Professional Pilot: Proven Tactics and PIC Strategies

By John Lowery

Professional Pilot is about decision making: that is, the element that sets the captain apart from the rest of the crew. It is filled with the kind of insightful tips, stories, facts and mythbusting that will change how you operate as PIC. Far from your typical textbook on aerodynamics and systems, Professional Pilot takes you right up front to learn from a master turbine pilot who’s been there.

John Lowery combines 50 years of experience as a corporate pilot and pilot examiner with fluid discussions that probe the details all career aviators must understand. Along the way you will find a new level of understanding about day-to-day, real-world flying you thought you long understood, and gain a full indoctrination into the topics that matter when flying heavy, high, and fast.

This third edition includes up-to-date cockpit and airport procedures and recent upgrades in communications and navigation equipment. FITS (FAA/Industry Training Standards) are now included, and information has been added to prepare pilots for today’s state-of-the-art “TAA” (technically-advanced aircraft) and VLJs (very-light jets).

Within this collection of impressive know-how, you’ll uncover the vital story behind such topics as:

• Takeoff V-speeds, runway length requirements, and the real physics of takeoff performance


• Handling runway contamination


• Cruising speed and fuel control in turbine aircraft


• Dynamics of high altitude flight


• Managing icing conditions


• Surviving emergencies such as rapid decompression and in-flight fires

• Language: English
• Publisher: Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc.
• Release date: Dec 1, 2007
• ISBN: 9781619540088

Book preview

JOHN LOWERY is a retired U.S. Air Force and commercial pilot with more than 13,500 hours of flying a wide variety of both light and high performance large aircraft. He taught for ten years as an adjunct assistant professor of aeronautical science for Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University at the McClellan AFB campus. Currently he resides in Folsom, California.

Professional Pilot, Third Edition

by John Lowery

Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc.

7005 132nd Place SE

Newcastle, WA 98059

www.asa2fly.com / [e-mail]

© 2008 Aviation Supplies & Academics, Inc. Ebook edition published 2012.

All rights reserved. This book, or any portions thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without written permission of the publisher. None of the information in this manual supersedes operational documents or procedures issued by the Federal Aviation Administration, or aircraft and avionics manufacturers’ manuals.

Third Edition published 2008 by Aviation Supplies & Academics.

First edition 2001, Iowa State University Press.

Photography © John Lowery unless otherwise noted. Photos p. 74–76, 291, courtesy National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); p. 80, 288 and 308, courtesy Paul Bowen; p. 112, John Fendly; p. 176, the Raisback Group; p. 182, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); p.183, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); p. 201, Perkins & Rieke; p. 236, Alese and Morton Pechter; p. 256, 259, and 261, the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR).

ASA-PRO-PILOT-3

epub ISBN 978-1-61954-008-8

LC# 00-053840

Dedication

To the memory of Captain Jack Lee Isaac, Western Airlines, Inc. He started in the early 1940s as a 21-year-old flight instructor in the World War II Civil Pilot Training program at Auburn University in Alabama. From there he signed up with the Navy where he first instructed, then went to sea flying Corsairs from carriers. After a brief post-war career as a bush pilot, flying out of Ely, Minnesota, he began a lasting career with Western Airlines. It was Jack who gave the author his first flying lesson at age 13. This lit the fire that set the course to a lifetime in aviation. He was my idol throughout his lifetime.

Living to Fly

Earthly encumbered; living to fly:

Taking to wing; coming alive.

Abode in blue; furnished in white:

Carpet in terra; effortless flight.

Gliding on sunlight; highways of air:

Hum to the winds’ song; little to care.

Soar above eagles; the zephyr a foe:

Chasing the evening; miles quickly flow.

Talons are readied; sleekness at cost.

Once more ungainly; a dimension is lost.

As the hawk with wings clipped, sooner would die:

Not meant to be earthbound; living to fly.

—Richard J. Harkness

Preface

When serious pilots begin searching for information beyond the aircraft systems training provided at most flight schools, they are immediately stymied by the lack of resources. Consequently, some important aeronautical information is not readily available. Yet the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the manufacturers have a wealth of information that, to operate safely, pilots of sophisticated aircraft simply must know. A basic reference is Aerodynamics for Naval Aviators, by H. H. Hurt of the University of Southern California (available from ASA). Two other excellent references are Fly the Wing by the late Jim Webb (EAL) and Handling the Big Jets by former British test pilot D.P. Davies. These too are books every serious pilot should own.

