Regulating lobbying: A global comparison, 2nd edition

By Raj Chari, John Hogan, Gary Murphy and Michele Crepaz

Governments worldwide are developing sunshine policies that increase transparency in politics, where a key initiative is regulating lobbyists. Building on the pioneering first edition, this book updates its examination of all jurisdictions with regulations, from the Americas, Europe, Middle East, Asia, and Australia. Unlike any book, it offers unique insights into how the regulations compare and contrast against each other, offering a revamped theoretical classification of different regulatory environments and situating each political system therein. This edition innovatively considers different measurements to capture the robustness of lobbying laws in terms of promoting transparency and accountability. And, based on the authors’ experience of advising governments globally, it closes with a no-nonsense guide on how to make a lobbying law. This is of value to policymakers seeking to introduce or amend regulations, and lobbyists seeking to influence this process.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Release date: Feb 28, 2019
• ISBN: 9781526117267

Raj Chari

Raj Chari is Senior Lecturer in Political Science in the School of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin

Book preview

Figures

2.1 Average spend (USD) per lobbyist

2.2 Total number of lobbyists active during the fiscal year

2.3 Monthly communication reports posted, by month

2.4 Transparency Register, evolution of registrations

5.1 Distribution of the scores applying 4 measurements of robustness

5.2 Case by case scores applying 4 measurements of robustness

5.3 Number of items (per measurement) that fall in the 5 OECD key elements of the robustness of lobbying laws

5.4 Distribution of the coding error expressed in proportion of agreement for each item

6.1 Stages of the development of a lobbying law

Tables

1.1 Regulations in place throughout the world

2.1 Top agencies lobbied at the US federal level, 2016

2.2 Total lobbying spending in US, 1998–2016

2.3 Number of lobbyists, 1998–2016*

2.4 Top US lobbying firms by total spend between 1998 and 2016

2.5 Top industries (1998–2016)

2.6 Top 10 government institutions lobbied

2.7 Top 10 lobbyists that targeted …

5.1 Normalised scores of 16 lobbying laws applying four measurements of robustness

5.2 Rank-order correlations between the scores of 16 lobbying laws using four measures of robustness

5.3 Inter-coder agreement using Krippendorff's Alpha Statistic

5.4 Features of the three classifications of the robustness of lobbying laws

5.5 CPI scores for lobbying regulations found internationally

5.6 Perceptions of corruption and types of regulatory systems

Acknowledgements and dedication

We are grateful for the continued support of the ‘Regulating Lobbying Project’ given by Tony Mason of Manchester University Press as well as the EPRU Series Editor Peter Humphreys. We owe a debt of gratitude to the anonymous external reviewers of both the second edition proposal as well as the final manuscript for important insights from which we have benefited. Rob Byron and Danielle Shepherd of Manchester University Press were instrumental in the production phase of this book.

We are indebted to the civil servants and regulatory officials whose insights were simply amazing. They include: Elisabeth Bauer, William Beausang, Katy Budge, Joanne Hardy, Lorna Horton, Monte Krueger, Caroline Martin, Alexandra Mills, Lynn Morrison, Sherry Perrault, Karen Shepherd, Aine Stapleton, Marie Thiel and David Willis. Various interest groups have also shared valuable information with us and given us frank views, and we are particularly thankful to Susana Coroado, John Devitt, Ádám Földes, Daniel Freund, Andrius Kasparavičius and Vojtěch Prokeš. We thank the various members of the parliamentary and institutional committees we have appeared before who helped us better understand the concerns that policy makers face, ultimately helping guide our penultimate chapter.

A big thank you goes to colleagues at home and worldwide who offered insights during the research and writing phases, including: Frank Baumgartner, Patrick Bernhagen, Jan Beyers, David Coen, John Christman, Erica Edwards, Robert Elgie, David Farrell, Chris Fox, Beth Leech, Eugene Kennedy, Declan Kiberd, Sylvia Kritzinger, Katrina Lawlor, Luís Macedo Pinto de Sousa, Shane Martin, Conor McGrath, Sean McGraw, Mary Beth Oliver, Mary O’Callaghan, Eoin O’Malley, Paul O’Reilly, Paul O’Sullivan, Diarmuid Ó Giollain, George Pagoulatos, Kevin Rafter, Declan Raftery, Michael Smith, Roger Sherlock, Stephen Stacy, John Stephens and Cornelia Woll.

