Raised on the Third Day: Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus

By W. David Beck and Michael R. Licona

Did Jesus rise from the dead? Is resurrection even possible?

There are numerous historical and philosophical challenges to belief in Jesus' resurrection. For many, these questions are insurmountable.

Raised on the Third Day approaches these questions with critical and believing eyes. Edited by W. David Beck and Michael R. Licona, Raised on the Third Day collects essays from prominent contributors in the fields of philosophy, history, and apologetics. Contributors--including J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, Craig A. Evans, Beth M. Sheppard, and Sean McDowell--evaluate scriptural, historical, moral, and apologetic issues related to Christ's death and resurrection. Essays on the Shroud of Turin and near-death experiences round out the volume. Inspired by the foundational work of Gary Habermas--arguably the greatest contemporary Christian thinker on the resurrection--these essays build upon his work and move the discussion forward.

Readers will better appreciate how Habermas has shaped scholarship on Christ's resurrection and further areas for exploration and discussion.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lexham Press
• Release date: Nov 23, 2020
• ISBN: 9781683594338

W. David Beck

W. David Beck (PhD, Boston University) is emeritus professor of philosophy at Liberty University. He is the coeditor of Raised on the Third Day: Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus, and his written work has appeared in publications including Philosophia Christi, Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, and Christianity Today.

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Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus

RAISED

ON THE

THIRD DAY

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W. David Beck & Michael R. Licona, Editors

Essays in Honor of Dr. Gary R. Habermas

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Raised on the Third Day: Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus

Copyright 2020 W. David Beck & Michael R. Licona

Lexham Press, 1313 Commercial St., Bellingham, WA 98225

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Scripture quotations marked (RSV) are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible, copyright 1952 [2nd edition, 1971] by the Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America. Used by permission. All rights reserved.

Print ISBN 9781683594321

Digital ISBN 9781683594338

Library of Congress Control Number 2020945451

Lexham Editorial: Elliot Ritzema, Matthew Boffey, Erin Mangum, Abby Salinger

Cover Design: Lydia Dahl

CONTENTS

Introduction

Michael R. Licona and W. David Beck

Note from Gary Habermas

1On Habermas’s Minimal Facts Argument

Robert B. Stewart

2The Soul and Near-Death Experiences: A Case for Substance Dualism

J. P. Moreland

3The Image on the Shroud: A Best Explanations Approach

Mark W. Foreman

4The Uniqueness of Christianity in a World of Religions

Craig J. Hazen

5John Rawls’s Political Liberalism and the Problem of Taking Rites Seriously: From Abortion to Same-Sex Wedding Cakes

Francis J. Beckwith

6On the Organic Connection between Jesus’ Atoning Death and Resurrection

William Lane Craig

7The Moral Argument and the Minimal Facts

David Baggett

8The Logical Structure of Moral Arguments

W. David Beck

9The Testimony of Josephus and the Burial of Jesus

Craig A. Evans

10Near-Death Experiences and Christian Theology

Dale C. Allison, Jr.

11The Deaths of the Apostles and Belief in Jesus’ Resurrection

Sean McDowell

12The History and Current State of Modern Shroud Research

Barrie M. Schwortz

13Racing toward the Tomb: Purity and Sacrifice in the Fourth Gospel

Beth M. Sheppard

14A Note on Women as Witnesses and the Empty Tomb Resurrection Accounts

Darrell L. Bock

15Historical Epistemology and Divine Action

Benjamin C. F. Shaw

16The Primacy of Paul in Discussions on Jesus’ Resurrection

Michael R. Licona

17What Aspiring (and Veteran) Apologists May Learn from Gary Habermas

Alex McFarland

18What Everyone Should Learn from Gary Habermas

Frank Turek

List of Contributors

INTRODUCTION

Michael R. Licona and W. David Beck

This volume was a labor of love to honor our colleague and friend Gary Habermas. His accomplishments in apologetics, especially his work on the resurrection of Jesus, puts him at the very top of his field. That alone warrants a book in his honor. But additionally, Gary has always seen his scholarship as a means of ministering to others. The crowd that will surround him in heaven to thank him for his help dealing with their doubts and puzzlements through letters and email is inestimable.