The Boeing Commercial Airplane Company has provided some outstanding studies on aircraft performance. A case in point is their Landing on Slippery Runways, published in the mid-1960s but still a valuable reference in the 21st century. Their study and video tape on rejected takeoffs was exceptional. Other valuable sources are listed in the bibliography.

National Transportation Safety Board statistics reflect a consistent accident pattern that varies little from year to year. Takeoffs and landings are most frequently involved. In fact, these phases of flight are so problematic that they’re referred to as the critical eight minutes of flight—two minutes during takeoff and six minutes during approach and landing.

For light aircraft (gross weight 12,500 pounds or less), neither accelerate-stop nor accelerate-go information is required by 14 CFR §91.103, Preflight Action. In fact, light twins are not required to have an accelerate-go capability, yet some of them do. Using transport category rules as a baseline for safety, it seems obvious that these distances should be the basic criterion for acceptable runway length. Accelerate-stop is especially important. Without a runway at least as long as the accelerate-stop distance, an engine failure at rotation/takeoff speed—the tacit decision speed—would cause a guaranteed accident. This is covered in depth in Chapter 2.

Flying in the upper altitudes and at high Mach numbers requires some very specialized aeronautical knowledge. For example, ignorance of the low-speed buffet boundary or of the aerodynamics involved when the airspeed or Mach number limitation is exceeded has led a number of pilots to grief. Disabling the airspeed warning system—required to be operational in transport category airplanes—in an effort to cruise faster than the airspeed/Mach limit, is the known cause of several accidents in some older model jets. It is especially critical during a severe turbulence encounter. This is covered in depth in Chapter 8.

Fuel costs make cruise control especially important in both propeller and jet aircraft. Yet the continuing mishaps caused by fuel exhaustion point to inadequate knowledge of the finer points involved. If both economy and safety are to be realized, each aircraft type, whether using reciprocating, turboprop, or jet engines, requires specific procedures and techniques.

The stall/spin factor has been a persistent problem in light twin training. Yet since light twins are not spin certified, good information on the subject is missing in the pilot operating handbooks. Still, it happens. For the most part, pilots are not trained in spin recovery. In fact, except for the flight instructor rating, spin training hasn’t been required since 1948.

Simulators are a godsend for learning and understanding minimum control speed (VMC) and engine-out procedures. If you make a mistake, your instructor simply freezes the simulator and you discuss the problem. Yet in the actual airplane, a mistake can result in an accidental and unrecoverable flat spin. No serious multi-engine pilot should operate a light twin without attending a simulator course for the specific airplane he/she will be flying. If the possibility of an accidental spin doesn’t scare you, just think of the cost of those carefully tuned and finely balanced engines you’ll be snatching to idle or cooling at idle power for long periods.

Of utmost importance is the hostile high altitude environment in which pilots of pressurized aircraft work. With a sudden rapid decompression you are literally in a life-or-death situation. Since you have just seconds to take corrective action, the emergency procedures outlined in the Airplane Flight Manual or Pilot’s Operating Handbook must be accomplished quickly and perfectly. You certainly don’t have time to refer to the emergency checklist. Yet how many pilots have memorized the rapid decompression/pressurization failure and emergency descent procedures? This subject is discussed in depth in Chapter 16.

Chapter 17 discusses the precautions recommended for flying after you or your passengers have been scuba diving. This has been a long-neglected subject. Yet an untreated case of the bends can lead to permanent injury or death.

Fire in flight, jet engine compressor stall, turbulence upset, and in-flight icing problems are other subjects discussed in the book.

Finally, Chapters 18 through 22 cover the landing phase in considerable detail. This is where the highest percentage of accidents occurs. These chapters include everything from landing performance requirements and limitations to tires and hydroplaning.

Our ever-improving accident record—2006 has been the best yet—is the by-product of both good aircraft design and competent ground and flight instruction. Therefore special mention is due the professional flight instructor. The instructors at Flight Safety International, Simcom, and SimuFlight, to name just three, are true professionals. Yet many of us fail to realize that instructing is a calling. It’s certainly not for the money. Not just anybody can do it and not everyone wants to.

Special thanks to Arnold Lane (FSI), a very knowledgeable instructor from St. Louis, Missouri, who enlightened me on commuter category performance. Arnold is a shining example of the professional instructor because he is motivated to teach and has the training and experience to know what he’s talking about.

