On Evil, Providence, and Freedom: A New Reading of Molina

By Mark Wiebe

This original study is concerned with the reconciliation of divine providence, grace, and free will. Mark Wiebe explores, develops, and defends Luis de Molina's work in these areas, and bridges the main sixteenth-century conversations surrounding Molina's writings with relevant sets of arguments in contemporary philosophical theology and philosophy of religion. The result fills a gap between theologians and philosophers working in related areas of study and is a unique contribution to the field of analytic theology. Wiebe begins by sketching the historical and theological context from which Molina's work emerged in the late sixteenth century. He then lays out Thomas Aquinas's understanding of God's nature and activity, as well as his understanding of the relationship between God's action and creaturely activity. In the face of challenges like the Problem of Evil, Wiebe argues, Molina's work is a helpful supplement to Aquinas's thought. Turning to direct consideration of Molina's work, Wiebe responds to several of the most well-known objections to Molinism. In support of Molina's understanding of creaturely freedom, he then develops some twentieth-century work in free will philosophy, focusing on the work of thinkers like Austin Farrer, Timothy O'Connor, and Robert Kane. He argues that there are good reasons to defend a restrained version of libertarian or noncompatibilist free will, and also good reasons to believe this sort of freedom obtains among human agents. Wiebe concludes that a Molinistic revision of Eleonore Stump's work on the relationship between providence and free will provides a well-rounded, coherent theological option for reconciling divine providence, grace, and free will. This thoughtful study will appeal to theologians and philosophers, as well as educated readers with a basic knowledge of Christian theology.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Northern Illinois University Press
• Release date: Apr 15, 2017
• ISBN: 9781609092344

Book preview

On Evil, Providence, and Freedom

A New Reading of Molina

MARK B. WIEBE

NIU Press

DeKalb, IL

Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb 60115

© 2017 by Northern Illinois University Press

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

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978-0-87580-752-2 (cloth)

978-1-60909-234-4 (e-book)

Cover design by Yuni Dorr

Composition by BookComp, Inc.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Wiebe, Mark, author.

Title: On evil, providence, and freedom : a new reading of Molina / Mark B. Wiebe.

Description: DeKalb : Northern Illinois University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016019765 (print) | LCCN 2016034259 (ebook) | ISBN 9780875807522 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781609092344 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Molina, Luis de, 1535–1600. | Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?–1274. | Free will and determinism—Religious aspects—Christianity. | Providence and government of God—Christianity. | Good and evil—Religious aspects—Christianity.

Classification: LCC BX4705.M598 W54 2017 (print) | LCC BX4705.M598 (ebook) | DDC 230/.2092—dc23

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016019765

For Jocelyn with love and gratitude

Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

CHAPTER 1. Molina and the Battle over Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

CHAPTER 2. The Concord of Grace and Free Will: Thomas Aquinas and Luis de Molina on God’s Nature and Providence

CHAPTER 3. Anti-Molinism

CHAPTER 4. Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and the Problem of Evil

Notes

Works Cited

Index

Acknowledgments

There are many people whose support was invaluable throughout the research and writing process for this book. Above all, I am grateful to my wife, whose love and encouragement made this work possible. And I owe a massive debt of gratitude to Dr. William Abraham, who introduced me to analytic philosophy and philosophical theology during my time at SMU, and whose thorough analysis and detailed feedback played a crucial role at every stage of the writing process.

Introduction

The following study concerns the nature of divine providence and creaturely freedom. This topic has been the subject of wide-ranging, sometimes rancorous debate throughout the Christian tradition, starting with Paul’s writings in the New Testament. A basic way of formulating the central issue is as follows: what is the best, the most fitting language available to describe both the nature of God’s providence over creation and creaturely freedom? Many other concerns are involved in attempting any answer to this most basic question. For instance, we need to keep in mind the fundamental assumption, based in revealed truth, that God is the creator and sustainer of all creation. This immediately places limits on the kinds of things that it would be fitting to conclude about the nature of God’s sovereignty and providential governance of creation. It excludes those visions of providence that give too much pride of place to the creature herself, as though the creature could be, for example, self-sustaining in some sense.

