British Cruiser Warfare: The Lessons of the Early War, 1939–1941

By Alan Raven

“An outstanding contribution to the historiography of the Second World War at sea . . . . an excellent book.” —The Australian Naval Institute
 
Cruisers were the Navy’s maids-of-all-work, employed in a greater variety of roles than any other warship type. Smaller, faster, and far more numerous than battleships, they could be risked in situations where capital ships were too vulnerable, while still providing heavy gunfire support for smaller ships or anti-aircraft cover for the fleet. As such, they were in the frontline of the naval war from the outset—and from its first days, the fighting provided unexpected challenges and some very unpleasant surprises, not least the efficacy of air power.
 
Cruisers learned to deal with these new realities in the Norway campaign and later in the Mediterranean, partly through the introduction of new technology—notably radar—but also by codifying the hard-won experience of those involved. This highly original book analyses the first years of the war when the sharpest lessons were learned, initially describing every action and its results, and then summarizing in individual chapters the conclusions that could be drawn for the many aspects of a cruiser’s duties. These include the main roles like surface gunnery, shore bombardment, anti-aircraft tactics, and fighter direction, but also encompass technology like radar, ASDIC, and shipborne aircraft, and even tackle more human issues such as shipboard organization, damage control, the impact of weather, and the morale factor. It also attempts to evaluate the importance of electronic warfare, intelligence and code-breaking, and concludes with a comparison between the performance of British cruisers and their Italian and German opponents.
 
Thought-provoking and sometimes controversial, this is a book that should be read by everyone interested in the Second World War at sea.
 
Includes maps and photos

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: May 30, 2019
• ISBN: 9781526747648

Book preview

Frontispiece: Dauntless as in early 1942 after refit. The ship embodies

many of the lessons of the first thirty months of the war, most notably the

radar and additional AA guns. She retains the foremast, but the mainmast

has been cut down and functions as an aerial spreader only.

Copyright © Alan Raven 2019

First published in Great Britain in 2019 by

Seaforth Publishing

An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd

47 Church Street, Barnsley

S Yorkshire S70 2AS

www.seaforthpublishing.com

Email: [e-mail]

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A CIP data record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN 9781526747648 (Hardback)

eISBN 9781526747648 (Kindle)

Mobi ISBN 9781526747655 (ePub)

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,

including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and

retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of both the copyright

owner and the above publisher.

The right of Alan Raven to be identified as the author of this work has been

asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988

Pen & Sword Books Limited incorporates the imprints of Atlas,

Archaeology, Aviation, Discovery, Family History, Fiction, History,

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History, Wharncliffe Transport, Wharncliffe True Crime and White Owl.

Contents

Introduction

Sources

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM SEPTEMBER 1939 TO DECEMBER 1941

SUMMARIES

Anti-Invasion Duties, June–November 1940

Surface Gunnery

Shore Bombardment

Anti-Aircraft Tactics

Anti-Aircraft Tactics

The Cruiser as a Fighter Directing Ship

How a Cruiser is Organised to Fight

ASDIC in Cruisers

Shipborne Aircraft

Radar

Damage and Damage Control

Repair Facilities

Weather

The Human Condition

British Breaking of German Codes

British Breaking of Italian Codes

German and Italian Breaking of British Codes

British Study of German and Italian Radio Traffic Analysis Procedures and British Counterintelligence Radio Procedures, re Operations ‘Substance’ and ‘Style’

Royal Navy Cruiser Activity, in Reaction to DF-ing on Enemy Radio Signals in the South Atlantic and Indian Ocean from January to June 1941.

Intelligence as it Related to Selected Naval Encounters

The Use of ‘Special Intelligence’ in the Aftermath of the Sinking of the Bismarck

German Raiders and the Search Procedures Used to Locate Them

Signals Interception and Direction-Finding (‘Y’ and DF-ing)

Radio Communications

Radio Warfare

The Italian Navy

The German Navy

British Cruisers

Weather Damage

Design

Machinery

Bibliography

Introduction

There have been many books that record the wartime operations of the British cruiser. The quality of these have varied considerably, from those that have used official papers almost exclusively to others that have relied heavily on anecdotal material, and then there are authors that have taken almost 100 per cent from previously-published commercial works, while at the same time eschewing easily-available official source material. But whatever the type of material used, none have tried to incorporate to any real degree the many aspects that directly and indirectly affect operational events and engagements, such as weather, intelligence and the many other things that come into play.

The sheer number of encounters with the enemy meant that it would be impossible for a single book to cover the whole of the war at sea in the manner I envisaged. However, most of the significant lessons of the naval fighting were learnt early on, so confining this work to the 1939–41 period makes thematic sense. Even then, in order to fit the material into one volume, I decided that the events/battles could not be described in as great a depth as I would have wished. The reader therefore will note what may appear to be gaps in the narratives, but I believe that nothing of real significance as it relates to cruisers has been left out. The activities of cruisers in the 1940 Norwegian campaign was somewhat of a challenge to record, and is incomplete, because the many operations were so much spur of the moment, performed without prior orders or planning, and this is reflected in the fragmented official documentation.

To the best of my knowledge this work represents a first attempt to marry actual events with the other factors that make things work, or not work, and . . . that large grey area in between. Researching the events was straightforward, if laborious; that of the other subjects demanded a level of determination and patience that occasionally taxed this author’s endurance. A special effort was made wherever possible to directly connect events with information given in the summaries, because in this way the events can be seen in context, thereby helping the reader to appreciate as fully as possible the recounting of events to a higher level of understanding than in previous works. One aspect that the author felt was very much unresearched was the intelligence story. There have been a few episodes where the intelligence factor has been addressed; Matapan is a good example, but as the summary that deals with operational intelligence for the battle shows, the story contains morethan is generally known.

I felt it important to at least recount a part of the story of the breaking and reading of codes; and I took from the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) signals intelligence (Sigint) histories for this. Where possible I told the story from the German and Italian perspective also, as it is important to give both sides of the story if possible.