Very special thanks to Federal Aviation Administration test pilot Gerald Baker, Wichita Certification Office, for his help in ensuring the accuracy of the takeoff performance chapters. Jerry’s recommendations improved significantly the accuracy of each of these chapters. And thanks also to Captain Jerry Blalock, (UAL retired), and Commander Marshall Graves USN (Ret.) for their advice on certain chapters.

Hopefully this book will provide some of the hard-to-find aeronautical information you need to make sound decisions when conditions are less than optimum. As pilot-in-command of an aircraft, safety must always be an overriding concern. And both training and academic knowledge are the basic requirements in making sound decisions. If you short-change either one, sooner or later you’ll learn that the air like the sea is terribly unforgiving of ignorance or incompetence.

PART ONE

Introduction

1

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

...Using Everything Available

Called Crew Resource Management (CRM) in multi-crew aircraft, and Single Pilot Resource Management (SRM) in general aviation, it is a popular topic that seems to mean different things to different people. In reality, it is a discipline concerned with how pilots and crews manage the equipment, information and support team members made available to them to ensure that the successful outcome of the flight is never in doubt. This also encompasses the responsibilities of management in the conduct of flying operations.

In private single-engine airplanes or the new very light jets, SRM involves managing automation, navigation and air traffic control such that the pilot can accurately and safely operate in the National Airspace System.

Up until now, pilots could make three takeoff and landings in an aircraft and legally qualify as PIC. Radios and cockpit layouts have been so similar that qualifying has been essentially a one size fits all operation. Management of cockpit resources has involved seemingly basic things, like use of the flight director system, or use of cowl flaps to control cylinder head temperature. Although from a legal perspective staying current hasn’t changed, modern avionics are changing the stakes for pilot qualification.

The introduction of GPS and LORAN systems to general aviation has led to the neglect of some basic skills, e.g., use of analog nav radios and charts. As a long-time flight instructor I have often seen pilots on VFR cross-country flights simply dial in the destination airport on the GPS or LORAN and never look at a sectional chart or cross-check a VOR or NDB en route. Further, they do not consider the need for an enroute alternate or identify areas suitable for an emergency landing. These are some examples of not using all the resources available. Unfortunately, these pilots wind up in trouble when anything untoward occurs.

Meanwhile the GA accident record, while improving each year, has shown a continuing trend toward a high number of fatalities due to weather—usually controlled flight into terrain—by non-instrument rated pilots. Loss of control also accounts for a high number of fatalities each year. These mishaps suggest that inadequate training, knowledge and proficiency lead to fatally-flawed judgment.

With these factors and evolving technology in mind, the FAA initiated a System Safety Management Program that outlined the objectives and planned activities of their safety effort, as it applies to the safety management for all systems, new and old, providing air traffic control and navigation services in the NAS, as well as the acquisition of systems in support of National Airspace System (NAS) modernization.

With SRM in mind, the new generation of technically advanced small reciprocating and jet powered (12,500 pounds maximum gross weight) aircraft, with glass cockpits and multi-function displays, has made it clear that a new approach to training and proficiency is needed. Electronic flight instrumentation systems require thorough instruction in order to be used proficiently and safely in the national airspace system.

Without a new approach to training, pilot workload in new electronic cockpits becomes very high. The increase in workload means more head-down time in the cockpit. Thus in VMC, pilots are less likely to see and avoid other traffic. Therefore, proper training requires extensive use of mockups and simulators to gain true proficiency.

Concurrently, procedures for operating in the national airspace are evolving and becoming more complex. As the FAA’s Operational Evolution Plan (OEP) takes effect and advanced airspace concepts such as free flight emerge, the changes include newer electronic systems and other flight technologies.

This has led to a program called FAA Industry Training Standards (FITS) which is an effort to make transition-training more relevant to pilots of new technically advanced aircraft (TAA) who will be operating in the evolving National Airspace System.

To develop FITS, FAA partnered with industry and academia to develop new flight training programs that teach aircraft and cockpit systems as well as the realistic use of the NAS—essentially like getting a type rating in a commuter or jet transport. (An example of this concept originated with the Beech factory training—later Flight Safety International—for pilots transitioning to the aerodynamically and electronically sophisticated Starship.)

