National Versus Human Security: Australian and Canadian Military Interventions

By Gregory MacCallion

By examining two military interventions that have defined the post-Cold War period, Somalia (1992-1995) and Afghanistan (2001-2014), this book argues that for Australia and Canada, the concept of human security works better in practice than it does in theory. When human security was first advanced in 1994, debates raged. It was argued that the concept needed an agreed and articulated definition before it could have policy relevance or applicability. The book provides unprecedented access to the key actors and decision makers, including Prime Ministers, military commanders, and senior diplomats.

It argues that the core concept of human security has altered states’ understanding of traditional national security during the implementation of military interventions. The experience of Australia and Canada over this period demonstrates that the concept of human security is becoming more relevant to states, and their policy makers and military planners, as they conduct military interventions.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Melbourne University Publishing Ltd
• Release date: Aug 20, 2019
• ISBN: 9780522875386

Book preview

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The history of human security

Between 2001 and 2014, both Australia and Canada were involved in a military intervention in Afghanistan that looked quite unlike previous interventions. During Australia’s deployment to Afghanistan, more than 1550 soldiers, as well as special forces, were stationed in the Afghan province of Uruzgan, conducting military operations in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.¹ Meanwhile, the Australian forces were also involved in non-military activities, including the construction of schools, medical centres and a waste management facility.² Additionally, in the Uruzgan provincial capital of Tarin Kowt, an Australian-run trade training school was teaching ‘fixed steel and concreting, plumbing and basic construction skills courses’ to local people.³ The Australian mission also considerably increased the number of civilian agencies deployed alongside the military within the mission.

At the same time, in the province of Kandahar, the Canadians were also conducting military operations with the deployment of 2500 soldiers to the ISAF mission.⁴ Like the Australians, the Canadian Forces were conducting both military and non-military tasks. Their key non-military tasks were their ‘signature projects’, which included rehabilitating a dam and irrigation system in the province, building schools and a local education system, and supporting an immunisation program targeting polio.⁵ The Canadians, also like the Australians, significantly increased the presence of their civilian agencies within the mission. Both Australia and Canada therefore appear to have been implementing their missions in a similar fashion. Australia and Canada, in their military interventions in Afghanistan, have seemingly prioritised the security of individuals from both military and non-military threats, through the integration of both military and non-military means. Both countries appeared to expand increasingly beyond traditional national security approaches that emphasise the use of military responses to military threats to engage in practices that are more closely associated with the concept of human security.

Although there is much debate regarding the definition of human security, the concept essentially promotes the prioritising of the security of individuals, from military and non-military threats, by integrating military and non-military means. Human security was promoted in the post–Cold War period as a challenge to traditional national security approaches, which emphasised the security of the state, from military threats, by military means. The United Nations Development Program Report 1994 (the UNDP Report) was one of the first formal documents to promote human security as an emerging concept in international relations.⁶ It argued:

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people … we need another profound transition in thinking from nuclear security to human security.⁷

The concept of human security is focused on the prioritisation of the security of individuals rather than the traditional focus on the security of the state.⁸ The UNDP Report emphasised that human security ‘must encompass matters beyond military threats’.⁹

In the years following the UNDP Report, several other major reports further developed the concept of human security.¹⁰ However, the concept was also widely criticised. The key point of criticism was the concept’s lack of analytical clarity owing to its nebulous and contested definition. It was argued that, without more precision in the definition, the concept could not become a norm in international relations. Roland Paris argued that there was a limit to ‘the usefulness of the human security concept for students and practitioners of international politics … [because] the concept lacks a precise definition’.¹¹ Although the concept was attractive as a potential norm, its analytical weakness was seen to prevent it from having policy relevance for states.¹² It was argued that states would not adhere to a norm of human security owing to the vague and amorphous nature of the concept: how can one adhere to a norm when the content and boundaries of that concept are unclear?¹³

Considering that the fundamental elements of human security appear to be evident in the Australian and the Canadian military interventions in Afghanistan, this research set out to examine the utility of human security as a concept for states in international relations. By doing so, it aimed to establish whether human security had become a norm that states have internalised in their practice and, if so, to what degree. There are two ways to assess the extent of a state’s norm internalisation: by what they say, and by what they do. Must states accept and articulate the concept of human security in their foreign policy before they use it in military interventions, or can it still be used in implementation? If human security practices are evident in military missions, regardless of whether the state has consciously adopted the policy in advance, could this prompt acceptance and articulation of the concept by that state?