However, first and foremost, Gary is our good friend, and that is what motivates us most. So we begin with brief personal reflections from the two editors.

Licona

In fall 1985, during my final semester of graduate school, something happened that I never anticipated: I began questioning the truth of the Christian faith. Until that point, my faith had been strong. I had a passion to know God and a love for exegeting the Greek New Testament. I had little concern at that time for the matters of higher criticism. In my mind, the Bible is God’s holy word. So I did not concern myself with those whose views about the Bible differed from my own. As a result, I had done just enough to squeak out a B in Introduction to the New Testament. That turned out to be a huge mistake.

Toward the end of my final semester, a number of issues began to shake my faith. I was doing my degree at Liberty University, and although there were some stellar faculty members in the theology department at the time, I suppose I felt a bit embarrassed to voice the questions that were troubling me. One of my roommates, an Australian named Jeff Jack who was in the process of earning a master’s degree in Christian apologetics, suggested that I speak with his professor, Gary Habermas. Until that time, I had no interest in apologetics. But I decided to pay Professor Habermas a visit.

I had never taken a course with him, since he taught in the philosophy department. Still, he welcomed me when I knocked on his office door and asked to speak with him. I found him approachable and authentic. That would be our first of countless discussions that have occurred over more than thirty years. Professor Habermas was exactly what I needed. He allowed me to share my concerns and ask any question. He listened. He understood. And he provided reasonable answers. I doubt whether I would be a follower of Jesus today had it not been for Professor Habermas.

Since that first meeting, we have become friends, very close friends, as close as any family member. Other than my wife Debbie, I do not have a closer or better friend than Gary. He and his wonderful wife, Eileen, have been spending a week with our family every year for more than two decades. Debbie and I love them dearly. My two children, Allie and Zach, know him as Uncle Gary, as does our son-in-law, Nick.

I could never repay Gary for the time he invested in me. This book is offered as a small demonstration of my respect, appreciation, and love for him.

Beck

I first met Gary at the annual meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society (EPS) in 1979. He read a paper on Averroes that piqued my medievalist attention. We talked afterward and I immediately knew we shared common interests and would be friends. A year later I was allowed to hire him, and he was at Liberty starting our MA in Apologetics. Our wives became good friends, as did our kids who are around the same ages.

Forty years later, I am pleased and proud to call Gary my best friend. I admire his incredible memory for facts, his dogged determination to get the evidence for every detail of an argument, his willingness to talk through difficult personal and family matters, and his great example in ministry.

Gary and I have attended EPS most of the forty years since then, always insisting on sharing a hotel room. We are both very late night owls and not early risers. As a result, we have spent countless hours discussing, well, whatever. There are a number of issues on which we disagree, which only makes our friendship more enjoyable. He remains an unrepentant Cartesian dualist, which effects numerous philosophical issues. I have tried my best, Lord! These arguments have been going on for most of those forty years, and they have served to deepen our friendship.

We have always lived near each other, shared lunch, gone to (or skipped) faculty meetings together, and shared each other’s burdens. Between our two large families, someone always needs prayer, and I can always count on my good friend to share those needs. Thank you, Gary.

When Mike brought up the idea of a Festschrift, I was eager to join in. This was a meaningful and joyous work in dedication to one of God’s best.

NOTE FROM GARY HABERMAS

The occasion of this Festschrift came to me as a genuine surprise. During the initial call from the editors, Dave Beck and Mike Licona, I was informed that the secret had stayed secure for more than one year, without so much as a guess or even a hint on my part. This was no small feat considering that the editors and authors are good friends with whom I quite frequently cross paths. But no slips occurred! The result was completely unexpected and I was overwhelmed. To simply say that I am humbled and grateful to be in this position would be a vast understatement.

The first thing that caught my eye when I skimmed the table of contents was the absolutely outstanding lineup of scholars that Beck and Licona had assembled. Time and again as I scanned the list of names and topics, I thought, Really? Wow! This or that scholar agreed to be involved? The next thing I noticed was the quite natural division of the essays and topics into two major areas. From philosophy and philosophical theology in the initial section, followed by history, resurrection, and New Testament in the next division, it was all well arranged from first to last.

