No Place for Glory: Major General Robert E. Rodes and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg

By Robert J. Wynstra

A scrupulous analysis of Rodes’s conduct during the Battle of Gettysburg

Over the years, many top historians have cited Major General Robert E. Rodes as the best division commander in Robert E. Lee’s vaunted army. Despite those accolades, Rodes faltered badly at Gettysburg, which stands as the only major blemish on his otherwise sterling record. Although his subordinates were guilty of significant blunders, Rodes shared the blame for the disjointed attack that led to the destruction of Alfred Iverson’s brigade on the first day of the battle. His lack of initiative on the following day was regarded by some in the army as much worse. Whether justified or not, they directly faulted him for not supporting Jubal Early’s division in a night attack on Cemetery Hill that nearly succeeded in decisively turning the enemy’s flank.

The reasons behind Rodes’s flawed performance at Gettysburg have long proven difficult to decipher with any certainty. Because his personal papers were destroyed, primary sources on his role in battle remain sparse. Other than the official reports on the battle, the record of what occurred there is mostly limited to the letters and diaries of his subordinates. In this new study, however, Robert J. Wynstra draws on sources heretofore unexamined, including rare soldiers’ letters published in local newspapers and other firsthand accounts located in small historical societies, to shed light on the reasons behind Rodes’s missteps.

As a result of this new research and analysis, we are finally able to come to a more detailed understanding of Rodes’s division’s activities at Gettysburg, an enduring subject of study and interest.

• Language: English
• Publisher: The Kent State University Press
• Release date: Apr 6, 2021
• ISBN: 9781631014314

Book preview

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No Place for Glory

CIVIL WAR SOLDIERS AND STRATEGIES

Brian S. Wills, Series Editor

Richmond Must Fall: The Richmond-Petersburg Campaign, October 1864

HAMPTON NEWSOME

Work for Giants: The Campaign and Battle of Tupelo/Harrisburg,

Mississippi, June–July 1864

THOMAS E. PARSON

My Greatest Quarrel with Fortune:

Major General Lew Wallace in the West, 1861–1862

CHARLES G. BEEMER

Phantoms of the South Fork: Captain McNeill and His Rangers

STEVE FRENCH

At the Forefront of Lee’s Invasion: Retribution, Plunder, and Clashing Cultures on Richard S. Ewell’s Road to Gettysburg

ROBERT J. WYNSTRA

Meade: The Price of Command, 1863–1865

JOHN G. SELBY

James Riley Weaver’s Civil War: The Diary of a Union Cavalry

Officer and Prisoner of War, 1863–1865

EDITED BY JOHN T. SCHLOTTERBECK, WESLEY W. WILSON, MIDORI KAWAUE, AND HAROLD A. KLINGENSMITH

Blue-Blooded Cavalryman: Captain William Brooke Rawle in the Army of the Potomac, May 1863–August 1865

EDITED BY J. GREGORY ACKEN

No Place for Glory: Major General Robert E. Rodes and the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg

ROBERT J. WYNSTRA

No Place

for Glory

Major General Robert E. Rodes and

the Confederate Defeat at Gettysburg

Robert J. Wynstra

© 2021 by The Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio 44242

All rights reserved

ISBN 978-1-60635-410-0

Manufactured in the United States of America

No part of this book may be used or reproduced, in any manner whatsoever, without written permission from the Publisher, except in the case of short quotations in critical reviews or articles.

Cataloging information for this title is available at the Library of Congress.

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Contents

Preface

Introduction: His Promotion Should Date from May 2

1Everything ahead Looks Like War

2A Perfect Triumphal March

3We Are Brought in Hearing of Artillery

4The Yankes Crossed Fired on Us a Good While

5I Never Saw Troops So Scattered

6For a Few Minutes the Fighting Was Terrific

7We Charged Right over Them

8It Was Then Too Late

9A Day None Will Forget

10 The Place Was Thronged with Rebels

11 The Night Was Hideous in the Extreme

12 So High That We Cannot Cross

Epilogue: The Whole Army Mourned His Death

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Preface

Over the years, many historians have cited Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes as probably the best division commander in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s vaunted Army of Northern Virginia. Despite those accolades, he faltered badly at Gettysburg, which stands as the only major blemish on his otherwise sterling record. Although his subordinates were guilty of significant blunders, Rodes shared the blame for the disjointed attack that led to the destruction of Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson’s brigade along Oak Ridge on the first day of the battle. His lack of initiative on the following day was regarded by some top commanders as much worse. Whether justified or not, they directly faulted him for not supporting Maj. Gen. Jubal Early’s division in a night attack on Cemetery Hill that nearly succeeded in decisively turning the enemy’s flank.

