The Paradox of the Subject

By Luis Marquez

In this academic work, Luis Marquez uncovers the paradoxical notion of the human psyche that brings about an eruptual end to the meaningless abyss of post-modernism. By bringing together the works and thoughts of numerous great thinkers such as: Socrates, Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza, Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Lacan, Friedrich Nietzsche and Alasdair MacIntyre; Luis Marquez is able to elicit a rich philosophical discourse. The main theme of this work is to tackle the prevailing decline of Aristotelian teleology or the telos, its ethical dimension in Western political and cultural thought. Following the critique of Žižek and MacIntyre about post-modernism's inherent absence of a coherent, purposeful political and culture discourse, Luis Marquez argues for the revival of the telos within a political society by unlocking its revolutionary potential within human unconsciousness. Marquez formulates a compelling critique of contemporary philosophers who argue that the telos is lost or has gone extinct, by demonstrating the contrary, as a critical component of human relations and a vital source of further human progression and happiness.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tellwell Talent
• Release date: Aug 13, 2019
• ISBN: 9780228807728

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The Paradox of the Subject

Copyright © 2019 by Luis Giovanni Marquez

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the author, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.

Tellwell Talent

www.tellwell.ca

ISBN

978-0-2288-0771-1 (Paperback)

978-0-2288-0772-8 (eBook)

Dedication

I dedicate this book to two of the most important people in my life. First to my son, Aurelius Leon Marquez-Ilia, who was born on 27 July 2015. His presence, smile and laughter gave me the strength and creativity to continue writing and finish this book. Second, and most importantly, I dedicate this book to my wonderful, sweet, intelligent wife, Nereida Ilia. Her intellectual influence on me is incalculable. Her introduction to sociological-philosophic theories and concepts to me form the conceptual bedrock upon which I have written this book. It has been her patience and understanding that has allowed me to start, continue and finish it, despite the birth of our son and the new demands and responsibilities as new parents. Without her, I could never have accomplished this feat that I bestowed upon myself to do, nor would I have ever had the creativity and fortitude to have written my thought on the subject at hand.

Special Thanks

I would like to thank my entire family, Luis Eduardo Marquez (Father), Luz Marquez (Mother) and my brother Omar Marquez for their love, support, encouragement and for instilling in me the ambition and the intellectual love of life. Without you, I would never have made it this far in my life.

I would also like to thank my closest friend and comrade, Darko Zdravic, for his intellectual influence and support in helping me write this book.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1

A Paradoxical Hypothesis

Chapter 2

The Subject’s Metaphysical Substance

Chapter 3

Political philosophy of the Subject

Chapter 4

State of Being as the Mean: Ideology

Chapter 5

Spinoza and the Repressed Telos

Chapter 6

The State of Being Part I: Ego ≠ Cogito

Chapter 7

The State of Being Part II: Finding the Sublime in the Monstrosity

Chapter 1

A Paradoxical Hypothesis

All forms of human life are a paradox. It has been especially explicit in our postmodern world, but as a kind of traumatic rupture in which we are now desperately attempting to believe in things, from God to our cultural and political values, such as freedom, democracy, human rights, love etc. The structure that once posited our reality and our place in it onto an externalized entity has now been or is being extinguished, rupturing the traumatic reality of our symbolic identity as a mere contradiction: that such an identity and purpose were never our own. We have succumbed to the cynical attitude of the subjectivity of the objectivity, in that we no longer have a clear foundation for our values, beliefs, historical role and future as anything ‘objectively’ certain. We have realized that everything we have come to know and understand is supposedly a representation of the world and our place in it. Following Albert Camus, we have surrendered to the absurdity of life in its absolute meaninglessness.

This is nothing new. Many thinkers have already predicated and expressed their concerns about the failure of our epistemological foundation. The result has been nothing but hysteria, an apocalyptic end to our symbolic identity. No wonder Slavoj Žižek contended that it is easier for the postmodern subject to believe in the end of the world, rather than attempt to restructure our subjectivity and the way we look at things, particularly ourselves.

