Inclusion, exclusion and the governance of European security

By Mark Webber

How inclusive are NATO and the EU? The enlargement of both organisations seems to give some substance to the vision of a ‘Europe whole and free’ articulated at the Cold War’s end. Yet more recently enlargement’s limits have increasingly come to be recognised bringing with it an important debate on the balance to be struck between inclusion and exclusion.

This book examines that sometimes awkward balance. Its analytical starting point is the characterisation of much of Europe as a security community overlain by a system of security governance. The boundary of this system is neither clear nor fixed but a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion can be said to exist by reference to its most concrete expression - that of institutional enlargement. On this basis, the book offers an elaboration of the concept of security governance itself, complemented by a historical survey of the Cold War and its end, the post-Cold War development of NATO and the EU, and case studies of two important ‘excluded’ states - Russia and Turkey.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Release date: Jul 19, 2013
• ISBN: 9781847795472

Mark Webber

Mark Webber is a former Formula One driver who raced for Minardi, Jaguar, Williams and Red Bull. He was twice winner of the Monaco Grand Prix, as well as the British and Brazilian Grands Prix. In 2010 he controversially missed out on the World Championship to team mate Sebastian Vettel. In June 2013 Webber announced his retirement from Formula One and subsequently joined Porsche on a long-term deal, racing in the premier LMP1 sportscar category of the FIA World Endurance Championship. His aim is to win the legendary Le Mans 24 Hour race. He is the author of Aussie Grit.

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INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND THE GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

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The time of European governance MAGNUS EKENGREN

An introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria EMIL GIATZIDIS

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Volume 1 The Czech and Slovak Republics JACQUES RUPNIK AND JAN ZIELONKA (EDS)

Volume 2 Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania VELLO PETTAI AND JAN ZIELONKA (EDS)

Democratising capitalism? The political economy of post-Communist transformations in Romania, 1989–2001 LILIANA POP

Europe and civil society: movement coalitions and European governance CARLO RUZZA

Constructing the path to eastern enlargement ULRICH SEDELMEIER

Two tiers or two speeds? The European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO JAMES SPERLING (ED.)

Recasting the European order JAMES SPERLING AND EMIL KIRCHNER

Political symbolism and European integration TOBIAS THEILER

Rethinking European Union foreign policy BEN TONRA AND THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN (EDS)

The European Union in the wake of Eastern enlargement AMY VERDUN AND OSVALDO CROCI (EDS)

Democratic citizenship and the European Union ALBERT WEALE

The emerging Euro-Mediterranean system DIMITRIS K. XENAKIS AND DIMITRIS N. CHRYSSOCHOOU

INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND THE GOVERNANCE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

MARK WEBBER

© Mark Webber 2007

The right of Mark Webber to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and

Patents Act 1988.

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ISBN 978 0 7190 6148 6

First published 2007

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In memory of Golda Barnett and Betty Brent