The reasons behind Rodes’s flawed performance at Gettysburg have proved difficult to decipher with any certainty. The major writings on his career remain sparse, with only a single book-length study and two significant articles available in the existing literature. Author Darrell Collins’s treatment of the general’s actions in that battle is limited to a single chapter in his highly regarded biography. Historian Robert K. Krick has also contributed two thought-provoking essays of less than thirty pages each that provide valuable insights on Rodes’s complex character and relations with his brigade commanders. This, then, leaves an opening to explore his role in the defeat at Gettysburg in more depth.¹

The lack of a large body of personal correspondence has long hampered the search for suitable answers. To the regret of future historians, Rodes’s wife, Hortense, destroyed most of his letters and other personal papers in the years following his untimely death in 1864 at the Third Battle of Winchester, which has severely clouded the understanding of this often enigmatic leader. Because he died before the end of the war, there are also no postwar memoirs that could help explain his actions. Other than the official reports on the battle, the record of what occurred at Gettysburg is mostly limited to the letters and diaries of Rodes’s subordinates.²

Luckily the advent of the internet has provided access to a trove of previously underutilized primary sources. Of special importance are the many contemporary letters and postwar accounts that the rank-and-file soldiers published in their hometown newspapers. Other vital resources include the manuscript collections available from several small archives and local historical societies. With those new materials, it is now possible to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of his division’s activities during the Gettysburg Campaign from the men who served alongside the general. More important, those accounts shed light on the reasons behind Rodes’s missteps in the battle.

Although he had performed brilliantly while temporarily leading the division at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg marked Rodes’s first major action as its permanent commander. This time, however, he had to operate without the guiding hand of Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson. Rodes was further burdened with two of the weakest brigade commanders in Lee’s army. Both Iverson and Col. Edward A. O’Neal would prove that his doubts about their abilities were well founded. While a third brigade commander would soon prove his merit, Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel was also new to the division. His troops’ only combat experience prior to Gettysburg had come during a brief stint a year earlier with the Army of Northern Virginia at Malvern Hill.

Often overlooked is how much Rodes’s ongoing disputes with Iverson and O’Neal affected his performance on the battlefield. The general particularly had no love lost for O’Neal, whom he regarded as little more than a political conniver. Rodes held the colonel in such low regard that he repeatedly interfered with the deployment of his troops on the field at Gettysburg, leaving O’Neal severely shorthanded at a crucial point during the fighting on Oak Ridge. The colonel refused to take his commander’s criticism lying down and enlisted some of his influential political allies to impugn Rodes’s character in the partisan press. Their feud went on for many months before Lee finally removed O’Neal from the army.

Iverson was so obviously incompetent that it is difficult to understand how Rodes allowed him to take a leading role in the opening part of the battle, which resulted in one of the worst slaughters of the entire war. Although Iverson largely avoided a direct confrontation with Rodes, the men in his own brigade constantly complained about his leadership failures and favoritism toward his friends in obtaining promotions. Following the battle, many of them blasted him as an outright coward who remained hidden behind a log throughout the fighting and called for his immediate dismissal from the army. Rodes enthusiastically supported Lee’s decision to strip Iverson of his command soon afterward.

These sources also add fresh insights into Rodes’s penchant for having every detail in place before aggressively moving forward on the attack. Many in the army regarded the general’s meticulous planning as one of his most admirable traits. At Gettysburg, however, it could be argued that his elaborate preparations were a major factor in the failure to support General Early’s nighttime attack against Cemetery Hill on the second day of the battle. Behind the scenes, both General Lee and Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, his corps commander, held Rodes largely responsible for letting slip away one of the best chances for dramatically turning the tide of the battle. More than any other fault, this was a blot on his record that the division commander would struggle to live down.

Several newly uncovered primary accounts have further confirmed that Rodes was likely sick during Gettysburg. By all indications, this amounted to more than just a minor bout of illness. According to one eyewitness, the general suffered so badly from chills and a high fever that he was forced to rest in an ambulance whenever possible, which surely would have degraded his decision making and the management of his troops. Others speculate that the effects from his well-documented drinking spree at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, a few days earlier during the advance north may also have contributed to his poor performance.

