The Light Division in the Peninsular War, 1808–1811

By Tim Saunders and Rob Yuill

This regimental history chronicles the legendary exploits of the British Army’s Light Division against Napoleon in Spain and Portugal.

From the outset of the Peninsular campaigns in 1808, the Light Division achieved results way beyond their scant numbers. But it was during the epic winter retreat to La Corunna that they showed their metal. Returning to the Peninsula months later, the irascible Brigadier Robert Craufurd led the Light Brigade on a terrible march to meet General Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington, at Talavera.

The Light Division played significant roles in the Battle of the River Côa, where the riflemen fought hard to escape Marshal Ney’s trap; the Battle of Buçaco Ridge, the Battle of Salamanca, and many others. More than a simple series of battle scenes, however, this history of the Light Division provides a wider picture of campaigning during the Napoleonic Wars and sheds light on the life of a 19th century light infantry soldier.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 30, 2020
• ISBN: 9781526757333

Tim Saunders

Tim Saunders served as an infantry officer with the British Army for thirty years, during which time he took the opportunity to visit campaigns far and wide, from ancient to modern. Since leaving the Army he has become a full time military historian, with this being his sixteenth book, has made nearly fifty full documentary films with Battlefield History and Pen & Sword. He is an active guide and Accredited Member of the Guild of Battlefield Guides.

Book preview

Introduction

Over the years plenty has been written on the 95th Rifles and of course there are the various regimental histories of the other light regiments, but when discussing our aspirations for this book we were determined that it should be an inclusive history of the Light Division. To achieve this, we have looked beyond the infantry element to include those other arms that were habitually attached to the division, such as Ross’s troop and the KGL Hussars. To achieve this, we have had to seek out letters and memoirs from less well-known accounts written by members of the wider division, such as Ensign Brumwell of the 43rd Light Infantry and Captain John Dobbs of the 52nd Light Infantry. In doing this we have tried to avoid an over-reliance on the accounts of a handful of well-known riflemen and the consequent narrow focus around the 95th Rifles. The paucity of accounts covering the two Portuguese Caçadore battalions who joined the division in 1810 is regretted. This means that, while we have given them credit, their story is not as comprehensively told as they deserve. The period covered by the second volume of this history (1811–1814) will, however, see the Caçadores and the 17th Portuguese Line Regiment emerging from the shadow of their British comrades and playing a more active part, which is easier to chronicle.

The Light Brigade, under Brigadier General Craufurd’s command, that joined Sir John Moore’s army and later Sir Arthur Wellesley’s, emerged as the elite formation of the Peninsular army during the years that the British essentially stood on the defensive. In early 1810 the brigade was elevated to become the ‘Light Division’ and by the end of the period covered by this volume its members and others came to refer to it as ‘The Division’.

In writing this account of the Light Division in the Peninsula we have used the spelling most commonly used in the various sources quoted, but where necessary have referenced their current name in order to help visitors locate them on modern maps and satnavs. For instance, Barba del Puerco (Beard of the Pig) and Villar de Puerco (Village of the Pig) have, understandably in these cases, been respectively renamed Puerto Seguro and Villar de Argañán.

Baron de Rothenberg, founder of 5th Bn 60th Regt 1798, the first green jacketed rifle battalion in the British Army, was the author of a drill manual that formed the basis of the Light Division’s tactics in the peninsular. (Courtesy RGJM, Winchester)

Chapter One

Origins of the British Light Infantry

‘Light troops are, as it were, a light or beacon for the general, which should constantly inform him of the situation, the movements and nature of the enemy’s designs; it is upon the exactness and intelligence of what they report that he is enabled to regulate the time and manner of executing his own enterprises.’ (Colonel Coote Manningham)¹

There was nothing particularly new about light infantry at the turn of the nineteenth century. Most armies had light troops in some form, including the British who had theoretically deployed light companies of just forty-four men since the middle of the eighteenth century. Captain Cooper wrote in his 1806 compendium of works on light infantry that

In the American wars they were particularly useful; and the mode of fighting, which the American nations pursued, evidently showed the necessity of such a corps. For, until Light Infantry were established, a regular army was never safe on its march, being always harassed and dispirited by the irregular troops of the enemy. To obviate these difficulties, the British Generals selected the most enterprising officers, and the most active of the privates ... by these means they produced the desired effect; they engaged the enemy in his own way, opposed Light Troops to Light Troops, repulsed him with advantage, and secured and facilitated the operations of the army. The success of these troops gave rise to the formation of a Light Company in every regiment.