Further, the volume’s topics largely revolve around the research areas that I have pursued most over the years. Near-death experiences (J. P. Moreland, Dale Allison), the death and burial of Jesus (Craig Evans, Beth Sheppard), the theological significance of these events (William Lane Craig), and the resurrection and its results (Mike Licona, Darrell Bock, Sean McDowell, Robert Stewart) form quite a swath of territory. Even the Shroud of Turin made it into the mix (Barrie Schwortz,¹ Mark Foreman).

Other relevant topics in this volume include the existence of God and related worldview issues (Dave Beck, Dave Baggett), Jesus’ uniqueness among the world religions (Craig Hazen), and the question of whether historians can legitimately identify any particular event as most likely involving a miracle (Ben Shaw). Frank Beckwith follows with some thoughts on more practical applications of philosophy to specific insights in the realms of political and ethical theory. Alex McFarland and Frank Turek address issues of ministry application and allowing our lives to speak as loudly as our words.

One could hardly be more pleased with how this text has turned out. The scholars’ competencies are off the charts, and the chosen topics likewise. I have nothing but admiration for the exceptional job done here by editors Beck and Licona.

The Minimal Facts Argument

A number of the essays in this text mention and/or discuss what I have termed the minimal facts method or approach to New Testament matters. This general angle is the one used most frequently throughout my writings. Though I have applied it often in published formats to several other research topics, I have employed it far more regularly over the years when examining the subject of Jesus’ resurrection. As such, it is not surprising that it has shown up in one way or another in several of the essays in this volume.

The chief idea behind the minimal facts argument is to use only those historical facts that fulfill two chief criteria. First, each event must itself be confirmed by an array of indications from various angles that establish the strong likelihood of its occurrence. In my now-massive resurrection magnum opus that has become my constant research companion for more than the past five years, literally several dozen pointers exist that confirm just these facts, even when derived by more skeptical standards of research. Many of these indicators are drawn from the very early creedal confessions as well as the strict application of the New Testament criteria to the available data.

Second, due to the strength of the backup information that favors just these few facts, the vast majority of recent critical specialists has affirmed the historicity of these early events. Of these two criteria, the first is by far the most crucial, since the multiple evidential pointers that establish the likelihood of each event are sufficient to make the case by themselves, whether or not the scholarly tide remains supportive, as it has been in recent decades. After all, scholarly convictions may change, no longer affirming this foundation.

Actually, a number of critical New Testament historians, theologians, and other scholars in recent years have also begun their search for the historical Jesus by delineating a list of those events that researchers consider to be well-established. Their lists of historical facts form their own foundation, with which they begin their study. By comparison, their lists are always longer than the truncated one used on behalf of the resurrection appearances of Jesus,² hinting at the strength of the more skeptically derived minimal facts method. After providing their own lineups of what they consider the known data, these contemporary scholars then move forward to work from their own starting points.

For the Sake of Ministry

Another area of study that is probably shared even more regularly and wholeheartedly by scholars across all sides of the theoretical perspectival divide is that, given the appropriate textual, philosophical, theological, and scientific foundational structure, sound theory must lead inexorably to good pastoral, ethical, social, and even political applications and practices. Of course, there will always be wide varieties of views on how some of the finer points of these applications ought to be pursued, but the idea that there must be ministry application itself is widely agreed upon. Even as Jesus taught us, the hungry, the homeless, the sick, and others, particularly those who cannot care for themselves, need to be fed and otherwise cared for. As Jesus told the lawyer who asked, this is our second greatest duty of all.

In this way, a firm theoretical foundation must lay the groundwork for good ministry. But as I remind myself regularly, our constant preoccupation with theoretical issues alone cannot absolve us of our practical responsibilities. A few of the essays in this text have varied from offering hints to providing more urgent reminders pertaining to some of these moves, calling us to our more practical responsibilities.