Although much about Rodes remains elusive, the recent flood of letters and diaries have also helped unravel his division’s often perplexing movements on the first day of the battle. In particular, the accounts have mostly settled the controversy over the exact sequence of O’Neal’s attacks along Oak Ridge north of town. They further provide new insights into the key role that Rodes’s men played in thwarting the destruction of Lee’s vital supply trains at Monterey Pass and Hagerstown, Maryland, following the battle and preventing the Federal Army of the Potomac from outflanking the Confederates during the final days of the retreat. Taken together, those sources serve as the crucial raw material for bringing some much-needed clarity to the mix of failures and successes that mark Rodes’s participation in the Gettysburg Campaign.

INTRODUCTION

His Promotion Should Date from May 2

By May 1863, Robert E. Rodes had emerged as one of the rising stars in the Army of Northern Virginia. While in temporary command of a division, he spear-headed Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson’s famed flank attack in the woods at Chancellorsville late in the afternoon on May 2. Only impending darkness prevented his troops from completely sweeping the Federal forces from the field. On the following day his men endured some of the hardest fighting of the war before finally sealing the Confederate victory in the tangled wilderness west of Fredericksburg. In all, it was a scene of triumph for Rodes and the men in his division.

More than six feet tall and with an imposing sandy mustache, the thirty-four-year-old major general exemplified for many the emerging breed of Confederate warriors. Unlike all others of the same rank in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s veteran army, Rodes had not attended West Point. A native of Lynchburg, Virginia, he instead graduated from Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in 1848. After a brief stint teaching at his alma mater, he built a thriving career as a civil engineer with the railroad industry in Virginia, Alabama, Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas. In 1856 Rodes moved to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, where he took over as the chief engineer for the North East and South West Alabama Railroad.

Despite all his success, Rodes longed for a return to a career in education. I have always known that I would be happier and more useful as a teacher, than in my present position, he wistfully admitted in a letter to VMI superintendent Francis H. Smith. Although Smith worked tirelessly to assist him, Rodes failed to secure a suitable teaching post during the years before the Civil War. His frustrations continued to mount until just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, when he accepted an appointment as professor of applied mechanics at his beloved former school. Regrettably that offer came too late. With a major conflict looming, other events soon intervened, and he never formally served in that position.¹

Rather than moving back to his home state, Rodes stayed in Alabama and organized a volunteer company known as the Warrior Guard. Soon after arriving in camp at Montgomery, he won election as colonel of the newly formed Fifth Alabama. His regiment reached Virginia just in time for the First Battle of Manassas but took no major part in the fighting. The troops in his command quickly discovered that their colonel was a strict disciplinarian and a proponent of constant drilling. Rodes I think has the drill-mania, for I think he had rather drill than eat a good dinner, Cpl. John Henry Cowin quipped in his diary during late July 1861. He noted, the boys grumble considerably.²

At the same time, his men found their commander nearly impossible to dislike. By most accounts, Rodes was a natural-born leader, whose stunning good looks and erect military bearing left no doubts with those who met him that he was someone to be reckoned with on the battlefield. He tempered his imposing presence with an easy charm that could disarm even his harshest critics. His manner remained the same whether he was dealing with an officer or an enlisted man. That stance proved especially popular among the troops in the ranks. One admiring soldier who later served under Rodes’s command insisted that he had never met a more just, conscientious and impartial officer.³

The colonel’s abilities also drew positive notice from Brig. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, his first brigade commander. In late August an officer from the brigade staff reported to one of his relatives that Rodes was an able & efficient officer. He added that the general thinks very highly of him. Throughout that time, Ewell worked tirelessly behind the scenes to secure his appointment as a brigadier general. Rodes finally received the coveted promotion in October 1861, when Ewell transferred to command of Jackson’s former brigade. According to the young staffer, the general’s repeated recommendations played a major role in the final selection of Rodes to fill the vacancy.⁴

The men of the Fifth Alabama enthusiastically supported his appointment to head the brigade. Corporal Cowin insisted in his diary that Rodes is well worthy the promotion and will do credit to the office. His popularity among the men in the ranks was never more apparent than during a going-away ceremony at the end of October. The new general took leave of his old command that day with a stirring speech, which left a lasting impression on everyone in attendance. He complimented us for our courtesy toward him also for our bearing up under many and toilsome and as he termed them famous marches, Cowin effused. At the conclusion of his remarks we cheered him lustily.⁵

The new leader’s first major combat at the head of his brigade came in late May 1862 at Seven Pines during the Peninsula Campaign, where he was wounded and cited for bravery. Despite that injury, Rodes returned to duty in time to lead his men in the bloody fighting at Gaines’s Mill. He further enhanced his reputation at South Mountain during the Maryland Campaign, where his brigade boldly held off a large Federal force threatening Lee’s supply lines. He again performed gallantly and suffered a slight wound during the fierce action along Bloody Lane at Sharpsburg only a few days later. At nearly every turn Rodes made his mark as someone with a bright future in Lee’s army.