As noted above, despite the difficulties that exist in defining the concept of human security, both Australia and Canada appear to have incorporated its fundamental elements in their military interventions in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is all the more curious as Canada had previously used human security in its stated—or declaratory—policies on foreign policy, whereas Australia had not used the concept in any declaratory policies relating to either its military interventions or its foreign policy.¹⁴ Interestingly, although Australia and Canada are similar in many ways, they adopted differing declaratory policies in regard to the concept of human security. This raises questions as to how states use, or do not use, human security in relation to their military interventions. How is the concept reflected in their declaratory policies (what they say) and their implementation approaches to military interventions (what they do)? The question that this book seeks to answer is: how has the core concept of human security featured in, or shaped, Australian and Canadian declaratory policies and implementation approaches to military interventions in the post–Cold War period?

The research examines two military interventions in the post–Cold War period in which both Australia and Canada were involved. It examines whether the concept of human security featured in or shaped their declaratory policies and/or their implementation approaches to their missions. The first military intervention, Somalia (1992–95), commenced before the popularisation of the term ‘human security’ and before Canada explicitly utilised the concept in its foreign policy. The second military intervention, Afghanistan (2001–14), followed the establishment of human security as a concept. By examining these two cases, the research aims to engage with a major debate regarding the utility of human security in international relations. More broadly, it also aims to further understandings of the conception and practices of human and national security in the post–Cold War world.

The human security debate

Following the introduction of the concept of human security in the UNDP Report of 1994, two sets of literature emerged that contested the relevance and applicability of the concept in international relations: proponents of human security and critics of human security. Proponents attempted to define human security in a way that both encapsulated the aims of the UNDP Report and demonstrated the relevance of the concept to practice and policy so that it could be implemented in the international policies of states.¹⁵ The proponents of human security were divided between those subscribing to ‘narrow’ interpretations of human security, under the rubric ‘freedom from fear’, and those subscribing to ‘wide’ interpretations of human security, under the rubric ‘freedom from want’.¹⁶ ‘Freedom from fear’ proponents argued that it was necessary to narrow the range of threats encompassed by human security to only violent threats so that the concept could gain ‘greater analytical and policy value’.¹⁷ ‘Freedom from want’ proponents argued that it was important to incorporate a wider number of threats to the security of individuals so that the concept encompassed both violent and non-violent threats to human security.¹⁸ The principle issue at stake here was not the breadth and nature of the range of threats encompassed by the concept but the failure of the proponents to agree on a clear definition of human security, which made it the subject of intense criticism.

Critics of human security argued that because of the concept’s amorphous and nebulous nature, it lacked utility as an operational concept: to put it bluntly, if you cannot define the concept, how can you operationalise it? If it was not an operational concept, then it was unlikely that human security could become a norm that states could adopt. Heather Owens and Barbara Arneil, for instance, argue that human security was perceived to be ‘too broad and vague a concept to be meaningful for policy-makers … [I]n practice, human security is too amorphous to implement successfully.’¹⁹ Similarly Roland Paris’s seminal piece on human security, while being sympathetic to the concept, argued that the concept lacked analytical clarity and that this would result in policy irrelevance.²⁰ Barry Buzan also critiqued human security, arguing that ‘it proliferates concepts without adding analytical value’.²¹ Both Paris and Yuen Foong Khong argued that by prioritising the individual, ‘we are making the security of each and every individual on the planet the object of our concern … [T]he result of such an approach is (total) paralysis of our ability to prioritize [original parentheses].’²² Even proponents have acknowledged that human security’s conceptual pliability was its main liability for policy effectiveness.²³