We dedicate this book to the late Michael Moran. Mick was one of the finest academics in social science whose scholarship had a major impact, and he always cared about what real readers thought while maintaining a healthy scepticism of the modern industry of citation impact measures. We were fortunate to have worked with him as one of the EPRU series editors: he believed in the project right from its inception and shepherded the publication of the first edition of this book some ten years back. Mick was truly a mentor in his work; a mentor in his actions.

Raj, John, Gary and Michele

Dublin and Madrid, April 2018

Abbreviations

1

Introducing Regulating lobbying

In the first edition we argued that while this book finds a niche within the broader scholarship on interest groups, it offers an innovative approach to the literature. This is because the work is concerned with comparing how lobby groups are formally regulated throughout the world and the impact this has had – something previously largely unexamined. The 2010 edition thus built on previous scholarship on lobbying regulation in Canada, the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and Germany, offering an in-depth, detailed analysis of this phenomenon from a global comparative perspective to include fuller examination of Europe, Australia, Asia and North America.¹

We highlighted that work carried out by interest groups (or lobby groups – we use the two terms interchangeably throughout the book) is a central and legitimate part of the democratic process within all liberal democratic systems. Yet, the term has often had negative connotations, even though the work of lobbyists is essential. Issues surrounding the openness of the policy-making process which may have been captured by specific interests therefore prompted countries to regulate the activities of lobbyists in order to increase transparency and accountability.

In less than a decade since the first edition, there has been a remarkable two-fold increase in the number of countries that have developed lobbying laws. This includes a number of jurisdictions in Europe, the Americas and the Middle East, which now boast lobbying regulations. Subsequently, we have since seen significant contributions by scholars who have extended our initial research, including more nuanced analysis of jurisdictions either recently adopting lobbying regulations (Veksler, 2012; Verčič and Verčič, 2012; Thomas and Klimovich, 2014; Crepaz, 2016; Murphy, 2017; McGrath, 2017), or amending extant rules (Greenwood, 2011; Hogan et al., 2011; Kanol, 2012; Crepaz and Chari, 2014). Others have considered new methods of analysis to better measure the robustness of lobbying laws and classify lobbying environments (Holman and Luneburg, 2012; Veksler, 2015). From an academic vantage, there is thus a need to take account of what new ideas are being raised in the literature on the theme. From a practitioner vantage, we have also seen increased demands from different countries that are either recently formulating, or about to make, such laws asking for more guidance on how to develop or amend regulations.² Further, while the original book was indeed less preoccupied with private interests’ role and actions when specific policies are made, we realise a decade later that lobbyists reading our work have taken their deeper understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ as a basis to develop global lobbying strategies. Such actors are now consequently asking for an updated version of all the countries that have developed laws since 2008 in order to better understand the different regulatory environments in which they work.

As detailed more fully in the final section of this chapter, given these academic and practitioner demands, the second edition of this book has been written in order to transcend the state of the art in this growing field of research, with the view to also offering significant insights to academics and practitioners throughout the globe.

In the form of a brief recap, it is worth considering what is generally meant by the term lobbying regulation. A fundamental dimension of lobbying rules is that lobbyists must register with the state, usually an independent regulator, before contact is made with elected representatives and high-level civil servants and officials who they target. The legislation defines which lobbyists are regulated (such as consultancies, in-house corporate lobbyists, NGOs and professional associations) and which organisations may be exempt from registration (such as charities; lawyers, or accountants). The amount of information that lobbyists must disclose varies among jurisdictions with lobbying laws. This ranges from simply stating the name of the bill, ministry and official being targeted, to disclosing more detailed information on money spent on lobbying. The regulator generally publishes the registration information in an open online database, allowing citizens to access it and see who is lobbying whom and about what. If there is a breach of the rules – say that a lobbyist is found to be active without being registered – the regulator may impose sanctions such as fines or imprisonment. In order to prevent potential conflicts of interest, many lobbying laws also have revolving door (or cooling-off) provisions which stipulate the time period that public officials leaving office have to wait before entering the lobbying industry. The overall objective of lobbying regulation is the ‘imposition of some degree of transparency’ as well as a level of ethical standards and behaviours which ‘lobbyists are expected to comply with’ (OECD, 2009: 4).