What a defeatist attitude! Is this not what we wanted? Is this not the triumph of not only capitalism, but of multiculturalism, of human rights, of equality and equity? Did the countries of the West not wish to create (at the very least within their own statehood) a world in which people can live and worship freely, without discrimination or hatred towards others that are different than you?

In order to make room for others within this symbolic universe, any objective certainty had to be done away with. That is, any epistemological foundation had to be subjectivized. Alas, as we are now seeing—with the rise of Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, the refugee crisis as a result of the civil war in Syria and instability in Iraq—the entire enterprise is failing. Old wounds are reopening. Yet the failure lies not in the stereotypical notions of ethnic hatred or religious fundamentalism, nor even in the ignorance of people about the true nature of the diverse cultures (if only we would study the history and culture of people, we would come to understand them etc.) The problem lies not in the supposed failure of multicultural interaction and understanding, but in the failure of taking for granted the presupposition that our own values and beliefs and knowledge were ever our own.

I have always found it fascinating that people in general are so attached to their ideas, beliefs and values, yet when asked a simple question as to why they believe in them, they are dumbfounded by the very thought of the question. Oftentimes they assume that by asking why, we are questioning or preparing ourselves to find flaws, or completely disregarding their values, ideas and beliefs as imaginary fallacies. That is exactly the intention I seek when making such interpersonal inquiries. It is now more imperative than ever to make such judgmental queries not only with others, but with ourselves. Postmodernism has created a huge gap within our moral psychology, a void that is only increasing in intensity, frustration and fanaticism. Yet it nevertheless presents the subject with an opportunity, rather than an apocalyptic attitude, to reassess his/her abstract thoughts in both its content and form.

One would suppose that an individual living his whole life in a particularly political society that invokes certain moral values, beliefs and ideas, would learn and uphold them in his/her daily life, and that he/she would be able to defend his/her decision to consider them as his/her own. This is no longer the case in our postmodern world. We have not only taken our abstract thoughts for granted, but have individualized them, neglecting their psycho-social/historical context.

This is the hypothesis that I wish to emphasize: that people in our postmodern society have been disconnected from their very own values, ideas and beliefs. A lack of an external paternal authority gave way to our cultural/symbolic foundation that once held it sway. We now perversely hang on to these same values, ideas and beliefs, called abstract thoughts, by attempting to re-establish the Big Other’s paternal authority in its monstrosity rather than its potential sublimity.

This disconnection stems from the subject’s own failures in assuming his/her subjective disposition in establishing such connections with their own abstract thoughts. As a result of such a failure, the Big Other has always had to reinsure such abstract thoughts that applies in each political society onto its members to uphold them, either through conversing and understanding, or as is often the case, in using its ‘iron hand’ to enforce them. In other words, historically, societies had to pick up the slack of each member’s failing responsibilities, a dangerous move that could have led to political oppression given the right circumstance. This has led societies to be coerced into coercing their members into upholding their abstract thoughts, because the very existence of society is fundamentally dependent on its members. The neglect of people in finding the path towards their very own abstract thoughts has led to a complete disregard of them; establishing chaotic relationships with each other that permeate their established social realm. As a consequence, I further expand my hypothesis to postulate that such a turbulent relationship between society and its members is not only unnecessary, but also reversible.

The discussion here is not the evaluation of certain types of abstract thoughts that society insists its contemporaries be considered as true or false. In other words, it is not the conclusion of a single or set of abstract thoughts that is going to be discussed. Rather, it is the attempt of analyzing the structure, as well as its social and historical process, that allows for our abstract thoughts to originate and conduce their sequence. To put it another way, it is reconfiguring the breakdown of language itself. People are disconnected from their own tradition and rituals despite following them every day. Yet in our postmodern society, it is not just a simple lack of consciousness; the loss of the Big Other’s authority has disenchanted people about the nature of their abstract thoughts, providing no references or directions by which they can dictate the course of their own values and beliefs. Cynicism and even nihilism are becoming predominant discourses in people’s lives. It is this inability in finding direction that compounds the problem, with people having no rational justification as to why they continue to follow certain abstract thoughts other than for the sake of the Other, and not themselves. And, as we shall see in later chapters, this breakdown of any meaningful and directive association with our abstract thoughts constitutes the breakdown of our own symbolic identity.