Does this lack of an agreed and specified definition of the concept mean that it is not possible to analyse human security as a meaningful concept in international relations today? I argue that, despite the contestation over the definition of human security, there are two common assumptions that both proponents and critics of human security share. The first is that human security must be defined before being implemented. The second, that there are three fundamental elements of human security. For despite the many, varied and contested definitions of human security that evolved following the UNDP Report, there are certain fundamental elements that constitute it—what will be referred to in this book as ‘the core concept of human security’.²⁴ Having surveyed the literature, I identified the three fundamental elements of the core concept of human security as: the prioritisation of the security of the individual as the referent object; from both military and non-military threats; and, the mitigation of these threats by the integration of both military and non-military means.²⁵

Table 1 illustrates how the core concept of human security relates to conceptions of traditional national security. Traditional national security has the security of the state as the primary focus (the referent object). The military is both the source of threat and the means by which to mitigate the threat. Conversely, all definitions of human security prioritise the security of the individual from military and non-military threats and call for both military and nonmilitary approaches to mitigate these threats.

Table 1: Comparison of core concept of human security and traditional national security

Source: based on Paris, ‘Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?’, p. 98; and Owen, ‘Human security: A contested contempt’, p. 40

The second, and most important, assumption shared by proponents and critics is that human security must be effectively defined before it can be implemented.²⁶ Proponents and critics agree that only by clearly establishing a workable definition of human security will policy-makers be able to implement policies that will prioritise and address the fundamental elements of human security: the security of individuals, from military and non-military threats, by military and non-military means.

At this point, there are therefore three elements of human security that need defining: human security as a concept; human security as a norm; and human security as a practice. Human security as a concept is the theoretical study of security that places the individual as the referent object of security, through the integration of military and non-military means.

Human security as a norm is the assertion that human security should/ought be how security is practised by states in preference to traditional national security approaches by stipulated prescribed behaviours and practices.²⁷ This definition is an application of Ann Florini’s claim that international norms are defined by their claim that a practice should/ought to occur.²⁸ The definition is also in alignment with Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s definition of a norm as ‘a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity’.²⁹ Norms are not static but evolve and change across time and context, a process referred to as norm diffusion.³⁰ There are various positions in the debate on how norms diffuse; however, the main assumption is that norms inform practice. Therefore, in order to identify whether a concept has become a norm, there should be evident claims that certain practices should/ought to be undertaken. Implicit within all discussions on the concept of human security becoming a norm is the assumption that a concept informs the norm, which is then demonstrated in practice.

Therefore human security as a practice is defined as an identifiable set of behaviours in distinction to traditional national security—an emphasis on the state as the referent object and the military as the primary means to secure the state. In practice therefore human security is identifiable through the prioritisation of the security of the individual, from military and non-military threats, through the integration of military and non-military means.

While the debate surrounding the theoretical definition of human security has been robust, little attention has been paid to determining whether or not the concept has become a norm; whether human security has become a standard of appropriate behaviour for states.³¹ While the term ‘human security’ was adopted in the 1990s, most notably by Canada, Japan and Norway, the degree to which the concept has since become a norm that states have followed is debatable.³² Edward Newman has noted that human security is a ‘normatively attractive but analytically weak concept’.³³ Critics are therefore sceptical, and proponents wary, of the concept’s utility and its prospects of becoming a norm in international relations and therefore informing practice.

How, then, do critics and proponents account for the way in which the Australian and Canadian interventions in Afghanistan seemingly prioritise the security of individuals, from military and non-military threats, through the integration of military and nonmilitary means? For all intents and purposes, this looks like the implementation of human security. This indicates that practice is informing the norm despite the flaws in the concept.

Two competing explanations for the Australian and the Canadian implementation approaches in Afghanistan might be derived from existing literature on human security. Proponents of human security would expect Canada, which previously utilised human security in its declaratory policies, to implement a military mission with increased prioritisation of the security of the individual, from military and non-military threats, through military and nonmilitary means. However, proponents of human security could not account for Australia’s implementation of approaches that also utilised the core concept of human security, as Australia had never referred to human security in its declaratory policies. If, as they stipulate, the concept must be defined before being implemented, then proponents cannot account for Australia’s apparent utilisation of the concept in Afghanistan.

