Brigades of Gettysburg: The Union and Confederate Brigades at the Battle of Gettysburg

By Bradley M. Gottfried

• Learn about the paper brigade and the battle of Gettysburg in this incredible book
• Includes Gettysburg maps, maps of Antietam, artillery at Gettysburg, and more
• Based on first-hand accounts

Author Bradley M. Gottfried painstakingly pieced together each brigade’s experience at the Battle of Gettysburg. This brutal battle lasted for days and left soldiers with boredom and dread of what was to come when the guns stopped firing. Visual resources are also in Gottfried’s book, including Gettysburg National Military Park maps, Savas Beatie military atlas, and more. 

Readers will experience every angle of this epic fight through stories of forced marches, weary troops, and the bitter and tragic end of the battle. This collection is a fascinating and lively narrative that empowers the soldiers who fought fiercely and died honorably. Every moment of the Battle of Gettysburg is in this comprehensive book.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Skyhorse
• Release date: Jan 12, 2012
• ISBN: 9781626366114

Bradley M. Gottfried

Bradley M. Gottfried served as a college educator for more than 40 years before retiring in 2017. After receiving his doctorate, he worked as a full-time faculty member before entering the administrator ranks. He rose to the position of president and served for 17 years at two colleges. His interest in the Civil War began when he was a youngster in the Philadelphia area. He has written 18 books on the Civil War, including a number on Gettysburg and map studies of various campaigns. A resident of the Chambersburg/Gettysburg, Pennsylvania area, Brad is an Antietam Licensed Battlefield Guide and a Gettysburg Licensed Town Guide.

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UNION BRIGADES

I CORPS—

Major General John Reynolds/

Major General Abner Doubleday/

Major General John Newton

Not to be confused with the I Corps of the ill-fated Army of Virginia, Major General John Reynolds's I Corps of the Army of the Potomac was formed on September 12, 1862. The corps had the distinction of opening the battle of Antietam under General Joseph Hooker. It ran into several gritty Confederate divisions in the East Woods and Miller's cornfield and suffered horrendous losses before being withdrawn. The heavy losses continued at the battle of Fredericksburg. Chancellorsville was a reprieve for the corps, but by this point it had become a crack unit.¹

Reynolds had commanded the corps since September 29, 1862. A West Point graduate, he had had an illustrious military career up to the Gettysburg campaign. Reynolds and his brigade fought in the Seven Days battles, and he was captured at Gaines's Mill. Exchanged soon after, Reynolds returned to lead the Pennsylvania Reserve Division with distinction at Second Bull Run. He did not see action at Antietam, because Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin had Reynolds detached from the army to assist in the recruitment and organization of the militia during Lee's first invasion of the North. Returning to the army after the battle, Reynolds assumed command of the I Corps and led it at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Prior to appointing General George Meade to take over the Army of the Potomac during the Gettysburg campaign, Lincoln offered the command to Reynolds. The latter would not accept the position as long as Washington tied his hands. Lincoln was unwilling to turn over so much responsibility to a field officer, so Reynolds rejoined his corps.²

The corps' long march to Gettysburg continued on June 28, when the men broke camp at Middletown, Maryland, and reached Frederick that night. The corps reached Emmitsburg on June 29 and camped just north of town. Reynolds thought a fight was imminent, so he selected high ground for the bivouac. The march on June 30 was much shorter—only about four miles to the banks of Marsh Creek, another strong defensive position. According to General Abner Doubleday, it was General Reynolds's intention to dispute the enemy's advance at this point. During this period Reynolds commanded the army's right wing, composed of the I, III, and XI Corps.³

Through a series of telegrams, Reynolds learned that the enemy was concentrating ahead of him. Galloping ahead of his men, Reynolds reached the battlefield at about 10:00 A.M., and sent a number of messages to General Meade and XI Corps commander General Oliver Howard. Reynolds brought up Wadsworth's 1st Division and Hall's battery, and his remaining two divisions hit the road around 90 to 120 minutes later. According to Doubleday, this action caused Wadsworth's two brigades to face the brunt of the initial Confederate onslaught alone and without support. Doubleday did not believe that Reynolds had any grand plan in mind, except to simply to defend the two roads entering the town from the northwest and southwest, and to occupy and hold the woods between them. Wadsworth's two brigades were attacked by units of General Harry Heth's Division almost as soon as they deployed west of town on McPherson Ridge. After initial setbacks, Reynolds's men defeated two Confederate brigades, causing severe losses. Casualties on the Union side were also heavy—and included John Reynolds. Leading the 2nd Wisconsin of the Iron Brigade to its position, he yelled, Forward men, forward for God's sake and drive those fellows out of those woods. He was struck by a minié ball and died almost instantly. Doubleday assumed command of the 1st Corps.⁴

General Thomas Rowley, now in command of Doubleday's 3rd Division, formed his two brigades on either side of the Iron Brigade on McPherson Ridge, while Robinson's 2nd Division remained in reserve on Seminary Ridge at midday. The latter did not remain there long, as Rodes's Confederate Division (Second Corps) made its appearance on Oak Hill, forcing Doubleday to send first Baxter's Brigade, and then Paul's, to the right to extend the Federal line.⁵ The Confederate attacks were again piecemeal, allowing the outnumbered Federal troops to maintain their positions on McPherson Ridge and Oak Ridge. By 3:00 P.M. the Confederates had finally brought their immense manpower to bear on Doubleday's beleaguered I Corps. The coordinated attacks forced the I Corps to withdraw to Seminary Ridge and then to retreat into Gettysburg.⁶

Unlike the XI Corps, which also battled the Confederates on July 1, Reynolds's men fought like tigers. Rather than make excuses or comparisons, the XI Corps veterans bestowed respect upon their comrades. For example, Private Andrew Sweetland of the 55th Ohio wrote, I have believed since that day that the First Corps did the hardest and most persistent fighting of any organization in that army up to and including that day.⁷

Reaching Cemetery Hill, Doubleday met General Winfield Hancock of the II Corps, who informed him that he had assumed command of the I and XI Corps. Doubleday was told to deploy his men, but confusion arose almost immediately when General Howard sent contradictory orders. This occasioned at the time some little delay and confusion, wrote Doubleday. Fortunately, the enemy did not attack during this chaotic period. During the early morning hours of July 2, General John Newton of the VI Corps was ordered to take over the I Corps, forcing a bitterly disappointed Doubleday to return to his 3rd Division. The remainder of the battle found the I Corps on Cemetery and Culp's Hills. Several units were moved south to support the rest of the army on July 2 and 3, and Stannard's Brigade and two regiments of Rowley's (Biddle's) Brigade helped repulse Wright's Brigade (Anderson's Division, Third Corps) on July 2 and Pickett's Division (First Corps) on July 3. The corps left the battlefield on July 6. Although decimated, the men knew that their spirited defense had contributed to the defeat of Lee's army.⁸