CONTENTS

List of tables and figures

Acknowledgements

List of abbreviations

1 European security and the inclusion/exclusion dynamic

2 Inclusion, exclusion and the international politics of the Cold War

3 Security community and security governance: a framework of inclusion and exclusion

4 NATO: ‘a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe’

5 The European Union: ‘overcoming the divisions of Europe and restoring the unity of the continent’

6 Russia: ‘included out’

7 Turkey: ‘neither in nor out’

8 Conclusion

Select bibliography

Index

TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

Figures

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book was conceived under the auspices of a research project entitled ‘Security Governance in the New Europe’ funded by the ‘One Europe or Several?’ programme of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). The research and writing of the book would not have been possible without the ESRC’s financial support (under Project Grant L213252008) supplemented, in its later stages, by a Leverhulme Research Fellowship. My greatest intellectual and professional debt, however, is owed to Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Elke Krahmann, my co-researchers on the ‘Security Governance’ project with whom I have shared many words and many enjoyable research trips. In addition, I have been lucky enough to work within a very supportive academic environment at Loughborough University. Staff within the Department of Politics, International Relations and European Studies and particularly the current and previous heads, Dave Allen and Mike Smith, provided endless encouragement and space without which the book would probably never have been completed. Numerous individuals provided other forms of support. Roy Allison, Derek Averre, Adrian Hyde-Price, Ruth Kinna, Emil Kirchner, Alex Pravda, Helena Rytövuori-Apunen, James Sperling either read parts of the text or gave me the opportunity to present works-in-progress to academic audiences. Bezen Coskun, Emilian Kavalski and Vasilis Margaras provided valuable research assistance. While much of the research for the book is open source, it has nonetheless benefited enormously from a series of interviews conducted at North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) HQ in Brussels, NATO Allied Joint Forces Command (Naples), meetings with officials in the European Commission and the Council, and two research visits to Moscow. My thanks go to all the officials who gave their time in these meetings as well as the good-will of those such as Artur Demchuk, Chris Donnelly, Mark McGuigan, Tony Mason and Robert Wright who either helped to organise them or provided local comfort. As ever, my family had to put up with my periods of absence and endless hours chained to the home computer. Della, Eddie and Theo all, therefore, deserve a special mention for their patience and love. Finally, the writing of the book coincided with the deaths of two dear relatives and so is dedicated to their memory.

ABBREVIATIONS

1

European security and the inclusion/exclusion dynamic

For those fortunate to live in a prosperous democratic state in the first decade of the 2000s, the politics of inclusion seems a natural state of affairs. It is indeed one of the most powerful legitimating claims of democratic political life. The ability to deliver welfare, prosperity and security to all citizens is the premise of successful electoral politics. Similarly, at the international level, the politics of Europe is increasingly the politics of cooperation. The latter, although sometimes taken for granted, might be regarded as truly historic. The history of Europe during the ‘short twentieth century’ was, after all, that of revolution, war and ideological antagonism, bookended by the First World War and, between 1989 and 1991, the triple collapse of the Cold War, communism and the Soviet Union. With the passing of this ‘age of extremes’ in Eric Hobsbawn’s phrase, a Europe of possibilities was opened up.¹ This brought with it certain intimations of catastrophe, not least Yugoslavia’s violent collapse, but it also permitted, in the words of another prominent historian, a fundamental rethink of both ‘the common European past’ and ‘a common European future’.² This was by no means a comfortable process, for it implied that the relatively prosperous West Europeans (and their American allies) would have to come to terms with the uncertain and vulnerable status of their Eastern neighbours, states no longer sectioned off by the Cold War divide and now as important to the future of the continent as they had been before 1939. An important part of the response has been to extend eastward (and latterly, southward) those forms of organisation which had for many decades defined Europe’s Western half and indeed ‘the West’ more broadly. The upshot, the enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) had, by the mid-2000s, proceeded to a point where the idea of European unity could, without seeming irony or exaggeration, be talked about as an achievable prospect.

The inclusiveness which this claim implied has, however, been contested. Here it is worth noting a simple but very important point: relations of inclusion, unless they are universal, presuppose some form of simultaneous exclusion. Exclusion, Andrew Linklater has argued, is ‘constitutive of all forms of life [… and] all social systems are constructed from the complex webs of inclusion and exclusion’.³ This is an insight that applies as much to gangs as it does to political parties; to clans, citizenship and ethnic groups as much as military alliances and international organisations. What this book seeks to do is to consider one important aspect of the relationship between inclusion and exclusion, namely how it has been played out in the sphere of international security, how the organisation of security on a European level has developed since the Cold War watershed and what enduring forms of exclusion have remained. While inclusion is important, it is this exclusionary dimension which is given a more prominent treatment, not least in order to provide a corrective to some of the more overblown claims concerning the prospects of European unification.

Part of the purpose of this first chapter is to sketch out some of the themes which ground the book and also to summarise its content. Equally, and by way of orientation, it provides a schematic overview of the book’s central analytical focus. In the following section, two ‘ideal types’ of inclusion and exclusion will be presented as alternative representations of Europe’s security relations. The relationship between these two will then be considered.

Security inclusion

The discourse of inclusion

The historical significance of the end of the Cold War was, in large measure, appreciated by its contemporaries. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe signed by some thirty-four states from across the continent in November 1990 declaimed that ‘[t]he era of confrontation and division of Europe has ended’.⁴ And at that historical juncture grand visions were elaborated of a unified Europe made possible by the disintegration of the Iron Curtain. For President George Bush Sr this was a Europe ‘whole and free’; for his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, ‘a common European house’ and for the West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a ‘pan-European cooperative security order’.