For critics, human security is a concept that is too vague and amorphous to be implemented. Critics of human security would assume that the concept could not be implemented by either Australia or Canada, regardless of the differences in their declaratory policies. They would therefore assume that, despite Canada’s utilisation of human security in their declaratory policies, there would be no change in the way in which they conducted their military interventions. Critics would expect that during the implementation of their military missions, neither Australia nor Canada would prioritise the security of individuals as a referent object; states would therefore not integrate military and non-military approaches during their interventions to achieve this goal.³⁴ However, neither proponents nor critics can properly account for the Australian and Canadian approaches to military interventions.

Main argument

Having examined Australian and Canadian declaratory policies and implementation approaches to their military interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan, this research has found that since the end of the Cold War, both Australia and Canada have utilised the core concept of human security in the implementation of their missions, despite lacking a clear definition of human security within their declaratory policies. The fundamental elements of the core concept of human security have played a significant role in the implementation of the Australian and the Canadian military interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan. Furthermore, this research has found that both states subsequently included references to human security in their declaratory policies following their implementation of military interventions that prioritised the security of individuals through non-military means. This suggests that the utilisation of the core concept of human security in the implementation of a military intervention shaped and influenced each state’s declaratory policies.

This book presents a framework for analysing the practices of states to determine their relative acceptance of a norm human security.³⁵ The framework includes a continuum from rejection, to co-option, to adaption, to adoption. The case studies examined in this book indicate that the fundamental elements of the concept were co-opted and adapted in the implementation phases of the Somalia and Afghanistan military interventions. Through this process the concept of human security has moved along the norm acceptance continuum during military interventions, a continuum that extends from rejection to adoption.

It is evident that during the Australian and Canadian military interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan, the core concept of human security was increasingly utilised in each country’s implementation approaches, despite the lack of an agreed, specific conceptual definition in either country’s declaratory policies. In the implementation of both missions, both states came to prioritise the security of the individual, from military and non-military threats, through the increased integration of military and non-military approaches. The core concept of human security was co-opted and adapted by both Australia and Canada through an increased prioritisation of the security of individuals alongside traditional notions of national security.

I argue that both Australia and Canada have come to acknowledge the limited utility of traditional national security approaches when implementing military interventions. Previously, traditional national security approaches concentrated on military responses to the military threats from other states. The book will demonstrate that Australia and Canada now consider that during the implementation of a mission, the core concept of human security has become a necessary condition for achieving mission success. Traditional security, based solely on the military, is now perceived as a necessary, although insufficient, condition for providing security during military interventions. Consequently, Australia and Canada now incorporate non-military means during their implementation of military interventions.

As a result of the strategies and practices adopted during the implementation of their missions in Somalia and Afghanistan, Australia and Canada eventually utilised the fundamental elements of human security in their declaratory policies in order to justify the conduct of their missions. This is contrary to arguments of both proponents and critics of human security who assume that the concept has to be a declared and defined policy before it can be implemented.

The book builds on the work of Pauline Kerr, William T Tow and Marianne Hanson, who, in one of the few studies on states’ engagement of human security, argue that norms of human security will be pursued by states when ‘state interests and humanitarian norms co-exist and are interdependent; and second, it is likely that these norms will serve as a means for enhancing perceptions of national security’.³⁶

I build on this argument by highlighting the differences that can exist between a state’s declared national security policies and the implementation of those policies. Whether or not a state declares policies that explicitly stipulate a human security component does not preclude that state’s utilisation of human security approaches during the implementation of those policies. This was evident during the military interventions in both Somalia and Afghanistan. This research finds that during the implementation of military interventions, Australians and Canadians based their utilisation of the core concept of human security on three important elements: the perception of the limitation of traditional national security approaches; the perception of human security as a necessary condition for mission success; and the perception that human security reflects national values.