1ST DIVISION—

Brigadier General James Wadsworth

The 1st Division had four commanders from the time it was formed on September 12, 1862, until Brigadier General James Wadsworth assumed command on December 27, 1862. Wadsworth's life up to the Gettysburg campaign was unusual. Reared in a wealthy family and without formal military training or experience, Wadsworth climbed the command chart. Initially a volunteer on the staff of General Irvin McDowell, he was soon in command of a brigade and in the late winter of 1862 was placed in charge of the Washington defenses as military governor of the District of Columbia. While in the army, he was on the ballot to be governor of New York, but lost the election, probably because he did not campaign. His meteoric rise continued when in late December 1862 he became the commander of the 1st Division of the I Corps. The men loved him because he took care of them. Gettysburg would be his first real test as division commander.⁹

The evening of June 28 found Wadsworth's Division camped in a meadow. Driving rain drenched the men, so the rail fences looked very tempting. A roaring fire could provide a welcome cup of coffee and dry clothing. Unfortunately, orders prohibited using fences for firewood. Realizing the plight of his men and being independently wealthy, Wadsworth sought out the farmer to purchase his fence. The farmer did not wish to sell, but Wadsworth finally convinced him that it was the right thing to do. The astronomically high amount of $250 also helped. In less than three minutes every rail had left the fence … and prolonged cheers for General Wadsworth fairly rent the heavens, noted one of the men. They had seen Wadsworth's first rule of command: First protect your men.¹⁰

The division broke camp on Marsh Creek at 8:00 A.M. on July 1. Cutler's Brigade led the column, followed by Meredith's Iron Brigade. When less than a mile from Gettysburg, at about 10:00 A.M., Reynolds ordered the men to the sound of the fighting. This meant crossing the fields to the left of Emmitsburg Road. Wadsworth immediately deployed three of Cutler's Regiments on the north side of Chambersburg Pike; the two others were on the south side of the road, near McPherson's farm buildings. The three regiments on the north side of Chambersburg Pike were almost immediately attacked by Davis's Brigade, approaching from the west. After less than half an hour, Cutler's Regiments were flanked and forced to retreat. On the opposite side of the road, the two remaining regiments battled skirmishers from Archer's Brigade. The Iron Brigade appeared and formed on their left in Herbst Woods. The left regiments of the Iron Brigade flanked Archer's Brigade, causing it to flee. A number of prisoners from Archer's Brigade fell into the Iron Brigade's hands, including its commander, General James Archer. The decisive victory permitted Cutler's two regiments on the south side of Chambersburg Pike, and the 6th Wisconsin of the Iron Brigade, to turn and take on Davis's Brigade, which was approaching from the north. Although taking heavy losses, the three regiments charged across Chambersburg Pike and captured over two hundred men in the unfinished railroad cut. By 11:00 A.M. Wadworth's two brigades had bested two Confederate brigades from Heth's Division.¹¹

The next attack on the Wadsworth's Division came around 3:00 P.M., when the Iron Brigade was again attacked by portions of Heth's Division, and Cutler's Brigade battled units from Rodes's Division. After initially holding their ground, both brigades were ultimately forced back to Seminary Ridge. A sharp encounter occurred there, but the division was again flanked, forcing it to withdraw to Cemetery Hill. The division was sent over to Culp's Hill the next day, where it helped battle Johnson's Division during the evening of July 2 and the morning of July 3. The division remained on the battlefield until July 6.¹²

Without question, the stout defense of Wadsworth's Division helped buy time for the Union army to assemble at Gettysburg and ultimately defeat the Army of Northern Virginia.

1st Brigade—Brigadier General Solomon Meredith

Units: 19th Indiana, 24th Michigan, 2nd Wisconsin, 6th Wisconsin, 7th Wisconsin

Strength: 1829

Losses: 1153 (171-720-262)—63%¹³

Arguably the finest fighting unit in the Army of the Potomac, the Iron Brigade deserved both its name and its designation as the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, I Corps. The five western regiments had been forged into a formidable fighting force that was both feared and respected by the enemy. The men could be easily distinguished by their tall black Hardee hats, pinned back on one side and sporting a feather. There was something of the ‘Western’ frontier mentality in all this, a quiet determination to see the job through with the same resolve it took to clear a field of stones, build a rail fence or wait out a Wisconsin winter, wrote two modern historians.¹⁴

The brigade also had another distinction. At 6′7″, its commander, Brigadier General Solomon Meredith, towered above any other officer in the army. Born in North Carolina, Meredith made his way north to Indiana as a young man and became a prosperous farmer and politician. Unfortunately, his leadership did not match his height, and many of his men and senior officers openly questioned his abilities.¹⁵

The division began its final march to Gettysburg at 8:00 A.M. on July 1. Cutler's Brigade led the column, but the Iron Brigade was about a mile behind. As a result, the veterans of the two units fought over which of them actually led the column to Gettysburg, long after the battle ended. Detached to perform picket duty about two and a half miles up the road toward Gettysburg the night before, the 19th Indiana was ordered to fall into its proper place in the column as it came marching by, reported its commander, Colonel Samuel Williams. This occurred between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M. The brigade marched toward Gettysburg in the following order: 2nd Wisconsin–7th Wisconsin–19th Indiana–24th Michigan–6th Wisconsin.¹⁶

Although the men knew that Lee's army was somewhere in front of them, they did not expect an immediate battle. The men were in good spirits, and songs broke out as they marched along. This quickly changed when up ahead the sullen booming of the artillery and the white smoke of the exploding shells told them that the enemy was nearby. The pace quickened, and the men knew that it was just a matter of time before they entered the fray. As the column approached Gettysburg, Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin ordered his drum corps to the front of his regiment and had the flags unsheathed. Within moments, the men were marching to the tune The Campbells are Coming.¹⁷

Upon reaching the Codori house at about 10:00 A.M., the brigade followed Cutler's Brigade to the left (west), across fields, toward the Lutheran seminary. The brigade band, which had been playing the tune Red, White, and Blue, now changed to Yankee Doodle. The men double-quicked across the open fields. The march was relatively easy because Cutler's men had already flattened the fences.¹⁸