It follows, therefore, that any theological anthropology or any description of creation that conflicts with our fundamental assumption about God’s absolute primacy will be excluded. Yet, it is not immediately obvious, and it is the subject of much debate, which vision of creation, if any, might have these kinds of troubling implications. Or conversely, it is not immediately obvious which vision of creation best fits with and flows out of these fundamental assumptions about God’s nature and sovereignty. Several approaches to these issues are explored in this study, with the aim of identifying which are more and which are less theologically and philosophically credible.

Another concern has to do with God’s goodness and justice. We need a vision both of providence and the nature of creation that does justice to God’s perfect love and goodness. At this point, the problem of evil looms large. Ideally, a robust Christian notion of providence will have taken this problem into account and offer (either explicitly or implicitly) some sort of coherent response to its various versions and formulations. To take one example, I believe, and will argue over the course of this study, that a creature under the pressure of hard determinism is not a fitting product of a perfectly good and loving God. Nor would it be fitting for a creature, thus determined, to be found guilty, punished, or lost eternally for her sin and failure. I will also argue, similarly, that certain accounts of human freedom enable a stronger response to the problem of evil than others by, among other things, supporting the possibility that there are certain worlds even God cannot create.

What is needed is an understanding of divine providence rooted firmly in the Christian tradition and affirming the absolute primacy and independence of God. Also necessary is an understanding of creation and the freedom of the creature that at once confesses the creature’s absolute dependence upon God, but that also coheres with God’s love and goodness. I will argue that the best way of doing this is to affirm both a strong, detailed view of providence and some version of libertarian freedom. More specifically, I think the best way of doing all of these things at once is via some form of Molinism. Therefore, in this study I aim to explicate and defend Molinism with the concerns I have just outlined in mind. As we proceed, I will be offering several novel contributions to this historically, theologically, and philosophically wide-ranging set of conversations.

My original contributions are as follows. First, and most broadly, I consider this project as a novel contribution to the field of Analytic Theology. That is to say, I am interested in exploring and expanding on theological topics from within the context of a commitment to Christian theism, utilizing the tools and methods, practicing the virtues, and seeking the ends typically associated with Analytic philosophy. More specifically, I believe we can gain much from a careful analysis of the words, ideas, and themes that have been central to the discussion of providence and creaturely freedom both in Molina’s time and more recent work in these areas. And so I work to bridge several of the pivotal theological and philosophical conversations relating to Molinism. Much of the work being done on Molina’s thought and on different versions of Molinism involves theologians and philosophers either talking past or ignoring each other completely. I argue that the theologians who criticize Molina, both in his own time and in the twentieth century, share some of the same basic concerns as the philosophers who have criticized Molinism over the past several decades. Bringing these two conversations together is important as this ever-growing body of materials and arguments continues to develop. To take one instance, many of the relevant theologians have been concerned that Molinism is a form of semi-Pelagianism (indeed, that term arose out of the Molinism controversy in the late sixteenth century). What I argue is that this concern is, at bottom, about ontology, which plays a central role in arguments relating to the most important contemporary objection to Molinism: the grounding objection.

It seems, then, that an answer to one of these sides of the objection will have implications for and help to illuminate the other. For the Christian philosopher working in this area, this sort of comparison and parallel also serves the purpose of maintaining the theological background commitments outlined above. Along related lines, I develop an explicit definition of Pelagianism, something that is uncommon even in the theological literature on these subjects, and rarely mentioned in the philosophical treatments of Molinism. This is an important move as the avoidance of Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism serves as another limit on the kind of concepts of providence and freedom that we can justifiably and legitimately defend. One of my central questions nearer to the end of the study relates to precisely this point, asking again what sort of freedom we might defend as not only philosophically but theologically plausible.