Crew Resource Management

The basics of CRM should begin in the initial phase of flight training and continue for the rest of one’s flying career. A NASA–Ames Research Center study showed that pilots and crewmembers frequently failed to identify and use information and human resources that were readily available. In fact, one study showed approximately 60 percent of the fatal commercial jet accidents involved improper CRM. The study identified five training objectives in teaching proper CRM:

1. Definition of individual crewmember roles and responsibilities during flight operations.

2. Better definition of crewmember roles and responsibilities within the company.

3. Recognizing the importance of monitoring, cross-checking and communicating effectively.

4. Recognition of available resources including manuals, other crewmembers, Air Traffic Control (ATC), maintenance, dispatch, etc.

5. Recognizing that resource management is the responsibility of all crewmembers, not just the captain.

Captain’s Authority

In a multi-crew airplane, CRM is not designed to dilute the captain’s authority or leadership position. Instead, it challenges the captain to exercise leadership and discharge responsibilities so that on each flight maximum use is realized from all human and technical resources.

When the captain creates an atmosphere where crewmembers can speak up and contribute responsibly to the operation, then his/her authority is strengthened because of valuable input from the entire crew. In other words, he/she is fully using available cockpit resources—the copilot, flight engineer and cabin attendants.

Single Pilot

For single pilot operation, the goal of SRM is to ensure proper use of all support team members, related equipment and all available information in managing the automation and associated aircraft control and navigation tasks. The FAA’s FITS program—supported by insurance companies—will ensure competent piloting in the new generation of technically advanced aircraft: The pilot’s knowledge-base and personality will ensure good decision making.

For example, how often have you seen a pilot preflight planning with an out-of-date airport directory, or looking for information in an ancient edition of Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Airport Directory? Then there’s the pilot who flies VFR over hostile terrain without a chart. Later, when the engine quits, this person will call ATC for vectors to the nearest airfield. If the ensuing crash is survived, ATC is faulted for not quickly providing guidance to a suitable field. Yet with proper use of resources (a chart), enroute airfields or areas suitable for an emergency landing would have been pre-located and monitored by the pilot in command.

Often, GPS predominates en route, while VOR and low-frequency radios—both of which provide valuable backup—are ignored. Approaching to land, the GPS pilot then takes a quick first look in an airport directory to obtain frequencies and runway alignment. Now he is head-down in the cockpit, in the area that is statistically most susceptible to midair collisions—the airport environment.

Inadequate proficiency with cockpit instrumentation can lead to midair collisions too. The pilot will be constantly head-down in the traffic area while trying to setup for landing. (Remember despite an IFR clearance and radar-contact with ATC, in VMC it is still your obligation to see and avoid other traffic.)

1.1 When an aircraft taxies for takeoff, it must be mechanically airworthy, with a crew that is properly licensed, adequately rested and physically fit. As second-in-command the copilot’s contribution to decision making is vital to the safe conduct of flight.

Crew Concept

Some time back I agreed to fly copilot on a Citation trip with a captain who was quite senior. He had flown Falcon 50s previously so one would assume he was well acquainted with the two-crew concept. During our preflight briefing he began with, Look, you’re here because the FAA requires it. You can handle the radios, but don’t touch anything or do anything unless I tell you to. Since I am rather senior myself, and have been a pilot proficiency examiner for the past 25 years, I honestly thought he was kidding.

He did allow me to copy the clearance, but reached across to dial in all the frequencies and push the changeover button. Later, at a thousand feet above El Centro airport—our destination—in clear desert skies, ATC asked if we were ready to cancel our IFR flight plan. Since we were entering the traffic pattern and very late making our presence known on CTAF, I responded affirmative. I was chastised immediately since he was not ready to cancel.

The next leg was to return in weather, at night, to Santa Barbara. This increased his workload enough so that he reluctantly allowed me to push the selector button to change radio frequencies. As we neared the outer marker for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, Santa Barbara Approach Control directed us to switch to the tower.

I understood that tower was on 118.5, but after calling did not receive a response. Because we were performing an ILS approach, asking approach control to repeat the tower frequency seemed amateurish. So I asked the captain to verify the frequency. After all, he possessed and jealously guarded the only approach plate. He too had heard 118.5, or so I deduced from his grunting response. Apparently, his cockpit lights were too dim to read the plate.

I quickly brightened my lights, then reached across and took the plate from his control column. After verifying that 119.7 was the frequency, I replaced it. At this point we were intercepting the glide path and crossing the outer marker.