The operational use of direction-finding (DF-ing) was of importance, although one may debate as to whether it ranks equally with code breaking. To illustrate the tactical use of DF-ing, I wrote up the account of the use of intercepted signals for the hunting of German armed raiders in the Central and South Atlantic. The short account highlights the limitations of DF-ing over a wide area of ocean without the added and necessary benefit of code breaking. From June 1941, when the German naval Enigma codes were broken into, the entire matter changed of course.

I have long felt that histories need to tell the story from both sides, and it is a truism that even the most respected historians fail to some degree in this respect. With the opening of the GC&CS histories in recent years that deal with intelligence, especially from the German side, plus translations of some German and Italian files, a broader perspective was gained and has been incorporated into the text.

With the bulk of surface warship action in the 1939– 41 period happening in the Mediterranean, I sought out, where possible, official Italian records that had been translated into English. There is an archive of Italian naval records on microfilm that is held at The National Archives in London, but unfortunately these have not been translated from the Italian. In the immediate post-war years, a very small percentage of Italian ‘after action’ reports were translated, allowing historians to flesh out to some extent the Admiralty Battle Summaries. The main use being to produce accurate track charts of a number of surface actions. There were interviews with Italian naval officers after hostilities had ceased in September 1943. Unfortunately, the author has been unable to locate these, and it is possible that they have not survived. Where I WAS able to find good foreign material, I used it. The end result I leave to the reader to judge, and I take full responsibility for all errors of fact.

Outside of any level of quality, it is my hope that this work will stimulate further research by authors, to use official source documentation rather than re-working existing histories, so many of which aretired excuses for acceptable writing.

Sources

Over 95 per cent of the written material in this volume is based on official Admiralty documentation held in what was the Public Record Office (now The National Archives) at Kew in London. Most of the remainder came from official files held in the US Archives in Washington DC, with a small percentage taken from institutional publications and finally, a selection of commercial titles.

What follows is a general look at a few of the documents consulted, and with each example there are a few words of description (a complete list of official source material is given in the Bibliography).

For the chronological list of events, encounters and engagements, material in the ADM 199 group formed the great bulk of the data, while information for the summaries came from a wide variety of files spread over several ADM groups.

There are currently around 300,000 Admiralty files listed at The National Archives. Some of these are not bound into hardcover volumes but held together by string tags. Occasionally this has the effect of crumpling the sheets to the extent that they tear badly and are unable to be read in full. Documents contained in these types of files are often not in any real order, having been thrown together with little thought for future historical reference. There are instances of accounts that form part of a narrative that have been included in the files; their contents commented upon, and then for reasons unknown, removed. For example, the cruiser Bonaventure’s action with the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper in late December 1940: the file notes the inclusion of Bonaventure’s narrative, with specific reference to the performance of main armament. Their Lordships were particularly interested in this aspect as this was the first time that the 5.25in armament had been used in combat. Going through the file, one notes the absence of the cruiser’s report. As the file is a hard-cover bound volume and there is no trace of anything being removed, this can only mean that Bonaventure’s report was removed before the file was bound, prior to being transferred to archival status. At the time of writing (October 2017) the author has not located the missing account.

The more files that are consulted, the more likely that the researcher/historian will come across ambiguities, omissions, contradictions and errors in the official records. Some of these are subtle, some are not. The more complex the account, then the greater the percentage of the above.

It helps to read ALL the individual ship accounts of a battle, because the main narrative will rarely cover everything that happened. The main narrative can be a selection and rejection account, and although generally accurate, it is also never absolutely complete. In addition to reading the narratives, it always pays to read the attached minutes made by various interested parties. They are always pertinent and of value.

It is common when consulting official papers as opposed to commercial publications that the former, in so many instances, contradicts the latter. For example, the claim that the Bismarck was never hit by torpedoes fired by destroyers on the night of the 26/27 May 1941. When one reads (IN FULL) the individual destroyer accounts, one is left in no doubt that the Bismarck was indeed struck, and more than once.

For the assiduous toiler there will be unexpected rewards: It has long been somewhat of a mystery as to why Admiral Tovey (C-in-C Home Fleet) formed his search pattern in the manner that he did, in the aftermath of the sinking of the Hood, and post-war written interviews between Admiralty and Tovey that were conducted while he was still active did nothing to clear things up. However, buried in a minor file that was produced after Tovey had retired, was the answer, and it related to the inaccurate number of shore DF stations known to the Chief Navigating Officer of the Home Fleet. The error led directly to the explanation of Tovey’s chosen course, proving that it pays to look at files and documents that appear from their titles to be of little or no value. Always look, never assume. One WILL find things of use. A good example of this was the material extracted from the diary of South Atlantic Command covering the January to June 1941 period, as it gave the intelligence taken from enemy radio transmissions coupled with DF-ing, as to how cruisers were then deployed as a counter to armed merchant raiders. Most of the diary entries are routine and mundane, but threaded through, here and there, are gems.

For the summary on cruiser anti-invasion duties, the diaries for the various Home-area Commands were invaluable, with data as to deployment and especially ship readiness, i.e., those vessels under repair or refit; for what reasons, and for how long they would be non-operational. The Northern Patrol diaries might appear to some to be of minimal interest, however, the overview that the entries give, especially the end-of-month summaries, offer an insight into just how arduous this type of work was, especially for the smaller ships, and the cumulative effects of continual very bad weather. The diaries do show just how valuable were the liners taken into naval service and converted into armed merchant cruisers. Although the effect of weather upon ships and the operations of the Northern Patrol are written about in official publications and histories, such as the major work by Captain Roskill, a full reading of the monthly Northern Patrol diary entries bring home to the reader just how awful the environment was. The entries have a relentless effect on a reader, that other writings seldom have.

The Home Fleet and Mediterranean Fleet diaries are full of items of substance, that other Command diaries do not have. The Mediterranean diary from June 1940 to December 1941 could not be fuller, and as expected, it stimulated a raft of official writings dealing with all forms of combat experience, ones that the Home Fleet did not enjoy. There are no Mediterranean Fleet diaries for the period of April and May 1941, probably because of the sheer volume of actual combat. In its place are a series of narratives that describe in great detail the entire Cretan campaign, including an account of the land battles. These narratives are in effect a history, and in bound volume form, take up several hundred pages of an ADM 199 file. Normally, diary entries are very much an abbreviated account of events, and the resumption of the Mediterranean Fleet diaries in June 1941 shows this, and even though that month was full of intense action (the Syrian campaign), only the briefest coverage is given in the diary entries.

