My Struggle for Peace, Volume 3 (1956): The Diary of Moshe Sharett, 1953–1956

By Moshe Sharett

The third volume of the former Israeli prime minister’s journals from the nation’s early years.

My Struggle for Peace is a remarkable political document offering insights into the complex workings of the young Israeli political system, set against the backdrop of the disintegration of the country’s fragile armistice with the Arab states. Replete with Moshe Sharett’s candid comments on Israel’s first-generation leaders and world statesmen of the day, the diary also tells the dramatic human story of a political career cut short—the removal of an unusually sensitive, dedicated, and talented public servant. My Struggle for Peace is, above all, an intimate record of the decline of Sharett’s moderate approach and the rise of more “activist-militant” trends in Israeli society, culminating in the Suez/Sinai war of 1956. The diary challenges the popular narrative that Israel’s confrontation with its neighbors was unavoidable by offering daily evidence of Sharett’s statesmanship, moderation, diplomacy, and concern for Israel’s place in international affairs.

This is the third volume in the 3-volume English abridgement of Sharett’s Yoman Ishi [Personal diary] (Ma’ariv, 1978) maintains the integrity, flavor, and impact of the 8-volume Hebrew original and includes additional documentary material that was not accessible at the time. The volumes are also available to purchase as a set or individually.

“The editors . . . vastly improved on the Hebrew version by adding Sharett’s speeches, reports, cabinet minutes, and other sources to the text. . . . These additions makes this work so important and welcome by all who aspire to understand the foreign and defense policies of Israel in its first decade.” —Israel Studies Review

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Mar 19, 2019
• ISBN: 9780253037657

Book preview

1956

The Envoy and the Secretary-General

Sunday, January 1

At the MFA for a short while. Yitzhak brought bad news: BG has decided to return the MACs [to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and the Army].¹ I said: He is pushing matters to Heaven-knows-where. He is cooking up something – so am I. Yitzhak asked whether [I would raise the matter] directly with the Cabinet or whether [I would have a] talk [with BG. I said]: If he invites me, I shall come.

[At the Cabinet meeting] I had intended to raise the question of Germany, but gave a review [of my talks with] Abramov, Nicholls and Lawson.² In order not to overly grate on their nerves, I glossed over the French [arms] embargo [while the SC debated the complaint against Israel for its Kinneret raid]; [but] I said [as much] to Eshkol and Ziama. I heard that BG was depressed [as a result of the embargo] and Peres, who had been satisfied that the deal was on, was at a loss when he realized that he was not so much in the know as he thought [in his] reporting that France was wholly given to manipulation and deceit. BG was in despair regarding the [Kinneret] operation. I asked who had started the chain of events [leading to the operation] but the riddle remained unsolved.

At the Cabinet meeting I outlined my speech for the Knesset political debate tomorrow and he [BG] did the same: He, however, would speak as a private citizen. [Some ministers] spoke against two opening speeches and against [BG’s intention of] speaking as a private citizen. I spoke against defying the Security Council. We should weigh our interests not on the scales of pure justice but on those of pragmatism.

A vote [was taken]. My proposal [received] 7:7. It was decided [to refer the decision] to a ministerial committee [by a majority vote of] 10. [- - -]

In the afternoon I finally got round to composing [the Knesset speech] from 2:30 to 5:00. In the middle, Gideon and Yaacov [came by to prepare] a briefing for [NYT correspondent Harry] Gilroy.³

[- - -]

More firing and clashes on the Gaza and Nitzana borders. Went to bed at 2:30 am.

Monday, January 2

Awoke at 7:15 am. Spent the whole morning editing the draft [of the Knesset speech]. The DG translated it [into English], with corrections by Leo, Gideon and Yaacov. In the middle I went out to the meeting of the JA about the Congress, and also [received] a letter from BG on the transfer of jurisdiction [of the MACs].

[Here follows the complete text of the letter:]

Jerusalem, January 1, 1956

To the Foreign Minister

From the Prime Minister

It seems to me that negotiations with UN Observers should be placed, as before, within the Ministry of Defense and be conducted by the army, with constant contact with Foreign Ministry representatives.

I had resigned myself to the arrangement you had established when Prime Minister, since I saw it as my duty to accept the PM’s decisions, even when I did not agree with him, without bringing the disagreements before the Cabinet. I don’t think that the Foreign Ministry should stay out of these negotiations, and in my opinion every step must be taken in consultation with the Foreign Minister or his representatives. But negotiations with UN Observers inside Israel are a security matter of the first order and they must be conducted within the framework of the Ministry of Defense.

If you do not agree with me I will not oppose the matter being discussed in Cabinet, or if you wish, at a meeting of [party] haverim.

D. Ben-Gurion⁴

At home, and in the afternoon to the Knesset, BG’s [opening] speech was long, unstructured, acerbic. Mine was solid but a little cumbersome, overshadowed by its predecessor. This precedent [of two opening speeches] is flawed.⁵

[Menachem] Begin, [Liberal MK Peretz] Bernstein, and [Hapo’el Hamizrahi MK Yitzhak] Raphael took part in the debate. The latter addressed to me Jethro’s admonition.⁶

Went to bed at almost 1:00 am.

[The following list of points prepared by Sharett, probably for the Knesset debate, was attached to the diary:]

1. Arms from Russia – hypothetical, not practical, as a point of principle.

2. Concessions of territory – Arabs [are not asked] for any, while [in principle] a give and take [policy is necessary]. The UN 1947 decision was a recommendation. At that point Britain opposed this, and now? She is involved. Our sons’ blood [in the 1948 War, which cannot be returned, justifies our retention of the additional territories occupied by IDF].

3. UN [police force] guards⁷ – totally ineffective. How would they prevent infiltration? [Their posting] would necessitate reformulating the Armistice Agreement. If infiltration is stopped, they shall not be needed. If not – [they will be] ineffective.