Passing the seminary, the column went by a two-gun section of Calef's battery tossing shells at the unseen enemy. Led by the 2nd Wisconsin, the Iron Brigade hurried toward McPherson Ridge. They could see Buford's cavalry division hotly engaged with the enemy. Except for the 19th Indiana, which had been on picket duty the night before, the men rushed toward the enemy with unloaded muskets. Some of the officers realized this fact almost too late. Colonel William Robinson of the 7th Wisconsin recalled that we had not halted to load, and no orders had been received to do so, for the reason, I suppose that no one expected we were to be engaged so suddenly. Colonel Henry Morrow of the 24th Michigan ordered his men to halt to load, but the order was revoked by one of General Wadsworth's staff, who waved them toward Herbst Woods. Some of the officers ordered their men to load while sprinting to the front. Although a difficult task for green troops, the Iron Brigade accomplished this order without missing a step. As the last regiment in the column, the 6th Wisconsin, passed the seminary, a boyish-looking staff officer galloped up to its commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Dawes, with information that General Reynolds was dead and General Doubleday was now in command of the field.¹⁹

Reynolds was still alive when the 2nd Wisconsin reached the crest of McPherson Ridge. He saw the line shudder when met by a volley from the 7th Tennessee and 14th Tennessee (Archer's Brigade, Heth's Division, Third Corps) that killed and wounded a number of men. Reynolds yelled, Forward men, forward, for God's sake and drive those fellows out of the woods. He died soon after. Not waiting for the remainder of the brigade, the men plunged down the slope toward Archer's troops in the woods below, obliquing slightly to the right because of the intensing of the gunfire. The next regiment in line, the 7th Wisconsin, waited momentarily, while the 19th Indiana and then the 24th Michigan formed on its left. Through the dense smoke, Colonel Robinson of the 7th Wisconsin could not discern whether the shots being fired at his men were from the enemy, or from the 2nd Wisconsin, which was somewhere up ahead and to the right. While he was pondering what to do, a staff officer rode up. Robinson asked if he knew the identity of the troops in front of him. The staff officer merely pointed to the left; following his arm, Robinson saw a Confederate battle flag in the ravine below. The staff officer ordered Robinson to charge the enemy. Robinson first ordered a volley, then, drawing his sword, ordered his men to charge. They responded by rushing down the hill, yelling at the top of their lungs. Because there was no time to waste, the three regiments went into action en echelon. ²⁰

While the 7th Wisconsin and part of the 19th Indiana smashed into Archer's front, the left of the 19th Indiana and the 24th Michigan overlapped the right of the Confederate line and circled around it. The battle flared on the banks of Willoughby Run. Realizing their peril, members of the 13th Alabama on the right of the Conferedate line either fell back or were captured. Within a matter of minutes, the entire right side of Archer's Brigade was rolled up and forced backward. Some hand-to-hand combat broke out, but most of the Confederates realized the futility of resisting an attack on their front, flank, and rear. Colonel Robinson recalled that the enemy—what was left of them able to walk—threw down their arms, ducked through between our files, and passed to the rear. One of the Confederates purportedly yelled to his comrades, That ain't no milishy! There's them damn black hats again—that's the Army of the Potomac.²¹

Just prior to these events, the 2nd Wisconsin on the right of the brigade had obliqued farther right, entered Herbst Woods, and slowly pushed back the Tennessee troops in front of it. One veteran from the 2nd Wisconsin observed that it was … the unadorned, long-drawn-out line of ragged, dirty blue against the long-drawn-out line of dirty, ragged butternut. Seeing the Confederates reforming their lines, Major John Mansfield ordered a charge. This put an end to the Confederate resistance, as the Tennesseans ran for the rear. Over seventy-five men were captured, including General James Archer, Lee's first general to be so humiliated. Archer was captured by Private Patrick Maloney, who delivered the general to Major Mansfield. Private Maloney would be killed before the sun set that day.²²

Continuing their attack, the brigade climbed the incline on the western side of Willoughby Run and fired at Archer's retreating men. Realizing the brigade's vulnerable position, the officers ordered the men back across the run and into position in Herbst Woods. The men lay down and prepared for another attack. By 11:30 A.M., the brigade was realigned. The 7th Wisconsin formed on the right of the 2nd Wisconsin, and the 19th Indiana formed on the brigade's left flank, with the 24th Michigan on its right. The brigade's deposition was, from left to right, 19th Indiana–24th Michigan–2nd Wisconsin–7th Wisconsin. The 2nd Wisconsin initially faced north, but after the realignment, faced west. Because of the disposition of the remainder of the brigade, the right wing of the 24th Michigan was forced to bend backward toward the right to connect with the 7th Wisconsin. This formed an obtuse angle at the center of the regiment. The regiment's left flank extended down the hillside, and was not visible to its right wing.

The 24th Michigan's commander, Colonel Henry Morrow, was unhappy with his regiment's deployment, and sent several aides to report that the position was untenable. Each time the aides returned with the same response: the position was ordered to be held, and must be held at all hazards. The 19th Indiana was also unhappy with its position, because its left flank hung in the air, dangerously exposed to a Confederate attack. The latter two regiments wanted to occupy the higher ground to the west, closer to Willoughby Run, but Doubleday insisted that the woods be held. It seemed to some of the men that the Union high command had gone into a state of shock after General Reynolds's death. As with the 24th Michigan, aides were sent to find General Meredith to protest their position. Meredith could only say that he was following orders, and when General Wadsworth was approached, he refused to make changes. The Hoosiers felt some relief when Doubleday's Division arrived and took position on either side of the brigade. Stone's Brigade was placed on the right of the Iron Brigade and Biddle's Brigade to the left. Unfortunately, a quarter-mile gap loomed between the latter two brigades. Colonel Williams of the 19th Indiana wrote in his report that "two regiments afterwards formed en echelon, to my left and rear, which however did not prevent a heavy fire on my flank in the action of the afternoon."²³

Earlier in the day, the brigade's last regiment, the 6th Wisconsin, was also preparing to face the enemy. One of General Meredith's aides galloped up as the unit reached Seminary Ridge and told Lieutenant Colonel Rufus Dawes, Colonel, form your line, and prepare for action. With a sweep of his arm, the aide indicated that the regiment should form on the 24th Michigan's left flank. The men loaded as they ran toward their assigned position. Before reaching it, another of Doubleday's aides halted the regiment and told Dawes that his unit was designated the division's reserve. Because the men were tired from their run across the fields, Dawes permitted them to lie down. Attached to the regiment at this point was the hundred-man Iron Brigade Guard. Dawes placed half of them on each flank of this regiment.²⁴