Entries will sometimes include notes on ship refits, e.g. in the Mediterranean Fleet diaries there is reference to the removal of cruiser catapults in order to install light Italian 20mm Breda anti-aircraft (AA) mountings, the cruisers Neptune and Orion being noted in this respect. In the December entries there is mention of the cruiser Naiad acting as a fighter directing ship for night fighters operating out of Alexandria; it should be noted that German night bombers were active over the Suez Canal in late 1941. Items such as this do not give details as to the results of such events, and the author can find no outside reference to flesh it out, but just the mention of things like this are of interest. At the end of each monthly entry there are usually remarks by the C-in-C on a variety of subjects. These can be long or short, detailed or not, but always of value. The style of the monthly summary would sometimes vary depending on the circumstances and pressures of the moment. Researchers should note that depending upon the intensity and duration of events, following the correct procedure in terms of paperwork was sometimes/often put aside; the month of June 1941 for the Mediterranean Fleet is a good example of this. For some events, the written descriptions appear to be very complete; the Bismarck affair from beginning to end is one of them, while others such as the encounter at First Sirte are thin to say the least.

Of particular interest were the German Naval Staff war diaries. In the immediate post-war years these were translated into English and later put onto microfilm. Unfortunately the monthly entries from September 1940 to December 1941 appear to be missing. However, the earlier entries offer fascinating snippets of information, such as the account of problems with faulty torpedoes and how they were solved. As expected there is a complete absence of anything political in the entries. Where checking of the entries was possible, no significant differences between British and German accounts were found.

As a general overview of German surface deployment and policy, the volume ‘German Surface Warships; policy and operations in WWII’ by former Admiral Weichold proved to be more than useful. Compiled in the post-war years from official German documentation, Weichold did not hold back with his opinions, and his accounts of the problems that the German Navy had with their machinery was illuminating at minimum. Volume VI of the GC&CS histories, ‘The German Navy’ provided useful supplementary data.

Weichold had been the chief German liaison officer to the Italian Naval High Command in Rome, and he was designated after to write histories of the Italian Navy in the 1939–43 period, a task for which he was well suited. The titles were:

A. Axis Naval Policy and Operations in the Mediter ranean 1939–43.

B. The War at Sea in the Mediterranean Parts I and II 1940–43.

These offer a third-party view into many aspects of the Italian Navy at several levels. Weichold’s opinions of the Italian Navy are, to put it mildly, damning! But, as part of his duties he had access to Italian naval reports, operational orders, deployments and policy, and so even allowing for a certain amount of ‘axe-grinding’ his accounts cannot be dismissed, and line up with British operational narratives and those assessments that were made through intelligence sources at the time, and confirmed at a later date after the fighting had ended.

Royal Navy action reports sometimes contain comments, blunt at times, on the Italian Navy. Admiral Cunningham who was the C-in-C of the Mediterranean Fleet from the beginning of the war to March 1942 did not hold back in putting his views in writing. His detailed comments that appear in various documents, e.g. Fighting Experiences, and the Mediterranean Fleet diaries are cutting, and like those of Weichold, have merit. Useful for assessing Italian tactics were the various track charts of surface engagements and events; of special interest is the one in ‘The Royal Navy and The Mediterranean Vol II (phase II)’, that shows the movements of British and Italian warships during the destruction of the Italian convoy ‘Beta’ on the night of 9 November 1941 by Force ‘K’ out of Malta. This track chart was compiled from official RN and Italian reports, and show the tracks of certain Italian destroyers leaving the scene of the battle out to a distance of approximately 17 miles; see the author’s opinions on this in ‘Final Thoughts on the Italian Navy’. The command structure, communications and the physical make-up of the Italian Navy came from the GC&CS history, Vol XVI ‘The Italian Navy’ by Dorothy Atkinson. Additional information came from Vol XX ‘The Mediterranean’ by F Jones, and Vol XXI ‘The Mediterranean’ by Thornton.

The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean

Vol I, 1939 – October 1940.

The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean

Vol II Phase I. Air and Sea Power, November 1940–

December 1941 .

Vol II Phase II. Support to the Army ,

June–September 1941.

By Commander Titterton R N, written 1952.

Published commercially in 2002 by Frank Cass Publishers, London.

Produced as a classified history for official internal use, that used British, German and Italian documentation to supplement and correct earlier battle summaries. It remained under cover until 2002 when it was published commercially. Well-written, balanced and with substantial detail on many individual battles and encounters. Commander Titterton is somewhat gentle in describing the efforts of the Italian Navy, possibly for post-war political reasons.

Confidential Admiralty Fleet Orders

These were published during wartime on a frequent and regular basis, and dealt with topics on every aspect of ship operation, equipment, weaponry, tactics, damage control, electronics etc.

Confidential Books

These publications covered a vast range of subjects from the bureaucratic to the partially dramatic; a great number deal with the operations of the many marks of guns and mountings, plus all other types of weapons, communications, firefighting, codes etc. Several thousand were published in the 1939–45 time frame, and for many years were housed in the Naval Historical Branch in London. When this office moved to Portsmouth, Hampshire, access to these books ceased, despite their being downgraded to archival status.

Battle Summaries

These are accounts of specific battles, events and operations over time frames and geographical areas. The details of a number of Mediterranean convoys, shore bombardments, invasions. Various cruiser and destroyer actions outside of the well-known ones are described. All are drawn from official narratives, diaries and logs, and although not always complete they give a very good starting point for future in-depth research by historians. Many of these summaries were subject to revised editions as additional data came to light; e.g., the Bismarck affair is a good example of this practice. There are also a number of expanded Battle Summaries, e.g., Arctic Convoys, which has 193 numbered pages, with many charts and maps that supplement the story.