4. Security pact - implementation of the Tripartite Declaration [of May 1950].

5. Tripartite Declaration - [involves] cumbersome consultations [between the parties], unclear obligation. It is not respectful nor obligatory, [while] in other cases [there are clear-cut] pacts: Anglo-Jordanian; US 40 [security pacts].

6. Conclusion: arms [to be given to Arab countries] on condition of [readiness to make] peace.

Tuesday, January 3

[- - -] A new cannonball from BG: Article XII [of the Armistice Agreements].⁸

I consulted with Joe on the transfer [of responsibility for dealing with] the MACs. [- - -]

Radio Cairo [broadcast] in Hebrew on me and on BG [i.e., commentaries on their Knesset speeches].⁹

At 10:00 pm to the Knesset. [- - -] Returned home [to work on] papers and a reply to BG about the MACs. [- - -]

Wednesday, January 4

At the MFA with Joe [working] on the draft [reply to BG about responsibilities for dealing with the UNTSO]. [There was a need for a few] corrections.

[Following is the translation of the original letter:]

Jerusalem, January 4 1956

To: The Prime Minister

From: The Foreign Minister

In your letter of January 1 you informed me that, in your opinion, negotiations with UN Observers should be placed, as before, within the Ministry of Defense and be conducted by the army, with constant contact with Foreign Ministry representatives.

I want to point out that the matter under discussion is not limited to the realm of negotiations with UN Observers, but, first and foremost, covers the ongoing written and verbal contact with the Chief-of-Staff of UNTSO. During your first term of office as PM and Minister of Defense, and especially in the days of General [William] Riley, all the diplomatic contacts on armistice affairs and with UNTSO HQ in Jerusalem – which is not the same as contact in the field with UN Observers – were concentrated in the Foreign Ministry in general and handled mainly by Eytan and Shiloah, and maintained with the closest ties of cooperation with the CoS, Yigael Yadin. The present CoS has advocated the total separation of the ministries in this field and has insisted that contacts with General Burns be maintained through him alone, apart from my own meetings with him. This had caused incessant complications and unnecessary hitches.

On your return to the Ministry of Defense, I had proposed an arrangement whereby all armistice affairs would be dealt with through close cooperation between the Army and the Foreign Ministry. The proposal had included direct contact between the CoS and the Head of UNTSO, with the assurance that the Foreign Ministry would be kept in the picture and would be a party to the determination of positions to be adopted. My proposal had been rejected and I had been given the choice of either putting armistice affairs wholly in the hands of the Ministry of Defense people, or transferring them wholly to the Foreign Ministry. I opted for the second alternative.

After being faced with this extreme choice and having decided to put armistice affairs into the hands of the Foreign Ministry, a certain routine evolved which I feel has caused no damage to the State and its security. On the contrary, I am convinced that it has brought only blessing.

I am not aware of any damage caused to the security of the state by the MFA’s handling of armistice affairs since that time. The MFA has not adopted a single position in these matters which had not been agreed upon by competent people in the Ministry of Defense, and in particular by the Minister of Defense. At the same time, the MFA’s methods – its way of dealing personally with the UNTSO CoS and his aides, the tenor of its correspondence and statements, and the strengthened contacts made possible by the MFA’s constant handling of these matters through our UN delegation– [all these] have vastly improved the international atmosphere surrounding our appearances on that very sensitive front. There has been no damage to security, while we have made substantial gains in political stature. This, in my opinion, sums up our efforts so far.

I am afraid that returning the handling of armistice affairs to the Ministry of Defense at present would be a change for the worse. Among other things, it is liable to damage the efficiency of the liaison on armistice affairs between the Foreign Ministry and our delegation in New York, and possibly cause a problem about under whose authority the delegation would be instructed, and the ability, or inability, of the Foreign Ministry to be responsible for its actions on armistice affairs vis-à-vis the UN Secretariat and the SC. There is logic in the assumption that contact with the UN both here and in New York should be through one undivided entity.

It therefore seems to me that it would be preferable to retain the status quo ("Abqa ma kan alla ma kan, to use the language of the Mejelleh" [Ottoman civil law]).¹⁰

As before, no position would be adopted on any matters without your approval in your capacity as Minister of Defense. In any event, the [final] decision would be in your hands as PM, except in cases where a matter of principle necessitated it being brought before the Cabinet.

Apart from practical considerations, I think that we have to take into account the question of how the change would be reflected outside. The transfer of authority would not remain secret, and would reinforce the malignant rumor spreading around the country that there are differences of opinion in the upper echelons of government, and it would also give rise in foreign capitals to interpretations and conjectures detrimental to the State.

I sincerely hope that, after reconsidering this matter in the light of the above explanations, you will find a way of continuing the existing arrangement.

If you do, however, decide to propose a change, I shall, of course, be prepared to conduct any discussion of the issue, be it between the two of us, in the Cabinet, or in a meeting of haverim.

Believe me, it would be better not to make any changes.¹¹

[- - -] To Tel Aviv for a meeting about Kasztner. [- - -] [Met] with the Burmese Ambassador. Back to Jerusalem.

[- - -] [A party at the home of] Dolik. [Richard H.] Crossman, who was there, said that Nasser [had told him] about [the Gaza operation of] February 28, [1955, and had claimed that] he was nearly toppled [as a result of it] by his officers and the refugees. [Nasser used it to justify] the necessity of the [Egyptian-Soviet arms] deal. His popularity was soaring. [The dam project at] Aswan was a serious matter. [Crossman had cautioned him that the Russians] would pin him down and milk him dry. [Nasser replied that] that, indeed, would be dangerous, but not immediately. [Crossman noted that] there was social reform in Egypt.