What was not readily apparent at the time was that this vision would come to centre on NATO and the EU. However, as the Cold War ended, both bodies laid claim to a pan-European vision (see Chapters 4 and 5) and this would continue to be held as enlargement proceeded. The year 2004 was thus a watershed year in Europe. In March, NATO admitted seven new member states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) – ‘[a]n event’, according to Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, ‘that will stand out in the history of […] Europe’ as confirming ‘that the divisions of the past have been overcome’. Or, in the words of Frattini’s Bulgarian counterpart, Solomon Passy, one that brings ‘us ever closer to [a] united democratic Europe without dividing lines’.⁵ The EU, meanwhile, in May formalised its own ‘big bang’ enlargement with the accession of ten new members (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). On this occasion the President of the European Commission Romani Prodi was moved to declare that the event would ‘go down in history as the day of the continent’s unification; when Europe’s decades-long divide was healed; when a dream was realised and a tragic historical absurdity laid to rest’.⁶

Enlargement (and accompanying forms of partnership with non-members), moreover, had a particular security relevance. A NATO publication in 2002 argued that the organisation was changing from ‘a tightly-knit alliance with responsibility for [the] collective defence [of its members]’ to ‘the dynamo at the hub of a profound new set of security relationships’, ‘an inclusive framework for the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole’.⁷ Statements emanating from the EU have carried a similar message. Agenda 2000, published by the European Commission in 1997, argued that enlargement would help ‘form Europe into an area of unity and stability’.⁸ Commenting on the 2004 enlargement Romani Prodi suggested that the EU, founded with the ‘overriding objective’ of eradicating war, had consolidated and extended a ‘Union for peace’ in Europe.⁹

The demand for inclusion

The credibility of the claims made on behalf of the EU and NATO rest on enlargement and partnership and, in security terms, the functional competence of these two organisations in addressing post-Cold War concerns. What has mattered equally is perceptions held of the organisations. How, in other words, they have been seen by aspirant members as a means of satisfying their security needs.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the power of attraction has been a truly pan-European phenomenon. In the case of NATO, to the seven entrants admitted in 2004 one can add three earlier acceding states (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), three (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia) within the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and a further four (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) who had by 2004 made a clear political commitment to accession. As for the EU, to the enlargement of 2004 one can add the three states (Austria, Finland and Sweden) involved in the ‘northern’ enlargement of 1995, Bulgaria and Romania who signed accession treaties in 2005, Croatia and Turkey who initiated accession negotiations later the same year, the states of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina [BiH], Macedonia and Serbia-Montenegro) whose accession has been recognised as a possibility by the EU, and a handful of states (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in the former Soviet Union (FSU) who have made a case for admission.

The differences between these states, coupled with the often overt distinction they have drawn between the attractions of NATO and the EU, mean it is difficult to generalise on the pull of enlargement. Indeed, a wide range of factors has motivated the candidate and new members. Membership has been desired for reasons of economic benefit, political stabilisation and regime consolidation. These factors have a particular resonance for the large number of former communist states all of which have faced profound social, economic and political transition, although even this commonality has only a very general application – the transition in say the East-Central European (ECE)states being very different from that in the Western Balkans, in turn, different from that in the Baltics. And one should bear in mind that transition is not simply a post-communist phenomenon – Turkey since the late 1990s has experienced a transformation arguably as far-reaching as that in many former communist states.

Yet what all these states share is a preoccupation with the insecurities of internal transition. Equally important have been issues of external security. It would be stretching the analysis to argue that the variety of states listed above share the same security problems or that they have a common appreciation of how to address them. The largest group has joined, or has sought to join, both the EU and NATO. Others (Austria, Sweden, Finland, Cyprus, Malta and Serbia-Montenegro) have joined the former (or, in the case of Serbia-Montenegro, aspire to join it) but have not made any movement towards the latter. Turkey, meanwhile has sought to join the EU while already a long-time member of the Alliance. The basic point to be made here, however, is that even allowing for such variety, security broadly understood has been an additional but nonetheless compelling factor behind these different patterns of accession.