Conclusion

We end where we began. The honor bestowed upon me on the occasion of this Festschrift was a truly humbling as well as totally unexpected experience. This is especially the case when the reputations of the individual contributors are considered along with these works that are drawn from their own areas of expertise. I thank profusely each of these scholars, friends, and colleagues.

Further, David Beck and Michael Licona have both been fantastic friends and so much more than that for several decades, and I will never forget the love that they have shown by making such an involved time commitment in the midst of their own exceptionally busy schedules. Though it is far too inadequate to simply say so, I thank each of them for that.

To the readers, I wish you many pleasant hours of thoughtfulness and study. May we all march forward together from our callings, jobs, and disciplines to being just as committed to personal ministry.

PART 1

On PHILOSOPHY, PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, and PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY

1

ON HABERMAS’S MINIMAL FACTS ARGUMENT

Robert B. Stewart

I am not aware of anyone who has studied the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus longer and more deeply than Gary Habermas has. As of 2004, Habermas had completed an overview of more than 1,400 sources on the resurrection of Jesus published since 1975, and he had catalogued about 650 of these texts in English, German, and French.¹ By the year 2012, that number had increased to around 3,400 sources.² Has anyone ever read even half that many unique books and/or articles on the resurrection of Jesus? From time to time, Habermas has reported on his findings, although the sum total of his research is a moving target. To his credit, Habermas has been insistent on including atheist, agnostic, and liberal scholars in his catalog, along with mainline and evangelical scholars. He does this in order to ensure that nobody can say that he only surveyed his own scholarly group.

He has also pioneered a minimal facts method of arguing for the resurrection of Jesus. This essay will be an appreciative critique of that method. For more than thirty-five years, Habermas has argued that surrounding the end of Jesus’ life, there is a significant body of data that scholars of almost every religious and philosophical persuasion recognize as being historical. The historicity of each ‘fact’ on the list is attested and supported by a variety of historical and other considerations.³

Explaining the Minimal Facts Method

Habermas has two criteria for an occurrence to be designated a minimal fact:

1.Each event has to be established by more than adequate scholarly evidence, and usually by several critically ascertained, independent lines of argumentation.

2.Additionally, the vast majority of contemporary scholars in relevant fields have to acknowledge the historicity of the occurrence.

One must note the difference in nature between these two criteria: the first is established by evidence, the second by consensus of scholarly opinion. The first is much more firm; past events are not subject to change, although our knowledge of evidence related to them and our interpretation of that evidence may change. The second is indeed subject to change because all of us, from time to time, change our opinions on matters, whether for good or ill.

Habermas is well aware of the difference between his two criteria in terms of sources and natures. This awareness leads him to state:

Of the two criteria, I have always held that the first is by far the most crucial, especially since this initial requirement is the one that actually establishes the historicity of the event. Besides, the acclamation of scholarly opinion may be mistaken or it could change.⁴

All along, Habermas has produced two lists of facts, the first list being longer and more inclusive, the second shorter and more exclusive. He states it thus:

The longer list was usually termed the Known Historical Facts and typically consisted of a dozen historical occurrences that more generally met the above criteria, but concerning which I was somewhat more lenient on their application. This would apply especially to the high percentages of scholarly near-unanimous agreement that I would require for the shorter list. From this longer listing, I would extrapolate a briefer line-up of from four to six events, termed the Minimal Facts.⁵

Something that is sometimes overlooked concerning Habermas’s method is that a minimal fact is not simply the agreed-upon opinion of the vast majority of scholars. He does not fall prey to the fallacy of appealing to majority belief or consensus gentium. Both criteria are necessary; one without the other is insufficient to produce a minimal fact. Minimal facts are established by more than adequate scholarly evidence and the vast majority of contemporary scholars in relevant fields [acknowledging] the historicity of the occurrence. In other words, a bare consensus of scholarly opinion is just that—naked shared belief. Each criterion is a necessary condition, but neither taken by itself is a sufficient condition to establish a minimal fact. It is the shorter, more exclusive, minimal facts list—and the method that drives it—that interests me and is the focus of this essay.

