The German Soldier's Pocket Manual: 1914–18

By Stephen Bull

This is the first Pocket Manual to be dedicated to the German Army in the First World War, with chapters comprising of complete documents or extracts drawn from two major sources: the German Army of 1914 - 1918 itself, or the intelligence sections of other armies.

It describes the new tactics and units developed by the German army during the war, including the myths surrounding Stormtrooper units. These new methods used were a result of interaction between the opposing forces and incremental in their appearance.

Nevertheless the new ideas were hugely influential and important not only to the German army but to others as well, including British and American forces.

Utilising a wide range of sources, including various pamphlets and manuals that were produced throughout World War I, this fascinating pocket manual gives a German perspective to World War I.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
• Release date: Jun 28, 2018
• ISBN: 9781472831057

Stephen Bull

Dr Stephen Bull worked for the National Army Museum and BBC in London before taking up his current post as Curator of Military History and Archaeology with Lancashire Museums. A consultant to the University of Oxford he is also a Member of the Institute for Archaeologists, and has made TV appearances that include the series Battlefield Detectives, news and archaeology features. Published on both sides of the Atlantic and in several languages, he is the author of a number of works for Osprey including titles on tactics in World War II. Dr Bull has been one of the key contributors to the accompanying television series screened in the United Kingdom and North America.

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Contents

Acknowledgements

  1. Introduction

  2. Der Spatenkrieg: The Spade War

  3. Proposals for Technical Methods

  4. German Instructions for the Employment of Flame Projectors

  5. Trench Raid Report

  6. Machine Gun Instructions

  7. Nahkampfmittel

  8. Minor Tactics

  9. Notes on Recent Fighting

10. Anti Tank Rifle Instruction

11. The Attack in Position Warfare

Index

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals and institutions have helped make this manual possible. I should particularly like to thank Johannes Bayer, the librarian, and Carmen Boehm of the Bayerisches Armeemuseum (Bavarian Army Museum), Ingolstadt, whose knowledge of sources and kind hospitality at the museum library are hugely appreciated. The assistance of Dot Boughton (née Bruns) – a former colleague at Lancashire Museums – has also been invaluable.

The documents in this book include both complete and edited examples. Omissions from the originals are signified by elipses in the text.

Chapter 1

Introduction

In 1914 the German Army was arguably the most potent war machine in the world. With a standing peacetime strength of 840,000 men, it was larger than the armies of France, Italy or Austro-Hungary, and considerably larger than those of Britain or the USA. Though smaller than the Imperial Russian Army, it was better equipped and supplied, deployed more effectively by means of the modern German rail network, and was better led. As the Prussian Army had been the primary instrument of German unification, culminating in the declaration of the King of Prussia as German Emperor or Kaiser in January 1871, the German Army was recognised as an essential pillar of the new state. At the outbreak of World War I the titular supreme commander was Kaiser Wilhelm II, King of Prussia, who also assumed command of the Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg contingents in times of conflict.

The core of the Imperial German Army was its General Staff. Its operations section not only transmitted directions and correspondence from the Chief of the General Staff, senior professional officer under the Kaiser, but also supervised the organisation and training of the Army, and processed its operational plans. Other sections and subsections of the staff dealt with intelligence, equipment, munitions and the various arms of service. In August 1914 German military forces were divided into separate armies: the First to Seventh armies facing west, the Eighth Army to the east. The armies were made up of 24 corps created in a similar number of regional districts. Corps in their turn were built of divisions.

In 1914 the standard infantry division had two infantry brigades, each with two regiments of three battalions each. The usual division was therefore 12 battalions of infantry, plus a Jäger battalion of light (literally ‘hunter’) infantry; an artillery brigade, and specialists including pioneers and engineers. Huge expansion of the German Army during the war saw the raising of fresh armies and a total of 251 divisions, though not all were in existence simultaneously and divisions were reduced to three regiments. Given the total nature of a struggle fought on two major and several minor fronts, there was unrelenting demand for new recruits. Peak wartime strength of all branches of the German Army reached about eight million men.