Our abstract thoughts are being carried out without offering any strong, valid, and rational arguments for their existence and acknowledgement in the first place. Therefore, the results are threefold. First, by not providing any continuous valid reasons or justifications to support our abstract thought within a postmodern perspective but, rather, skipping this entire process altogether, our supporting notion of them is not an obsessive compulsion towards them. Secondly, by skipping the process of providing arguments of our abstract thought through reasonable assertions that support the duty and claims of our thoughts, we have become completely disconnected from them. By disconnected, I connote the failure in understanding our own thoughts, their meaning and structure, whereby our only connection with them lies in our affection towards our symbolic identity to practice them. Lastly, as a failure of inducing conscious logic to predominate in the particular existence, practice and understanding of our abstract thoughts from a postmodern network frame, we have become lost, utilizing our time to frantically hold onto our values and beliefs instead of providing alternative solutions toward the decline of our own convictions. As a result, we presuppose our abstract thoughts as a given Reality. In the words of the Slovenian Philosopher Slavoj Žižek, they believe before they actually believe.

Growing up in a multicultural environment, I came across such diverse forms of abstract thoughts at a very early age. The types of values, beliefs and ideas one came across depended on cultural and societal instances. However, I realized that, in addition to cultural and religious differences of abstract thought, there is an interconnected notion between all of these various abstract thoughts. That is, the creation and understanding of abstract thought is based on the uniqueness of how one perceives the world around him/her, while also becoming aware of how particular abstract thoughts within a particular political society is dependent on the understanding in themselves, but also from the other political societies, aka the Other. I quickly grasped the importance of these two features and their influence on the development, understanding and acceptance of abstract thoughts in each individual.

If each person’s personality is based on the uniqueness of their interpretation and perception of the world in their own form of understanding, then they must also form their own understanding of certain abstract thoughts. Additionally, society can, unofficially, provide certain arguments, evidence for the existence and acceptance of a certain set of abstract thoughts, although officially, it can only enforce them, by supporting them. The real connection is through the subject; only it can provide the link between themselves and the abstract thought that is supported by society.

The basis of this book will be to discuss the disconnection between us and our own abstract thoughts, the relationship between a political society and its members, and the conflict between the ego and the cogito, and how crucial these are to both the individual and to society. We will see that despite the ‘postmodern’ individual and society, attempting to establish this connection between us and our own abstract thoughts through advancement in technology, knowledge and communications, is still lacking.

Chapter 2

The Subject’s Metaphysical Substance

Metaphysics, in its attempts in understanding the nature of beings, does not derive from looking and analyzing objects, beings and substance that our senses perceive in the real world, for such an attempt merely prevents us from seeing the whole scope of the world itself¹. Metaphysics requires us to look at both what our senses perceive and the beings that are not disclosed in our interpretation of reality. It also involves looking and discovering every being’s transcendence. By transcendence, I am not referring to any religious or divine revelation, but rather to a being’s nonfigurative or abstract conception, which lies beyond any physical or scientific revelation². In Lacanian terms, metaphysics is looking and analyzing an object’s symbolic stance within our reality.

Metaphysics has usually been associated, and largely obsessed with, reality and what is really ‘out there’. It asks question such as: Why do we or do beings exist? What is the meaning of existence? How do I exist? What is my existence made up of? Does my existence or that of beings serve a purpose? Do beings have a purpose? And the list goes on. These metaphysical questions have all been asked and answers have been attempted since Antiquity by philosophers, scholars, theologians and intellectuals alike. Although many thoughts and ideas were considered, it left out a peculiar issue. When we ask questions as to the existence of beings or entities, especially living being including us, we are asking such questions already with a presupposition that we know what it means ‘to exist’³. This is precisely what the 20th century German philosopher Martin Heidegger became aware of when he investigated and reanalyzed the notion of metaphysics by asking: What does it mean to exist? For Heidegger, Western thinkers lost sight of the fundamental notion of metaphysics by being unaware if whether or not we really do know what it means to exist. There was no possibility of asking, let alone answering the question why, unless we first ask ourselves what does existence mean for beings. Only then can we begin to ask the question why.