Despite his enviable record, Rodes failed to earn further advancement over the following months. The most discouraging moments came when it appeared that he would be passed over as head of the division in which he was serving. Following the transfer of Maj. Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill to North Carolina in early 1863, Rodes temporarily assumed command of the division. Even so, Stonewall Jackson favored the selection of Brig. Gen. Edward Old Allegheny Johnson rather than Rodes as the unit’s permanent head. The final decision, however, remained on hold until Johnson could heal from a severe ankle wound that he suffered while serving alongside Jackson in northwestern Virginia the previous year.⁶

Hill’s former division included five brigades with lengthy experience in Lee’s army. Col. Edward A. O’Neal of the Twenty-Sixth Alabama temporarily headed Rodes’s Brigade during this transition period. Brig. Gens. George P. Doles and Alfred H. Colquitt commanded the two Georgia brigades in the division; Colquitt would not remain in the division for long. The command also included two veteran brigades from the Tar Heel state. One of them served under Brig. Gen. Stephen Dodson Ramseur, who had only recently joined the brigade after recovering from a wound to his arm at Malvern Hill. Brig. Gen. Alfred Holt Iverson commanded the other North Carolina brigade.

Rodes quickly became a favorite among those who dealt with him while he temporarily headed the division. I like him so much, Lt. James Power Smith from Jackson’s staff effused in a letter to his sister during late January 1863. He is very much admired by all and very popular. Pvt. George Thomas Rust, who served as a courier on the division staff, was equally pleased with his new commander. What stood out most of all for him was the general’s sense of fairness toward those in the ranks. Genl Rodes is very cordial & treats me as a friend & his equal, Rust declared in a letter home. That was a sentiment with which few men in the division would have disagreed.⁷

Lt. Col. Thomas H. Carter, who headed the division’s artillery battalion, enthusiastically endorsed Rodes as the permanent commander. We are much pleased with Rodes & hope his chance is good for promotion to the command of the division, the artilleryman commented in a letter home. Maj. Eugene Blackford, a longtime field officer in the Fifth Alabama, held him in such high regard that he became indignant over the widespread reports that Johnson would take over the division. They have missed it much in not making Rodes the commander, he complained to his father. Blackford insisted that Rodes failed to gain this well-deserved promotion because he had not graduated from West Point. He lamented that the prejudice in favour of West Pointers was too strong even for a man of his merit.⁸

Nearly all the Alabama troops in his old brigade supported Rodes’s selection as head of their division. Many of his trusted subordinates quickly moved to make their preference known to the higher authorities. We are all much interested in the appointment of our new Division General, Major Blackford remarked in a letter home during early March. Yesterday this brigade sent up a petition signed by every officer in it asking that Rodes be made Maj. General and assigned to this command. They kept up their efforts even though it still seemed likely that the position would go to Johnson. Blackford admitted that he did not know if it will do any good or not but it can’t do any harm.

The major displayed special disdain for one Alabama politician who attempted to block the advancement because Rodes originally came from Virginia. Blackford, who was a native of Virginia himself, griped to his father that Confederate congressman William Lowndes had excited my indignation to the utmost by having said to the Alabama delegation that he was opposed to Rodes’s promotion, that he was in the first place too severe a disciplinarian, and ‘a mere adventurer and not an Alabamian.’ Such partisan maneuvering left Blackford fuming. Tis very humiliating to a soldier that these vile politicians in Richmond should have to be consulted in regard to the appointment of a Maj. General, he protested. Besides it is news to me to that being a Virginian is a reproach.⁹

The few other negative opinions about Rodes came mostly from Doles’s troops. Old Allegheny Johnson had served with distinction as colonel of the Twelfth Georgia during the early part of the war and remained well respected by the veterans in the brigade. As a result, at least some of the Georgian troops in the division openly favored his promotion. It is talked and generally believed that Gen. Ed. Johnson will take command of this division, Lt. Irby Goodwin Scott from the Twelfth Georgia bluntly commented in a letter to his father in mid-March. He has been recommended by Lee & Jackson. I hope it may be true. Rodes is not very popular.¹⁰

Although Johnson’s recovery lasted well into the spring, Rodes held out little hope that his own prospects for advancement would improve. Jackson certainly gave no hints that he had any intention of changing his original preference for Johnson as Hill’s successor. Rodes also remained convinced that the first opportunity to fill any other vacancy for division commander in Lee’s veteran army would go to Brig. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox. As he is a West Point man he will beat me almost to a certainty, he grumbled to Ewell during early spring. I would prefer being beaten by a baboon but will submit to it quietly, unless they place [him] in command of this Div.