What Are Habermas’s Minimal Facts?

In The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, Habermas and Michael R. Licona argue for four minimal facts.⁶

•Fact #1: Jesus died by crucifixion.

•Fact #2: Jesus’ disciples believed that he rose and appeared to them.

•Fact #3: The church persecutor Paul was suddenly changed.

•Fact #4: The skeptic James, brother of Jesus, was suddenly changed.

Each of these four facts was affirmed by 90 percent or more of the scholars that Habermas had studied in his voluminous cataloguing of sources on the resurrection of Jesus.⁷

Interestingly enough, in 2010, with the publication of his The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach,⁸ Licona trimmed (with Habermas’s agreement) their earlier list of four facts to three, which he termed historical bedrock.⁹ Which criterion was discarded and why? The castaway was fact four, that James was suddenly changed. Did the percentage fall below the requisite threshold of at least 90 percent affirmation? No, but the sample size was deemed too small compared to the sample size of the other three minimal facts for this highly-agreed-upon fact to be retained. Apparently there is a required sample size as well as a required percentage, although neither Habermas nor Licona state exactly what that sample size needs to be.

The (minimal) elephant in the room is the absence of one other historical statement that both Habermas and Licona, along with the majority of scholars that Habermas cataloged, personally affirm: the empty tomb. Why do they exclude the empty tomb as a minimal fact? Because it does not rise to the level of at least 90-percent agreement among the scholars that Habermas has catalogued. A large majority of scholars, across the theological divide—skeptical, liberal, mainline, and conservative—conclude that the tomb was empty, but not 90 percent. In other words, it was left out because the percentage of scholars that affirmed it was not high enough. It had nothing to do with the evidential support or the epistemic justification for the proposition itself.

Nevertheless, in The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (2004), Habermas and Licona designate the empty tomb as a Plus One fact. They grant that less than 90 percent of scholars writing on the resurrection affirm the empty tomb as a fact, but they give the empty tomb significant attention because there is strong evidence for it, and it is accepted as a fact of history by an impressive majority of scholars. Habermas estimates that 75 percent of scholars affirm it.¹⁰

In Licona’s tome, he offers up four second-order facts: (1) the conversion of James, (2) the empty tomb, (3) Jesus’ predictions of his violent, imminent death as well as his resurrection afterwards, and (4) that the earliest apostles held that Jesus appeared in a bodily form.¹¹ Habermas seems to agree with Licona on these points.¹²

I mention this to point out that even Habermas and Licona seem to want to include more than their method allows. I wonder if there is something driving this desire that warrants attention.

Analysis and Critique

There are thirteen points I want to make about this method: some positive, some negative.

1. Habermas’s minimal facts method is evidential. Although rational belief in God’s existence may not require evidence, belief in an event in history seems to require evidence. In other words, given that history is a public discipline, one arguing for a historical event needs to argue from evidence that anyone can access and critique, and by doing so reach a reasonable conclusion regarding the claim that has been made. Habermas appeals to the most certain and widely attested evidence, i.e., that evidence most likely to be publicly affirmed, and thus his argument for the resurrection is based on a very solid foundation.

2. The minimal facts approach is simpler than others. In other words, by limiting the data that one is considering, the method focuses one’s attention on a few truly important issues, thus keeping potential objections to a minimum. Minimal facts arguments are less vulnerable to criticism because there are fewer points to be challenged. This focus is good, although it may overlook otherwise significant issues. One generally reliable rule of thumb is this: address the central issues and the peripheral ones will fall into line. Additionally, historians, like scientists, need to keep the principle of parsimony (Ockham’s razor) in mind. All other things being equal (and they almost never are), the simpler solution is generally to be preferred. Although Ockham’s razor applies to solutions, not methods, perhaps something similar is true concerning methods to arrive at a solution. Even if such is not the case, the simplicity of the method must still be appreciated.

3. On the other hand, comprehensiveness is also a good thing. In historical investigation, one should take note of all the relevant data. All other things being equal, the explanatory theory, or hypothesis, that can make sense of the most data should be preferred. Focus is a good thing, but so is comprehensiveness. Simplicity has a mirror twin, and her name is sufficiency. To its credit, Habermas’s method fares well in terms of focus and simplicity, but it does not fare as well in terms of comprehensiveness.