In my second chapter, I consider Thomas Aquinas’s thought on God’s nature and providence and also his thinking on the nature of created causes, with special focus on his approach to the creaturely will. Over the course of that chapter I provide a detailed map of Thomas’s thought on these subjects. One pivotal question at this stage is whether Thomas supports anything like the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). That is, does Thomas believe that a necessary condition for all free action is the ability to choose among alternatives, or to be able to perform or refrain from particular actions?

Ultimately, I conclude that Thomas does stress the importance of alternatives in free actions for which agents can be held responsible, but, like Eleonore Stump, I do not think he would fully support the contemporary version of the PAP. Whereas contemporary libertarians support the PAP based on their understanding of free action and the will, Thomas’s understanding of alternative possibilities is rooted ultimately in his understanding of the nature of created reality, its origin in a change from nothingness to being, and its ineluctable capacity to fail and fall. I also compare Stump’s work on Thomas Aquinas’s thought with that of other well-known contemporary Thomists. I argue that Stump’s approach is different and distinctive in important ways, and also that overall it is stronger than the others philosophically and theologically. I point to some important flaws in Stump’s arguments relating to God’s epistemic causality as well as her notion of quiescent creaturely wills, highlighting the need for something that moves beyond Thomas’s categories of the divine intellect.

Another original contribution begins with my overall method in this project. There are several facets to Molinistic thought that depend upon intuitive support. For example, some people find it intuitively plausible that so called counterfactuals of creaturely freedom or CCFs (the propositions that describe what free creatures would do given certain states of affairs, and which God uses in pre-creative and providential deliberation) are brutely true. Arguably, we use these types of propositions in everyday life, often as the basis for our decisions, assuming that they have some truth-value. Similarly, as I argue in the fourth chapter, some of the strongest support for belief in libertarian freedom comes from a set of claims about the common intuition that one’s choices are not determined by preceding causes or states of the world, and that at least some of my choices must be in some sense up to me.

It therefore seems prudent, considering the important role played by intuition, to provide further support for my argument by indirect means—by eliminating or weakening the intuitive (or other) supports for alternative approaches to these issues. Moreover, although the arguments I make and the conclusions I reach narrow the field in terms of possible theological and philosophical options, they do not necessarily narrow those options down to one—for example, if Open Theism turned out to be a viable option, it could provide some of the things that Molinists want out of a theory of providence. Thus we should ask whether it is theologically and philosophically viable. Along this line, I offer several novel arguments against alternative approaches to questions of divine providence and human freedom, including Open Theism, Boethian and Ockhamist responses to these questions, and various versions of Thomism.

With the field of options thus narrowed, I move on in the fourth chapter to offer some positive support for Molinism. This comes in the form of an elaboration and defense of Molina’s intuitive inclination toward libertarian freedom. I do this by appealing to and developing, among others, Austin Farrer’s thought on the nature of the will, considering also the implications for the argument thus far. I argue that there are good reasons to think that freedom involves some level of ultimacy on the part of the creature, insofar as that word can apply to a creature, and also the ability to do otherwise at least some of the time. I also argue that we have good reason to think we are free in this way. What this provides, then, is another limit on the kind of theory of providence we should hold—it needs to be one that coheres with this kind of liberty among creatures. Finally, developing some of Eleonore Stump’s thought in this area, I offer one example of an approach that would fulfill all of the requirements that are in place at that point in the argument.

Putting this material—support for libertarian freedom and the examination of the implications for the broader argument—near the end of the study is optimal in this particular setting. As will become clear in the advancement of the argument, one of the crucial questions motivating and captivating the attention of each participant in these debates has to do with the nature of creaturely freedom. Specifically, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions of free choice, and do those conditions obtain among creatures? The arguments in the first through the third chapters consider, explore, and ultimately reject a variety of alternative answers to these fundamental questions, narrowing the possibilities as we proceed. This material sets the stage to ask a couple of important questions in the fourth chapter. First, given the preceding, what conclusion should we reach with regard to the nature of freedom and the nature of creaturely action, and what supports do we have for this conclusion? Having eliminated or weakened the support for alternative approaches to these questions, the material under consideration in chapter four then provides the final positive support for my overall defense of a Molinistic approach to both providence and freedom. Furthermore, as I noted, we have to ask not only what type of freedom we should affirm, but which type of creaturely freedom we can affirm in a way that coheres with and flows out of the broader web of arguments up to this point in the discussion concerning God’s nature and providence, and God’s relationship with creation. As I will explain in detail, I do this by appealing to a modified form of Stump’s quiescence in combination with Molina’s understanding of the divine intellect.