Ewell’s impending return to duty from a long absence, due to a severe wound that resulted in the amputation of a leg, further complicated the situation. By the time Ewell recovered from his injuries, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early had already assumed leadership of his old division, leaving him temporarily without a command of his own. Rodes found his own chances for promotion as permanent head of Hill’s former division so slight that he called for Ewell to take over in place of Johnson. Do not then hesitate to avail yourself of every means of procuring this result, and be assured that I will be personally gratified to be under your command again, he declared in his letter to Ewell.¹¹

Rodes did not allow those troubles to interfere with the need for rigid disciple and constant drilling among the men in his old brigade. Pvt. Samuel D. Pickens from the Fifth Alabama griped in his diary early in 1863, we are drilling every day now in Hardee’s Tactics. Pvt. Thomas Coffey from the Third Alabama found the training so exhausting that he actually welcomed five days of the worst weather that they had experienced during the entire winter, allowing him to take a much needed break from the parade grounds. He joked in a letter home during late January that old Rodes would die if he could not have the men double-quicking five hours a day.¹²

Rodes’s prospects for promotion suddenly brightened following his brilliant performance during the ferocious fighting at Chancellorsville. On April 29 Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker sent a large portion of his Federal Army of the Potomac across the Rappahannock River upstream from Fredericksburg. General Lee countered on May 1 by moving Stonewall Jackson’s Second Corps along Orange Plank Road in the direction of Chancellorsville. After a flurry of action, the Federal troops pulled back into a defensive position amid the tangled wilderness just west of Fredericksburg. On the following day Jackson responded by marching his corps higher up the river along Furnace Road in an effort to outflank the Union army.

By the late afternoon on May 2, three of Jackson’s divisions had moved into place just north of the Orange Turnpike, directly on the exposed right of the Federal Eleventh Corps. With Rodes’s men in the lead, Jackson launched a lightning assault on the unaware enemy troops. We drove them through woods and fields, right by splendid breastworks, for about 2½ miles, as one triumphant soldier from the Twentieth North Carolina in Iverson’s Brigade described the results to his brother. Despite their success, the flank attack came too late in the afternoon to finish off Hooker’s army, leaving the outcome of the battle to be decided on the following day.¹³

A major disaster struck later that night when some troops from James H. Lane’s brigade accidentally wounded Stonewall Jackson while he carried out a reconnaissance along their front lines. Other firing in the darkness subsequently injured Maj. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill. Oh! an awful calamity befell us, Lt. Col. John W. Lea from the Fifth North Carolina in Iverson’s Brigade lamented in his diary. Jackson’s left arm was broken and A. P. Hill wounded in the leg (left) by the firing of our own troops. Lane’s Brigade had marched almost into the enemy and halted when they were fired on with shell. He noted that this created an alarm and they fired on nothing—for several minutes our troops cut each other to pieces.¹⁴

After a fitful night of rest, Rodes’s men returned to action along the turnpike on the morning of May 3. Although they suffered appalling losses, the troops eventually swept the enemy from that part of the field and succeeded in uniting the divided wings of Lee’s army. Even then, however, the danger was not over. Another column from Hooker’s army under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick soon moved forward against Lee’s rear from Fredericksburg but was rebuffed in heavy fighting at Salem Church on the fourth. The tactical masterpiece at Chancellorsville, which many regard as one of Lee’s greatest battlefield achievements, ended two days later when Hooker finally withdrew his battered army across the Rappahannock.¹⁵

Rodes earned praise throughout the army for his splendid performance during the fighting. Gen. Rodes distinguished himself much and won a proud name for himself and his division, A. P. Hill declared in his official report on the battle. General Ewell informed another high-ranking officer that Rodes seems after Jackson to be the hero of the fight. Most important were the comments from General Lee, who indicated that one of Jackson’s dying messages to me was to the effect that General Rodes should be promoted major general and his promotion should date from May 2. As a result, Lee elevated Rodes to his new rank within days after the battle, while Old Allegheny Johnson assumed command of Jackson’s former division.¹⁶