Building further on Kerr, Tow and Hanson, this research demonstrates that states will utilise human security in their declaratory policies when a state’s national identity and its national interests are interdependent and coexist with established humanitarian norms. That is, during the implementation of military interventions, states will pursue the core concept of human security when it is perceived as a necessary, although not necessarily a sufficient, condition for mission success, and when such actions reflect the state’s national values. Most importantly, in the cases analysed, the states utilised the core concept of human security in their declaratory policies after the concept was utilised in the implementation of their military missions. This suggests the existence of a dialectical relationship between state-centric and human security. The existence of such a dialectic has been identified by Pauline Kerr.³⁷ However, where Kerr focuses upon the dialectic between state-centric and human-centric approaches, this research argues that there is also a dialectic between a state’s implementation approaches and its declaratory policies.³⁸ The research will explain and expand upon this process, noting that this evolution occurred despite the apparent decline in the concept’s use in the declaratory policies of states.

The number of states that utilise the actual term ‘human security’ in their foreign policy has declined in recent years (most notably Canada).³⁹ I argue, however, that despite this decline, the core concept of human security continues to be employed by states as they engage in military interventions. This is also despite lacking a clear definition of the concept or making use of the term in their declaratory policies. In this regard, the research suggests that in order to understand human security and its utility, ‘academic criteria are not always what determines a concept’s success or failure’.⁴⁰

The cases presented in this study also demonstrate the different processes by, and levels to which, the fundamental elements of the core concept of human security have been implemented in military interventions. This has implications for the ways in which we think about the evolution of human security as a norm. The following section will explain in more detail how the research was designed and what methods were used in order to reach these conclusions.

Mission case selection: The nascence and establishment of human security

This research examines the declaratory policies and implementation approaches during one military intervention in the post–Cold War period before the introduction of human security, and one military intervention following the concept’s establishment. The US-led, UN-mandated military intervention in Somalia (1992–95) commenced in the post–Cold War period, two years before the establishment of the concept of human security. The US-led, UN-mandated mission to Afghanistan (2001–14) commenced seven years after the introduction of the concept.

Both Somalia and Afghanistan are ‘crucial cases’. The facts of each case are central ‘to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a theory’.⁴¹ Under investigation is the relevance of the concept of human security for states in their declaratory policies and the feasibility of its implementation during military interventions. Both missions exemplify crucial ‘before’ and ‘after’ cases within a longitudinal study.⁴² Somalia is a crucial case, commencing two years before the publication of the UNDP Report that first popularised human security as a concept. Methodologically, it is a crucial case because it explores the implementation of human security before the concept was clearly articulated. The UNDP Report was heavily influenced by experiences in Somalia and elsewhere in the post–Cold War period.⁴³ Afghanistan is also a crucial case for examining the degree to which the now-established, although still contested, concept of human security has affected states’ declaratory policies and implementation approaches because it examines the concept post-UNDP Report.

Somalia, 1992–95: The nascence of human security

The military intervention in Somalia was unprecedented in that it was the first use of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (peace enforcement measures), within a state, in the post–Cold War period.⁴⁴ Following the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia descended into civil war. A famine then gripped the nation. The civil war exacerbated the famine, creating a humanitarian disaster in the country. With the world watching live news broadcasts, the situation gained international attention and precipitated calls for action.⁴⁵

In April 1992, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) commenced as a humanitarian mission to provide humanitarian aid to the country. UNOSOM was unable to protect the humanitarian aid adequately once it arrived in Somalia, however, owing to the deterioration of security in the country. Following the failure of UNOSOM, the United States agreed in December to lead an alternative UN-mandated Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was empowered by the UN Security Council to use ‘all necessary means’ to deliver humanitarian aid to Somalia.⁴⁶ Consisting of more than 37 000 troops from twenty-seven countries, UNITAF was one of the largest humanitarian interventions ever attempted at that time.⁴⁷ In March 1993, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was created to take over from UNITAF. With a deteriorating security situation and some countries, most notably the United States, withdrawing their commitments, UNOSOM II eventually withdrew completely from Somalia on 3 March 1995.⁴⁸

Somalia became one of the first peace enforcement missions whereby ‘the Security Council authorized a Chapter 7 intervention—without the consent of a sovereign government—for explicitly humanitarian reasons’.⁴⁹ Most importantly, the intervention in Somalia was perceived as a clear case of intervention by states ‘without obvious interests’.⁵⁰ Although the mission was termed ‘humanitarian’ at the time, it is a crucial case study for evaluating how states prioritised the security of the individual when declaring and implementing military interventions, before the development of the concept of human security.