The 6th Regiment's reprieve was a short one, for yet another aide arrived with orders to move to the right. While the Iron Brigade was defeating Archer's Brigade, Cutler's Brigade on its right, across Chambersburg Pike, was having a more difficult time with Davis's Confederate Brigade. Two Federal regiments had already been forced to retreat, and a third was in danger of being annihilated. Flushed with victory, Davis's men swept toward the Iron Brigade's vulnerable right flank. Dawes was ordered to meet this new threat from the north, and he did so by yelling, By company into line on the right company.²⁵

The guns of Hall's battery could be seen driving to the rear, and Cutler's men were manifestly in full retreat, Dawes noted after the war. In his official report he wrote, my men kept up a steady double-quick, never faltering or breaking under the fire, which had become very galling. As the regiment approached Chambersburg Pike, Dawes's horse was shot and the colonel was thrown to the ground. As Dawes scrambled to his feet, the men heartily cheered. Stout fences lined the pike, and beyond them, the men could see the Confederates firing as they advanced. Dawes's men began to fall, so he ordered them to halt and lie down behind the fence. Resting their guns on the lowest rail, the men fired several volleys into Davis's troops. Many of the enemy soldiers simply disappeared. It was not until later that Dawes and his men realized that many of the enemy had sought refuge in an unfinished railroad cut that paralleled Chambersburg Pike.²⁶

Seeing the Confederate line waver, Dawes drew his sword and ordered his men over the fences lining the road. The maneuver was a deadly one, as many were hit during their climb. The heavy fire made Dawes realize that the enemy had not retreated, but were firing from a depression in front of them. After crossing the second fence on the opposite side of Chambersburg Pike, Dawes saw the 95th New York of Cutler's Brigade forming on his left. He may not have known it at the time, but another of Cutler's Regiments, the 84th New York, was on the 95th New York's left flank. I did not know or care where they came from, but was rejoiced to see them, wrote Dawes. These regiments had been on the Iron Brigade's right, south of Chamberburg Pike, and when Davis's movement threatened the Union line, they were also rushed north to halt the Confederate advance.²⁷

Rushing up to Major Edward Pye of the 95th New York, Dawes yelled, We must charge. Pye readily agreed, and the Federal units swept forward. As the three regiments closed on the railroad cut, Davis's men poured destructive volleys into them. Scores of men were hit, but there was no turning back—they had to reach the Confederate position to silence the deadly gunfire. Captain John Kellogg recalled that the three regiments did not attack together—the 6th Wisconsin reached the railroad cut about three minutes before the New York regiments. Dawes recalled giving no orders during this charge, except Align on the colors! Close up on the colors! Close up on the colors! As the Federal troops reached the edge of the railroad cut, some of the enemy threw down their arms to surrender.²⁸

Some of the men saw the 2nd Mississippi's flag and rushed toward it. The flag bearer, Private William Murphy, recalled that they still kept rushing for my flag and there were over a dozen shot down like sheep in their madly [sic] rush for the colors. The first soldier was shot down just as he made for the flag … and at the same time a lieutenant made a desperate struggle for the flag, and was shot through his right shoulder. Over a dozen men fell killed or wounded, and then a large man made a rush for me and the flag. As I tore the flag from the staff he took hold of me and the color. The large man was Corporal Francis Waller, who later earned the Congressional Medal of Honor for his feat.²⁹

Looking down upon the Confederates in the railroad cut, a general cry, Throw down your muskets! Down with your muskets! rang through the line. Seeing a potential escape route to his right, Adjutant Edward Brooks took a detachment of twenty men to this part of the railroad cut, and ordered his men to fire into the flank of the rebels. Knowing that he needed to act quickly before the Confederates fled, Dawes yelled, Where is the colonel of this regiment? An officer with stars on his collar, Major John Blair of the 2nd Mississippi, approached and asked Dawes who he was. To this question Dawes replied, I command this regiment. Surrender, or I will fire. Blair did not say a word, but merely handed over his sword. Seeing this act, Blair's men threw down their muskets. Over 225 men, primarily from the 2nd Mississippi, were captured. Six other officers also approached, and as they moved away, Dawes tried to hold seven swords. Adjutant Brooks relieved Dawes of the burden, permitting him to order the captured Confederates to the rear.³⁰

The behavior of some of the Confederates angered the men. Private James Sullivan wrote that some of them would throw down their guns and cry ‘I surrender,’ and immediately pick them up and shoot some of our unsuspecting men. After the war, Dawes marveled at his men's actions. The coolness, self-possession, and discipline which held back our men from pouring in a general volley saved a hundred lives of the enemy. The 6th Wisconsin was attached to Cutler's Brigade on the north side of Chambersburg Pike for the next few hours.³¹

While the 6th Wisconsin was fighting at the unfinished railroad cut to the north, the rest of the Iron Brigade remained in their positions in Herbst Woods, under constant shelling by Confederate artillery. They rested and watched their skirmishers engage the enemy. General Doubleday rode up to the men and told them to hold their position at all cost. If we can't hold it, where will you find men who can? was the grim reply, according to Doubleday. Six Confederate brigades of General A. P. Hill's Third Corps were moving into position to attack the Federal units on the south side of Chambersburg Pike. Three brigades from Heth's Division led the attack column, supported by three more from Pender's Division. Sometime between 2:30 and 3:00 P.M., the men could see the Confederates advancing in two lines. What worried the 19th Indiana most was that the Confederate line extended far beyond its vulnerable left flank. The men grimly watched as the long Confederate line approached, with battle flags flapping in the wind. Observing the advance of the 11th North Carolina, and part of the 26th North Carolina of Pettigrew's Brigade (Heth's Division), Williams told his men, Boys, we must hold our colors on this line, or lie here under them. Although Williams had earlier wanted to pull his men back to a less exposed position, he was ready to defend his assigned position to the death. When the Tar Heels were within range, Williams ordered his men to open fire. Confederates dropped all along the line. The attackers returned the fire, and Hoosiers fell by twos and threes. Because Biddle's Brigade was so far to the left and rear, it did not provide adequate support to the 19th Indiana's left flank. After a valiant fight, the 19th Indiana could hold no longer and the men began to drift backward about 100 yards to assume a new defensive position. They left twenty dead and another hundred wounded behind, about 40% of the regiment's strength. If it was any consolation, the 11th North Carolina was also sustaining heavy casualties. One company entered the fray with thirty-eight men, but only four remained when the sun set.³²