Nearly everyone in the division greeted Rodes’s appointment with enthusiasm. Major Blackford, who served under Colonel O’Neal’s temporary command, reported to his cousin soon after the announcement that Rodes well deserved his promotion. Even some of the Georgians in the division were ready to give him the benefit of the doubt. Pvt. W. Davies Tinsley from the Fourth Georgia, one of Doles’s regiments, described the new division commander in a letter to his mother as a fine officer. He was especially struck by the youthful appearance of someone in such a high position. He is a very young man—looks younger than I do, the Georgian declared in amazement.¹⁷

Most of the troops were even willing to overlook Rodes’s well-known reputation for rigid discipline. We hope he will make a good and efficient officer though some think he will be very Strict with both men and officers, which is all wright in so large a crowd of men, Capt. William B. Haygood from the Forty-Fourth Georgia of Doles’s Brigade remarked in a letter home during mid-May. With Rodes in command, he had no doubts that the men were ready to face whatever test awaited them. Although they had suffered some appalling losses in the recent fighting, the captain insisted that our Division is a very ifficient corps of men yet and can do good service when ever we are called on.¹⁸

CHAPTER 1

Everything ahead Looks Like War

Despite the stunning victory at Chancellorsville, Robert Rodes faced several nagging problems in the weeks following the battle. One particularly troubling issue was the mixed quality of the officers who commanded the five brigades in his infantry division. He initially focused on finding a suitable candidate to lead his former brigade, which comprised the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Twelfth, and Twenty-Sixth Alabama Regiments. The general’s most immediate concern was the lackluster performance of forty-four-year-old Col. Edward A. O’Neal from the Twenty-Sixth Alabama, who had temporarily headed the brigade since early January 1863. Finding a permanent leader, however, would be much more difficult than he had anticipated.

While acknowledged for his bravery in action, O’Neal lacked any formal military training. He practiced as an attorney in Florence, Alabama, prior to the war and unsuccessfully ran for Congress in 1848. As a leading advocate of secession, he cultivated strong political connections throughout the state. O’Neal joined the Ninth Alabama at the start of hostilities as a major. In early 1862 he took over the Twenty-Sixth Alabama as a lieutenant colonel, promoted to colonel soon afterward. While serving at the head of the regiment, O’Neal was wounded at both Seven Pines and South Mountain. Leading the brigade at Chancellorsville, he suffered another wound during the fierce fighting on May 3.¹

Soon after assuming temporary command of the brigade, O’Neal began using his extensive political contacts in Alabama to lobby the Confederate government for promotion to brigadier general. In mid-January one of his allies informed Secretary of War James A. Seddon that O’Neal’s conduct at the head of his Regt. very fully entitles him to the most favorable considerations of his government. He emphasized that the promotion "would be popular in this portion of the state & I have not [sic] doubt all over the state." Little more than a month later, influential Confederate senator James Phelan from Mississippi, who began his career in Alabama, wrote a letter of support directly to Pres. Jefferson Davis. This came after Gov. John G. Shorter called his attention to O’Neal’s qualifications during the senator’s visit to the state capital at Montgomery.²

Despite O’Neal’s efforts to gain promotion, Rodes failed to include him among his top choices to head the brigade. He preferred to have Brig. Gen. John Brown Gordon, who had earlier served as colonel of the Sixth Alabama in his brigade, transferred from his position as temporary commander of a Georgia brigade in Early’s Division. The only concern that Rodes expressed about Gordon’s abilities was his apparent lack of attention to maintaining order in the ranks. He confided to General Ewell that Gordon is a magnificent officer in action, but is a horrible disciplinarian I find. Despite those qualms, the Georgian remained his first choice to take over his former brigade.³

If Gordon’s transfer could not be worked out, Rodes then requested the promotion of Col. John Tyler Morgan, who had spent the early part of the war as a field officer in the Fifth Alabama. The general described Morgan as an able officer who was well known to him before transferring to a command in Alabama. But Rodes emphasized that he would accept this alternative only if Morgan can be had promptly. As a last resort, his choices were confined to O’Neal and Col. Cullen A. Battle from the Third Alabama. Rodes emphasized that neither of them was in my opinion equal to Morgan. The devastating loss of more than eight hundred men from the brigade during the fighting at Chancellorsville further complicated O’Neal’s chance for promotion, which remained unlikely at best.