Ship Damage Reports

An extensive series of files that describe in detail the action damage sustained by individual warships in wartime.

History of British Sigint (Signals Intelligence) from GC&CS

Currently (2017) the published list numbers 107 volumes, of which only a small percentage is available to the public. Those that are, contain information that underpins the history of WWII in a manner that many other official histories do not. Much of the data in the code breaking summaries came from these volumes.

Official Histories from GC&CS

A multi-volume archive that describes in detail the organisation and make-up of the German and Italian navies in wartime, with the emphasis on the Germans; covering U-boats, surface units, small battle units etc. Extremely useful when used together with the Sigint histories. Some of the data in the summaries on the German and Italian navies were drawn from these volumes.

Papers and Files from the Naval Intelligence Division and Operational Centre

Very much a mixed bag, and many of the files individually are a mixed bag, being a thrown-together collection of individual sheets that cover a wide range of reports, assessments etc that deal with German activity, procedures and equipment. Included are translations of essays by former German flag officers, such as Dönitz, Krancke, Heye. Admiralty weekly and quarterly intelligence reports, combined intelligence committee daily reports, Ultra bulletins and others, proved very useful.

The Naval ‘Y’ Service in Wartime

A short, twenty-page, mainly bureaucratic history, but one that lays out the foundation of the service, and therefore valuable.

Mediterranean Fleet Gunnery Experience 1940–1

This file, which does not have an archive reference, contains a varied group of papers, including detailed notes on the gunnery aspect of the Bismarck affair.

The section on Mediterranean Fleet Gunnery Experience is a detailed, to the point assessment of the Italian and Royal Navy’s performance in battle.

Some Developments in Naval Tactics 1939–45

Written soon after the war, this file is a general overview of weapons and tactics in the light of six years of operational experience. A number of naval encounters are described, but not all of them are referenced by name or date or location or ship names. This made using the file difficult and a little frustrating.

Handbook on the Use of VS Special Equipment 1945

Essentially a catalogue of wartime Infra-Red (Special Equipment). This was of some general use as it contained some background historical data.

Handbook for Naval Rangefinders and Inclinometers vol 1

A general description of rangefinders.

Handbook for Naval Rangefinders and Inclinometers 1945

Stereoscopic Rangefinders and Training of Stereoscopic Rangetakers 1945

A training manual.

Radio Warfare 1941–50

A collection of loose reports gathered together in an unbound folder. This file deals with the interception of enemy signals and the countering of same, including the fit of equipments to ships at sea. There is a docket on anti-jamming devices for electronic and non-electronic forms. Most of the information is technical or semi-technical in nature, involving design specifications, policy etc. The author found it interesting as it describes to some extent the very early work and shipborne fits, which do not seem to appear anywhere else in the written literature.

Progress in Tactics 1939

There were several editions produced. This one is a 100-page handbook that describes tactics in all forms, plus security, communications, night fighting, reconnaissance etc. It is useful, because it can be compared to later editions that cover the changes that the war brought about.

The Pocket Gunnery Book 1945

A general description of guns, control systems, gunnery, gun mountings, ammunition and the marriage of radar to high- and low-angle gunnery.

Home Fleet Technical Orders 1943

This file has a collection of assessments, tactics, fleet orders, recommendations etc from the period March 1940 until well into 1943. Much of the documentation is amendments, supplements and addenda to existing papers. A varied lot, but of great interest.

Fleet Tactical Instructions

Various dates of issue. Contents generally as for Home Fleet Technical Orders above.

HMS Dido. War Orders Book

Every warship was issued a book specific to that ship that described in detail, how the ship was organised for combat, for damage control, breakdowns and operation during various states of readiness. Dido’s War Order Book appears to have been the only one to have survived out of several thousand. This one was located in the US archives in Washington DC.

HF/DF in Ships 1934 –54

A collection of documents that span the development of DF equipment, along with many examples of the operational use of same. Special attention is given to North Atlantic convoy actions. Of interest are the very early (late 1930s) experiments on ships at sea with High-Frequency Direction-Finding (HF/DF). There are also accounts of VHF and UHF developments. The first practical HF/DF sets are covered (3/41) in detail. as are the first of the VHF/DF sets (mid-1942).

Gunnery Review January 1945

This was a regular publication that covered all aspects of gunnery, tactics, accuracy et al. This particular issue has some brief accounts of late-war surface actions.

General Review of Electronics and Research in the German Navy

A series of lectures delivered by Dr Heinz Schlicke in July 1945. There were ten in all, describing among others, U-boat camouflage, radar and search receivers, infra-red equipment and direction-finding at sea. Published by the Division of Naval Intelligence, November 1945.

German Battlecruiser and Light Cruiser Developments 1945

A review of all German cruiser designs from 1934 to 1944 that were under consideration but never completed. Compiled from captured German naval archives, the file has several detailed plans of ships that never were.

New German Battleship and Carrier Development

Similar to the above, but not as extensive.

ASDIC in Cruisers

A brief but detailed history of the fitting and use of ASDIC in cruisers. Well written and informative.

Admiralty Use of Special Intelligence in Naval Operations

A nearly 400-page history that gives a brief but useful introduction as to how ‘Special Intelligence’ was used operationally in Home waters, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

INSTITUTIONAL PUBLICATIONS

Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects

The Royal Navy at the Outbreak of War. The Repair and Upkeep of H M Ships and Vessels in War. The Work of the Admiralty Ship Welding Committee. Notes on the Behaviour of H M Ships During the War.

The Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland

Fire Fighting in H M Ships.

The Mariners’ Handbook 1973 Edition.Published by The Ministry of Defence .

A useful reference for using the correct terms for weather conditions, sea states etc.

Admiralty Charts for the Mediterranean, and Pilot Charts for the North Atlantic, The Arctic and the Mediterranean

The large scale of these charts gives a better feel for distances than a small-scale map, while the pilot charts give a month-by-month coverage of weather conditions, that have not changed in any meaningful way over the last 100 years.