Though no nation foresaw the sort of war that occurred on the Western Front, the German Army had technical branches as advanced as any, and its heavy ‘foot’ (Fuß) artillery in particular was a world leader. Largest of all the Army’s guns in 1914 were the 42cm howitzers popularly known as the ‘Dicke Bertha’ (‘fat’ or ‘big’ Bertha), so named after Bertha Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach (1886–1957), daughter of armaments and industrial magnate Friedrich Alfred Krupp. These pieces came to particular prominence during the suppression of the Belgian forts during the 1914 summer campaign, but the heavy artillery also included 21cm Mörser (also more readily defined as heavy howitzers in English) and 15cm and 10cm howitzers, as well as other guns. The field artillery had mainly 7.7cm guns and 10.5cm light field howitzers. Contrary to popular belief, the artillery was a bigger killer than machine guns, the numbers of which also grew exponentially during the war. Though not yet much manufactured, a heavy ‘trench mortar’ had also been developed before 1914 and a small stock of hand grenades was held for use by pioneers.

The 7.7cm gun was standard issue to the German field artillery in 1914, and in various improved models was still serving in 1918. It was capable of firing a variety of shells including shrapnel and high explosive.

The mechanism of the issue G98 bolt-action rifle with its five-round integral magazine, from the manual Der Gute Kamerade, Berlin 1915.

Dashing as the mounted branch appeared with its regiments of Kürassiere (‘cuirassiers’), dragoons, ulans, hussars, Jäger zu Pferde, as well as Bavarian and Saxon heavy cavalry and Bavarian Chevaulegers , it was the infantry that formed the bulk of the Army in 1914. Though there were career officers and non-commissioned officers, plus some ‘one year volunteers’, the standing army was fuelled mainly by conscription. At 18 years of age German males became liable for service, and, if selected from the annual tranche, joined the standing army at 20. The states provided men in proportion to their populations, with Prussia raising the bulk (78 per cent), Bavaria 11 per cent, Saxony 7 per cent, and Wurttemberg 4 per cent of the total.

Infantrymen served two years with the active army, cavalry and artillerymen three, before moving into the reserve. Infantry were reservists for five years, the artillery and cavalry four, all being expected to undertake yearly training. At the age of 27 liability was reduced with men accounted Landwehr until the age of 39, and finally Landsturm (‘general draft’) from 39 to 45 years. In a state of emergency all categories could be called upon to take the field and the period of service was unlimited. Men who had been passed over previously could also be inducted.

Pre-war training moved in yearly cycles, culminating in the Kaisermanöver – a full-scale army manoeuvre in the presence of the Emperor. Instructional literature was of three main varieties: official volumes produced by the relevant War Ministry and the General Staff; volumes from commercial publishers, often based on official documents or updated historic texts; and newly compiled unofficial material, usually by serving or former officers. Recruits were normally expected to purchase a basic manual to support their own training: typical examples included Dienstunterricht des Deutschen Pioniers by Major von Rabenau and Dienstunterricht des Bayerischen Infanteristen by Oberst Otto Schulz. Transfeldt’s Dienstunterricht für Kriegsrekruten der Deutschen Infanterie proved particularly popular, reaching its 52nd edition by early 1917. Most of these volumes included a history lesson on past glories; a note on the Empire and its geography and military organisation; and some summaries of aspects of basic training. These last generally focused on the skills of rifle shooting and marching; military discipline; maps; uniforms and equipment. The yearly training schedule began with the individual and worked up to small units, then companies and battalions.

The model 95 Tornister or backpack. In standard use by the infantry at the outbreak of war, it was still seen, often in simplified forms, in 1918. The manual illustration from Der Gute Kamerade, Berlin 1915, shows how various items including spare cartridges, food, coffee, field cap, shirt, wash kit, boots and camping equipment are packed.

As far as strategy and tactics were concerned, attack was considered by far the most important option. This was partly because offensive action proved so successful in the wars of Bismarck in the 19th century, but also because maladroit diplomacy left Germany outnumbered by potential opponents under the later regime of Wilhelm II. The only plausible antidote to this situation was imagined to be a swift coup to dispatch at least one enemy nation quickly. Although training documents such as the manual of field pioneer work for all arms (1911) showed trenches and field works, defence was seen as merely a temporary way to buy time, or to spare men, while offensive action was performed elsewhere. Such preconceptions were rudely upended with the failure on the Marne in 1914 and the unenviable prospect of a long war on two or more fronts for which Germany was largely unprepared. Defence and trench warfare came suddenly to the fore while new methods of offence were worked out, often with the aid of trial and error and observation of enemy methods – be they things to avoid or to emulate.