As was normally the case, the final selection of a new brigade commander rested with General Lee. When difficulties arose with securing the services of both Gordon and Morgan, the army leader decided to give the position to Colonel O’Neal, whom he did not know well. That decision caught many in the division by surprise. Lee based this unexpected choice on O’Neal’s seniority and the fact that he has been identified with his regiment and brigade by long service as Lieut. Col. and Colonel. On Lee’s recommendation, the Confederate War Department formally issued a commission for O’Neal’s promotion to the permanent rank brigadier general on June 6.⁴

In a break with standard procedure, Lee did not immediately pass on news of the appointment to the colonel and his family, who had long expected a much different outcome. If any man has ever done his duty or won his promotion, you have, O’Neal’s wife, Olivia, complained to him on the day before the commission was issued. And yet I think it very doubtful whether you will have justice done you. The failure to inform the colonel of his commission resulted from a last-minute protest by General Rodes that caused Lee to put the promotion on hold. The final decision on O’Neal’s future with the Army of Northern Virginia would come only after he was further tested in the upcoming summer campaign.⁵

The situation proved much different for Brig. Gen. Stephen Dodson Ramseur, who commanded one of the two Tar Heel brigades in the division. Although his men suffered nearly seven hundred casualties in the battle, Ramseur’s performance at Chancellorsville further cemented his growing reputation as one of the best brigade commanders in Lee’s army. The twenty-six-year-old general was universally known by his middle name, Dodson. Born and raised in Lincoln County, North Carolina, Ramseur attended Davidson College for three years before winning an appointment to West Point. Following his graduation in the class of 1860, he briefly served as a lieutenant in the U.S. Army.

After resigning his commission at the outbreak of war, Ramseur entered the Confederate service as a captain of artillery. He took over as colonel of the Forty-Ninth North Carolina in the spring of 1862 and sustained a severe wound in the arm at Malvern Hill on July 1. Ramseur’s reputation as a hard fighter eventually earned him promotion as the replacement for Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson, who had died in October from wounds he sustained at Sharpsburg. His new command comprised the Second, Fourth, Fourteenth, and Thirtieth North Carolina. Although his appointment dated from November 1, 1862, Ramseur did not join the brigade until mid-January 1863 due to continued problems with his wounded arm.⁶

Because Ramseur came from outside the brigade, some of the senior officers greeted his selection with less than complete enthusiasm. Col. Francis M. Parker from the Thirtieth North Carolina, who had been passed over for promotion to take over the brigade, was initially one of his most ardent critics. While smarting from that apparent snub, the veteran field officer openly griped about Ramseur’s young age and his well-known penchant for imposing rigid discipline on his troops. Our Brig. Genl. is quite a strict young man, not more than twenty-seven, Parker commented in a letter to his wife. He is a very strict disciplinarian. Drills are very hard.⁷

Other men in the ranks expressed similar concerns about Ramseur’s fitness for command. One soldier from the Fourth North Carolina complained to his mother that their own colonel was more entitled to the promotion of brigadier than Ramseur. At the same time, he held out hope that his new commander would prove himself to be as good as General Anderson was, though that is hardly possible. Sgt. William A. Adams from the same regiment was especially unhappy about the exhaustive training that the new commander required. Gen Ramseur is giving us the very devil on drilling, he commented in a letter to his sister soon after the general’s arrival. He is a good general but he is as tite as the very devil.⁸

Any worries about their new commander quickly evaporated following the ferocious fighting at Chancellorsville, where Ramseur won praise throughout the army for his unmatched skill and bravery. Brig. Gen. William Dorsey Pender from A. P. Hill’s Division reported to his wife soon after the battle that Ramseur had covered himself and brigade with glory. Even Colonel Parker, who had been cool to Ramseur’s promotion, admitted in a letter home that our own Brigadier is a very gallant officer. By the time Rodes took over as permanent head of the division, Dodson Ramseur was acknowledged throughout the army as someone destined for higher command.⁹

Brig. Gen. Alfred Holt Iverson led the division’s other North Carolina brigade, which suffered nearly five hundred casualties during the awful fighting at Chancellorsville. For many in the brigade, those appalling losses only confirmed the worst doubts about their thirty-four-year-old commander. Iverson was born and raised in Georgia. He had strong political connections to President Davis through his father, who was a former U.S. senator and a vocal advocate of secession. The younger Iverson had served briefly in the Mexican War as an officer with the Georgia volunteers. In 1855 he won an appointment from the civilian ranks as a lieutenant in the newly formed First US Cavalry.