Heidegger was on the right track by examining the way we view metaphysics by asking the right questions. Therefore, to further enhance the discovery of metaphysics and the nature of beings in the world, we must first ask ourselves: What is metaphysics? Once we have answered this question, we can proceed with the fundamental question of metaphysics, which will be revealed later in this chapter.

What is metaphysics, then? This question is crucial because this question has not and cannot be easily answered. However, I feel that we can at least give a rather content description of what metaphysics is.

The word itself, metaphysics, is hard to define, but what is known is that the whole definition of metaphysics was entirely accidental. It is derived from Aristotle’s fourteen books that have now been called Aristotle’s Metaphysics⁴. However, Aristotle himself did not know this word. It was not until Andronicus of Rhodes, a hundred years after Aristotle’s death, that the books were titled "Ta meta ta phusika—the after the physicals or the ones after the physical ones"⁵. Aristotle called his books that were the subject-matter of metaphysics as ‘First Philosophy’ or ‘a science that studies being insofar as it is being’⁶. Eventually, the Greek plural noun-phrase ‘ta meta ta phusika’ became, in Medieval Latin, the singular noun ‘metaphysica’, which became both the title of Aristotle’s work and the name of the science that is now its subject-matter⁷. However, it was not until the seventeenth century when the word ‘metaphysics’ became an catch-all phrase, in reference to any philosophical problem that either originally had no category in which to be classified or those philosophical problems which did not have any empirical basis to be scientifically acknowledged and proven⁸. Metaphysics thus became so commonly used that the word ontology began to be used in order to specifically refer to beings as such. (However, I will avoid using the word ontology and stick strictly with metaphysics.)

Yet, this is merely a definition of the word ‘metaphysics’. What does metaphysics actually mean? What is its nature?

To put it in simple terms, metaphysics is the science that studies beings as such and the causes of things⁹. As stated above, it initially concerned itself with the nature of beings and causes of movement of beings and changing of beings. However, metaphysics has incorporated other philosophical issues such as the nature of free will, personal identity, God, mental issues etc.¹⁰ However, for the sake of simplicity and relevance, the metaphysics that I seek to discuss concerns itself with the existence of beings and substance.

In addition, as hinted earlier, metaphysics has bluntly been associated with mystical, quasi-religious notions of beings and their nature. I can tell you right now that metaphysics has absolutely nothing to do with anything of that sort. Although it can, it does not officially associate itself with any mystical, religious, spiritual or divine relation with the real world. And if it does associate itself with it, it is part of the metaphysical understanding. It is not its essence, but accidental. It does not define it.

Metaphysics, then, in the general sense, is the philosophical discipline that concerns itself with objective physical or real beings of the real world and their subjective but abstract or theoretical conception or transcendence, in the Kantian sense of the term. Metaphysics seeks to unite and seek an understanding of both worlds and how they both relate to a particular being. In other words, metaphysics is the bridge between the Real World as ‘it is’, objectively, and its Symbolic stance by how we perceive it to be ‘as if’, subjectively, which allows us to form the abstract world which is based on the symbolic transcendence of every being. Before I continue on with this second metaphysical issue of the relation between the objective real world and our subjective abstract thought, I must address our first metaphysical problem.

Metaphysics, in my view, has revolved around three categories: existence, purpose (or telos) and the essence of beings. A central notion of metaphysics has been the meaning of existence. Why am I here? What is my purpose? Why are substances here? What is their purpose? What can I hope for? These, and many others, are all questions that are central to the meaning of existence in metaphysics. In order to better understand these categories, it is best to define them as accurately as possible.

Existence

The most familiar yet elusive of metaphysics’ categories, it is the existence of a substance. Depending on what is being discussed, a substance’s existence can be objective or subjective. I will not confuse anyone by arguing how one can exist objectively or subjectively. We can argue intensively by asking questions such as Why does Tom exist? and discuss whether or not Tom’s existence is subjective or objective. We can also ask a question as: What does it mean to exist? I am merely defining what existence is at its more basic level of understanding. Therefore, in this case, I am defining existence of a substance, in its most tangible or physical form. It needs not be subjective to someone’s awareness in order for that substance to exist physically.