The 24th Michigan, to the Hoosiers' right, had been ordered to hold its fire until the enemy approached to within fifty yards. When the order was given, the line erupted with sheets of flame. The men of the 24th Michigan were incredulous when the smoke cleared, for the 26th North Carolina still advanced. Colonel Morrow wrote in his report that the nature of the ground protected the enemy. Their advance was not checked, and they came on with rapid strides, yelling like demons, he wrote. Not a Michigander ran. All continued loading and firing into the enemy's ranks. Every shot found its mark and gaps formed in the Confederate ranks. One veteran recalled that no Rebel crossed that stream [Willoughby Run] and lived. The men spied a Confederate officer on a mule, cheering his men on by yelling, Give 'em hell boys. A bullet knocked off his hat, which he grabbed in mid-air and returned to his head, continuing to lead his men.³³

The withdrawal of the 19th Indiana exposed the left flank of the 24th Michigan, which resulted in the men falling like grass before the scythe. The hail of bullets was so great that even wounded men on the ground were hit additional times. The two left-most companies refused to face the threat on the flank, and held for a short period before the regiment was also forced to retreat.³⁴

Taking a new position in the rear, the men opened fire again, exacting a terrible toll. The two lines stood less than twenty paces apart, firing volleys into each other. After holding this position for a few minutes, the 24th Michigan was overwhelmed and again forced to retreat. The line had been bent, but was not broken. If the Confederates wanted the hills west of Gettysburg, they would have to pay an outrageous price for them. Thirteen flag bearers from the 26th North Carolina went down. The flag of the 24th Michigan was carried by a succession of ten soldiers, all but one killed or wounded in the process. As Colonel Morrow of the regiment bent down to pick up the fallen standard, he was approached by Private William Kelly, who shouted above the din, The colonel of the Twenty-fourth shall never carry the flag while I am alive, and grabbed the standard. Kelly died almost immediately in a hail of bullets. Realizing that he needed to rally his men, Morrow grabbed the flag and was wounded. The 19th Indiana's flag bearers had suffered so severely that an officer ordered the flag to be wrapped and slid back into its shuck, so no more men would be slaughtered while carrying it. It was unsheathed again later. As the men were pushed backward by the growing horde, they continually stopped and returned the fire, then inched backward again. According to the regiment's historian, the unit stopped four times to turn and face the Confederates, but each time was again forced to continue to fall back to Seminary Ridge. Only one man in five that marched down to McPherson Woods that morning was still standing, and only three officers remained with the unit.³⁵

While the enemy's initial advance was directed against the 19th Indiana and 24th Michigan, the men of the 2nd Wisconsin and 7th Wisconsin on the right of the line watched Brockenbrough's Brigade (Heth's Division) making preparations to attack. At first it appeared that the Confederate attack would hit Stone's Brigade on their right, but a second line detached and obliqued toward them. Colonel William Robinson, whose 7th Wisconsin occupied the brigade's right flank, watched the Confederates advance into Herbst Woods, then lie down to open a galling fire on his position. Seventy-year-old Gettysburg resident John Burns fought with the regiment during this part of the battle; he was wounded several times.³⁶

General Meredith was struck by an artillery shell. Since Wadsworth was off to the right, no replacement was appointed. Therefore, each regiment subsequently fought independently. As the left side of the line was rolled up under the intense pressure from Pettigrew's Brigade, a staff officer galloped up to Colonel Robinson with orders to pull his 7th Wisconsin and the 2nd Wisconsin back to the safety of Seminary Ridge. Robinson left the 2nd Wisconsin and three companies of the 7th Wisconsin in their positions; the seven remaining companies Wisconsin fell back. Attempting to hold their positions was folly, and after a short time, they joined the seven companies of the 7th Wisconsin on Seminary Ridge. Colonel Robinson wrote that I retired by right of companies to the rear some 150 or 200 yards, halted, and wheeled into line again to support the other regiments in retiring. Then again retired about the same distance, and again wheeled into line, and so on until I reached the foot of Seminary Ridge.³⁷

It appears that the 19th Indiana reached Seminary Ridge first; the 2nd Wisconsin last. As the men approached the seminary, they witnessed both harrowing and uplifting sights. The latter was in the form of a soldier from the 24th Michigan, lying on the ground and holding aloft the unit's flag, even in death. When the 7th Wisconsin approached a nearby orchard, canister and shells that had been passing over their heads from the Federal batteries on Seminary Ridge began to fall among their ranks, killing and wounding several men.³⁸

The men received a measure of relief when they saw eighteen cannon arranged on Seminary Ridge. About forty yards in front of the batteries was a two-foot-high barricade of loose rails, which … had been thrown together by some of our troops in the earlier part of the day, behind which I threw the regiment, noted Colonel Robinson of the 7th Wisconsin. Lying down behind it, the men grimly watched Scales's and Perrin's Brigades (Pender's Division) approach. Here was made out our last and hopeless stand, wrote the commander of the 19th Indiana. Major Mark Finnicum of the 7th Wisconsin watched as the Rebels came moving on in gallant and splendid style, not withstanding the shot and shell that ploughed through their ranks from our artillery. The waiting infantry screamed, ‘Come on, Johnny! Come on!’ When within a hundred paces of us, a sheet of flame burst from our line hurling its leaded hail with such deadly certainty that their confident ranks were checked … literally annihilating the Rebel line. In our front not a man was left standing, what few if any were unhurt, sought safety behind the dead bodies of their fallen comrades.³⁹

The position was a strong one, particularly with the line of artillery 40 yards to their rear, and could have been held somewhat longer had the 1st South Carolina not broken through the line to the left of the Iron Brigade. Seeing their flank about to be rolled up again, some of the men directed an oblique fire at the Confederates charging from their left. It was futile, for the South Carolinians swept around the Iron Brigade's flank. With the collapse of the XI Corps, enemy soldiers were approaching their right flank as well. In danger of being surrounded, General Doubleday finally ordered the brigade to abandon its position. Colonel Williams of the 19th Indiana wrote that we could have held out against the line in front but their maneuvers on the left made the position untenable and I gave the order to retreat. Williams wrote to the governor of Indiana soon after the battle that the men were loath to obey the order … [and] returned again to the barricade to pay the enemy one more complement.⁴⁰