At the outbreak of the Civil War, he resigned from the U.S. Army and took up recruiting duties in North Carolina. As one of the few professional soldiers in the camp, Iverson easily won election as colonel of what would become the Twentieth North Carolina. After joining Brig. Gen. Samuel Garland’s brigade outside Richmond, his men experienced their first major combat at Gaines’s Mill during the Seven Days’ Campaign, where Iverson was wounded in the hip. He returned to duty in time for the Maryland Campaign, during which his men twice broke and ran under the weight of a Federal assault. His chance for advancement suddenly came when Garland suffered a mortal wound at South Mountain.¹⁰

Despite his spotty record, Iverson was promoted to brigadier general and assigned to head the brigade about a month after Garland’s death at South Mountain. His new command comprised the Fifth, Twelfth, Twentieth, and Twenty-Third North Carolina. Soon after his promotion, Iverson became embroiled in a vicious feud with the officers of his former regiment over the choice of an outsider to succeed him as colonel. The infighting turned so rancorous in late December 1862 that he arrested all twenty-six officers from the Twentieth North Carolina, who had sent a protest about his actions to the Confederate War Department. At the end of January 1863, the new general reluctantly agreed to a compromise in which the senior officers waived their ranks in favor of Capt. Thomas F. Toon from their regiment, who was appointed as the next colonel of the regiment.¹¹

Another bitter dispute broke out in the Twelfth North Carolina during late 1862, when Iverson forced the resignation of Col. Benjamin O. Wade. Following several failed attempts to find a replacement, he eventually nominated former captain Henry Eaton Coleman as the new colonel. Coleman was born in 1837 and grew up in Halifax County, Virginia. He briefly attended VMI before being dismissed for exceeding the allowable number of demerits. After studying for a year at William and Mary College, the Virginian worked as a civil engineer and supervised his family’s properties in Virginia and North Carolina, where in 1858 he purchased a plantation in Granville County. Coleman entered military service from that county as captain of a volunteer company, which had been largely raised and equipped by his uncle.¹²

The captain soon became widely disliked by the men under his command. One soldier from the regiment recalled that Coleman proved to be a too strict disciplinarian. Sgt. Adolphus Pitcher noted that there was also bitter hatred existing against him amongst the men of the regiment in consequence of his bad treatment of them while on guard. Sgt. Archibald Henderson reported in a letter to his brother during early 1862 that Coleman’s reputation had sunk so low by then that he could not get two men in the company to go under him in action. As a result, he was handily defeated for reelection during the army’s reorganization of May 1862 and returned to civilian life at his family’s plantation in Virginia.¹³

Capt. William S. Davis and other ranking officers in the Twelfth North Carolina vehemently protested against Iverson’s selection of their despised former captain to take the place of Colonel Wade. Davis noted that he looked upon Coleman at this time as sustaining the relation of a citizen to the regiment and could not see how he could interpose with promotions in the regiment. After numerous delays in securing Coleman’s nomination from the War Department, a board of examination intervened during late May by promoting Davis to lieutenant colonel and assigning him command of the regiment. Although nothing was further heard of Coleman’s appointment at the time, Iverson continued to maneuver behind the scenes to obtain the position for his friend, which only further undermined the general’s leadership.¹⁴

Many others already viewed the selection of Iverson, who came from Georgia, to command a brigade made up entirely of Tar Heel troops as a severe affront to their state’s honor. Some charged that the promotion only happened because of his father’s political connections to President Davis. Col. Duncan K. McRae from the Fifth North Carolina, who temporarily headed the brigade following Garland’s death, resigned in protest. Gov. Zebulon Baird Vance and other top politicians in North Carolina even attempted to block Iverson’s promotion in the Confederate Senate. The soldiers endured another blow to their pride when Iverson retained nearly all of the Virginia officers from Garland’s brigade staff, including his assistant adjutant general, Capt. Don Peters Halsey.¹⁵

The general’s reputation suffered further damage during his first major combat as a brigade commander at Chancellorsville, when some of his men accused him of remaining safely behind the lines on both days of the fighting. At least one wounded soldier from the brigade recalled seeing Iverson well in the rear while his men pursued the fleeing Federal troops during the flank attack on May 2. I went first to the field hospital station to have my wound dressed, Pvt. George W. Rabb from the Twelfth North Carolina recalled years later. As I was going to the hospital, I passed by Brigadier Gen. Iverson, and told him the Yankees were running like turkeys.¹⁶

Rather than accompanying his men into the fight on the following day, Iverson again chose to direct the action from behind the front lines. While rallying his troops amid a hail of bullets, Lt. Col. John Lea from the Fifth North Carolina attempted to locate the brigade commander. He discovered to his disgust that the general "was no where to be found in my front