4. Habermas’s minimal facts method has the benefit of bypassing the often protracted preliminary discussions of which data are permissible.¹³ This is one of its strengths. Frequently the first step to resolving disagreements is to find that on which all (or most) parties can agree, and then work from that starting point. This allows the apologist to fight as few battles as necessary to achieve his or her aim.

5. Minimal facts does not mean minimal information. The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus is 352 pages; The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach is 718 pages. The minimal facts method is thus one way to give maximal attention to the most widely accepted propositions concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus, and thus to draw out all the implications of these central historical facts. In this way, the objections to conclusions in favor of Jesus’ resurrection drawn from these minimal facts can be thoroughly assessed.

6. Habermas’s minimal facts method does not downplay the importance of biblical reliability. Instead, the method focuses one’s attention on a few nearly universally acknowledged facts without denying other less widely affirmed claims of Scripture. Nowhere, that I’m aware of, does Habermas ever indicate that the reliability of the New Testament should be doubted or denied, or that biblical reliability is unimportant. Still, it is true that the method does not depend upon biblical reliability. But this is a strength, not a weakness, in that his method can be used effectively with skeptics because it does not allow them to disregard facts supporting the conclusion that Jesus was raised from the dead simply by denying the inspiration and/or inerrancy of Scripture.

7. A clearly stated method that is consistently followed levels the playing field. We will never overcome our worldviews completely (although worldviews can be challenged, critiqued, and changed); but unless we state our methods, and then seek to justify them in public dialogue, we will never even limit their influence on us as to what we believe. Simply put, method matters. Habermas recognizes this, and he receives some support from an unlikely source in the person of John Dominic Crossan, who states it well:

Method, method, and once again, method. Method will not guarantee us the truth, because nothing can do that. But method, as self-conscious and self-critical as we can make it, is our only discipline. It cannot ever take us out of our present skins and bodies, minds and hearts, societies and cultures. But it is our one best hope for honesty. It is the due process of history.¹⁴

Though no method can ensure success in this endeavor, in my opinion this method has at least as good a chance as any other in this regard because it is a clearly stated method. (As an epistemic particularist, I feel obliged to point out that this is not epistemic methodism.)

8. One concern is that this method, with its insistence upon 90-percent or higher consensus, may be too clever by half. By requiring at least 90-percent agreement, it may force historians to ignore facts that are potentially even more helpful in discovering the truth than those that Habermas accepts as minimal facts. This is so because sometimes a proposition fails to achieve 90-percent affirmation, not because skeptics deny it, but because conservative scholars hold to positions regarding those propositions that even more strongly support the Christian case.

A personal story may help illustrate my concern. Several years ago, Habermas and I were speaking at the same conference. I presented an argument for the historicity of Jesus contra mythicism, one I now term an argument from critical scholarship. I accepted for the sake of argument the standard form-critical date for Mark’s Gospel of AD 70 or shortly thereafter (Bart Ehrman’s dating) and argued along form-critical lines, including the four-source solution to the synoptic problem that included the hypothesis of Q, in this way:

1.If the Synoptic Gospels were written around AD 70 or a little later, then Q was obviously written earlier, say from the late 50s to the mid-60s;

2.If Q was written in the late 50s to the mid-60s, then the formal traditions from which Q came were written earlier, say from the late 40s to mid-50s;

3.If the formal tradition which predated Q was situated in the late 40s to mid-50s, then the informal stories from which the formal tradition came were even earlier, say from the late 30s to the mid-40s;

4.If that’s the case, then there simply wasn’t enough time for legends about Jesus to grow up (particularly when one considers the presence of Aramaisms in the Synoptic Gospels).¹⁵