Kingsley, F, The Development of Radar Equipments for the Royal Navy, 1935-45

An impressive item, compiled in the main from records of HM Signal School, and the Admiralty Signal School. It concentrates on the use of radar combined with various weapons and weapons systems. It steps outside of radar to describe the development of High Frequency Direction Finding, and on this subject the coverage in unfortunately incomplete and spotty, especially for the late 1930s into 1940. The story of radar countermeasures is also thin. However, overall, and partly because of the sources consulted, this book is worth reading.

COMMERCIAL PUBLICATIONS

Bromley, Allen

British Mechanical Gunnery Computors.

Brooks, John

Fire Control for British Dreadnoughts.

Brown, David K

From Nelson to Vanguard.

Written by a former Deputy Director of Naval Construction, from the perspective of a ship designer. Almost all of the writing tends to be semi-technical, but is useful for outlining some of the problems encountered in producing warships within strict displacement limitations. The sources for the book are to a large degree taken from constructors' notebooks, which for decades were unavailable to the public. There are no specific examples of design and construction that relate to specific battles or encounters with the enemy, but the book is nevertheless of value.

Friedman, Norman

British Cruisers: Tw o World Wars and After.

One of a series of design histories by a well-known author who uses almost 100 per cent official documentation for his work. In this volume, every class of cruiser is very well covered and supplemented by numerous detailed line drawings. For those that wish to know the design history of every cruiser class, this volume is mandatory reading.

NOTES ON NOTES

It is normal in a serious book to provide endnotes, or chapter notes, or footnotes. I however, decided after some thought and discussion with friends and fellow writers, to eschew this practice, for the following reasons:

(i) Endnotes

I dislike them. A reader’s concentration is broken by having to note the reference to the text and chapter heading, and to then locate the note itself in the back of the book; a time consuming and irritating practice.

(ii) Chapter notes

As above, but to a lesser extent.

(iii) Footnotes

Although I find these to be of value and usually acceptable, especially those given in official histories, they are very much selective, as indeed they have to be. If one were to include footnotes for the summary sections in a comprehensive manner, there would often be more space devoted per page to the notes than to the actual text. With this in mind, I decided to reference generally, the more provocative statements that appear in the summaries, ones that describe the German and Italian navies. There will no doubt be some that will dispute the data in parts of this work, but apart from the few commercial publications listed (all of which have used official material), everything else has come directly from official sources.

INTERNET SOURCES

There is currently (2017), great reliance placed upon using the internet for information; and for non-serious works that deal with naval subjects of the Second World War, this may be acceptable. However, there is no substitute for researching and using original official source material. Data found on the internet is so very often unsourced, but even when it is, the references are often commercial ones. On occasions, official documentation is available, but there are unfortunately many instances where these have been incorrectly copied. A serious researcher must be careful when relying on retyped material, especially when it is found on the internet. This author has personally noted his own writings incorrectly copied and referenced, and almost always posted by persons who remain very anonymous. Material is sometimes updated, frequently without the update being dated! Internet material in certain cases is subject to peer review, and or, fact checked, however and quite often the reviewer’s name is unknown, which makes said peer review absurd. And … when real names are attached, they do not give their credentials, which makes any review subject to review!

Acknowledgements

A number of persons gave freely of their time and knowledge for this work, and it is my pleasure to name them.

A D Baker of Williamsburg, Virginia, for assistance with references for the artwork.

L Batchelor of Nuneaton, Warwickshire. Without his initial help with Public Record Office indices, I would probably not have started this project.

M Eisenstadt of Washington DC who cast an eye over the work from an academic angle.

N Friedman of New York City, for his complete and unasked-for assistance with Public Record Office and US Archives material. His help substantially reduced the number of overseas trips made by the author.

I Gazely of Brighton, UK, for allowing the use of privately-taken wartime photos. Although not always of the highest quality, they are of ships taken on foreign stations, depicting configurations that are rarely seen.

P Gollin of London, who helped with a number of files held at the Public Record Office and the finding of ‘Papers on Engineering Subjects’.

L L L (Ladies of The Lynbrook Library), for their unstinting help in obtaining titles and material from all parts of the country, and for enduring my difficult and demanding ways. Lending libraries exist to be used; I certainly did.

M McLaughlin of Mitchellville, Maryland, for allowing access to, and the use of his photo collection, especially the pre-war aerial views.

John Synder of Summersville, West Virginia. A friend, who reviewed the manuscript from an enthusiast’s perspective.

John Tennier of Valapie, New York, who sought out a stack of institutional files on marine engineering.

Abbreviations

CHRONOLOGY

OF EVENTS

FROM SEPTEMBER 1939

TO DECEMBER 1941

22 September 1939.

2336. While on patrol, the cruiser Calypso reported that a torpedo was fired at her at 61°N and 008°W, off the north coast of Scotland.

26 September 1939. Air attacks on Aurora and Sheffield.

The Home Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (CS) set out to cover the damaged submarine Spearfish in the North Sea.

Aurora and Sheffield came under high-level attack by Ju 88s at a height of 12,000ft. Aurora took a glancing hit and several near misses from delayed-action bombs. No damage of note was sustained and the ship’s fighting efficiency was not affected.

8–9 October 1939. Air Attacks on the Humber Force.

While on patrol in the North Sea, the Glasgow in company with Southampton and Edinburgh was attacked at 1120 by a single aircraft that made an unsuccessful dive-bombing run.

Beginning at 1237, a series of high-level attacks was made; there were no hits. At around 1425 there was a further bombing attack; again, there were no hits.

During these attacks the ships held a course so as to remain under areas of blue sky, thereby depriving the enemy of the use of cloud cover. The three cruisers were steaming in line ahead and zigzagging. Course changes were made by pendant. None of the ships were hit.

The aircraft were noted to be of a silver colour and that it was difficult to see them against the blue sky, especially when they made they approach down sun. In several instances, the aircraft were not seen until the moment of bomb release. All aircraft were of the twin-engined type. Attacks were often made from different directions at heights varying from 10,000 to 20,000ft. On several occasions, the attacks were aborted due to the effect of the AA fire. The 4in AA fire was generally very poor in obtaining hits due to the height and speed of the attacking aircraft, and that they were rarely seen until the moment of bomb release, and this, coupled with radical course changes, tended to throw off aiming.