Like a bomb exploding, the captain suddenly went into a violent, unrestrained rage. He was incensed that a copilot had momentarily violated his space. Fully expecting to see trees and rocks at any second, I quickly resumed monitoring the flight director. Yet amazingly, despite his ranting, we were on course and on the glide path. Dutifully I made the 1,000-foot callout, then 500 above, then minimums. But I was guessing since he would not let me see the approach plate. Santa Barbara is a sea-level airport, so it was not difficult to guesstimate minimums.

We broke out of the clouds at 300 feet and landed successfully in a light drizzling rain. The experience was like a chapter from the CRM textbook: a classic case of the dictatorial captain who had no use or respect for the copilot. He was a dedicated single pilot operator and, in his own words, required by the FAA to carry a copilot.

This experience brought to mind a Citation II accident that occurred several years ago. The captain too had a reputation as a strong individualist. On the accident trip his copilot was a contract employee. NTSB investigators found that, despite being new to jets and the two-crew concept, the copilot had never received any formal training.

The two pilots had flown as a crew for 20.8 hours. However, all but 3.7 hours which were logged on the fatal trip, were in the King Air 200. This was the copilot’s first trip in the Citation II. He had told others in the flight department that he didn’t really want to fly with this particular captain. While no reason was given, one witness who had flown with the same crew on a King Air trip told investigators that the captain had spoken about three sentences to the copilot throughout the entire day-long trip.

Their destination that night was Person County Airport, North Carolina (TDF). The closest official weather station was Raleigh–Durham International (RDU). Located 26 miles to the southeast, RDU was reporting a 500-foot ceiling with 3 miles visibility. Temperature was 68°F and dew point 67°F.

A non-certified Automated Weather Observation Station (AWOS) at TDF reported the same ceiling but 10 miles visibility. Temperature and dewpoint spread was 2 degrees. Witnesses at TDF reported light to moderate rain. One witness near the accident site said there was fog near the ground and around the treetops.

Noteworthy too was that with the remote altimeter setting from RDU, the reported 500-foot ceiling was below TDF’s 655 feet AGL (1,260 feet MSL) NDB minimums.

ATC cleared the flight for a straight-in NDB approach. They crossed the beacon at the published 2,100 feet then began a rapid descent toward the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 1,260 feet. See Figure 1.2.

1.2 TDF ADF approach plate.

A nonprecision approach requires precise airspeed control to achieve the published timing to the missed approach point. However, the Citation’s ground speed varied from 200 knots at the final approach fix to 120 knots, then back up to 135 knots. Just before impact the recorded ground speed was 123 knots.

The descent rate was worse yet. Radar showed a descent rate of 1,920 fpm at the FAF. This was maintained through 1,400 feet, (140 feet above the MDA). The last radar return showed the airplane descending through 1,100 feet (160 feet below MDA), with a sink rate of 1,263 fpm.

The Citation flew into trees 2.5 miles short of the threshold for runway 06. At impact it was about 100 feet right of centerline, in a wings-level landing configuration, with idle power and a slightly descending attitude.

The runway end identifier lights (REIL) and precision approach path indicator (PAPI) were both functional. Thus, if the flight had broken out of the clouds they would have had adequate visual guidance to the touchdown zone. This would certainly have prevented landing short due to black hole effect. And the power levers would not have been at idle, nor the aircraft in a descending attitude. These factors tend to verify the witness report of fog that had formed near the ground and around the treetops.

The Crew

The 31-year-old copilot was a contract employee for the operator, with a flight time of 1,705 hours. His systems training reportedly consisted of self-study using a Citation II training manual. His official copilot checkout consisted of a full-stop ILS landing at a nearby airfield, followed by two visual approaches and full-stop landings at TDF. Because none of his training was documented, a letter to the NTSB from the owning company’s assistant chief pilot attempted to verify the copilot’s cursory compliance with 14 CFR §61.55 for second in command (SIC).

The 35-year-old captain was known as a strong-willed individualist. Eight months prior to the accident he had been hospitalized with malignant lymphoma in the chest. Following surgery and chemotherapy he returned to work. He completed a First Class medical examination and then, following a week as copilot, resumed his normal flight schedule as captain.

Although back at work, he continued receiving maintenance levels of chemotherapy. In the wreckage, investigators found a list of prescription and nonprescription drugs that were contraindicated for flying. Toxicology tests were positive for both marijuana and tranquilizers, along with a therapeutic level of chemotherapy drugs.