In this light, what has been the security context facing these states? Here, the end of the Cold War is crucial. This is a theme we shall return to throughout the text, however, briefly stated, this historical juncture had a profound effect on the security situation of states globally and most notably on Europe’s periphery. For those not already members of NATO and the EU at the Cold War’s end, the effects were particularly urgent. According to Christian Haerpfer and others, during the early 1990s ‘[t]he stability provided by the Cold War [was] replaced by the threat of confusion, disintegration and chaos’, and this was a problem that mattered as much for states such as ‘traditionally neutral Austria as [it did] for the newly emerging [post-communist] democracies’.¹⁰ There was, in other words an abundance of insecurity that stretched throughout Central, Eastern and SouthEastern Europe, the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the Baltic region and the Western FSU. This involved at its worst civil war, state collapse and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the South Caucasus, fears of domination by an over-bearing neighbour (be this Germany in the cases of Poland and the Czech Republic, Turkey in the case of Bulgaria, or Russia in the case of Georgia, the Baltic states and Ukraine) and exposure to a multiplicity of security ‘risks’ relating to the emergence of new inter-state borders, the status of national and ethnic minorities, unchecked migration, transnational crime, environmental degradation and terrorism.¹¹

These concerns were, in turn, compounded by what might be called status insecurity, an uncertainty stemming from geopolitical location, the demands of foreign policy reorientation and detachment from international institutions. This condition has taken different forms at different moments in time. Among the ECE states, the anxieties it spawned were at their height in the early 1990s. At this point, the region was characterised as occupying a security vacuum or ‘grey zone’, under-institutionalised and lacking in security guarantees. This zone, moreover, fell within Zwischeneuropa – a ‘Europe in between’ located at the edge of competing spheres of influence (Russian–German traditionally and Soviet–Western after 1945) exposed to invasion, domination and subjugation, and subject, according to Sergei Medvedev, to a ‘geopolitical identity […] based on a cultural duality […] the hope of being accepted into the West and the fear of being dominated by the East’.¹²

With varying degrees of emphasis, this condition of separation and consequent insecurity has applied throughout the post-communist world, and indeed to most of Europe beyond its integrated Western part. The practical response to these various security predicaments has (as noted above) been a movement toward the EU and NATO. For some, this orientation has been associated with a historical even philosophical claim – the notion of a ‘return to Europe’ articulated in ECE and the Baltic states. For the vast majority it also represents the absence or weakness of meaningful alternatives – be this military self-sufficiency, neutrality (the official stance of Ukraine throughout the 1990s), sub-regional security cooperation (developed to varying degrees in ECE, the Baltic region, the Balkans and the FSU) or a strengthening of the pan-European Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

As for views of the organisations themselves, those seeking membership have appreciated NATO and the EU in somewhat different ways. Joining NATO, for instance, is regarded as affirming the transatlantic link to the US, as providing a ‘hard’ collective defence guarantee and as offering a route to defence modernisation and security sector reform. The EU, meanwhile, as the site of a sophisticated and multilayered set of cooperative policies, has been perceived as the best method to address myriad ‘soft’ security challenges and increasingly, via the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its offshoot the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as a means of tackling sources of regional instability.¹³ These specific roles, moreover, have a wider significance, accession being what Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacks referred to in 1995 as ‘an indispensable condition of […] security [and] stability’¹⁴ or what the Czech President Vaclav Havel noted in 2002 as a guarantee of entry into the ‘common Europe’ of ‘peace, stability and prosperity’.¹⁵

The demand for inclusion has not simply been an elite project. The path towards the EU and NATO has enjoyed widespread support within those states which acceded in 2004 (and, indeed, earlier in 1995). This has been apparent from opinion poll data¹⁶ and, in the case of the EU, from national referenda (see Table 1.1). Among the post-2004 aspirants, opinion has been more varied. Consistent majorities have been in favour of EU membership in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Macedonia as well as in potential candidates Serbia-Montenegro, Albania, Moldova and Georgia. Opinion, however, has been split in Croatia and Ukraine.¹⁷ Support for NATO has been strong in Macedonia and Albania with opinion divided in Croatia and a majority against accession in Ukraine.¹⁸