CHAPTER 1

Molina and the Battle over Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom

A quarter-century after the council of Trent, a Spanish Jesuit named Luis de Molina, a professor at Portugal’s University of Evora, joined the long-standing debate regarding the relationship between grace and free will, God’s knowledge and creative action, as well as the relationship between these and free, human action. Molina’s most important contribution to this conversation was his De liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, praedestinatione et reprobatione Concordia (The Harmony of Free Will with Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge, Predestination and Reprobation). He saw this as a crucial addition to the discussion, simultaneously affirming a strong sense of both divine sovereignty (inclusive of divine foreknowledge), and human freedom, two key dogmatic themes from the Council of Trent. Yet his work set off a firestorm of criticism among some of Molina’s own Jesuit peers as well as many in the Dominican Order.

The main sources of controversy, initially, were Molina’s emphasis on a libertarian notion of the freedom of the will and also his insistence that apart from the individual’s (in some respects) independent consent and action, God’s salvific grace remains sufficient for salvation rather than strictly efficacious. That is, the effect of salvific grace is partly up to the individual in whom grace is at work. The early controversy over his work, then, had less to do with his assumptions regarding God’s knowledge of futuribilia¹ and more to do with the already heated debate about the nature of and difference between sufficient and efficient grace (whereas the reverse is true of the contemporary debate).²

Molina’s early opponents argue that this vision of grace contrasts sharply with that offered by the late-Augustinian and Thomistic tradition, both of which defended the freedom of the person while also, according to most interpreters, insisting on a more strictly efficacious notion of divine causality in general and salvific grace in particular. In addition to what seemed like logical flaws in Molina’s arguments, many saw Molinism as a resurgence of Pelagianism, with similarities to the much more recent Arminianism. Accordingly, critics believed Molinism called for active and rigorous resistance on the help part of the church. Ultimately the controversy grew to the point that Pope Clement VIII had to intervene; he commissioned the congregatio de auxiliis (commission regarding [divine] assistance or help), a papal commission whose task was to investigate the matter, with special conceptual focus on the nature of divine grace as a help to creatures. This move proved to be just the start of a long controversy. Thus in 1607, after dozens of heated debates spanning three papal reigns and with no final answer in sight, Pope Paul V declared that each side could defend its portrayal of divine grace while awaiting a final decision. That decision has never been reached.³

This project begins by exploring the network of theological debates out of which Molina’s work on these topics emerged, giving special attention to Molina’s own sixteenth-century context. Specifically, the immediate theological aftermath of both the Protestant Reformation and the Council of Trent will be considered as they relate to some relevant key questions. This will provide a framework to understand Molina’s theological and doctrinal motivations, shedding light on the substance of his work in these areas. With some understanding of his own context in hand, it will become possible to get a handle on the basic question of providence. Accordingly, it will be important to ask after the desiderata of a Christian view of providence. One of the first questions to be asked along this line is why the Christian theist would wish to maintain both a strong view of providence, inclusive of foreknowledge, and a libertarian view of freedom. Here it will be necessary to reflect upon the creedal and biblical language on these subjects. This will be followed by a step back to evaluate more broadly Molina’s reasons for explaining providence in the way that he did. This will involve, in the next chapter, an assessment of Thomas Aquinas’s arguments on several related questions as well as the points at which Thomas and Molina differ from one another. It will be argued that Thomas’s views regarding divine knowledge and providence as well as human freedom are improved with the inclusion of scientia media (middle knowledge).