Afghanistan, 2001–14: The establishment of human security

The military intervention in Afghanistan represents the second crucial case in the period following the establishment of human security as a concept. The terrorist attacks on the United States, on 11 September 2001 (9/11), were conducted by the Afghanistan-based terrorist organisation Al Qaeda. Demands by the United States for the Afghan Taliban government to hand over those responsible were denied. As a result, the United States invaded Afghanistan in order to overthrow the Taliban government, destroy the Al Qaeda training camps and capture Osama Bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda.⁵¹ On 7 October 2001, the US invasion of Afghanistan began. The Taliban government was overthrown on 11 November 2001.⁵² In December, a conference in Bonn, Germany, established the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to re-establish the state of Afghanistan. Involving, at its peak, 172 000 troops from forty-six nations, the ISAF mission to Afghanistan was one of the longest and largest military interventions in the post–Cold War period.⁵³

The use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as part of ISAF was one of the most controversial developments of the military mission in Afghanistan.⁵⁴ A Provincial Reconstruction Team is ‘[a]n interim civil-military organization designed to operate in semi-permissive environments usually following open hostilities. The PRT is intended to improve stability in a given area by helping build the host nation’s legitimacy and effectiveness in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services.’⁵⁵

PRTs came under intense scrutiny as they integrated military and non-military approaches to security within a military intervention.⁵⁶ The PRTs were designed by the US military as a ‘population-centric’ approach to winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan people.⁵⁷ They became a contentious issue owing to the involvement of the military in aid and development programs during the military mission.⁵⁸ The PRTs were established to provide support for the new Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The integration of military and non-military approaches to security, in a population-centric form, makes the military intervention in Afghanistan a crucial case for investigating how the core concept of human security featured in, and shaped, the implementation of the selected states’ military missions.

Why Australia and Canada?

Australia and Canada are similar states in many respects, despite diverging in their declaratory use of human security in their respective foreign policies. Australia and Canada provide an interesting comparison between two ‘strategic cousins’.⁵⁹ Both countries have similar cultural heritage and government type, and they share a head of state: Queen Elizabeth II.⁶⁰ Both are traditionally perceived as middle powers in the international system.⁶¹ This means that both states have commitments to multilateralism and generally support international institutions. Australians and Canadians share values that are broadly liberal internationalist—based on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. It is these values which will help set the perception that human security is a reflection of national values.

Their relative strategic positions are both predicated on the United States, which was the lead actor in both military interventions. Australia and Canada were both involved in the military interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan in the post–Cold War period. Their commitments were comparable in size, with both states committing similar levels of troops to each mission (see Appendix 1). Australian and Canadian commitments, as a ratio of the overall mission, were comparable for both countries and across both missions.

As Australia and Canada are most similar in most aspects of their political, cultural and historical criteria but diverge on their declaratory use of human security, they are cases that are ‘most likely’ to have significant divergence in their implementation of human security.⁶² Proponents of human security would expect to see divergence between Australia and Canada over a period of time, owing to Canada’s declaratory policies regarding human security. Critics of human security, however, would expect to see no evidence of the core concept of human security being increasingly implemented by either state, owing to the nebulous nature of the concept.

A key area where these two countries diverged, however, was in their declaratory positions on human security in their respective foreign policies. Before the Afghanistan mission, Canada articulated and promoted the concept of human security and declared it central to its foreign policy whereas Australia did not mention human security in any of its foreign policy statements.⁶³

First championed in 1996 by the then Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy, human security became prominent as a guiding concept for Canada’s foreign policy