One issue with the first edition was that we did not fully situate lobbying laws in comparative context with other open government policies such as Freedom of Information (FoI), Whistleblowing and Ethics Reform laws. Throughout the last seven years of our advising governments and political institutions which have either developed lobbying laws (the UK, Ireland and Scotland), or held parliamentary committees to study the pros and cons of lobbying laws (the Czech Republic, Serbia and the European Parliament), or outlined a series of recommendations or proposals on what should be in the nature of said laws (the Council of Europe and New South Wales, Australia), we realised that there is a need to place lobbying laws and their importance in terms of wider government initiatives to ‘clean up’ politics. In short, ‘who’ do lobbying laws regulate, and how should this be seen as different from FoI, Whistleblowing and Ethics Reform?

Before we answer this question, it is first necessary to clearly define terms: what is meant by the terms ‘lobby groups’ and ‘lobbying’, as well as the concept of regulation. We then offer a theoretical discussion of why regulating lobbyists is important, highlighting the importance of transparency and accountability, while presenting a balanced view of scholars who have considered its drawbacks. Following this, we see which jurisdictions have adopted lobbying legislation as of 2017, and when, underlining the rapid growth of such laws over the last decade. The final section outlines the four large questions that guide this book, demonstrating how they are linked to the objectives of each of the chapters.

Lobby groups, lobbying and regulation

Providing a working definition of ‘lobby groups’ and ‘lobbying’ is helpful at this early stage, for two main reasons. First, the definition of lobby groups clarifies who are the actors typically targeted by lobbying laws. Second, the definition of lobbying illustrates which activities fall into the scope of the regulation.

Yet, the literature demonstrates that the classification of such groups, and explaining what exactly lobbying is, has proved immensely difficult (see Greenwood and Thomas, 1998; Nownes, 2006: 5; Chari et al., 2010: 3; Scott, 2015). Developing cogent definitions of both ‘lobby group’ and ‘lobbying’ is not as easy as it might first appear. More importantly, it is necessary to also consider ‘cultural’ variations of the ‘perceptions’ of lobbying.

To define an ‘interest group’ or ‘lobby group’, different classification schemes have been used in the literature. For example, in a study on the EU, Watson and Shackleton (2003: 89) provided a useful typology to classify different types of lobby actors, distinguishing between bodies that promote private interests (i.e. that pursue specific economic goals) and those that promote public interests (i.e. that pursue non-economic aims). Chari and Kritzinger (2006) extended this by considering three types of groups: economic groups (including individual corporations and business organisations), professional groups (such as trade unions and farmers) and public groups (including groups that are concerned about issues such as human rights, the environment, animal rights and health and safety). Chari and Kritzinger (2006: 30) define an interest/lobby organisation, whether motivated by economic, professional or public concerns, ‘as any group, or set of actors, that has common interests and seeks to influence the policy-making process in such a way that their interests are reflected in public policy outcomes’. Some everyday examples include: corporations trying to ensure that the Finance Ministry has a policy of minimising corporation tax; a farming organisation that lobbies the Ministry of Agriculture in order to ensure maximum subsidies for the goods farmers produce; and an environmental group that wants to make sure the Ministry of the Environment has strong legislation in place to control the negative impact of fracking.

With regard to the activity of lobbying itself, two eminent scholars in the field have pointed out that ‘the word lobbying has seldom been used the same way twice by those studying the topic’ (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 33). These authors define lobbying parsimoniously and clearly as ‘an effort to influence the policy process’ (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 34). For Nownes (2006: 5), ‘lobbying is an effort designed to affect what the government does’. Hunter et al. (1991: 490) argue that ‘a common definition of a lobbyist is ‘someone who attempts to affect legislative action’. Impacting legislative developments may include either changing policies, or maintaining the status quo by preventing new ones from emerging.

Taking ideas from these contributions to the literature, we regard lobbying as the act of individuals or groups, each with varying and specific interests, attempting to influence decisions taken at the political level. Such lobby groups may include, but are not necessarily limited to, those with economic interests (such as corporations), professional interests (such as trade unions or professional societies) and civil society and non-governmental organisation (NGO) interests (such as environmental groups). Such groups may directly, or indirectly through consultants they have hired, seek to have public policy outputs reflect their preferences (Holman and Luneburg, 2012).