On the way back, I suddenly thought about BG’s passion for competing with Nasser for pre-eminence. It apparently irritated him that the latter was looked upon as a great man. [BG] is constantly angry at him. [In comparison] I am but a Hanukkah candle with no pretensions of competing with a neon light.

I received the original text of a letter from Dulles¹² and I said [that] I should consult BG. Yaacov [arrived and said]: BG wants to call in Lawson to lay down the law.¹³

Yaacov [wondered:] How are you going to pacify [BG]? [I told him:] Go ahead, you find the formula. However, in three months’ time [BG] will bomb airfields, and in the meantime he will raise the question of [Operation] Eilat in the Cabinet [with the aid of] parachutes.

[Wrote] a letter to N[uri] S[a’id, Iraqi PM, about an amnesty for] Yehuda Taggar, a native-born Jerusalemite,¹⁴ [to be conveyed] through Elias. [I opened it with] as-Syad al-Iraqiyyin [Arabic: Most honourable among the Iraqis].¹⁵

Thursday, January 5

[With] Mrs [Lena] Jeger [British Labour MP]. I said [apparently in a reply on the chances of peace]: In order to achieve peace we must ignore it. [I attacked] British double standards towards us and the Arabs.

Consultation on the Soviet Union – a request for arms, [counter-]attack on Khrushchev. [I reported] my talk with Abramov [at which I had raised the topic of the] Bandung [conference].

[- - -]

At the apartment Isser [brought] a fresh cable about Chameleon. [- - -] [After supper, I went] again to the Defense Minister’s office [and worked] with BG on an invitation to Lawson and my reply to Dulles.¹⁶

[BG was] opposed to my traveling to England.

[- - -]

With Crossman, [who claimed that] Nasser was prepared for secret negotiations, through British mediation. Ominously, he praised Eden. [He wanted to be able to negotiate] from a position of strength. The British Ambassador [in Cairo, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, had said to him]: [Israel must make] a single territorial concession: Eilat. Nasser [told Crossman]: Tell BG I can delude my people and present a defeat as a victory only once.¹⁷

[On this date, Zipporah Sharett wrote to her son Yaakov in New York. Herewith the political section of the letter:]

5.1.56

…. Last week I was unable to resist the temptation of attending the [Mapai Political] Committee meeting [on December 27] about the Kinneret incident. The bloodletting on both sides went on for a long time and tension rose to a peak. As I was not feeling well, I did not attend the Knesset session [on January 2] where Moshe and BG opened the political-security debate. I only witnessed the fury which preceded it. A great deal of hot air, many slogans and hollow roars were heard here and there. A mood of war is being created before our very eyes. Not everyone has gone off the rails, but it is not difficult to be swept up by the hysteria. Moshe has one objective at present: to prevent war if at all possible. That is no easy task when the PM and the CoS think differently – the former likes to play soldiers and lives in a dream world, and the latter has got it into his head that now is the time to destroy the enemy. Some things that occurred in conjunction with the Kinneret operation are simply too shameful to be put on to paper lest someone read it and be shocked at our lack of maturity. Navot [who took part in the Kinneret battle], too, says that the soldiers did not feel that the operation had any justification. The people of [Kibbutz] Ein Gev are worse off now than they had been before.

Friday, January 6

[- - -]

Isser [came by] prior to his trip [to the US]: He would report [there] to Golda. [We discussed] how the Envoy would get here,¹⁸ what he [Isser] would tell the Brother.¹⁹

[- - -] [Worked] with Yaacov and Gideon on [preparations for] the Envoy, the interview with Lawson [scheduled for January 9] and my reply to Dulles.

[- - -] At night [heard from] Teddy about [arrangements for] the Envoy.

Saturday, January 7

[- - -]

Sunday, January 8

Got up at 7:00 am and drafted a reply to Dulles which included a commitment [to using American arms for defensive purposes only].²⁰ Would BG agree?

An hour at the MFA with Shabtai and Gideon about [Egypt’s blockade of Israeli air traffic over the Gulf of Aqaba leading to] Eilat. It seems that [Jordan’s King] Hussein²¹ has also agreed to examine the matter. I also studied the [International Court of Justice at the] Hague procedures and the precedent of [the right of passage through the Straits of] Corfu.

In the Cabinet [we held] a major debate concerning the opening of diplomatic relations with Spain, and an even more serious one concerning [relations with] Germany. We started [a discussion of BG’s proposal to break the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of] Eilat. I was astounded when I heard the plan. My turn to speak came in the afternoon. I analyzed [the proposed operation] in detail [and said that] the question [was:] do we want a war, [involving a full-scale] invasion[?] [Would we later expect to receive] arms[?] [How would the Western Powers invoke the] Tripartite [Declaration of May 1950 against Israel?]. The argument was most serious. Almost everyone around the table with the possible exception of [Agriculture Minister Kadish] Luz [was] against [the operation]. Eshkol kept quiet. BG’s reply distorted the truth. I spoke again in reply.

[Here follow excerpts of Sharett’s remarks from the Cabinet protocols:]

I propose that we authorize the Foreign Minister to establish diplomatic relations between us and Spain and act in the same vein towards Germany. Regarding Spain, the only reason for our abstaining from responding to its proposals or, more correctly, to its feelers several years ago, was that the regime now in power in Spain was at the time an ally of Hitler. Clearly, the reason was not that the character of the regime itself was to our liking; Israel’s foreign policy has not been based on differentiation between regimes or on discriminating among them. We have never shaped our foreign policy by morally judging the nature of foreign regimes. That regime was an ally of Hitler when his chances of winning the war were considered real, in which case the Jewish people would not survive. However, as far as Franco’s attitude towards the Jews, not only did he not follow the Nazi policy as did Mussolini in Italy, but he made efforts to help and rescue Jews. Spain’s doors, during all the persecution and destruction, were open for any refugee who managed to get there. That regime also went out of its way to grant fictitious Spanish citizenship to a number of Jews residing in several counties who could claim that they were descendants of exiled Spanish Jews. The number of those Jews was perhaps not big, but some were saved by this means.