A flight department peer of the dead captain told investigators that the captain did not (sic) seem to be his old self after medical leave. He reportedly tired easily over the course of a long day. His flying habits too seemed to have changed. An example given to investigators was that he had developed the tendency to fly initial approaches high and then rocket down to the MDA.

NTSB investigators noted that the company operations manual lacked guidance for cockpit resource management. Missing was a description of the separate duties and responsibilities of the pilot flying (PF) and the pilot not flying (PNF). This was especially important since their crews also flew the single-pilot certified King Air 200 with two pilots.

The NDB approach appeared to have been unnecessarily rushed. Approach Control had intended to vector the flight in a box pattern. But the captain interceded and transmitted, Ah, we’ll be in good shape getting down, sir. Whereupon the controller resumed providing vectors to the final approach course.

The captain elected to stay high during the initial vectors in order to remain above weather that was in the area. After passing the NDB, the initial descent rate was 1,920 fpm. At impact, his descent rate was 1,263 fpm, at idle power, with the airspeed 10 knots above the 113-knot Vref (threshold speed for gross weight).

His descent rate was more than three times that recommended for a nonprecision approach. However even with idle power in the Citation II, that extra 10 knots would have enabled him to arrest his rocket-like descent.

One formula which works nicely for estimating rate of descent on a 3-degree glide slope is: VVI = Ground speed x 10 ÷ 2. This formula shows that the descent rate should have been about 615 fpm. Recorded at 1,263 fpm upon impact, it was more than double that figure. Regardless of the formula or airspeed used for a nonprecision approach, a descent rate greater than 800 fpm becomes dangerous, as this accident shows.

The fact that the weather was below published minimums for a remote altimeter setting was hardly discussed in the accident report. And the AWOS was not certified, so its weather information could not be considered reliable. A competent copilot would have brought up both of these factors since they represented FAA regulation violations. In fact, the accident itself makes a good case for why the FAA established such rules.

From the description of the captain’s recent flying habits, it appears he expected to rely on the AWOS and a rocket-like descent to pop out of the clouds at 500 feet with plenty of visibility. Unfortunately fate had a gotcha in store with fog near the ground and around the treetops.

In an effort to explain this irrational accident, other possibilities were explored by investigators. Black hole effect was considered as one possibility. While the dark rainy night was ideal for this phenomenon, the availability of a visual glide slope and the fact that fog was reported at treetop height seem to reinforce the idea that the captain fully expected to break out clear of the clouds. Unfortunately it never happened.

The NTSB investigator noted that with few exceptions the copilot made all radio transmissions. This and the captain’s reported single pilot attitude highlight a major human-factors problem in cockpit resource management. This involves an egocentric captain who refuses—even subconsciously enjoys—demeaning a subordinate, while demonstrating his own superior multifaceted skills. At best the copilot is a radio operator.

In the cited case the copilot was new to the two-crew concept. Worse, he had no formal systems training in the Citation II—his first jet—or the expected duties of a copilot. This, plus the domineering attitude of the captain, would have left him psychologically timid and afraid to speak up. In essence, he was programmed as a radio operator rather than as second in command.

Complicating the equation was the unspoken threat that a bad word from the captain would mean no more trips—and that all-important jet flight time—from the company.

Exacerbating the problem of CRM is the almost universal practice in non-airline operations of having only one copy of the approach plate in the cockpit. Often the captain clips this plate to his control column and never reviews the principal aspects of the approach with the copilot who is blinded by lack of information. (This is not a problem in glass cockpit aircraft that electronically display the approach procedure.) Consequently the copilot has no rational basis for being assertive when something looks questionable. Again, without access to all the information, the copilot is actually a radio operator rather than second in command.

Some misguided pilots have the PNF hold the approach plate and read the approach step by step, telling the PF when to descend or when to turn and to what heading. With this procedure, the PNF is directing the flight or acting as pilot-in-command. Once again, the two-crew concept is not functioning, since only one pilot knows where they are going.

This was the specific cause of a fatal Sabreliner 65 mishap during a dark night VOR approach into Kaunakakai, Hawaii. The captain (PF) was relying on the copilot to read him each step of the approach procedure. Unfortunately the copilot misread the approach minimums and they flew into high terrain killing all aboard.

The principal reason for having two pilots is the safety inherent in two intelligent minds that are actively using and cross-checking cockpit resources to ensure a successful conclusion of a flight. The need