After the peace of 1763, the Light Companies were all reduced.²

Notwithstanding the above, in the British military tradition the army mainly relied on foreign mercenaries and locally-raised irregulars when light troops were needed. The majority of the light infantry fighting for the British in the forests of North America were provided by the likes of Rogers’ Rangers. Armed with, for instance, the Pennsylvania long rifle or the Ferguson rifle, they were a very effective supplement to the red-coated British infantry in the heavily-wooded terrain of the colonies. During the American War of Independence, Hessian mercenaries provided most of the formal light infantry presence in the order of battle.

At the end of the wars in North America the conservative military view was that formed units of light infantry would be of little utility on the more open European battlefield and that the practice of raising companies of backwoodsmen or hiring mercenaries when the situation dictated would suffice.

Major Robert Rogers.

In Dundas’ drill manual of 1792 which consists of 458 pages, only 11 appertained to light companies. All this is not to say that there were not advocates of light infantry, but those that developed and practised light tactics tended to do so well out of the gaze of the Horse Guards.³ The fact that the term ‘Light Bob’, which later became a plaudit, was almost an insult before and during much of the French Revolutionary Wars is a measure of how far the British military were from accepting whole light infantry units into the regular army on a permanent basis.

The process of change in the outdated British military came as a result of the hard school of defeat in early campaigns and battles against the French revolutionary armies between 1792 and the end of the century. The raw energy released by the Revolution and the levée en masse had produced large numbers of enthusiastic but barely-trained soldiers. In battle they attacked in columns preceded by clouds of voltigeurs and tirailleurs deployed as a protective skirmish screen, which also galled the enemy line with their fire. This was so effective that by the time the column closed, the enemy was half defeated.

Volley fire against skirmishers was ineffective; they would either go to ground or into cover as the orders ‘Ready, present, fire’ were given, and similarly a bayonet charge had little effect against tirailleurs who simply fell back and resumed their firing as the line re-formed. In short, without sufficient skirmishers of their own to counter those of the French, the British could do little to oppose the voltigeurs. Slowly an understanding of the need for more than a nominal light company per infantry battalion grew, but there was continued opposition from the ranks of more conservative officers. Nonetheless, in 1794 Thomas Graham (later major general) was authorized to raise the 90th Regiment as light infantry following the experience of facing tirailleurs the previous year.⁴

By the final years of the eighteenth century there were senior commanders such as Generals Grey and Sir John Moore, both veterans of North America, who were active exponents of light infantry. Sir John had witnessed the methods of one of his commanding officers, Lieutenant Colonel Mackenzie.⁵ Following this seminal moment Sir John started to form his own theories, based on his experience of campaigning in the Mediterranean and the West Indies, which he put into practice when he held a command during the United Irishmen’s rebellion in 1798. He trained elements of his force, including a militia battalion, as light infantrymen or, as he promoted the concept, as ‘a universal soldier’. This was an infantryman that was, he stressed, not only trained to fight conventionally in line but also capable of being deployed as a skirmisher. The writings and advocacy on light infantry that had been begun by a handful of almost visionaries in the last decade of the eighteenth century had, by 1806, had become a deluge of print, including compendiums such as Cooper’s bringing together the best thought and practice regarding light troops.

Despite growing enthusiasm, the conversion of whole battalions to light infantry would, however, not begin until 1803. In the meantime, the appreciation and tactical handling of line battalions’ light companies was improving rapidly.

The Experimental Corps of Riflemen

The rifle had been the preferred weapon of many of the irregulars and mercenaries hired by the British but in an army still wedded to Frederician drill and crushing volley fire, all kinds of reasons were advanced for the rifle not to be adopted by the British army. It was, however, during the Irish Rebellion of 1798 that the first rifle shot in battle was fired by a ‘British’ unit: the green-coated 5th Battalion, 60th North American Regiment.⁶ These rifle-armed troops were, in reality, virtually all Germans and other émigrés raised from a variety of foreign units in British service, such as Hompesch’s fusiliers and Lowenstein’s chasseurs.