The New Tactics

The long-held idea that the ‘Stormtroop’ tactics that revolutionised infantry combat during World War I had their origin only in the German Army, were developed in secret on the Eastern Front in late 1917, and appeared by surprise in the west during the Spring Offensive of 1918 has now been completely debunked. Gen d.Inf Emil Oskar von Hutier (1857–1934) – victor at Riga against the Russians and later commander of the German 18th Army in the west – was a successful commander, a relative of Generalquartiermeister Ludendorff, and a winner of the coveted Pour le Mérite in recognition of his outstanding contribution on the Eastern Front. However, it is untrue that he was single-handedly responsible for inventing entirely new tactics that helped the German Army come close to victory. Indeed, the focus of the Entente press on ‘Stormtroopers’ during and immediately after the war was something of a smokescreen. It was designed both to explain away a major, if temporary, German advance and, more importantly, to conceal the weaknesses that contributed to create near catastrophe in early 1918. For German tactical skill was but one factor: the collapse of Russia had enabled large numbers of men to be transferred west; heavy casualties and French mutinies undermined the Western Front; Italian setbacks dogged the south; and the USA was not yet ready to deploy large numbers of men. The British Army was therefore on the ropes, and advanced German methods might have been the final straw.

German troops at Riga with grenades and gas masks, 1917. Gen d.Inf von Hutier’s attack was highly successful, but the tactics used were developed over a period of years and with the Russians already weakened.

The original documents that form the body of this manual focus on the German infantryman and how his tactics changed over four years of war. Crucially, they illustrate two key things. The first is that while ‘storm’ or ‘shock’ troop tactics were undoubtedly very significant, and small flexible units of men moving in fluid groups in battle armed with a variety of weapons eventually became the norm around the world, the notion of sudden creation and any claim to authorship by a single hand are completely erroneous. Infantry combat methods began to change as soon as there were trenches and as soon as the dreadful impact of artillery and machine guns were felt. Nor was this unique to the German Army.

Moreover, contrary to popular depiction, pre-war German drill regulations already allowed some flexibility in combat. ‘Skirmish’ lines and firing ‘at will’ were normal. The advance was supposed to be at ‘a free natural pace’, and the ‘rush’ and ‘creeping’ were officially recognised tactics. While the ability of the soldier to shoot and hit his target was paramount, taking cover and screening from the enemy were already important considerations. That such dictates were not always followed in the 1914 campaigns was due to accidents of command, enemy ambush, overwhelming defensive fire, overconfidence, poor training, or battlefields simply too crowded to admit proper deployment.

The new battlefield environment from the autumn of 1914, the ‘otherworld’ of trenches, quickly demanded new tactics, new routines and new weapons. To break into field fortifications, let alone through them, required moving in different ways and in different, more flexible formations. ‘Trench raids’ began in late 1914, as did small-scale use of hand grenades. Pioniere and Jäger, the German battlefield engineers and light infantry, took early roles in the development of new tactics: the former because they already used explosives and grenades, the latter because their traditional battlefield role demanded deployment as skirmishers and in small units. 1915 saw the front-line appearance of sometimes informal ‘shock’ and ‘hand grenade’ squads for close action.

Also created early that year, at the behest of Oberst Max Bauer (1869–1929), were three small High Command Versuchstruppen or experimental units. One, under Maj Lothes, was to test trench mortars, another under Hptm Reddemen used flame-throwers, and the third, commanded by Maj Kalsow, experimented with small ‘assault cannon’ designed to bring artillery firepower right into the front line to deal with enemy positions. Kalsow’s Sturmabteilung (‘Storm detachment’) saw action against the French in June 1915, though Kalsow himself was replaced by Hptm Willy Rohr in September. The formation was later regarded as the first German true Stormtroop unit.

At the same