Table 1.1 Referendums on EU membership

An inclusive concept of ‘security’ in Europe

The enlargement of the EU and NATO has clear security purposes. In general terms, it can be seen as part and parcel of the extension of security community on a potentially pan-European basis. As such, this is a fundamental switch from how security was both conceived and organised in Europe during the long period of the Cold War. This theme is taken up in more detail in Chapter 2, but briefly stated, during the Cold War security was associated with military threats directed against the state and against which the state was obliged to respond with strong counter-measures, be this armed defence, espionage, subversion and so on. Further, while the Cold War contained a strong ideological flavour, its most pressing material component was that of the nuclear arms race matched by high levels of conventional forces. This is not to say that other ways of looking at security were entirely absent. Even such a stalwart of the ‘traditional’ agenda as Henry Kissinger was moved to argue in the mid-1970s that for the US and the West more generally issues of energy, the environment and population were of increasing relevance.¹⁹ ‘Alternative’ defence thinking, meanwhile, gained ground during the 1970s and 1980s and in the academic world the beginnings of an intellectual reconsideration of security was in motion.²⁰ Encouraged by the end of the Cold War, a veritable cottage industry sprang up dedicated to elaborating the concept still further. This analysis has made much of what are seen as security-relevant threats beyond the purely military (economic, environmental, social, demographic and others) and has identified ‘referents’ or subjects other than the state against which such threats are directed.²¹

These conceptual shifts were not initially reflected in the practical management of security in Europe, however. Only with the winding down of the Cold War in the latter half of the 1980s was there a marked move away from strictly military preoccupations amongst national governments. Subsequently, through the 1990s and 2000s, official outlooks have become attuned to a changing security agenda. National governments (in Western and much of Eastern Europe, at least) and international organisations have elaborated positions which accord security a fluid and multifaceted meaning. In this sense, issues related to transnational crime, unregulated trans-border migration, weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, disease pandemics, terrorism and regional conflict management are as germane to security in the post-Cold War period as was the fixation with territorial defence and deterrence prior to the Cold War’s end.²² This, moreover, has been accompanied by a public commitment to broad and extensive cooperation embracing Europe in its widest sense. This has been apparent in NATO and EU documentation, but its broadest meaning can be found in statements of the OSCE. The Charter for European Security signed by the fifty-four OSCE participating states in November 1999 notes the goal of creating a ‘common, comprehensive and indivisible security and a common security space free of dividing lines’.²³ This, according to the instructively named Lisbon Declaration for a Common and Comprehensive Security Model for the Twenty-First Century, should be based on ‘the widest cooperation and coordination among participating States and European and transatlantic organisations’ in turn underpinned by an ‘allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour’.²⁴ As the 2003 OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability suggested ‘[n]o single state or organisation can, on its own, meet the challenges facing us today. Coordination of the efforts of all […] organisations and institutions that are concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area […] the UN [United Nations], EU, NATO and the Council of Europe’ is therefore essential.²⁵

The inclusive organisation of security in Europe

At face value, OSCE documentation suggests that the organisation of efforts to address Europe’s post-Cold War security challenges has been both multifaceted and inclusive in nature. There is some substance to this position if one considers formal structures of security management centred, for example, on institutional affiliation, the application of treaties and conventions and participation in conflict management activities.

Taking the first of these, organisational membership is outlined in Figure 1.1. The OSCE takes in all of continental Europe and the FSU, thus making it the world’s largest and most comprehensive regional organisation. This body’s broad reach is, however, a historical accident, a consequence of its former inter-bloc character during the Cold War. It has, moreover, developed only fitfully as a security provider and lacks the substantive forms of political and security integration apparent in the EU and NATO.²⁶ In this light, the enlargement of the latter two bodies takes on a particular significance. As Antonio Missiroli has noted, as of 2004 NATO had come to ‘encompass 26 members and the EU 25, 19 of which [ … are] in common: the level of overlap is unprecedented and may rise even further with the likely accession to the EU of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and, possibly, Turkey later on. Taken together, the two organisations will cover almost all of continental Europe and represent a majority within the OSCE.’²⁷ Further, the significance of NATO and the EU cannot simply be viewed in terms of their enlarging membership, as important as that is. Both organisations have developed a range of partnership activities (many with an explicit security purpose) which have extended their reach and influence across Eurasia and beyond. These are considered in Chapters 4 and 5, but are summarised here in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.