The first British riflemen, it is claimed, were, however, found in a green-coated company of the North York Militia who were accepted into the service as ‘light armed marksmen’ in 1795.⁷ The militia were essentially a county asset and consequently the views of the Horse Guards did not bear so heavily on local committees who were also in part at least funding the project!

Following successful examples of brigading line battalions’ light companies and the private publication of pamphlets on tactics, during 1798 advocates of light troops, including the pre-eminent general of the day, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, pressed the Secretary of State for War to formally introduce light infantry battalions. The following year Lieutenant Colonel Stewart was in Italy where he observed Austrian light infantry in action and on his return joined the ranks of those proposing that reform of the army should embrace light infantry. In December 1799 he wrote to the Duke of York proposing a corps d’elite of riflearmed British light infantry marksmen. The much-maligned duke supported the proposals and established the Experimental Corps of Riflemen under Colonel Coote Manningham,⁸ with William Stewart as lieutenant colonel.

Colonels Coote Manningham and Stewart, the founding fathers of the 95th Rifles.

In January 1800 thirteen infantry battalions were ordered to each provide a detachment of thirty-four men, plus three officers for selection ‘… for the purpose of its being instructed in the use of the rifle, and in the system of soldiers so armed.’⁹ The Kentish Weekly Post commented on 14 January: ‘The Corps of Riflemen which are about to be formed, are to be selected from the flank companies of the different regiments of the line.’

Inevitably during this process some commanding officers took the opportunity to offload undesirables from their battalions. The red-coated Experimental Rifle Corps, however, started to gather during February 1800 at Horsham Barracks in Surrey and first paraded in April of that year before moving to Windsor Forest.

The types of rifle used by various units that came together as the 60th North Americans in the Caribbean and Ireland, along with those supplied from German manufactures and the Tower Armouries, were found to be inadequate. Consequently, a specification was drawn up for what was to be known as the Short Infantry Rifle and ‘In the year 1800, the principal gunmakers in England were directed by the honourable Board of Ordnance to produce a specimen, in order to procure the best rifle possible, for the use of the Rifle Corps raised by the Government.’¹⁰

The winner of an experimental trial¹¹ was a weapon made by Ezekiel Baker, colloquially known as the ‘Baker rifle’. The first order for the rifle was placed with the Whitechapel factory in March 1800 and with their new weapon the members of the Experimental Rifle Corps set about marksmanship training, taking on targets at up to 300 yards. The Kentish Gazette noted that training of the first riflemen was already under way in late March: ‘Two battalions [probably ‘wings’] of riflemen, selected from different corps of infantry, are at present stationed at Horsham. They are under arms six hours every day, practising their manoeuvres and firing at targets.’

Training progressed rapidly and in August 1800, despite attempts by the opponents of the experiment to return the detachments to their parent battalions, three companies of Experimental Rifle Corps, under Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, were ordered to join the expedition to Cap Ferrol, the objective being the capture of the nearby Spanish naval base. After bombarding the port, on 24 August the Experimental Rifle Corps covered the landing and subsequent advance inland to the high ground, where firing their first shots in anger the Riflemen drove off a Spanish company. The following morning the enemy launched a substantial attack, which was also beaten off. During this action the Rifles distinguished themselves; the overall result being that even though the three companies of the Ferrol expedition rejoined battalions in the Mediterranean, there were no further attempts to force the complete dispersal of the Experimental Rifle Corps. Quite the reverse: the five companies that remained in southern England were to be formed into the Rifle Corps.

In September, the Rifle Corps was still at Blatchington Barracks in East Sussex, where they received drafts of, among others, Scottish and Irish Fencibles in order to bring them up to battalion strength of eight companies.¹² The London Gazette of 11 October 1800 formally established the Rifle Corps, with the officers of the Experimental Rifle Corps having their commissions backdated to the action at Cap Ferrol, 25 August 1800. The Corps’ distinctive green uniforms were issued in January 1801.

1800 Pattern Infantry Rifle

The 1800 Pattern was more often referred to during the period as the ‘Short Infantry Rifle’ but is today most commonly known these days as ‘The Baker Rifle’.*

On the formation of the Experimental Rifle Corps in 1800 the question of their weapon was naturally foremost in the minds of the Rifle’s founding fathers. Previous pattern and foreign rifles that had been in use in North America and during the Revolutionary Wars were deemed inadequate being too cumbersome, at one extreme or insufficiently robust for use on campaign on the other. Available patterns were also considered too slow to load or not of a suitable calibre.