We have established relations with Italy. True, one can argue that there was a change of regime there. The same goes with Japan – the change of regime there could be disputed, for the Emperor has remained in place.

Spain is a Mediterranean power. It is constantly faced with Arab beseechings, and responds to them. Its position as far as we are concerned becomes incongruous in view of the Arab states’ relations with it and the absence of relations with us. This is reflected in its position towards us. Spain can be considered a Catholic state, and certainly could be under Catholic influence which is not too friendly.

We must do our global political accounting. We must weigh devotion to past tradition against the test of our concrete interests today and tomorrow. And meanwhile, in any case, in the sphere of practical relations we cannot by any means pursue a policy of boycotting Spain. Both of us are citrus-growing countries. Our citrus growers participate in conferences convened in Spain, and we hope that Spanish representatives will attend the citrus growers’ conference which will take place in Israel this year. Our ships visit Spanish ports and we are hindered and damaged because we do not have any authorized representation there.

There is one more pressing consideration, added recently: we do not know where Morocco is heading, what kind of troubles await us there. While we do not expect a situation of catastrophe emigration, one does not know whether, in the event of some upheaval, a mass flight of Jews would not occur. And then the one place in which we could act would be Spain, in that we would then be in need of Spain’s assistance. A lack of Spanish assistance would be to our detriment.

Now, as to Germany, we have so far said that our contacts with it are dictated by the reparations agreement does not lead to diplomatic relations. However, we have never committed ourselves to abstain from establishing diplomatic relations. In the course of the years since our signing that agreement, two processes have occurred. One was wholly positive – the full implementation of the reparations agreement by the Germans. All ominous prophecies about Germany’s intention of deceiving us, of its intention to shirk its commitments, have been proven false. Germany has fully and exemplarily fulfilled its commitments and in some cases went out of its way to do more than was specified. We are now negotiating a big German loan in dollars on account of the two final years of the agreement, thus shortening the Reparations Agreement’s duration in order to avoid dependency into the distant future.

In the meantime the issue of reparations has not become popular with German public opinion. The German government finds it necessary time and again to defend its policy against all kinds of distractors. Here Adenauer’s personality serves us as a stable source of support.

The other process, which is not wholly positive as far as we are concerned, has been the growing technological, economic and political power of Germany, its entering into the Atlantic Alliance, its entering into the Middle East as an active factor, its establishing diplomatic relations with almost all the Arab countries, the sensitivity of the German government, German public opinion and press to what is generally happening all over the globe. Germany today is already an important European power; it is invited to deliberations to which other states are not; its foreign interests are constantly growing.

This Germany is free from having to take us into consideration on account of our boycotting it, and it is constantly pressured by Arab pressure and influence which are taking place not behind slosed doors but through official channels of diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, until recently I felt that we should not hurry in this matter. At the same time, an idea arose of taking a first step by allowing the posting of a German representative here in view of several practical considerations. However, recently I have changed my mind because of the realization that, if we do not establish diplomatic relations with Germany in the very near future, we might miss the moment; indeed, I am not sure that we have not missed it already. Quite possibly we are facing a situation right now whereby we are not doing Germany any favor by expressing our readiness to enter into normal relations. It is we who have ask for Germany’s consent in view of its Middle East policy and the deterioration of our relations with the Arab world. We do know – by way of very secret sources – that recently the German Foreign Ministry considered this issue and that they asked their representatives in the Arab countries what would be the reaction if Germany established diplomatic relations with Israel. All answers were in the negative. Some were more serious, some were less, but all reported that this might cause a crisis in the relations between the Arab states and Germany. The German Foreign Ministry tends to think that there is no need to expedite this process. Perhaps a time will come when it would be much easier – why should they complicate matters with the Arabs now?

We may become, therefore, responsible for the creation of an unfriendly German orientation towards us. Once in a while there arises, in higher circles, an initiative – within the Social-Democrat opposition as well – to propose the establishment of diplomatic relations, but that this process must be started by us, for in the past German feelers were turned down. They are not prepared to face a negative Israeli response again.

When I said before that I considered making some initial step in view of pressing needs, I was thinking of our agreeing to the sending of a German consular mission to us as a minimal step. Now I am proposing taking a maximal one.

What are the concrete reasons for my proposal? There is a series of issues. Germany has just now passed a law which greatly increases the right of refugees, most of them Jews, to compensation for all kinds of damage suffered in [wartime] Germany if they could prove their claims. These amount to about $450-500 million. According to this evaluation, Israelis would receive about $100 million over five years. I do not think that I should explain around this table the meaning of an annual additional income of $20 million when the American grant, if it does materialize, would not exceed more than $30 million.

An additional liberalization has taken place in the sphere of personal reparations. They are now being given not only for property damage, but also for loss of income, e.g., for loss of professional opportunity.

All these payments must be approved by the German mission in the country of residence of those entitled to reparations. Otherwise the claimant must go to Germany, even though he cannot be sure in advance of receiving approval. Moreover, acording to German law, certain pensioners can receive payments only if there is a German mission in their country of residence. This law was intended for claimants residing in Eastern European countries, but it applies to us as well.

There are other reasons for my proposal. German ships are docking nowadays in our ports and Israeli ships are docking in Germany. If an Israeli ship is in need of some assistance, our mission in Cologne, which has a consular standing, can intervene. German ships docking in Israel have no such protection. Sooner or later we would face a protest that this situation is intolerable. There must be reciprocity here.

This year we are going to host not a small number of German experts whose presence is essential in view of the importing of German machinery under the reparations agreement. The suppliers would not accept responsibility for the operation of their machinery unless their experts supervise its installation and activation. The presence of Germans in Israel is a reality, and they are in need of consular protection.