The definitions offered here are all useful for this work because they resemble the way lobby groups are usually defined in regulations. For example, as discussed throughout this book, the regulations in place in the EU, Ireland and Austria define lobby groups distinguishing between economic, professional, public groups and consultancies. Other regulations, such as the ones in place in the UK, Australia or Lithuania, by contrast, define lobby groups as organisations that work as consultancies.

In essence, lobbying can take two forms: in-house and the hiring of professional lobbyists. In-house lobbying refers to the practice whereby the lobbyist is an employee of the organisation engaged in lobbying. Paid lobbying takes the form of professional lobbyists who perform that function for a fee. Influencing political decisions may take place by many means, including direct communications with government officials, presentations to state officials, draft reports to public officials wherein specific details of policy itself are suggested, telephone conversations, and even a simple lunch with government personnel, to name but some mechanisms.

In advising governments and institutions throughout the world, we have come to realise that there are two fundamental differences of perception around the globe that are worth taking stock of at this stage. First, some people in some countries fundamentally see lobbying as a ‘bad thing’, usually associating it with some form of ‘corruption’ and ‘back room deals’. Scandals have helped foster a perception that lobbying is influence peddling in which self-serving entities exercise greater than normal sway over policy outputs (Holman and Luneburg, 2012; Schubert et al., 2016). Those views often went beyond the ‘negative connotations’ previously referred to; rather, there was a feeling of outright mistrust and sometimes hatred towards lobbying and lobbyists. This was perhaps one of the most surprising comments we consistently heard since publication of the first edition, which we were criticised for not fully addressing when we faced some parliamentary committees.

Though this perception is less likely in western liberal democracies (although some individuals do hold this view), our own experience is that it is not uncommon in jurisdictions such as Central and Eastern Europe and South America, which have more recently established democratic structures of governance and have been historically plagued with corruption. This has also been consistently observed by several authors. Studies conducted in the Czech Republic by Kollmannovà and Matuškov (2014) and Soukeník et al. (2017) unveil that the majority of the general public sees lobbying as a ‘non ethical practice’. In relation to these perceptions, McGrath (2008: 20) showed that in Eastern European democracies ‘lobbyists are sometimes recognised as fixers, namely actors coming from prominent public positions, which now sell their services being able to resolve issues for clients, though often through corrupt means’. As a response, we can only emphasise that lobbyists are an accepted element within democratic society, providing crucial input and feedback into political systems, thereby helping to develop policy outputs that drive political and economic aspects of citizens’ lives. As Holman and Luneburg (2012: 74) argue, ‘lobbying is absolutely essential to the success of representative government’. This view is shared not only among leading contemporary scholars writing on lobbying such as Howlett and Ramesh (2003: 37–8), Jordan and Maloney (2007) and Baumgartner et al. (2009), but also has been purported for well over a century by iconic scholars writing in the 1900s. This includes Bentley (1908: 200–2), who emphasised the importance of ‘group politics’, and Easton (1957), who conceptualised that demands of interest groups are a main input into any political system. That is not to say that lobbyists may not lie, give misinformation, or pursue corrupt activities. Some may, but very few do: given that they are considered legitimate actors in policy making, it is not rational strategy to tell untruths or act improperly precisely because this would guarantee a lobbyist no access to influence future decisions.

Second, some claim that there is an inherent ‘moral’ difference between types of lobbyists or, more simply put, there are some lobbyists that can be considered ‘better’ than others. For example, based on the classifications offered above, a view often heard when we advised the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe – an intergovernmental organisation dedicated to the furthering of human rights – was that corporate lobbying can be considered ‘bad’ when compared to, for example, that done by NGOs which is deemed to be naturally ‘good’. This is because the NGO is more concerned with promoting a public (or general) interest, as opposed to an in-house corporate espousing a private (or special) one. But, this normative distinction cannot credibly be made by policy scholars concerned about objective analysis: to paraphrase Shakespeare's Hamlet, no act to influence is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so. That is, the act of seeking to influence or communicate on a policy is the act of importance in and of itself, and it does not depend on the nature, values, or morals of the organisation seeking to do so.