An initial design based on the Brown Bess musket was regarded as being too heavy, while others were expensive or fragile. Consequently, a competition between weapons, based on a specification draw up by Colonel Coote Manningham, was held at the Woolwich Arsenal in February 1800. In this competitive trial selection. As a result, the rifle designed by Whitechapel gunsmith Ezekiel Baker was chosen for development from a weapon that was akin to the musket into the final Short Infantry Rifle for the Rifle Corps.

A representation of the targets and results achieved by Barker’s rifle during the 1800 competition.†

(Left to right) A musket ball, cloth and leather patched rifle balls and a plain rifle ball.

The Short Infantry Rifle and its sword bayonet.

The resulting rifle was of .653-inch calibre, which was adopted for ease of loading and compatibility with carbine balls that was also logistically expedient. The calibre of a carbine ball of .625-inches (22 to the pound) allowed sufficient space in the barrel for a patched ball that would grip the seven ‘rifles’ or groves in the barrel that made a quarter turn in its 30 inches. The patches would not unduly affect accuracy but would still enable quicker loading than other rifles. As the war progressed, some units used a slightly larger ball (20 to the pound) without a patch. The cartridge contained 4 drams of black powder.

Unlike the standard musket, the rifle had a fore and back sight and to make up for its significantly shorter barrel length, a 23in sword bayonet. During the wars further modifications were made including an introduction of the brass ‘pistol grip’ in 1806.

If patched balls were used, a mean rate of fire of one and a half rounds per minute could be expected from an average rifleman, with hits out to 200 yards being normal. An un-patched ball, fired where volume of fire counted, was quicker to load, with a rate of fire similar to that of the musket in British service, i.e. a mean of two and a half rounds per minute, but accuracy was reduced. It must be borne in mind that the marksmanship training received by the Rifles and Light Division, way above that of the normal line infantryman, had as much to do with their fire effect on the battlefield as the weapon itself.

* This is a misnomer as Ezekiel Baker produced a series of rifle designs and variants between 1800 and 1830.

† Baker, Ezekiel, 23 years Practice & Observations with Rifle Guns, 1804.

A copy of an original hand-drawn 95th Rifles recruiting poster and a contemporary printed transcript.

Light Infantry and the Camp at Shorncliffe

Major General Sir John Moore is regarded as ‘the father of light infantry’.¹³ His opportunity to develop his concepts came when he took command of the Kent military district, his brigade being a part of General Sir David Dundas’ division garrisoning south-east England. Sir John ordered the Rifle Corps to the camp at Shorncliffe which overlooked the coast and on a good day France.¹⁴ In a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Stewart, Moore hoped that ‘... you find the station at Shorncliffe adapted to your target practice and field movements.’

Sir John Moore, ‘father of light infantry’.

If the formation of the Rifle Corps in 1800 had been a significant step in the development of light infantry in the British army, events in January 1803 were perhaps even more so. During that month the Rifle Corps was retitled the 95th (Rifle) Regiment, confirming its place in the order of battle, but of greater significance, in the same order was the instruction to convert the 43rd and 52nd regiments to light infantry. The 52nd joined Sir John’s brigade for conversion training and by June 1803, the 52nd and the 95th were both encamped at Shorncliffe along with other brigade units, the 4th King’s Own, 59th and 70th Regiments of Foot. These latter three battalions were moved at various points to other brigades. What became Sir John Moore’s Light Brigade took its noted form in 1804, when the ‘unsatisfactory’ 43rd Light Infantry were sent to join the 52nd and the 95th Rifles at Shorncliffe. The second battalions of the 43rd and 52nd Light Infantry and the 95th Rifles were raised in late 1804 and 1805 and joined the brigade.

Sir John Moore described his aim to produce a ‘universal soldier’ who he described as a mixture ‘of the jager, and the grenadier’.¹⁵ Light infantrymen were, however, in contrast to the grenadiers of the ordinary infantry battalions, often smaller, more agile soldiers and were ideally bright and capable of independent action. To make the most of this raw material the ‘Shorncliffe system of training’ sought to foster initiative through encouragement and reward rather than by punishment.