The reparations agreement also requires a German mission in Israel, for all kinds of misunderstandings and complications may arise. The Germany mission must not reside in Jerusalem. It can be in Haifa or Tel Aviv. Certainly, it should be assured that a German of some stature, who was never a member of the Nazi party, would head this mission.

This was the proposal I had in mind, but by now it has become superfluous, for now we must take steps at once towards the normalization of relations with Germany. This because of the worrying development of Germany’s relations with the Arab states, as well as because Adenauer turned 80 a few days ago. No one knows how long he will live and especially how long he will remain in power. In my opinion we should hurry up and put an end to this problem, thereby avoiding a situation whereby we would be in dire need and Germany would deliberate over whether to clinch it or not.

We can now propose this to Adenauer, who would accept it as a tremendous moral step towards himself and towards Germany. There is no doubt that the Social-Democrat opposition would support our proposal wholeheartedly.

I therefore propose that the Foreign Minister be authorized to investigate this possibility, which should be executed respectfully and would include arrangements for the residence in Israel of a German economic and consular mission while the main effort would aim at the establishment of normal diplomatic relations.

[A long debate ensued around the Cabinet table. Here is Sharett’s rebuttal:]

Just a few short remarks. I forgot to point out that, if a German consular and economic mission is not established here, then at least journeys to Germany would be a problem. As is well known, many Jews travel to Germany to claim their rights, and this is a crucial necessity. So far the British consul in Haifa has been authorized to issue visas, but since Germany has become independent, his right has become limited; he can still issue visas, but has to receive Bonn’s approval for each case. This causes delays, and soon this system of authorization will come to an end. Whoever wants to go to Germany would have to go first to a European country and there receive a visa, or be refused one. This is not a proper situation. I do not think Israel should agree to such a situation persisting.

I would like to say something regarding reparations. First of all, Minister Bentov’s contention that Germans must pay the reparations for otherwise they would not be granted normalization of relations by all countries, is imaginary.²²

To the extent that such an attitude ever existed, it has vanished. On the other hand, I do fear lest something happens to the fulfilment of the reparations. I am blessing each day, each week and each month which passes smoothly, and I do not know what tomorrow will bring. If danger looms over the implementation of reparations, if it materializes, we would be left without help. If it becomes necessary to strongly intervene diplomatically with the German government, then we are denying ourselves having such tool.

Second, one could argue theoretically right from the beginning that all our contact with Germany for the sake of the reparations is purely practical; it is only commercial, devoid of any political content. Well, we have come to realize that this is not so. When the question of the implementation of reparations arose, when strong and intensive Arab pressure was brought to bear on Germany against implementation, the Germans approached us and said: Would you help us, would you agree to a compromise? We then announced that we would not accept any compromise. We told them that they must approve the agreement, that otherwise we would announce that Germany has gone back on its commitment before starting to implement it.

They entered into a sharp argument with the Arabs. We enlisted Dr Nahum Goldmann. I composed a detailed memorandum and handed it over to Goldmann so that he would know how, in our opinion, the Germans should refute the Arabs’ arguments. He delved into the issue and flew over to Bonn, where he instructed the Foreign Ministry people how to argue with the Arabs, what their answers should be, how to refute their contentions. The Germans did not want to tell the Arabs to go to hell; this would have been a disrespectful development. It would have been much more efficient had we maintained political contact with them. This situation is continuing. We cannot stay indifferent to the influence directed at the Germans through official channels of all Arab capitals on Middle East issues while we are unable to furnish them with different information. In such circumstances we are compelled to find ways for conducting private talks with influential people in Germany, in order to partly compensate for our lack of direct official contact.

One more point. I am still of the opinion that, although I said that war is possible, I strongly feel that it can still be prevented. Perhaps I am wrong, but if there are among us Members who hold more extremist views, who see war as more imminent than I do, then I would like to ask them: if war is possible, if, God forbid, it erupts, should we then leave the situation as it is, and have Germany maintain diplomatic relations with the enemy camp, with all its members? If this war has global repercussions, if it influences the prospects of peace, are we interested in allowing Germany to receive the Egyptian case by way of official channels? And Germany would have to take that into consideration, because she would be receiving information from a state with which she maintains diplomatic relations, while Israel misses out on the opportunity of presenting its own case because she finds it unbecoming to be connected with Germany by diplomatic relations.

An argument was raised here regarding our public opinion. Well, the opposition at the time against the reparations had roots in public opinion too; but a rational attitude, an attitude based on clear thinking, not on impulses, won the day. I think that following the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, against the foreboding process taking place in Germany, we have reached the point at which considerations of state must be paramount.

Possibly there is no majority [support] for taking the step. I am not against postponing the vote to next week. I would like to say: I do not see any possibility of managing our interests without a German consular and economic mission. I have no idea how it is going to be named. I do not know in what kind of a position the government would find itself when it is told: After all, this means relations with Germany – why are you not saying this openly? What are we going to tell that segment of our public which demands the establishing of diplomatic relations? While you accept all negative consequences would stem from the establishment of Germany consular and economic mission such as the need to protect its members, why then are you opposing what we are entitled to? The position of the German mission here would not be honest; it would establish a relationship which we would be afraid to call by its appropriate name.