When turning to the concept of regulation, Michael Moran (2007: 13), a leading scholar in the field, points out that ‘regulation is a notoriously inexact word, but its core meaning is mechanical and immediately invokes the act of steering’. A simple definition of the concept of ‘regulation of lobbyists’, which we came up with in the first edition, refers to the idea that political systems have established ‘rules’ which lobby groups must follow when trying to influence government officials and the nature of public policy outputs (Chari et al., 2010: 4). The idea of ‘must follow’ is a significant one for the purposes of the study: it is not simply a matter of voluntarily complying with rules. Rather, the regulations represent a set of codified, formal rules which are passed by parliament and written in law (which is enforced), and so must be respected. The latter point suggests that the risk lobbyists run in not complying with the rules is penalisation, whether that is a fine or, potentially, a jail sentence. Examples of rules that lobbyists may have to follow include: registering with the state before contact can be made with any public official; indicating what policy a lobbyist intends to influence; providing the state with individual or employer spending disclosures; and having a cooling off period if lobbyists are former legislators. However, it is imperative that these lobbying regulations do not prevent citizens from approaching their representatives (OECD, 2009). As examined in Chapter 2, some political systems still have voluntary systems, which, as seen, for instance in the EU, have nevertheless effectively evolved into a de facto mandatory system. Others, such as those in place in Germany, remain voluntary.

The theoretical justification for the introduction of lobbying rules is based on ensuring transparency and accountability in the political system and, in this regard, this form of regulation should be seen as a part of a larger strategy of ‘open government’ and ‘transparency’ policies that have been pursued by governments throughout the world. The next section therefore contextualises lobbying laws with other regulations concerned with government openness.

Contextualising lobbying laws: similarities and differences with FoI, Whistleblowing and Ethics Reforms

Beyond lobbying laws, other open government or transparency policies that governments may pursue include Freedom of Information (FoI), whistleblowing laws and Ethics Reform legislation. All these policies together seek to ‘clean up’ politics, adding transparency and accountability in public policy. Transparency refers to the ease with which the public can monitor not only the government with respect to its activity, but also which private interests are attempting to influence the state when public policy is formulated (Broz, 2002: 861). This encapsulates the motives of all policy-making actors and the clarity of policy objectives (Geraats, 2002: 540). As Héritier (1999) and Scharpf (2003) show, transparency not only increases policy actors’ responses to public demands, but also helps prevent misconduct. In addition, according to Naurin (2007), transparency in policy-making has a ‘civilising effect’ on actors, which ‘under public scrutiny’, tend to behave less selfishly.

Although there may be no direct material benefits per se, Geraats (2002: 562) shows that there are benefits associated with transparency, such as bettering the democratic quality of life, something which makes citizens become less apathetic towards the world of politics. Accountability means answering to, and taking responsibility for, actions (Moncrieffe, 1998: 389; Scott, 2000: 40). In a democracy, for an effective administration, elected officials should be accountable for their decisions (Moncrieffe, 1998). At the political level, actors accountable for their actions include politicians, who must seek re-election on a regular basis. Increasingly, other actors, such as civil servants and regulators, are also under the spotlight, where exposing the details of decision making helps ‘purify’ politics (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 95).

While all open government policies seek to shine light on politics and increase transparency and accountability, this section highlights how lobbying laws can clearly be differentiated. It does so by first considering the objectives of the three other policies and then seeing how they compare and contrast with lobbying regulations.

First, FoI legislation promises that open access to governmental information should result in increased transparency in the policy-making process (Hogan et al., 2012). A ‘promise of greater openness signals a whole set of messages: that a government is somehow more democratic in providing the raw material for rational, public deliberation, and is prepared to be monitored or overseen by the public’ (Worthy, 2017: 9). Thus, when citizens make FoI requests, they can better understand why decisions have been made by the state, effectively regulating the actions of public actors and holding them accountable for their actions. Although dozens of countries throughout the world have FoI legislation at this point, academics have noted that sometimes the FoI laws do not work very effectively, sometimes existing only in name (Banisar, 2006). With this in mind, and in order to strengthen the functioning of FoI legislation which has been in place in countries such as Ireland since the late 1990s, new commitments now promote best practice in public bodies in the FoI's operation. In the case of Ireland, this included proactive publication of information that is deemed in the public interest as well as pursuing reforms that made it easier (and less costly) for citizens to make FoI requests (Chari, 2016).