At the outset of my presentation, I announced that I was going to make an argument inspired by Habermas’s minimal facts approach. At lunch afterwards, he insisted to me—correctly, given his stated method—that my argument was not a minimal facts argument because the standard form-critical view as to the dating of the Synoptics was not agreed on by 90 percent or more of the guild. He was correct on that point. I agree. My argument was not and is not a minimal facts argument. It was, however, somewhat like a minimal facts argument in that it worked from a starting point that the vast majority of skeptical scholars would affirm. It is better described as an argument from critical scholarship, liberal source critical dating, or critical consensus. Habermas’s catalog count concerning the dating of Mark to around AD 70 does not rise to the 90-percent or more level primarily because conservatives like myself or Craig Blomberg think that Mark’s Gospel should be dated earlier than AD 70.¹⁶ (One should note that there are some liberals, like John A. T. Robinson, or non-theists, like James Crossley, who also think along these lines.)¹⁷ If the standard critical hypothesis that the oral tradition formalized over time (which led to written sources prior to Mark) is correct, and Mark was written earlier than the 70s, then my argument works even better, because then all the other components of the view, including the dating of Q, the formal stories from which Q came, and the informal traditions that later were formalized have to be even earlier. Unfortunately, Habermas’s minimal facts method doesn’t allow for it because of the requirement for at least 90-percent consensus on the issue!

9. Another concern is that Habermas’s method demands that he ignore propositions for which he has good reasons to believe—indeed, propositions that he does believe. I think this is why Habermas and Licona insist on mentioning Plus One or Second Order facts. Even they are uneasy with this unfortunate result of their method. But to their credit, they maintain their method, which is the methodologically responsible thing to do.

10. Having more true beliefs rather than fewer is almost always advantageous, so long as one doesn’t just believe irresponsibly. (The gullible person who believes anything for any reason, or without reason, will always have more true beliefs than the epistemically responsible person—but the gullible person will also have far more false beliefs than the epistemically-responsible person.) Of course, if we knew which propositions were true, then we wouldn’t need to discuss historical method. It seems, however, that for the most part, we can agree upon which beliefs are justified. Yet the minimal facts method requires that we exclude many propositions that are very well justified simply because only a clear majority—as opposed to the vast majority—of scholars affirm them. But justification is not something that is dependent upon being believed by anyone—propositions are justified or unjustified even if nobody believes them. Responsible belief is based on justification, not vice versa. This is an apparent problem for the minimal facts method.

11. Another concern is that the scholarly consensus will almost certainly change (as Habermas acknowledges).¹⁸ In fact, the scholarly consensus could change so drastically that Habermas would have fewer minimal facts from which to argue (although I am not expecting that to happen anytime too soon). Still, quantitatively speaking, the shift would not need to be that large for one or more of his minimal facts to drop below the 90-percent affirmation threshold. If that happened, then Habermas would be left with one or two minimal facts rather than three. In fact, given Habermas’s criteria, it could even be the case that the scholarly consensus would change so drastically that there would be no minimal facts from which to argue, even if there were multiple lines of evidence for several facts concerning the resurrection of Jesus. This is at least possible. On Habermas’s criteria, a minimal facts method today could leave us with a no facts method tomorrow.

12. I am struck by the fact that if one ends Mark’s Gospel at Mark 16:8—which most critical scholars do—not every New Testament Gospel records an appearance of Jesus, which is one of Habermas’s minimal facts. Yet all of the New Testament Gospels mention the empty tomb. If the Holy Spirit thought it best to include the empty tomb in each of our Gospels, then perhaps the empty tomb should be part of our method of arguing for the resurrection.

On the other hand, it is also true that the earliest New Testament witness to the resurrection, 1 Corinthians 15, mentions numerous appearances of the risen Jesus but says nothing about an empty tomb: Jesus died, was buried, was raised, and appeared to many believers—some of whom (e.g., Paul) were not believers until Jesus appeared to them.

Still, one can pretty safely assume that an empty tomb was entailed in Jesus being raised. After all, if he was in Galilee after his resurrection (Matt 28:16), then he was not in a tomb in or near Jerusalem. Furthermore, the empty tomb establishes an important point concerning the nature of Jesus’ resurrection: it involved the resurrection of an embodied person. That is, he was raised bodily from the dead.