Although poor at first, the AA fire improved with practice as the attacks wore on. The initial rate of fire from the 4in guns was ten to twelve rounds per gun per minute that later reduced down to eight rounds per minute per gun. Glasgow attempted to use her 6in guns for AA fire but was unable to bring them to bear as the aircraft came into range, due to the lack of elevation, the 6in only having a 45-degree maximum elevation. It was noted by the gunnery officer that the binoculars used were of limited power and field and he was unable to view the AA burst, having to resort to the human eye.

Two aircraft were claimed to have been shot down.

16 October 1939.Air Attacks on Southampton and Edinburgh at Rosyth.

An alert was received at around 1923 of a pending air attack. Both ships went to action stations immediately. The 4in gun crews were at five minutes notice for action.

Southampton

At 1030 the air defence officer heard the sound of engines and sounded ‘alarm to arms’. An aircraft was then seen diving to make an attack. One bomb was dropped which fell astern. Shortly afterward, a second attack was made and the bomb that was dropped (believed to be 1,000lb), struck the ship abaft the port high-angle (HA) director. It passed through the pompom deck, the hangar deck and out of the ship’s side, exploding on or just under the water. There were four more attacks made on the ship, with two near misses on the starboard quarter, that caused the ship to whip. The aircraft were engaged by 4in, pompoms and 0.5in machine-gun fire. One thwarted attack caused an aircraft to drop its bombs on the Edinburgh without result.

A degree of electrical and structural damage was sustained; the latter was repaired quickly. Efficiency was temporarily affected and the ship was three days out of action while temporary repairs were made. The ship was seaworthy by 0200 on the 17th.

Edinburgh

The ship was near-missed by three delayed-action 500lb bombs that caused minor splinter and structural damage. Fighting efficiency was not affected. This attack showed the need for splinter protection for exposed personnel and for electrical lines. It was recommended that the electrical breakers be kept in the ‘locked on’ position.

Edinburgh as completed in 1939. She was one of the first warships to be damaged by air attack (on 16 October 1939), albeit not seriously.

On board Edinburgh at the time was Commander Hitchcock, the US Assistant Naval Attaché (air). He was lunching with the Captain as the attack commenced. Both made for the bridge, where the former stayed throughout the action, later noting that the attacks were badly executed by American standards.

13 November 1939. Air Attacks on Ships at Sullom Voe.

In the early afternoon there was a series of attacks made on several ships at anchor. In addition to merchant ships present, were the cruisers Cardiff, Colombo and Dragon.

Aircraft were sighted at 1257 as they began their dives through the clouds. Cardiff and Colombo immediately opened fire. Five bombs were dropped, one of which fell a cable’s length astern of the Cardiff. In a second attack, this time by a single plane, no bombs were dropped and the aircraft was taken under barrage fire. At 1319 a single aircraft made an attack, and as in the previous one, no bombs were dropped and barrage fire was employed in response. At 1329 the third and last attack was made, this time by three aircraft. Four bombs were dropped with Cardiff as the target. All fell some distance from the ship and one bomb fell a mile away.

21 November 1939. Mine Damage to Belfast.

While on exercises with the cruiser Southampton in the Firth of Forth, Belfast detonated a magnetic mine while steaming at 17 knots. The mine exploded under the forward engine room 320ft from the bow. The explosion caused the ship to whip to large degree followed by complete immobilisation.

The bilge keel was blown upwards. The forward engine room transverse girder support to the main turbines was distorted as were the supporting pillars. The most serious damage was to the keel of the ship between frames 40 and 146. These were forced upwards breaking the ship’s back and causing the stern to drop down 2ft. This in turn caused severe transverse buckling. The flat part of the keel was completely broken and there was buckling to frames and sheer strakes. The explosion also caused the fore deck to drop about 1ft above the point of the underwater explosion.

There was severe structural damage under the bridge to the upper deck.

There was severe damage to the main machinery.

There was flooding near the point of the explosion, and more flooding might have occurred had it not been for the immediate closing of several watertight doors.

There was no structural damage aft of the main machinery spaces.

Whipping of the ship caused the main radio transmitting aerials to part; the yardarms remained intact.

Damage to the main and auxiliary machinery was so great that all power to the ship was lost, this was caused by the fracturing of the cast-iron feet to all of the oil fuel discharge pumps; also there was the fracturing of the cast-iron feet of all the turbines in the forward engine room.

There was no major damage to any of the boilers.

The breakers in all three dynamos tripped, plunging the ship into total darkness.

All four of the 6in turrets jumped from their paths putting the entire main armament out of action.

With the entire ship in darkness, the number of hand-held torches was found to be inadequate. The damage also stressed the need for lumber that was used for damage control to be stowed in different locations to enable temporary repairs to be carried out.

When the ship was docked for inspection and as the water was being pumped out, it was noted that many of the structural fractures were opening out, causing an increasing strain on the hull. The docking was halted and straps placed across the upper deck fractures. All ammunition, guns, oil and other items were removed in order to lighten the ship which was then re-docked. This time, the docking blocks were heightened in a line with the distorted keel. This second docking was successful with no resulting strain to the vessel.

Belfast as repaired following the mine damage that broke her back in November 1939. Repairs took three years and involved sheathing the hull in a ‘blister’ to restore its longitudinal strength – it is most clearly apparent forward, just above the waterline and faired into the armour belt.

Belfast was out of action for thirty-six months.

22 November 1939. Air Attack at Sullom Voe.

Aircraft attacked the depot ship Manela, and Coventry engaged the aircraft with AA fire. There were no hits.

23 November 1939.Sighting of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

On the 21st, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sailed from Wilhelmshaven in company with two cruisers and seven destroyers. On the 22nd the cruisers and destroyers were detached to raid in the Skagerrak. The two German battleships then proceeded north between the Shetlands and Norway and then turned north-east passing just north of the Faeroes.