Essence

Essence is the attribute or set of attributes that allows an object or substance to be identified for what it is, and which it has by necessity, and without which it loses its identity. For example, the cheetah’s most important attribute to its identity and survival is its ability to run fast to catch its prey. Essence is contrasted with accident: a property that the object or substance has contingently, without which the substance can still retain its identity. In the case of the cheetah, its spots are accidental, because whether or not a cheetah may have spots, stripes or neither, it does not change its essential attribute, its ability to run fast. This definition goes back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, where he links a substance’s definition to its essence. For Aristotle, it is not words that defines a substance, but their essence. He also links definition with essence. A definition is an account that signifies an essence¹¹.

Telos

Telos, a Greek word, is an end or purpose. Although it may sound rather easy to answer, it has also been as elusive as its contemporaries. It is the philosophical concept that invokes that final causes and/or purpose exist both in humans and in nature. In general, it may be said that there are two types of final causes, which may be called intrinsic finality and extrinsic finality:

•A thing or action has an extrinsic finality when it is for the sake of something external to itself. In a way, people exhibit extrinsic finality when they seek the happiness of a child. If the external thing had not existed, that action would not display finality.

•A thing or action has an intrinsic finality when it is for none other than its own sake. For example, one might try to be happy simply for the sake of being happy, and not for the sake of anything outside of that.

Aristotle outlines his metaphysics in his treatise titled Metaphysics, where he concludes that, for an entity or being to be, was for it to be what it is, without any qualifications¹². For example, in order for Socrates to be man, he must be a man. For Aristotle, existence is not an ontological constituent that is added to a being. For him, there is no distinction between existence and essence¹³. A substance is its essence. He argues that if something is primary and spoken of in respect for itself, it is one and the same as its essence, because this primary is its essence¹⁴. He does not include accidental characteristics as part of the essence of a substance. For example, the characteristic of a man being pale does not define that man to be such. A man can be pale, dark, or brown and yet still be considered as a man. Hence paleness is accidental and not the primary essence of a man.

For Aristotle, for a being or substance to exist it must be at one with its essence. Aristotle does mean existence literally. For him, for a being to be as a primary being or substance, it must metaphysically exist independently of other beings. However, for a being to be considered as a substance or primary being, it is not enough for a being to simply exist. Existence for Aristotle means nothing unless a being is one with its essence. Only then, in order to understand a certain being at the very least, can any meaning be found in a being and can be considered as such in its own right.

Additionally, Aristotle offers four causes in his Physics II 3 and Metaphysics V 2¹⁵:

•A thing’s material cause is the material of which it consists. For a table, that might be wood; for a statue, that might be bronze or marble.

•A thing’s formal cause is its form, i.e. the arrangement of that matter.

•A thing’s efficient or moving cause is the primary source of the change or rest. An efficient cause of x can be present even if x is never actually produced and so should not be confused with a sufficient cause. Aristotle argues that, for a table, this would be the art of table-making, which is the principle guiding its creation.

•A thing’s final cause is its aim or purpose, that for the sake of which a thing is what it is. For a seed, it might be an adult plant. For a sailboat, it might be sailing. For a ball at the top of a ramp, it might be coming to rest at the bottom.

All four causes, in Aristotle’s view, can be considered as an answer when asking the question why, that is, its cause¹⁶. Aristotle argues that the first three causes, despite having their own purpose, all contribute to the final cause or purpose of something¹⁷. For Aristotle, the essential nature of things lay not in their cause (beginning), but in their telos (end). The end result of something, after careful study, is what allows us to understand not only what the entire process was for, but why the cause even began¹⁸.

My claim here is that for all beings, in order to be considered as such, existence, essence and telos are all part of it, they are all inseparable from each other. We can picture this by looking at the diagram below:

Spinoza himself acknowledges this trend in his Ethics. In Part 1, two arguments very much sum up what I am arguing for:

D1: By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence involves existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived except as existing.

P7: It pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.

Dem.: A substance cannot be produced by anything else (by P6C); therefore, it will be the cause of itself, that is (D1), its essence necessarily involves existence, or it pertains to its nature to exist, Q.E.D.