[Following a short debate, the Cabinet moved on to discuss the next item on the agenda: Implementation of the Government’s Basic Guidelines [kavei hayesod], announced by PM Ben-Gurion in the Knesset upon presenting his government in the Knesset on November 2, 1955 (Divrei Haknesset XIX: 226-31). BG took the floor and said: The free passage of Israel’s ships through the Strait of the Aqaba will not be secured by General Burns’ proposals nor by the SC’s decisions. [- - -] I would like to know whether or not the government stands clearly by its opinion as stated in its Basic Guidelines – BG referred here specifically to the following part of clause 25: The government shall strive for the development Eilat, its building and buttressing as a port city, for the opening of the Red Sea to Israeli and other ships sailing from and to Eilat. Here Sharett intervened:]

Sharett: I would like to pose two questions: one, is the intention that if a positive decision is taken now, its meaning would be that we are to begin with preparations [for mounting a military operation aimed at putting an end to the Egyptian blockade] and, if so, what would the time-frame for preparation be approximately? Two, are you going to tell us what is the operational plan, what is the meaning of your words to defend the passage of Israeli ships, what does it involve on our part, what could the reaction to our operation be? Are you going discuss this here, or is this subject to the Cabinet’s decision taken in our former meeting, which I did not vote for?

Ben-Gurion: I will discuss it here. It is serious matter. The question is not whether we are going to begin preparations. The question is: are we going to continue with the preparations which have [already] begun in accordance with the position which was accepted when the basic guidelines were approved. The intention is to prevent the use of force by the Egyptians aimed at interfering with our free passage [through the Gulf of Aqaba Straits]. The plan is to put into action three forces – on land, sea and by air. The main thing is not the operation itself, but the possible consequences which may ensue afterwards. The preparations would take two months at the most. We would have to stay there [at the straits] in order to secure the passage of ships, but we will announce that once passage is guaranteed, as is required by [international] law, we would retreat.²³

[A debate ensued at this point. Almost all speakers opposed the proposed operation. The meeting was closed at noon and reconvened in the early evening of the same day. Sharett was the first speaker:]

Sharett: I assume that it is clear to all of us that it is impossible to consider the Eilat operation alone, as if it were something cut off from the general background, as if it were something unconnected with the whole gamut of problems we are faced with. Indeed we must discuss this subject as one part of the whole picture. We must discuss it in the light of the Czech deal, in the light of the darkening of the horizon. And then the question is: what is it that we want, and what are we discussing exactly?

It seems to me that a second point which is rather clear is that the proposed or planned operation means war. We cannot argue, as perhaps some do, that what we are aiming at is just eliminating the blockade of Eilat and then, maybe or probably, this would unfortunately, somehow unavoidably, entail war. I contend that this proposed step cannot but bring about a war; what we are discussing, then, is not the breaking of the blockade but the waging of a war. And if so, we must ask: Do we want a war to erupt? If so, then we can execute the Eilat operation as its opening. Somebody may suggest a different or more convenient opening step. I might agree that, out of all possible steps, this one might be more convenient than others, although it has some shortcomings. But this is if our intention is the waging of war. Otherwise, if we are not interested in waging war at present, in view of the general situation, then we must most certainly approach the problem of Eilat rather differently. It seems to me that this should be the starting point, and this then should be the focal point of our deliberations.

We are announcing openly that we do not want an initiated war [by us], that we do not intend to initiate war. But this still does not exhaust the matter, for there remains the problem: Do we or do we not want a war to erupt, whether by way of an initiated one or not an initiated one? In other words, do we want to bring about a war or do we not? This does not mean that war would not erupt; not everything depends on us. But inasmuch as will is an active factor, and inasmuch as it is active, then the question is: towards what should our will be directed – the execution of a war, or its prevention? This is a penetrating question. We must answer it to ourselves, and then each decision we make should consequently derive from this answer, from this indispensable clarification.

I would like to point out, following upon the assumption that this operation cannot but lead to war, that the clear and the unavoidable impression all over the globe would be that this war was initiated by us. True, there is constant provocation by the Egyptians, who are announcing that they will not let our ships sail through the straits of the Gulf of Aqaba, and they might possibly shell one of our ships. Let me clarify in passing a certain point pertaining to international law. As far as I am informed, what is exactly the controversy about? The waters of the straits are clearly territorial; they are considered shore waters belonging to Egypt. There is no doubt about that. However, these waters are at the same time serving as the only passage for other states, and in such cases international law says that the state to whom such territorial waters belong cannot block the passage of other states’ maritime traffic through them. This was affirmed in a case brought before the International Court at The Hague by Britain when its passage through certain waters was denied by the Albanians. But according to international law, the state to whom the passage waters belong has the right to inspect any ship passing through.

We are also aware that when Egypt again announced her decision and we approached maritime states regarding this matter, a few of them, including the USA and Canada, investigated this issue and their judicial experts, each separately, came to the same conclusion that, indeed, the state to whom the passage waters belong is entitled to stop any passing ship and inspect it. Consequently, if indeed this is so, any passing ship ordered to stop must obey and stop. Only if, after inspection, the said ship is prevented from continuing its voyage, is there a breach of international law.

I assume that whatever happens, the first act, the first strike, would be executed by the Egyptians, so that whatever we do would be carried out as a response. Nevertheless, I am convinced that this would not blur the impression that we were the initiators, and this because of two simple reasons: Egypt would be acting inside its territory [i.e., territorial waters], and it may argue that it has a case, that its interpretation of international law is different, and that we have invaded a foreign territory. It is not the same as what happens in most of our retaliatory operations, when we are crossing the border for a short distance; for here we would be going out of our territory for quite some distance and then invading a foreign territory. I have no doubt that this would create a shocking impression in the outside world. Second, it would be clear that it was we who initiated the whole affair – we sent a ship knowing what the Egyptian response would be, while being prepared in advance to react as we did. When this sequence causes a war, these two matters would be clear and lead to a negative judgement against us.

I would like to say, first of all, that one of our sensitivities is deficient. It may be that there are some political and psychological reasons for this deficiency, but our sensitivity regarding the meaning of borders and of entering another state’s territory for the purpose of carrying out a pre-planned military operation is deficient. I don’t mean to reject acts of retaliation; I did approve several of these operations, and inasmuch as higher state institutions bear responsibility for operations carried out, I am responsible for these operations and these involved crossing borders. True, I endeavored to weigh seven times before giving my approval, and because of this sensitivity I prevented several operations.