The purpose of this operation was to make a feint into the Northern Patrol lines in order to draw off British patrols and to generally disrupt shipping in the North Atlantic. The two German ships were to then withdraw to the north and later at a time of opportunity, make for home.

At 1545 at dusk on the 23rd, while patrolling the Faeroes-Iceland gap, the German ships sighted the armed merchant cruiser Rawalpindi. A one-sided engagement followed, ending after only a fourteen-minute battle, leaving the Rawalpindi on fire.

The Newcastle, which was on patrol a few miles to the west of the Rawalpindi, took in her message of 1545 and at 1553 Newcastle altered course to close and increased speed to full. At 1715, Newcastle and Delhi received orders to shadow the enemy ship or ships, and in company with Calypso and Ceres who were coming up from the south, make a night attack.

1735. Newcastle observed a searchlight and altered course to close.

1743. Gunflashes were sighted and Newcastle altered course to port in order to shadow. Visibility was good at eight miles with a full moon in the south-east. Newcastle was now up moon thus giving her an advantage. There were a number of rain storms in the area which often reduced visibility.

Speed was slowed to 20 knots to reduce the bow and stern wakes from being seen, and at 1815 a darkened ship was sighted at 13,000 yards. A light message was seen being sent from a second ship to the first. Rawalpindi was now sighted and seen to be on fire.

1822. Newcastle’s plot indicated that the range was closing rapidly and so course was altered away and speed reduced to 15 knots so as to maintain range and give a smaller silhouette. At this moment a heavy rain storm began between the British and German ships and two minutes later the visibility was down to two cables (about 400 yards). By 1836 the Newcastle was clear of the rain storm but there was now no sight of the enemy. Rawalpindi was again sighted and seen to be still on fire.

1859. A flashing light was seen and speed increased to 22 knots. No further sightings were made and it was assumed that the Germans were now making to the south-east so as to reach the North Sea. On this assumption, speed was increased to full on a course to cover the enemy’s most probable southern track.

Following the attack on the Rawalpindi, all available ships were redeployed to intercept or to form patrol lines so as to catch the Germans as they passed between the Shetlands and Norway bound for home.

After shaking off the Newcastle, the two German ships turned due east and at midnight altered course to the north-east. Soon after midnight on the 25th, they turned for home and passed through the British patrols the next day without being seen.

25 November 1939.

Aurora in company with the destroyer Inglefield came under air attack 100 miles east of Scapa Flow. There were no hits and no damage.

28 November 1939.

Norfolk was attacked by U 47 west of Bergen. All torpedoes exploded in the ship’s wake. There was no damage.

Ajax was Harwood’s flagship at the Battle of the River Plate. This is a late view, taken at New York in October 1943.

13 December 1939. Battle of the River Plate.

After weeks of searching the southern oceans with hunting groups, a force of three ships, Ajax, Achilles and Exeter, commanded by Commodore Harwood, made contact with the German ‘pocket battleship’ Graf Spee off the coast of Uruguay.

0616. Smoke was sighted and the Exeter detached to investigate. Exeter signalled, ‘I think it is a pocket battleship’.

0618. Graf Spee opened fire with her 11in guns.

The British force of three cruisers was now split into two groups – Ajax and Achilles comprising one, and Exeter the other – which allowed one unit to act as flank marking for the other.

At 1620, shortly after turning to port, Exeter opened fire with her forward 8in guns at a range of 18,700 yards, while Ajax and Achilles pulled away to the north-east. This division of the British ships forced the German ship to choose which of the two forces to engage, or to split her main armament fire. The German chose the latter, and initially Exeter and Ajax were taken under fire at the same time.

After a few salvos directed at both cruisers, the Graf Spee concentrated all of her 11in fire on Exeter, making the first hit at 0623. The shell hit the shelter deck abaft ‘B’ turret, and passed out through the superstructure without exploding.

At 0624 there was a second hit, this time on ‘B’ turret which was put out of action. Splinter damage from this hit destroyed wheelhouse communications, and killed and wounded bridge personnel. No longer under control, the ship turned to starboard. Helm control was regained by using the lower conning position and at around this time (0626) two 11in hits were taken forward. The first of these two hit the starboard anchor and exploded upon impact, causing some splinter damage to the side plating. The second, hit the forecastle deck on the centreline, bursting upon impact and making a 10ft by 10ft hole in the deck along with splinter damage in the surrounding area.

Communications had broken down between the aft conning position and the steering flat, and helm orders had to be passed verbally by a string of messengers positioned along the upper deck.

One of Exeter’s 4in HA guns seen in 1939. During the River Plate action, an 11in shell hit the starboard side gun and started an ammunition fire.

0622. Achilles opened fire with her 6in guns at a range of 19,500 yards, followed by Ajax one minute later at a range of 19,200 yards. By the use of concentration fire, the two cruisers forced the enemy to return fire at 0630, taking the heat off Exeter.

0631. Three 11in salvos straddled the Ajax.

0632. Exeter fired her three torpedoes from her starboard tubes.

0637. Ajax flew off her spotting aircraft and at the same time, the Graf Spee turned from an easterly course to a north-westerly one and made smoke.

0640. An 11in shell hit the right gun of Exeter’s ‘A’ turret and exploded upon impact, putting the turret out of action. The ship turned to starboard and at 0643 fired her three port-side torpedoes.

0644. Exeter was hit by an 11in shell that passed through the wheelhouse, and burst just forward of the starboard 4in HA gun. There was damage from splinters to the lower bridge and 25 per cent of the 4in ready-use ammunition was set on fire. The ship was now without her forward guns, with ‘Y’ turret in local control and a fire amidships. The ship took another hit that passed through the ship’s side abreast ‘B’ turret, bursting on the lower deck. There was serious damage from splinters; fire mains and communications were damaged and the lower deck was holed. The 4in magazine and handing room was flooded because the fire mains were broken. There was a fire in the mess decks just aft of ‘B’ turret. There was an accumulation of splinter damage from near-misses along the ship’s side along the waterline that caused substantial flooding. As a result of this, she then turned onto a southwesterly course away from the Graf Spee.