The 2nd and 7th Wisconsin were apparently the last units to leave the barricades. Captain Nat Rollins of the 2nd Wisconsin claimed that he did not receive orders to withdraw. Instead, he could see the Confederates drawing around his position and, looking to his right, could see Chambersburg Pike clogged with retreating Union soldiers. There was no time to waste; so we stood not on order of our going, but went at once. Farther to the right, Lieutenant Colonel Dawes of the 6th Wisconsin saw a staff officer approach, who leaned over his horse and quietly said to Dawes, The orders, colonel, are to retreat beyond the town. Hold your men together.⁴¹

The survivors found no solace in Gettysburg. The streets were clogged with soldiers from the XI Corps, and Confederates entered the town, scooping up scores of prisoners. The streets were jammed with crowds of retreating soldiers, and with ambulances, artillery, and wagons. The cellars were crowded with men, sound in body but craven in spirit, who had gone there to surrender. I saw no men wearing the badge of the First Army Corps in this disgraceful company, wrote Dawes. The Iron Brigade's units had disintegrated to the point that many men made their way to safety without much direction from their officers. Colonel Williams wrote that it was impossible to form [the units] and we retired, each to care for himself, through the town. There was constant firing, and the men stopped periodically to fire a volley before moving on.⁴²

The 6th Wisconsin was one of the few units that moved through the town as an organized unit. When the remnant of the regiment came to an intersection swept by small arms fire, Dawes ordered his men across single file, through a small opening in a fence. Dawes positioned himself by the opening, and any man who dallied was jerked away without ceremony or apology, the object being to keep the track clear for those yet to come. The regiment lost only two men crossing the street. The weather was extremely hot, and Dawes recalled the sweat streaming down his men's faces. A local citizen received three cheers when he appeared with two buckets of cool water.⁴³

Upon reaching Cemetery Hill, the men threw themselves down on the ground in utter exhaustion. After taking stock of their losses, the men's worst fears were confirmed. The brigade had almost been destroyed. Only twenty-six men assembled under the flag of the 24th Michigan propped up against the wheel of a cannon, while its single remaining captain slumped against a nearby tombstone. Stragglers later swelled the number to ninety-nine men and three officers—out of almost five hundred who had entered the fight, a loss of 73%. Few Federal regiment lost a larger proportion of men during the battle. The 19th Indiana initially mustered seventy-five men on Cemetery Hill, and the 2nd Wisconsin, only sixty-nine. Wadsworth finally ordered Colonel Robinson of the 7th Wisconsin to take command of the brigade during this period.⁴⁴

The men did not have time to rest, for they were ordered to fall in and march to Culp's Hill. The 6th Wisconsin joined them later and formed on the right of the line. This was a special reunion, because the 6th Wisconsin brought its regimental wagon containing entrenching tools. Although Dawes received no orders, he told his men to begin digging after they arrived. "The men worked with great energy. A man would dig with all his strength till out of breath, when another would seize the spade and push on the work," recalled Dawes. The activity was probably therapeutic, for it took their minds off their terrible experiences. Coffee and hardtack were distributed to the exhausted men. Some of the units were also temporarily reorganized during this period. For example, the decimated 24th Michigan was divided into two parts, each under the command of a lieutenant. As additional men returned, the regiment was again reorganized, this time into four battalions.⁴⁵

July 2 was a quiet time for the men. This changed at dusk, when Johnson's Division (Second Corps) attacked Culp's Hill. According to Dawes, a sound came from the woods to our right, that made us jump for our breastworks. It was the rebel yell, sounded by thousands of voices …. I ran to my post, and ordered: ‘Down, men, watch sharp, keep your eyes peeled! Shoot low, shoot low, the hill is steep; quiet, now; steady!’ Because the attacks were made farther to their right, the men did not open fire that night.⁴⁶

The night was not over for the 6th Wisconsin. A staff officer ordered Colonel Dawes to report with his regiment to General Greene, who was holding out against extraordinary odds. All but Greene's Brigade had been removed from the breastworks on Gulp's Hill just before Johnson's attack. Dawes issued a string of orders to his men: Attention, battalion, right face, forward by the file right—march. It was an unsettling combination—the night was dark, and the men did not know where they were going or where the enemy was. Stumbling again and again, the men moved toward Greene's vulnerable right flank, which had been bent back by Johnson's charge. Somewhere near them was the 84th New York of Cutler's Brigade, also moving to Greene's aid.⁴⁷

As Dawes's men approached the breastworks, they made an unsettling discovery: they were occupied by the enemy. The enemy soldiers, who were completely surprised at our sudden arrival, rose up and fired a volley at us, and immediately retreated down the hill, recalled Dawes. The encounter with the 10th Virginia of Steuart's Brigade lasted but a few moments, but was instrumental in blunting its further advance toward the Federal rear. The 6th Wisconsin remained there until midnight, when it was ordered back to its brigade.⁴⁸

The renewed attacks on Culp's Hill during the morning of July 3 were again directed to the right of the brigade, so it played no role in repulsing the enemy. Later that afternoon, the brigade was rushed over toward Cemetery Ridge, where the Pickett–Pettigrew–Trimble charge was ebbing. Not needed here, the men were again ordered back to their positions on Culp's Hill. This ended the brigade's actions at the battle of Gettysburg.⁴⁹

Three days after the battle, General Wadsworth paid the 24th Michigan's commander, and essentially the entire Iron Brigade, a special tribute, when he remarked, Colonel Morrow, the only fault I have with you is that you fought too long, but God only knows what would have become of the Army of the Potomac if you had not held the ground as long as you did. Few units could have sustained the punishment meted out to the Iron Brigade on July 1. Its stubborn resistance of the two ridges west of Gettysburg bought valuable time for the Federal army to concentrate.⁵⁰

2nd Brigade—Brigadier General Lysander Cutler

Units: 7th Indiana, 76th New York, 84th New York, 95th New York, 147th New York, 56th Pennsylvania

Strength: 2017

Losses: 1002 (128-509-365)—50%⁵¹

Like his division commander, Brigadier General Lysander Cutler had no military experience; prior to the war, accumulated wealth, and hailed from New England. That is where the similarities ended. Two successive business ventures eventually failed, throwing Cutler from the ranks of the affluent into poverty. Starting over again in Milwaukee, Cutler struggled. When the Civil War broke out, Cutler raised the 6th Wisconsin. Hated by his sub-ordinates, but respected for his fighting abilities, Cutler was badly wounded during the Second Bull Run campaign. He received command of the 2nd Brigade on March 26, 1863, and led it at Chancellorsville. Since the corps saw limited action there, Cutler rode toward Gettysburg without battlefield experience at this level. His brigade was a mixed bag of regiments from three states. Four had been together since the brigade was formed, and a fifth, the 147th New York, was added in March 1863. The brigade certainly did not have the same reputation as its sister brigade.⁵²