I am deeply worried. Why is it that among our soldiers, and also among our top military commanders, this sensitivity is not developed? There is indeed some justification for this phenomenon – our special security situation; but let it be clear that this sensitivity is completely lacking among our soldiers. Sometimes one is aware of the lack of a certain sensitivity in a certain person. I was aware that, during his childhood, one of my sons lacked a sense of fear. I became quite worried at that, because fear is a natural, instinctive sense; it is also a sense of self-protection. But was lacking it completely and indeed there was not one accident that he missed during his years of childhood and adolescence.

We are devoid of the awareness that here, in the act of crossing borders, something extremely serious is performed, that such an act should be weighed carefully, that such an act can be performed only in exceptional cases. Not so with us – among us this limitation has been over-ridden, and people have got used to it. This fills my heart with anxiety and fear.

In the outside world there is a lot of sensitivity in this respect. In all the talks we had following the Kinneret operation, we were unable to convince anybody regarding this issue [of crossing the Syrian border]. We were confronted by dozens of examples of conflicts involving Albania, Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, showing that even when serious, no crossing of borders took place. Just the other day, in view of the coming decision of the SC [on the Kinneret operation], in a conversation between our UN representative and his Soviet colleague, the latter accepted a few of our arguments, but said: Crossing of borders is the most serious matter possible. It is incumbent on us, and possible, to avoid such a step in all cases (PM Ben-Gurion: Except North Korea"). But they contended that they did not cross the borders, while we are not claiming that we did not.

Moreover, it is clear that this [our invading Egyptian territory] would entail serious responses. Somebody here asked when this operation will take place. I don’t know in what kind of situation we would then be in terms of our receiving arms. Would we receive arms beforehand? I am not sure that we will receive arms within the next two months, but I am definitely not giving up hope of receiving arms within these two months.

We are already now mounting strong pressure [for receiving arms]. I assume that somehow the sorry discussion [about Syria’s complaint against Israel] at the SC will end, one way or another. We do not know what would the result will be, but we shall not stop requesting arms and perhaps we will attain some satisfaction. It may well be that in two months from now we will find ourselves in the same position we were in on the eve of the Kinneret operation, when there were very solid chances of us receiving a theoretical, in-principle declaration after which we would need to fight over quantities and type of arms, etc. Clearly, a military operation would stymie all chances of us receiving weapons from any Western source.

I have also asked the PM privately when we are supposed to receive the destroyers [built for us in Britain]. BG answered me that they are expected by the end of March. I did my arithmetic: right now we are in the beginning of the second week of January. We shall be ready to act [militarily against Egypt] by the end of two months. If we act before receiving the destroyers, they would certainly be embargoed, in spite of being ours. We would be able to sue the British, but the destroyers would be in Portsmouth, not in Haifa.

Moreover, the action planned would be a sheer invasion. We would contend that it was justified on several grounds, but this would be an invasion unlike our crossing of the border in the case of the Kinneret operation or in that of the operation in Nitzana. In Nitzana we occupied a position and kept holding it, arguing that the said territory is ours. True, we did violate the status of the DMZ, but we are also contending that if the other side evacuates this area, so would we too. We did not operate outside the international border.

True, in carrying out the Kinneret operation, we clearly penetrated deep beyond the international border; however it was a case of hit and retreat. We silenced and destroyed the Syrian positions and immediately went back. We did not remain there. The operation being suggested now involves parachuting our men as well as moving them on land at the planned area [i.e., Sharm el-Sheikh] and remaining there until the Egyptians announce that they are ceasing to interfere with our passage through the straits, or until the experience of sailing a ship [flying an Israeli flag] proves that the passage is free.

We have been warned by the US that a retaliation operation involving the occupation of territory might entail an American response. I have not prepared myself for this debate; I have not consulted the relevant documents. Perhaps their [the Americans’] assumption is that the Tripartite Declaration would not be activated if one side invades the territory of the other without the intention of holding its territory; otherwise they should have acted on each Arab action against us involving penetration into our territory. But in the case before us they would surely have a clear cause to activate it; how can we expect them to sit still following the grievances, even anger, which have accumulated against us so far? There is a feeling there [i.e., among Americans] that it’s about time to teach them a lesson so that they would realize that they cannot play with fire as they do.

It would not be so easy to rely on precedents. For instance, when the fedayeen or any other Arab gang crosses our border and perform acts of violence, and then we retaliate, we retort to those who come to us and complain: "What would you have done, what would the state of Texas have done if Mexicans had invaded it, shot and killed Texans? Even against such arguments they can advance counter-arguments, but I am not going to play the Devil’s advocate. But what are we going to rely on? We will cite the case of Britain versus Albania. Now what happened there? A British destroyer attempted to sail through between the Island of Corfu and Albania. Albania opened fire and sank the warship and eighty marines died. This happened in 1946 or 1947. Did Britain shell Albania? No. It did not. Did Britain land troops on Albania’s shores? It did not. It appealed to the SC, and the SC discussed the issue, and when it was about to pass a resolution the Soviets vetoed it. Britain then sued Albania before the court in The Hague. Albania agreed with this procedure. However, I would not recommend going to The Hague. We should be aware that this is a matter of at least two years. In the case of Britain and Albania, the court at The Hague Court reached a decision, and we are relying on it as a precedent. But if we now rely on it, someone may point out the development of what happened. I do not think that we would be able to find justification for the present proposed operation in The Hague decision.

I would like to conclude by saying that only if we want war, come what come may, then we should go on with what is now being proposed. I am saying this against the background of the Czech deal, against the background of the weapons Nasser is about to receive, against the background of our efforts to receive arms, against the background of us appearing as a state defending itself. True, while we do have the right to self-defense [against the Egyptian aggressive blockade], it is not for us a question of life and death; rather [if we occupy the straits], it would mean preparedness, with the possibility that the operation would spark a conflagration leading into a war.