Graf Spee continued to fire at the other two cruisers, obtaining a very near miss on Achilles at 0640 that killed and wounded personnel in the main director on the bridge; the director itself was undamaged.

At 0646, the radio equipment in Achilles failed, causing her to lose contact with Ajax and her spotting data. Achilles now had to resort to doing her own spotting which initially produced very poor results with salvos falling short, partially due to the Graf Spee using a smokescreen.

A mix-up in communication with Ajax’s spotting aircraft which had been flown off at 0637, caused her firing to be inaccurate. The problem was not resolved until around 0700, and accurate shooting began at 0708.

Exeter, which was making to the south-west, now had a 7-degree list to starboard due to several forward compartments being flooded, but was still firing from ‘Y’ turret in local control.

At 0716 the Graf Spee made a turn to the south, steering directly for the Exeter. This caused the two light cruisers to turn toward the enemy, closing the range and using rapid and accurate fire. Hits were obtained that forced the German onto a north-westerly course away from the Exeter and to resume firing at Ajax.

0725. Ajax was hit by an 11in shell on the aft superstructure. The shell passed through ‘X’ barbette and burst in the Admiral’s cabin. ‘X’ turret was put out of action and splinter damage put ‘Y’ turret out of action.

At 0727 Ajax fired her four torpedoes from her port tubes at a range of 9,000 yards. These were seen by the Graf Spee and she made a turn to port to avoid, and then turned back later onto a north-westerly course.

0729. Ajax and Achilles turned onto a south-westerly course and began to close.

For a period of over one hour from 0630 to 0734, the enemy made frequent use of smoke to disrupt the cruisers’ fire.

At 0738, a near miss brought down the topmast of Ajax along with the radio aerials. The range at this time was 8,000 yards.

At 0730, the Exeter lost power to ‘Y’ turret and firing ceased. As a consequence of flooding, fires and structural damage caused by seven direct hits and a great deal of splinter damage and with speed now much reduced, Captain Bell made the decision at 0740 to withdraw to the south-east to effect what repairs might be possible.

At 0740, Ajax reported (erroneously) that she had only 20 per cent of 6in shell remaining. This information, coupled with only having 50 per cent of her main armament available, plus Exeter permanently out of action, decided Commodore Harwood to break off the action. The two cruisers turned away under cover of smoke and took up shadowing positions. Graf Spee did not pursue, but maintained a westerly course with Ajax and Achilles following at a range of 15 miles.

Shortly after 1000, Graf Spee fired at Achilles which had crept up to a range of 23,000 yards. There were no hits but the second salvo burst very close alongside. Achilles turned away under smoke.

1105. Exeter reported that she could make 18 knots and a little later, that ‘Y’ turret was back in action.

1340. Harwood ordered Exeter to make for the Falklands.

At around 1900 it became apparent that it was the intention of the German ship to make for the River Plate.

1915. The Graf Spee turned and fired two salvos at Ajax at a range of 26,000 yards.

At 2014, Achilles began to close with the intention of making a torpedo attack before nightfall, but at 2048, Graf Spee fired three salvos as a warning to not come too close. Achilles made a turn to the north, and taking advantage of the last light, fired five salvos before retiring at 30 knots.

Between 2130 and 2145, Graf Spee fired three salvos at the Achilles, the last of the battle.

Graf Spee entered the harbour at Montevideo.

Exeter, showing the location of the 11in shell hits from Graf Spee during the action of 13 September 1939.

Tactics

It was Commodore Harwood’s policy to attack the enemy on sight by day or night. By forming his ships into two groups, Exeter in one and Ajax and Achilles in the other, this would split the enemy’s fire and permit flank marking to assist in spotting. It was also the policy to fire torpedoes at moments of opportunity.

Because the Exeter was damaged early in the battle, flank marking would not happen, but there was the firing of torpedoes from Ajax and Exeter, with Exeter firing all six of hers and Ajax firing 50 per cent of hers, a total of ten from the two ships. Those from Exeter missed, and those from the Ajax broke surface soon after being fired: these were then seen by Graf Spee which took evasive action.

From breaking off action at around 1740, the two cruisers took up shadowing positions at 15 miles distance, with Achilles on Graf Spee’s starboard quarter and Ajax on the port quarter. The range of 15 miles was not a problem as visibility was very good and Graf Spee’s tall control tower allowed easy spotting. As Graf Spee approached the River Plate the light began to fade and the task of shadowing fell to Achilles who still had her full outfit of eight torpedoes available for use if the opportunity presented itself. Although the ‘pocket battleship’ was silhouetted against the afterglow, with the Achilles in darkness, the German ship had her sighted and kept her at a distance with a number of warning shots until safe in neutral territorial waters.

Gunnery

The conditions for a daylight gunnery battle were perfect, with an absence of haze, visibility of over 15 miles, and with Graf Spee’s large and tall control tower giving an excellent point of reference.

It is impossible to accurately assess Exeter’s gunnery performance, there being no record of shell expenditure from ‘A’ turret, and the only account for ‘B’ turret is that eight salvos were fired which would give a total of about sixteen shells fired. The expenditure from ‘A’ turret would have been about the same. Within thirty minutes of opening fire both turrets were put out of action.

‘Y’ turret fired 177 rounds of 8in shell before breaking down due to loss of power at 1730, a little over one hour into the fight. The exact number of hits made on Graf Spee by Exeter is unknown but it is believed that at least one hit was obtained.

Ajax and Achilles: although conditions for shooting were very good and both ships had a fully-trained and worked-up crew, the enemy made good use of course changes coupled with smokescreens on a number of occasions. These screens were dense but not as effective as they may have been as they did not rise high enough to obscure the ship, tending to lay along the water.

The fire from Graf Spee’s main armament was accurate during the entire battle and this caused the two light cruisers to make frequent use of helm. The pre-war doctrine for cruisers was to make course changes of no more than 10° in order to throw off the enemy’s aim and to avoid follow-up salvos, However, in a number of instances, both ships were forced to use more than 10° of rudder when initial salvos from Graf Spee fell very close. Luckily the Germans’ rate of fire was slow and there were periods when only one