In chapter three, several of the main criticisms leveled at Molinism, both from the initial and more recent debates, will be considered. The first three chapters will provide support for Molinism under the assumption that freedom of the will, as Molina understands it, is defensible and cogent. And it is precisely this point that will play a central role in the fourth chapter. In the fourth chapter, the reasons will be considered for thinking not only that, in terms of theology and theodicy, Molinism is preferable to traditional Thomism, Ockhamism, and more recent revisionist portrayals of providence and free will, but also what justifications there may be, relating to libertarian accounts of the will, for affirming Molinism. Finally, the preceding work will enable an exploration of some of the implications of Molinism for the problem of evil, which will involve comparing the theory to other responses from within the Christian tradition.

Grace, Free Will, and Molinism in the Sixteenth Century

There were several elements to the sixteenth-century debate out of which Molina’s writing emerged. In the immediate post-Tridentine context, debates raged concerning certainty, the nature of doctrine, the authority and truth of scripture, and the role and theological significance of the traditions, creeds, and teachings of the church. Another important conversation was that concerning predestination, reprobation, and God’s foreknowledge, which became so important especially for the Reformed Church, and which grew in importance for figures like John Calvin as he continued to edit and republish his Institutes.⁴ There was also a felt need in the debates that flowered near the end of the sixteenth century to move past the Tridentine consolidation of doctrine and tradition, and on to the clarifying work that theologians were to take up later.⁵ It was this desire to clarify long-standing questions that drove Molina and his opponents to delve into the murky waters of divine providence, human freedom, and future contingents.

Protestant leaders had made a wide variety of arguments regarding the freedom or bondage of the human will, the consequences of Adam’s fall, and the limits of the human capacity for good. Everyone involved tried to maintain a delicate balance amidst several theological pitfalls in this controversial context. For Molina, there was the need to avoid all of the following: the taint of Lutheran thought (especially the Lutheran bondage of the will), what was seen as both the Calvinist and Bañesian consignment of the will along the lines of something like physical determinism,⁶ and finally the whiff of the old heresiarch Pelagius.⁷ Thus at the heart of the discussions were issues pertaining to grace, merit, predestination, and creaturely freedom.

Although Molina’s most well-known contribution to the debate dealt more with the Thomistic construal of divine scientia (knowledge), Molina’s participation in that conversation was framed by all these other arguments stemming from the Reformation and the late sixteenth-century self-reflection of the Catholic church. One of Molina’s central concerns was to maintain a thoroughly libertarian sense of the freedom of the will. What’s more, he saw his own stress on the freedom of the will as a means of affirming and delineating the nature and role of grace in salvation. Thus he considered Martin Luther’s attempt to establish or articulate the truth of grace by eliminating the freedom of the creature’s will self-stultifying. Molina, accordingly, argued that the Catholic doctrine of grace provided not only a contrast with Luther’s notion of the bondage of the will, but also preserved a more coherent and holistic notion of grace, whereby the prevenient grace of God and the free will of man were not antitheses, but were ‘two parts of a single integrated cause of the act of believing.’⁸ Here Molina was locating his own position within the shadow of the Tridentine articulation of grace and free will, and was simultaneously providing a criticism of the shift toward a more rigid interpretation of the late Augustine in the work of thinkers like Michael Baius and Dominic Bañes.

Molina’s interest in bolstering the Catholic position at once becomes clear. On the one hand, he insisted on the deep dependence of human beings upon grace in salvation. He wanted to affirm the long-standing position of the Roman Catholic Church stating that human salvation is very much dependent upon the free decision of God to act gracefully on behalf of humankind in the incarnation of Jesus Christ—his thought in this area will be considered in more detail when discussing related objections to Molinism in chapter three. On the other hand, Molina was also determined to avoid eliminating the creature’s free will. As Pelikan says, he was protecting liberty against necessity, an aim that has always driven disputants in arguments about divine providence and human freedom.⁹

In the period during which Molina was writing, there