Cutler's Brigade had the distinction of leading the I Corps toward Gettysburg, and therefore it was the first infantry unit to reach the battlefield. Despite the arduous march, the men's spirits were revived by the civilians who lined the road during their march. Frequently loaves of fresh bread, kneaded by loyal hands and tendered with pleasant smiles of welcome, and aprons full of ripe cherries were much in evidence, noted one of the men. As the 56th Pennsylvania crossed its state border, the men sent up cheer upon cheer, showing their appreciation of ‘Home sweet, sweet home,’ recalled Lieutenant Abram Smith of the 76th New York.⁵³

Up at dawn on July 1, the men ate whatever was available. For Captain J. V. Pierce of the 147th New York, it was two pieces of hardtack and a cup of black coffee. Prior to breaking camp, the men each received sixty rounds of ammunition and one day's rations. The brigade began its march toward Gettysburg at 8:00 A.M. on July 1 without the 7th Indiana, which was left behind on special duty. The 76th New York led the column, followed by the 56th Pennsylvania, 147th New York, 95th New York, and 84th New York (bringing up the rear). The column halted about two miles from Gettysburg during the early morning, where the men watched as General Reynolds studied a large map while standing by the side of the road.⁵⁴

As the column pushed on, the men heard sounds of battle up ahead. Before long, circular wreaths of smoke could be seen over trees in the distance, marking where artillery shells had exploded. Staff officers brought word that Buford's cavalry were attempting to hold off a growing horde of Confederate infantry. The Rebs were thicker than blackberries beyond the hill, they were told. According to Colonel John Bachelder, the ranks closed up, the head became more firm, and the whole column swept grandly on, and every one seemed anxious to meet the invader.⁵⁵

Realizing that he needed to get his men to the scene of the action as quickly as possible, Reynolds decided to order them to double-quick across the fields. As the head of the column reached the vicinity of the Codori house on Emmitsburg Road, the men heard the orders, Head of column to the left! quickly followed by Forward, double-quick! Load at will! A wild rattle of jingling ramrods filled the morning air. Although the pioneers cleared the path of obstructions, the 76th New York was also required to push down fences, which impeded its movement across the fields. As the men ran forward in the narrow valley between McPherson and Seminary Ridges, shell fragments rained down on them from Confederate batteries on Herr Ridge.⁵⁶

Upon reaching the Lutheran seminary, the head of the column turned left and marched westward. Seeing the infantry arriving, General Buford pulled his cavalrymen back to safety. This was a critical time, as Cutler's Brigade was the only infantry unit on the scene and two Confederate brigades from Heth's Division (III Corps) were approaching. After marching about 150 yards, Cutler divided his brigade. The first three regiments, the 76th New York, 56th Pennsylvania, and 147th New York, marched northward and crossed Chambersburg Pike and took position north of the unfinished railroad. The 84th and 95th New York bringing up the rear were ordered toward the McPherson house. For some reason, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Miller of the 147th New York did not receive the orders to cross the road, and instead remained behind the 95th and 84th New York. Halting his regiment at a garden with a picket fence at the McPherson house, Miller either rode off to seek orders or received them from an orderly while deploying his men. Either way, he issued orders to By the flank to the right at a double quick and the men hastily crossed the road, and therefore were over a hundred yards closer to the enemy than the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania, which were on its right and rear. This was not an enviable position, given the fact that Davis's Brigade was bearing down on it.⁵⁷

The two other regiments to the north of the road, the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania, had already crossed the unfinished railroad cut and formed line of battle about two hundred yards north of it. This accomplished, the line moved about fifty yards west. Reaching the crest of the ridge, the two regiments halted and came under intense small arms fire. The Pennsylvanians could see the 55th North Carolina (Davis's Brigade) approaching from the right. Colonel J. William Hofmann of the 56th Pennsylvania was apparently confused by this sudden turn of events, for he turned to Cutler, who was riding behind the regiment, and asked, Is that the enemy? When Cutler replied in the affirmative, Hofmann screamed to his men, Ready, right oblique, aim, fire!⁵⁸

As Hofmann gave the order, aim, Cutler asked whether the enemy was close enough for a volley. Hofmann apparently did not hear him, and the volley exploded from the Pennsylvanians's gun barrels. The first Federal infantry volley of the battle of Gettysburg had been fired. Cutler received his answer within seconds, when a Confederate volley brought down a number of Pennsylvanians and unhorsed Cutler and two of his aides. The 76th New York encountered a similar situation, but its commander handled it quite differently. Upon reaching their position on the right of the 56th Pennsylvania, the New Yorkers were immediately raked with several volleys. Because the 2nd Mississippi was lying down in a Wheatfield, Major Andrew Grover assumed that the fire was coming from Federal troops. We were exposed to their fire several minutes without replying. The men were cautioned to hold their fire until the enemy appeared, wrote a grim Captain John Cook in his official report. At least three volleys were fired into the 76th New York before it responded. The long, straight lines of the 55th North Carolina pushing down on its right flank left no doubt in Grover's mind, and he hastily ordered his men to open fire. The regiment soon received fire from its front and flank. To counter this threat, Grover ordered his right flank to Change front to the rear. No sooner had these orders been issued, than Grover went down with a mortal wound. The men obeyed the order as though the unit was on the parade ground. With its right flank refused, the New Yorkers tried to stem the Rebel advance from the north and west. ⁵⁹

Seeing the two regiments' untenable situation, General Wadsworth ordered Cutler to withdraw them to the safety of Seminary Ridge. The regiments lost heavily during the twenty minutes they were engaged. The 76th New York suffered the most, losing 234 men out of the 375 it carried into battle (62%). The 56th Pennsylvania lost about half of its men.⁶⁰

The 147th New York had crossed the road later than her sister regiments, and moved westward—into the path of the 42nd Mississippi. It arrived at a fortuitous time, as the Mississippi skirmishers were bearing down on Hall's battery along Chambersburg Pike. Private Francis Pease recalled seeing the enemy was not more than 30 or 40 rods off and their colors flying. Adjutant Henry Lyman of the 147th noted that the fighting was at very short range and very destructive. Captain J. V. Pierce reported that the bullets from the enemy were flying thick and fast as we marched rapidly towards our opponents. Many of the men dropped down into the wheat to avoid the killing fire of the Mississippians. Captain James Coey recalled that the men would take deliberate aim, fire and then slide back under their canopy or covering of straw; reload and continue their firing. Those of the regiment wounded here were in the head or upper part of the body, consequently more fatal. While the New Yorkers and Mississippians fought it out, Hall's battery limbered up and galloped to safety.⁶¹