Each metaphysical component is derived from one another; that is, in their differential relation, they positively negate each other. One cannot succeed on its own without the other two. If a being lacks any one of these categories, it cannot properly function in the physical world. Throughout this entire process, it is all in one step. Because of this, there are no actual steps, from a temporal point of view, in which one category appears and then the second or third, all of the other steps that derive from the first. Rather, all three categories that make up the nature of being appear to begin their function simultaneously, irrespective of time. Furthermore, no category is primary over its contemporaries, they are all crucial to each other and to beings. How is this so?

Let us discuss this by beginning with existence. For the sake of simplicity, I will arrange this discussion into a series of steps, so as to enhance understanding of how each category is inseparably tied to the other and how they all, in the end, contribute to the existence of the nature of beings.

There are two types of existence. There is firstly the internal existence, in which a being begins the process of existing. In other words, a being begins its existence. Secondly, there is external existence, where a being is in continuous of its existence. Temporally, it is the continuing process that allows the being to continue on existing. What is crucial here is that despite their distinction, there is only one type of existence. Time merely divides a substance’s existence into these two types. Furthermore, the existence of a being could not have been so without the other two categories. No being could have existed, much less continue existing, without its essence and its telos. It is logically unsound for a being’s existence and essence to be in any way or form distinct from each other. A being’s existence depends on the appearance on the essential and accidental attributes that compose its parts and eventual whole. Existence without essence is the equivalence of an abstract form not taking any physical shape or form. A being’s existence would only be as it is without its essence, an abstract. It would be formless, and unphysical.

Simultaneously, no essential attribute and existence of being can begin its process without its telos. In other words, the existence of a being cannot even be so unless its telos is also created. Existence of a being without its telos, even with its essence, would be a being with no purpose or function, neither externally nor internally. Its existence would not only be random, if it even randomly existed; its function and place in nature and with itself would be inconsistent. It would be the equivalent of a watchmaker who, by not placing any purpose or function, attempts to make a watch by placing all of a watch’s mechanical parts randomly, with no clear indication of each part’s function and purpose, or even what he is even making. The result would not be watch at all, since the device would not look like one, nor will it function as one, assuming it works at all. Hence, without the existence of a being’s telos as part of the essential nature of beings, no beings would exist and if they do, their essences and whole function would be inconsistent with each other and beings will not be able to exist intrinsically, that is, will not be in continuous of its existence.

In continuing this metaphysics, we will now look into essence. As stated earlier, a being’s existence and essence cannot be distinct. Both must be created simultaneously. Hence, a being’s entire existence depends on the simultaneous existence of its primary and accidental essence, which allows all of its components to not only take appropriate form, but to also take its proper place within a being’s entirety or whole. Even if by some means, a being’s essence is distinct from its existence, essence would still have to come in existence, regardless of its source or first cause. Essence cannot escape from existence in general, as essence is fully dependent on existence to give it any form of existence in the first place, just as existence is dependent on essence for a being or something to exist in physical form. Essence being distinct from existence is a suggestion that essence has no beginning, that it is eternal. Or, that essence of a being originates from God. I argue that both such indications are false attributes in the relationship between a being and its essence.

Firstly, essence in some way or form has an existence, which means, from the subject’s perspective, it has a beginning. Whether that existence is directly derived from a being’s existence or not, it is implausible that essence cannot have existence. Second, the thought that essence is not directly involved in the process of the formation of beings is illogical, for it would suggest that by essence being distinct from a being’s existence or existence in general, essence, both primary and accidental attributes are separate from a being as a whole, even if it later becomes part that it. If that is so, then we approach Rene Descartes’ notion of dualism between mind and body, that although the mind and body are distinct from each other, they are connected. I argue against this dualist notion in that as the mind cannot live without its body, a being cannot live without its essential attributes. And just as both the mind and body are created and developed fully together throughout a being’s lifecycle, both a being’s existence and essence are created simultaneously. Furthermore, as a scientific approach, only that being’s nature can allow what essence is necessary in order for it to succeed in life (we can see that we are approach Darwin’s natural selection), and whether or not an essence evolves into something else