreetly and report fully and promptly to Department reasons for Balfour’s recent statement relative Jewish States in Palestine.⁷⁷ The reason for the non-endorsement was that the United States was not at war with Turkey; that the Jews themselves were divided over Zionism and the Declaration; and that many Christians would not favor the handing over the Holy Land to the Jews.⁷⁸ President Wilson followed Landing’s advice until the last day of August, 1918, when Rabbi Stephen Weiss requested a statement of approval. President Wilson then issued his first public expression of sympathy for Zionism in the form of a New Year greeting to United States Jews.⁷⁹

Although the vast majority of the quarter of a million Jews in England were passionately in support of Zionist aims and daily meetings, packed to overflowing, were held throughout London and the Provinces,⁸⁰ there was also opposition. A League of British Jews was set up less than three weeks after the announcement of the Declaration whose aims included a promise to resist the allegation that Jews constitute a separate political nationality.⁸¹ The upper-class Jews repeatedly asserted: Judaism is a religion and not a nationality, and protest meetings were organized; on November 30, 1917, a meeting of the Anglo-Jewish Association was held at which the organization’s President stated: The Zionist movement was caused by anti-Semitism. ⁸²

Less opposition was found in France and Italy, both of whom approved the Declaration early in 1918, as did the smaller Allied powers subsequently.⁸³

News of the Balfour Declaration reached the Arabs when it was communicated to them by General Gamal Pasha to Hussein’s son Emir Faisal at Aqaba. The news created a rebellion in the ranks of the Arab youth. The British Government, however, sent an explanatory note to King Hussein which mitigated the feelings of the Arabs. Arab leaders persuaded the soldiers to continue fighting for the Allies. But to the Arabs, the bad faith of the Allies was obvious in all the declarations, proclamations and messages issued by them in order to claim the rebellion of the Arabs against the Balfour Declaration and the Sykes-Picot Agreement.⁸⁴

Thus were the reactions. As to the question of whether or not the Balfour Declaration fulfilled its purpose, the answer would probably be negative. One historian stated:

No doubt sentiment was aroused in favor of the Allies, but apart from the Jews living in Allied countries who were already taking a full part in the war effort, it is difficult to find any evidence of the Declaration’s having had any practical, calculable effects.⁸⁵

Another author stated it more specifically:

Indeed the ironic feature of the Balfour Declaration is that, from the very moment of its adoption by the British government, it ceased to be of any service to British imperial interest. The seizure of power by the Bolsheviks finally destroyed the fantastic illusion that the Russian Jews could be persuaded to keep their country at war in defiance of the Revolution. Moreover, the beginning of the British occupation of Palestine meant that it was unnecessary any longer to use Zionism in order to keep the French out of the Middle East. Even the argument that the Declaration was necessary to prevent the German government from issuing its own pro-Zionist policy was found to have little validity. Though there were a few people in the German Foreign Office who would have liked a policy of this kind, the need to prop up an unable Turkish regime made it completely impracticable. For the time being the Declaration seemed to have been stillborn and its opponents in the United States were successful in preventing President Wilson from giving it any support. ⁸⁶

The general consensus of historians is that the declaration did not accomplish what it set out to do, that is, fulfill the possible reasons for its issuance. But in the year that followed the Declaration, which in November of 1917 was just one of many pieces of war correspondence, was brought to the fore in policy-making.

In January of 1919 the intelligence section of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference presented a comprehensive memorandum for the settlement of the problems of the Middle East. It recommended that the Arabs have independence in Syria,

Mesopotamia, and Arabia and that the Jews have independence in Palestine. The exact words of the recommendation form an echo to the Declaration:

That the Jews be invited to return to Palestine and settle there, being assured by the Conference of all proper assistance in so doing that may be consistent with the protection of the personal (especially religious) and the property rights of the non-Jewish population, and being further assured that it will be the policy of the League of Nations to recognize Palestine as a Jewish State as soon as it is a Jewish State in fact.⁸⁷

This recommendation was quite a contrast to America’s original apprehensive reception of the Declaration. President Wilson on March 2, 1919, repeated his personal approval of the Declaration and added:

I am, moreover, persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundation of a Jewish Commonwealth.⁸⁸

Wilson’s support for the Declaration did not waver, even after the negative and anti-Zionist report of the King-Crane Commission, which he had appointed to study the region’s problems, was put in his hands:

Beirut, July 10, 1919: We recommend serious modification of the extreme Zionist Program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State.⁸⁹

The report continued by pointing out that in the Commission’s conference with Jewish representatives, that the Zionists looked forward to a practically complete dispossession of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, by various forum of purchase.⁹⁰

The Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed at the San Remo Conference in 1920.⁹¹ It was written into the Mandate instrument for Palestine and was so passed by the Council for the League of Nations on September 29, 1923.⁹² Part of the treaty reiterated the Declaration:

The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status of Jews in any other country.⁹³

Thus, through the League of Nations, the world recognized the Jewish claim to Palestine. ⁹⁴ The declaration was not seen forgotten thereafter, for as an Arab writer pointed out: It (1948) was the turning point in the long history of the unique problem which the Balfour Declaration initiated in 1917."⁹⁵

With the significance which the Declaration came to take on, many interpretations, definitions and descriptions were offered. The first reaction of the masses, as has been pointed out, was one of joy. Yet as many Jewish leaders and members of the upper-class society voiced their opposition, other Jews in homes and synagogues began to ask questions:

Was there significance in the phrase ‘a National Home’? Did it amply full autonomy or was it different in principle from ‘Jewish State’? How much did this difference imply a concession to allay the fears of the anti-Zionists and how much did it reflect a subtle modification of British policy?⁹⁶

These questions suggest the very problems the Declaration posed in matters of interpretation and its inherent contradictions. When asked about his interpretation of the ‘national home phrase, Weizmann replied that the Zionists understood that it gave the Jews a right to make Palestine as Jewish as England is English."⁹⁷

England, immediately after the Declaration was issued and in the years following, tried to interpret the Declaration to the English and to the people of the world. The press gave an immediate interpretation, accepting the Declaration as a recognition of the right of Jewish autonomy in the land. Scarcely a month after the Declaration was put on paper (December 3, 1917), the Manchester Guardian printed the flat assertion of what the Declaration meant:

What it means is that … our deliberate policy will be to encourage in every way in our power Jewish immigration … with a view to the ultimate establishment of a Jewish State.⁹⁸

The American Ambassador in England informed the State Department of the United States on December 21, 1917, that he had been told by the British Government …

that the British Government pledges it to put the Jews in Palestine on the same footing as other nationalities. This is as far as the British Government has gone.⁹⁹

In the White Paper of June 1922, Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, clarified the Declaration:

The terms of the Declaration do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but the further development of the existing Jewish Community … in order that it may become a center in which the Jewish people as a whole may take … an interest and pride.¹⁰⁰

This statement is also exactly re-entered in the White Paper of May, 1939 (the MacDonald Memorandum).¹⁰¹ When General Smuts was in the War Cabinet, he spoke on the subject cautioning "his hearers that the

British Government did not bind itself to collect all the Jews in the world and settle them in Palestine, but only to provide a national home for those Jews who desire to settle in the ancient home of their race."¹⁰²

The Balfour Declaration was contradictory in its own wording and inconsistent with other promises. Although only a vaguely worded declaration of sympathy, the Declaration incited great expectations in the minds of the Jews, just as the McMahon-Hussein correspondence offered hope to the Arabs.¹⁰³ Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out that nationhood was not promised but the declaration clearly permitted a more generous Jewish immigration to Palestine which underlay the crisis in 1948 and the creation of Israel.¹⁰⁴

The Arabs still argue that the Declaration was most unjust, not only because of the other promise previously made but also because the British had no right to dispose of a land which was not their own or to determine the future of any people other than their own.¹⁰⁵ At the time the Declaration was written, the territory was still a part of the Ottoman Empire since it had not yet been conquered. Because of this fact, none of the Allied wartime promises and agreements between themselves concerning the Holy Land carried any authority in international law.¹⁰⁶ In addition, the declaration was a unilateral promise by Britain without Arab consent and was thus not legally binding on the Arabs.¹⁰⁷ A Jew evaluated the problem thus:

The Balfour Declaration itself recognized the rights of the Arabs. When the Arab nations demand that Israel fulfill the United Nations’ resolutions, they are making a real concession in that they themselves are submitting to resolution they believe to have been illegally and unjustifiably adopted.¹⁰⁸

Thus, the Declaration has been interpreted and reinterpreted and the problem which grew out of it remains today. Writing of Balfour, one author stated that the Balfour policy for the settlement of Jews in Palestine in not an achievement of sufficient magnitude long to be remembered.¹⁰⁹ Written almost thirty-four years ago, these words were to be proved grossly incorrect by 1948 and the years that have followed. Today, the Balfour Declaration is remembered—and all too well by a million and a half Palestinian refugees.

Yet condemnation and full responsibility cannot be leveled in the direction of Lord Balfour and the rest of the War Cabinet that met in November