With its two sister regiments pulling back, the 147th New York was facing the 42nd Mississippi on its front and the 2nd Mississippi and 55th North Carolina on its flank and rear. The regiment's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Miller, had received orders to pull back at about the same time as the two other regiments, but was wounded before he could give the order. Not knowing this, Major George Harney, the new commander, ordered the right companies refused at right angles to face the threat from the north. The fight was again fierce and hot; the boys on the right [the refused part of the regiment] were falling like autumn leaves; the air was full of lead. Men fell all along the line, wrote Captain J. V. Pierce.⁶²

Seeing the regiment's perilous position, Captain Timothy Ellsworth recalled Wadsworth turning to him and saying what that regiment was doing up there; said he had given orders some time ago for those troops to be withdrawn, and directed me to go and withdraw them unless there was some special occasion, which was not apparent to him for their remaining. Pressing his head against his horse's neck, Ellsworth galloped through the maelstrom to give orders to Harney. Major Harney then gave orders, to be communicated along the line, for the men to divest themselves of everything but the rifle and cartridge box. Thus went our rations, and until July 4, only two crackers from a passing regiment sustained us, complained Captain James Coey. With three enemy regiments pushing down on its front, flank, and rear, extracting the 147th New York from its precarious position was not easy. Coey recalled the orders as the men were to fire, rise up and immediately fall down, thus letting the enemy's fire pass over them, Then bending low, march in quick step to the rear, trailing their guns, loading and firing at will. The regiment fired its volley, then crouched down. When it received orders to rise up and run to the rear, it seemed to melt away, as it received the retained fire of the enemy's line, recalled Coey. It was now a race for the rear, and in their excitement, many of the inexperienced Southerners neglected to remove their ramrods before firing their rifles. This caused even more terror among the retreating Northern troops. In all, the regiment probably remained in combat for at least ten additional minutes after its comrades withdrew. The seventy-nine survivors (of the original 380) eventually joined the 76th New York and 56th Pennsylvania behind Oak Ridge on the north side of Chambersburg Pike, where they refilled their canteens and rested. The fight of the 147th New York, an untested regiment in its first battle, was said to be a highlight of the first day's battle. Its gallant stand had helped save Hall's battery from certain capture.⁶³

While three of Cutler's regiments were battling Davis's Brigade on the north side of Chambersburg Pike, the two remaining regiments, the 84th and 95th New York, were taking position just to the south of the McPherson farm buildings. Cutler decided to remain with the three regiments across the road, so he ordered Colonel Edward Fowler to take command of the two regiments to the south of it. The demi-brigade almost immediately engaged the skirmishers from Archer's Brigade, whose main body was still beyond Willoughby Creek. It must have been a welcome relief for the New Yorkers to see the black-hatted Westerners from the Iron Brigade arrive and take position on their left.⁶⁴

Looking across Chambersburg Pike to his right, Colonel Fowler was surprised to see the remnants of his three sister regiments streaming to safety to the rear, pursued by a thick mass of Confederates. Knowing that the whole Federal defensive line would collapse if the enemy rolled up its right flank, Fowler about-faced his two regiments and pulled them back a short distance. When about even with the Confederate line across the road, he ordered his men to change front forward on the right so that the right-most company pivoted to the right until it faced the enemy. The next company completed this maneuver, then the third, until both regiments faced Davis's Brigade's right flank. Upon reaching Chambersburg Pike, Fowler ordered his men to lie down. Around this time, General Doubleday ordered the 6th Wisconsin forward, which ultimately formed on the 95th New York's right. Although the Badgers claimed otherwise after the war, the New Yorkers insisted that the three regiments had attacked Davis's Brigade together.⁶⁵

Davis's men were disordered at this time and their higher-ranking officers seem to have lost control. The men, however, knew a threat when they saw one, and three Federal regiments lying along the road on their flank stopped them in their tracks. Wheeling to their right, they confronted the new threat. Fowler's troops were not about to make it easy for the Confederates, and, with their muskets barrels resting on the fence rails along Chambersburg Pike, poured volleys into Davis's men. The fire from the thousand muskets was just too hot for the enemy, so they approached the unfinished railroad cut. Only now did Davis realize that the situation had gone from sweet victory to the possibility of defeat, as the three regiments he had driven backward loomed on his flank and three other regiments were in front. The time had come for a retreat.⁶⁶

Colonel Fowler could sense the tide shifting, and ordered his 84th New York to charge. At the Colonel's command they rushed forward with a cheer … as the troops, charging with dash and spirit, reached this little eminence, they were met with a murderous hail of musket bullets. The balls came so thick and fast that the whirring noise they made sounded like the steady rhythm of machinery. For just an instant, as the full force of this terrible fire broke along their front, the line wavered, recalled C. V. Tervis of the regiment. Composing themselves, the units rushed on. Men dropped with each step. The 95th New York and 6th Wisconsin also charged across Chambersburg Pike. Many of the Confederates had jumped into the unfinished railroad cut for safety. It was a trap, as the sides were too steep for an escape.⁶⁷

The 6th Wisconsin sent a detachment to flank the enemy in the railroad cut, thus cutting off their retreat. As the three Federal regiments lined the bank, hundreds of Confederates threw down their rifles to surrender. This action claimed a lasting page in the history of the battle for Cutler's Brigade. After sending the prisoners to the rear, the three regiments joined the remainder of Cutler's Brigade in the woods just to the east on Seminary Ridge. Here the men rested and helped the wounded.

At about 1:00 P.M. that afternoon, Cutler ordered his men forward to reoccupy their former positions. According to a recent analysis by James McLean, the troops were arranged, from south to north (left to right), as 6th Wisconsin–84th New York–95th New York–76th New York–56th Pennsylvania–147th New York. Wadsworth detached the two left regiments, the 6th Wisconsin and the 84th New York, to support Calef's battery, which occupied Hall's battery's old position.⁶⁸

After about forty-five minutes, General Cutler made another disturbing observation: I discovered the enemy putting a battery in position on my right flank and moving forward large bodies of infantry in the same direction. Rodes's Division had arrived on Oak Hill, squarely on Cutler's flank. Requesting orders, Wadsworth told Cutler to take such a position as I judged proper. He decided to wheel his four regiments to the right, via a right oblique movement, to face this new threat from the north. His men were