I would now like to bring to the attention of the members that, right now, we are involved in a most difficult battle regarding the wording of the SC resolution [on the Kinneret operation]. A draft is now starting to circulate, and this draft contains two harmful points: it does not include clauses which we desire, and there is nothing in it regarding Syria. It is wholly against us. We are now fighting for a balanced text and there is some chance for attaining something.

What are the two harmful points? They were included in the American draft – not only a rebuke of Israel, but a definition of the Kinneret operation as a breach of the peace. Such a wording appeared only once before – in 1948 regarding the Arab invasion. Even the French and the British opposed this wording. According to our information it is the Americans who proposed this. Now a discussion is going on between America and England and France regarding the inclusion of this wording. Possibly the Americans will withdraw it.

The other damaging point in the draft resolution is the demand that Israel pay compensation to Syria. We are fighting against this clause vehemently while demanding reparations from the Syrians for damages they caused to us. Both Britain and France are still in favor of this clause. We are fighting against it in their capitals.

[The discussion continued. At one point Sharett intervened and said:]

In my talk I did not touch upon the military and operational aspects of the proposed plan. Suppose the political considerations were negligible, would this operation be reasonable militarily? Had we discussed this aspect, I would have been compelled, even though I am not an expert, to raise most serious doubts in this regard.

[The debate continued. Ben-Gurion took the floor:]

[- - -] History is not made by speeches, although it cannot do without speeches. Zionism is not made by speeches, although it too cannot do without speeches. For thousands of years, Jews believed in redemption by miracles, that it will arrive by itself, by prayers. Prayer is also a speech, albeit a speech directed towards God. But there were Jews – the first ones were all religious Jews – who, while not denying the power of prayer, thought that if they themselves would not concretely take action, nothing would change. Initially, this was understood by only a few, then by many more. It pertained to the question of settlement in Eretz-Israel. It is still not understood by many pertaining to the political sphere. I will not speak about deficient sensitivities; this is a matter of psychology, I am not an expert on psychology. But policy too is not made by speeches; it is made by political facts, and I can enumerate a series of cases [proving this]. The Negev is in our hands because the IDF drove the Egyptians out of it. If this had not been done, no UN would have done this. Speeches would not have prevented the internationalization of Jerusalem. It is because we went there that its internationalization was prevented, and the same goes for many issues.

There are things which we do that are not immediately understood by the world, and not only by the world but by some Jews too, and the world becomes angry. If we realize that a given action is right and we are able to execute it, we shall execute it even if the world becomes angry. One of the most difficult things we did was regarding the Arab refugees whom we did not want to have back. In the beginning not only the goyim, but several members who are sitting here thought that we should take them back, if not all then a part of them. Now there are many in the outside world who are beginning to understand our refusal.

I say we have a paradox here even though I cannot prove it: the Kinneret operation, in terms of us receiving arms or not, was one of the means leading to our receiving arms in spite of America being angry. And tomorrow America and others will say that we have breached the peace and denounce us. But if we are a factor, then they will take us into consideration. If we are talkers [dabranim] they will not. They too can be talkers, the Arabs can certainly talk, but here in this country we are a highly decisive factor not because we are talkers, but because we exist [in this land] and prepared to risk our lives for its sake, while no other nation is prepared to do likewise. If the US Army comes here we would not be able to overcome it and the same goes for the British Army. But the US Army would not be dispatched here anytime soon, especially if two powers, the Russian and the British, are now standing behind the Egyptian Army.

I am not impressed by the fact that our actions are still not understood. I have seen cases of people who do understand. I will find many people to whom I will explain things, and I hope they understand.

If our power lies in words alone, then we cannot exist. For there are huge forces in the world who do not accept our existence, first of all in the West. We have not achieved what did through the power of words, but because we were a political and military factor, not in the world at large but here, in this country. Of course, we must know how to use our power, and do it cleverly. We should not be boastful; we have our limitations and there is a limit to both our political and military weight. But only power is what decides; no talking by us is decisive. Had the words of George Eliot, who was a Zionist, the words of Disraeli, who had Zionist ideas, the Zionist words of Napoleon, brought about anything? We can withstand this pressure of the Arab world and of Eden’s England, of the Vatican and of the Soviet Union – if we constitute a power which we know how to wield. Of course, we should act justly when wielding it.

I’m astonished to hear our haverim. If you are of the opinion that the Kinneret operation was a blunder and unjustified, you must arrive at a conclusion. I’m confident that it was justified and timely, but I’m not going to defend it now. If we shall be a [powerful] factor so that we shall be respected, not because of platonic sympathies (even though I am not completely disregarding them, but they carry weight if we are a factor [wielding power]) and a factor of wording; if we exist as a factor, both militarily and politically, then they must think before they make this or that decision. And if there is a chance of us receiving arms, this would be achieved only by one main thing – not the only thing but the main one [i.e., our being forceful, active.] Otherwise there may be a dangerous conflagration.

I reject this philosophy [of reliance on words]. I did not propose executing an operation. I just asked if we are to act or not to act. I’m denying the philosophy [of those opposing the use of force] if it leads to capitulation, to destruction, because there are huge forces around us and they have foreign supporters who have no need of Israel. It is only we who are in need of Israel. Only if they realize that they are unable to do everything that they want, because we here are a power able to act – then they will take us into consideration.

This needs to be explained. Surely it takes some time for the explaining to get through. If in the meantime they are grumbling – let them grumble. I’m not impressed by Dulles being angry at us. If I understand not that Dulles is angry, but that an American division is being dispatched here, then I would have to take it into consideration. But apparently there is no American division behind every word [uttered] by Dulles. Had I known that the US Army was standing behind [General George C.] Marshall’s advice to refrain from establishing a Jewish state, I would have opposed the declaration of