13. A further question concerning Habermas’s minimal facts method is this: Why is it not one of Habermas’s minimal facts that the Christian movement begins in Jerusalem? Are there not multiple lines of evidence for this being the case? Do less than 90 percent of critical scholars affirm this? This seems to be a significant fact. There is little doubt that the earliest Christians declared the resurrection of Jesus in Jerusalem in the earliest days of the Christian church. But it seems obvious, at least to me, that they could not have preached the resurrection of Jesus in Jerusalem at this time if Jesus’ body were still in the tomb. It strains the imagination to believe that the earliest disciples preached that Jesus was raised from the dead in the same city where he was executed and buried fifty days after his crucifixion if the tomb were not empty. So why is the fact that the Christian movement began in Jerusalem not one of Habermas’s minimal facts? Perhaps the reason is because this fact is so widely recognized that few, if any, scholars question it. If this is so, then why have so few written on Jerusalem being the place where the Christian movement began? The answer seems obvious: you don’t have to argue for things that everybody believes. But then this calls into question the necessity of the unstated criterion of a sufficient sample size for a fact to be considered a minimal fact.

Trying the Case (Thinking Juristically)

Perhaps it will help to assess Habermas’s minimal facts method in a different way. I am the son of a judge. Growing up with a judge as a father is like living with a human lie detector. A constant refrain in our home was, Boys, I hear better liars than you every day. Worse, when we misbehaved, we got sentenced. Most important for this essay is that judges like to say, "What matters is not what you know; but what you can show!" In my view, the minimal facts method works best as a strategy for showing what you know rather than for knowing what you show. It works best as a strategy to argue a case, rather than a strategy to discover the facts of a case. It works best not as a method of discovery, but rather as a presentation method; it’s not about epistemology, but instead about persuasion.

The minimal facts method is akin to the case a lawyer makes when the judge has ruled one or more items of evidence out of order. It is not all the evidence that you have at your disposal, but it is all the evidence that you’re allowed to present, or at least everything this particular court will consider. It is not the whole story, but it might still be enough of the story for you to persuade a jury to rule in favor of your client.

The mentioning of second-order facts seems to support my position that the minimal facts method is a way to present a case rather than a way to discover the facts. In other words, Habermas did not reach his conclusions on the basis of minimal facts. Instead, he reached his conclusions on the basis of his first (and admittedly most important) criterion—multiple lines of evidence pointing in that direction.

That the minimal facts argument gets off the ground is testimony to how strong the historical evidence for the resurrection actually is. The argument demonstrates that there is more than enough evidence for an objective person to conclude that it is very likely that Jesus was raised from the dead, or at least to admit that it is possible that Jesus was raised from the dead. At the very least, Habermas’s minimal facts argument demonstrates that those denying the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus have not proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The minimal facts method is therefore an exercise in a fortiori reasoning. Note that there is a difference between a fortiori reasoning and an a fortiori argument. An argument is a set of statements in which there are clearly stated premises that offer support for a conclusion, while some particular type of reasoning is often simply thinking in a general way. One can reason in an a fortiori manner without making an explicit a fortiori argument. (Generally, a fortiori reasoning can be translated into one or more a fortiori arguments, although the reasoning may not be explicitly stated.¹⁹) The following is an example of a fortiori reasoning:

If I am too old to play Little League baseball, then obviously my father is too old, too.

Minimal facts arguments appear to argue along this line:

If the resurrection of Jesus is probable with only three facts being admitted as evidence for it, then obviously the resurrection of Jesus is even more likely if more evidence in favor of Jesus’ resurrection is admitted.

Conclusion: If It Helps, Use It

Apologists should always size up their apologetic context, including their audience, and then proceed accordingly. If you can use more evidences, then do so. If you can lead someone all the way from skepticism to Christian faith, then do so. Much of the time, doing so is not possible in one conversation—nor the result of one argument—because of the worldview or mindset of your dialogue partner. Worldviews typically change over time, not as a result of one argument or conversation.

Additionally, it is often better to take one less step in presenting the evidence for the Christian worldview than