The basis of the light infantry training at Shorncliffe was Colonel de Rottenburg’s manual.¹⁶ In case there is any thought that Dundas’ close order drill was not practised, the introduction to Colonel Neil Campbell’s light infantry manual¹⁷ makes it clear that

It will be found, upon trial, that men never can attain perfection as light infantry, without being thoroughly grounded, in the first place, in slow movements in close order; and it is indispensably necessary that a very frequent and regular practice of the latter should be resorted to, in order to continue perfect in the former.¹⁸

If there was any doubt, Campbell goes on to stress ‘… but there exists a too prevalent, yet mistaken idea, that a permission to practise light infantry movements should be followed by relaxation and neglect of those in close order.’

The issue of training and developing new tactics was explained to his officers by Shorncliffe camp’s drill master, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie of the 52nd Light Infantry:

The only way of having a regiment in good order was by every individual thoroughly knowing and performing his duty; and that if officers did not fully understand their duty, it would be quite impossible to expect that the men either could or would perform theirs as they ought; therefore the best and surest method was to commence by drilling the whole of the officers, and when they became perfectly acquainted with the system, they could teach the men, and by their zeal, knowledge, and, above all, good temper and kind treatment of the soldier, make the regiment the best in the service.¹⁹

The camp at Shorncliffe was, however, not just for training, as the Kentish Weekly Post of 7 June 1803, following the resumption of war with France, makes clear: ‘Major General Moore has taken his residence at Sandgate; as soon as the encampments are formed, his brigade ... will be assembled. Part of them are to encamp near Shorncliffe, and the residue will guard the line of batteries [Martello towers] along the coast from Shorncliffe to Dungeness.’

A contemporary map of the camp and redoubt at Shorncliffe. (Courtesy Shomcliffe Trust)

Early Campaigns

By the time the units that eventually made up the Light Brigade and Division reached the peninsula in 1808/09 they had accrued not insignificant experience of campaign and battle. During the spring of 1801 two companies of riflemen served as sharpshooters aboard Royal Navy ships in a conflict with Denmark. The aim of the expedition was the breaking-up of the League of Armed Neutrality, to which the Danes were a signatory. The league was designed to ensure continued trade with France in the face of the British naval blockade.

In a hard-fought almost gun-to-gun action, the ships of the Royal Navy bombarded the batteries and armed hulks moored off Copenhagen. With Lieutenant Colonel Stewart aboard Nelson’s flagship, the riflemen were active in sniping at enemy officers and gunners. The admiral wrote: ‘The Honourable Colonel Stewart did me the favour to be aboard the ‘Elephant’; and himself with every officer and soldier under his orders, shared with pleasure the toils and [considerable] dangers of the day.’

The battle was concluded with an armistice and negotiations were conducted with British bomb vessels anchored within range of Copenhagen. Even so, the talks broke down and the naval campaign ended inconclusively. Nonetheless, Nelson, Stewart and the Rifles had earned considerable credit for their actions during the battle.

Riflemen in action aboard HMS Elephant during the 1801 Battle of Copenhagen.

During the shaky Peace of Amiens, the government reacted in character by reducing the army and in that respect the Rifle Corps, being a new and junior part of the army, was vulnerable to disbandment. The facts that they were under the command of Sir John Moore who was overseeing the cuts in the south-east, that they had performed well in the late campaigns and benefited from Coote Manningham’s influence at court all helped to ensure their survival.

Most of the period from 1803 to 1805 was spent guarding the coast of southern England against the threat of French invasion, with the Grand Army encamped at Boulogne. In 1805 the 2nd Battalion 95th Rifles was raised, and in October of that year when word arrived that Napoleon had marched south across Germany, Horse Guards prepared an army of 15,000 men for deployment to Hanover. The 1st 95th Rifles were included in this small army which, under the command of General Cathcart, was to join forces with Russian and Swedish forces to create a diversion to draw French forces away from Austria. Cathcart established himself at Bremen, captured Hanover, fought an engagement at Munkaiser, and then waited on events. News of French victories at Ulm and then Austerlitz, which resulted in the beginning of the collapse of the Third Coalition, put Cathcart’s force in a precarious position. When word was received of Prussia breaking her neutrality and of the Franco-Prussian accord in February 1806, which handed control of Hanover to Prussia, Cathcart’s army was recalled. During the potentially dangerous withdrawal to Cuxhaven the 95th provided the rearguard.