Figure 1.1 Participation in European security organisations

Turning to treaties and conventions with a security relevance, these include formal arms control agreements of which the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is the most important. Originally applicable to the states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, its post-Cold War adaptation means that CFE provisions have come to apply to a total of thirty states. The 1992 CFE-1A Treaty on military personnel levels has a similar coverage. Other notable texts include the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. These have a global relevance but have been signed by the vast majority of European states. As well as arms control, other key documents concern Europe-wide confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), most notably the four Vienna Documents (of 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1999) and the 1992 Treaty on Open Skies.

As for conflict management activities, these have acquired their most inclusive quality in the Balkan region. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe launched at the EU’s initiative in June 1999 has come to involve eight states of the region, all member states of the EU, interested states such as Russia, Turkey and the US, as well as a number of international organisations (the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE), international financial institutions and sub-regional bodies. International efforts in BiH and Kosovo, more specifically, have involved similar coordination among an equally wide range of actors, including also in these cases several NGOs. Peacekeeping in the region, meanwhile, has been conducted under the auspices of three organisations – the UN, NATO and the EU, and has had a broad multinational character. UNPROFOR, the UN mission in Croatia and BiH between 1992 and 1995 involved thirty-two contributing nations, twenty of which were European. SFOR the NATO-led stabilisation force in BiH entailed contributions from a total of thirty-six NATO members or NATO Partnership for Peace (PFP) states. The EU successor mission, EUFOR was, as of 2005, made up of personnel from twenty-two EU states and eleven other contributing nations. In Kosovo, finally, NATO’s KFOR mission in Kosovo, has entailed contributions from thirty-two NATO and partner states.

In light of the above, two characteristics are particularly noteworthy. First, commitment and cooperation has occurred on a clearly pan-European basis, in the process cutting across the old East–West division of the Cold War. Second, security cooperation has involved a wide range of actors – a large collection of states, a variety of international organisations and, in some situations, non-state actors also.

Table 1.2 NATO partnerships (2006)

Table 1.3 EU partnerships (2006)

Security exclusion

The rhetoric and practices of inclusion detailed above would seem to suggest that the development of security in Europe after the Cold War has followed a seamless path of community building. This is a misleading assumption. Enlargement, the most important expression of community, does belie a certain vision and purpose. However, to regard it as the consummation of a process of inclusion is to be guilty of what Herbert Butterfield in very different circumstances pejoratively referred to as ‘Whig history’: a view of the present as the inevitable outcome of the march of progress with its organisational forms the height of political development and the product of an unchallenged consensus.²⁸ Elements of a more complex process will be apparent throughout the text. As a first corrective, it is worth briefly surveying three instances of exclusion of relevance to post-Cold War Europe: security differentiation, discourse and organisation.

Security differentiation

As noted above, the meaning of security in both conceptual and policy terms has broadened since the Cold War. How one understands and interprets security has come to depend on working through a wealth of different meanings and allusion to a range of security actors and subjects. To simplify matters somewhat, here we accept the analytical centrality of the state although this is done with some important caveats. First, one must note that subjects of security other than the state (individuals and social groups, for instance) are not unimportant; the state, in other words, is not the only ‘referent’ which may face threats and thus experience insecurity. Second, ‘new’ security actors (NGOs and private security firms) have assumed a certain role in security provision – for example in post-conflict situations, in monitoring treaty compliance and in countering transnational problems of disease and trafficking.²⁹ Third, and contrary to traditional security studies, threats to security arise, as already noted, in multiple ways; security is not simply about inter-state competition and conflict. Indeed, in terms of the widened agenda of threats, the main protagonists are either non-state actors (terrorist or criminal networks, computer hackers) or abstract entities (the Aids or flu virus, carbon emissions and so on).

Given these qualifications, how can we justify retaining the state