In 1806 the 52nd and 43rd Light Infantry accompanied Sir John Moore to the Mediterranean where he was to be second-in-command in Sicily. While duties were primarily of a garrison and security nature, Sicily provided them with useful experience of operating in a hot climate and difficult terrain.

Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley. Future members of the Peninsular Light Brigade served under his command at Copenhagen in 1807.

In 1806 both Rifles battalions contributed companies to two expeditionary forces to South America. In October three companies of the 2nd 95th sailed as a part of General Auchmuty’s reinforcement to the expedition to Buenos Aires that had got into difficulty, while five companies from the 1st 95th joined Brigadier General Craufurd’s Remote Expedition. Both forces ended up under command of General Whitelocke and despite the capture of Montevideo, in which the Rifles played their part as stormers, Whitelocke’s army ran into trouble. Craufurd and 1,000 men, including the Rifles, were captured at Buenos Aires. The expedition ended in a humiliating armistice for all concerned. The Riflemen, having been released by the Spanish, eventually arrived back in England in December 1807.

In 1807 in response to the imposition of Napoleon’s Continental System, Britain launched another naval expedition against the ostensibly neutral Denmark, which was under pressure from both France and Russia to pledge her fleet to Napoleon’s cause. The objective of the expedition, which included the Light or Reserve Brigade under Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, was to seize or destroy the Danish fleet, which in the aftermath of Trafalgar would, in French hands, go some way to restoring Napoleon’s naval fortunes. The land force of 25,000 men included the 1st 43rd, 2nd 52nd Light Infantry, the remaining five companies of 1st 95th Rifles and the seven companies of the 2nd Battalion who had not gone to South America.

On arrival off Copenhagen an ultimatum was issued to the Danes to hand over their fleet but when they refused the army was landed on Zeeland during 19 August, with the Light Brigade taking up position on the Heights of Hellerup before Copenhagen. The following day the city was formerly invested.²⁰ On 26 August the Danes were assembling a relief force of four battalions, some cavalry plus armed peasantry, to confront which Wellesley was detached with his brigade, along with eight squadrons of cavalry and two batteries of light guns to cover the siege and deal with the threat.

On 29 August the Light Brigade closed with the Danes near the town of Køge and attacked with the 1st 95th’s companies deployed as a skirmish screen and the other battalions deployed in echelon. The enemy promptly retired to Herfølge where they stood but were overwhelmed by Wellington’s light troops. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy bombarded Copenhagen and the siege was prosecuted with the only interruption being a single Danish sally. With much of Copenhagen burning, the Danes surrendered both the city and their fleet on 7 September.

This was Wellesley’s first encounter with a light brigade, and their success would bode well for their time under his command in the peninsula.

Chapter Two

The First Peninsular Campaign, 1808

‘Hitherto Buonaparte has run a victorious race, because he has contended with princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom and peoples without patriotism. He has yet to learn what it is to combat a nation who are animated with one spirit against him. Now is the time ...’

(Richard Sheridan MP)¹

By 1808 Britain had long given up the aims of restoring the Bourbon monarchy in France and reinstating the status quo of Europe’s eighteenth-century Ancien Régimes. Napoleon’s 1806 Berlin Decrees, which instituted his Continental System, had, however, closed European ports to British trade and the emperor thought that this would bring Britain to her knees economically. Unable to invade England after Trafalgar in 1805, this was Napoleon’s only option to deal with the paymaster of seven coalitions against him. Despite sundry leaks in the system, it was badly hurting Britain’s economy. Even so, with Napoleon at the zenith of his power, Britain eschewed all offers of settlement emanating from Paris and His Majesty’s government’s war aim was to do all it could to break the supremacy of Napoleonic France and its domination over the continent.

As master of Europe, Napoleon’s ambitions knew no bounds. With wholesale smuggling and evasion of the Continental System being rife and with both Sweden and Portugal at the extremities of his empire continuing more or less discreetly to trade with Britain, action was required. While Portugal was a significant leak, bringing the Portuguese to heel was, however,