Second, with regard to Ethics Reform, corruption of public officials is a bane which decreases citizen's trust in government. Most famously, the reform of ethics regulations was placed on the agenda of the US government after the eruption of the Watergate scandal (Rosenson, 2005). More recently, dealing with conflicts of interest among public officials was particularly salient, given the corruption in many countries that led to the global financial and economic crisis (Chari and Bernhagen, 2011). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states that a ‘conflict of interest arises when a public official (including elected officials, members of boards of public bodies, and civil servants) has private-capacity interests which could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities’.³ A hypothetical example illustrating an actual conflict of interest is as follows: a minister receives a sizeable amount of funds (that are not disclosed) for personal use from a donor, and a public policy in the interests of the donor is then tabled by the minister. A hypothetical example of a potential conflict of interest is as follows: a board member of a telecommunications regulatory agency, who is empowered to decide which company should be awarded a second cellular phone licence, has a brother who owns (completely or partially) the company that is eventually awarded the licence, a fact that the board member never disclosed when the decision was made. In both cases, public officials acted in their official capacity improperly given their own private interests. Because of the importance of both actual and potential conflict of interests that plagued countries with cases of bribery and influence peddling, many sought to develop specific reform proposals for a new ethics regime to effectively address corruption risks (and perceived corruption risks) and thereby increase public trust.

Finally, whistleblowing legislation (or, protected disclosures legislation) provides a regulatory framework where workers can raise concerns about potential wrongdoings that are happening in the workplace, knowing that they can be protected if they are penalised by their employer for ‘blowing the whistle’. As with lobbying regulation, the US was the first country to legislate for whistleblowing during the Civil War with the False Claims Act (Heumann et al., 2013). Amended in the twentieth century, it has proved one of the most effective anti-fraud laws in the US (Kohn, 2011). Bjørkelo et al. (2008: 18) define whistleblowing as relating to ‘situations where an employee is witnessing something illegal, illegitimate or unethical taking place within their organisation, which he or she subsequently decides to take action against, thus trying to eliminate the wrongdoing’. For example, consider a worker (the whistleblower) who sees his/her boss discriminating against another employee, such as preventing the employee from being promoted based on racial discimination. If, when reporting this discimination, the whistleblower gets fired for raising the concerns, he/she will be protected by whistleblower legislation. Such protection may include, for example, retroactive pay being awarded to the whistleblower in the case of an unfair dismissal for having made the protected disclosure.

Countries have subsequently developed whistleblower legislation in order to protect workers (which in some cases are applicable to those working in both the public and the private sector) and subsequently raising the awareness of whistleblower duties and protections.⁴ This form of regulation is particularly relevant for the discourse around transparency and accoutability in relation to cases of fraud, environmental and corporate crimes that have often called for the intervention of the state (Maguire, 2010). Vandekerckhove and Lewis (2011) highlight the importance of whistleblowers for a healthy democracy. Leaks are essential in checking governmental, institutional and commercial power and informing the public about policies and programmes (Papandrea, 2014). As such, whistleblower legislation is a ‘guarantee for democracy and the well-being for society’ (Crowther and Capaldi, 2008: 189).

How does lobbying regulation compare and contrast to these three other open government policies? The basic rationale behind implementing all of these regulations is that the public should have some insight into, as well as oversight of, institutional structures, allowing for transparency and accountability. In the case of FoI and Ethics Laws, the rules shine light and demand accountability of actors working in state institutions. Whistleblower legislation also adds insights into developments in the ‘workplace’ (including those working for the state) extending transparency and accountability to enterprises. The first two policies allow citizens to better understand why decisions have been made by the state (FoI) or potential conflicts of interests that public officials may have (Ethics Reform). They effectively regulate the actions of public actors and hold them accountable for their actions. In contrast, lobbying laws regulate the relationship between private actors who are seeking to influence public institutions. In other words, the main objects of lobbying regulations are private actors. Whistleblower legislation may have both public and private actors as the object of regulation, the latter of which is seen when protecting those working outside the state apparatus. While this adds a microscope on specific workplace developments, lobbying laws have as a much broader end goal to add insights into how all public policies are shaped by all private actors seeking to shape them. In this regard lobbying laws, at their broadest, seek to add transparency and accountability to the overall policy-making process in all policy areas of government, allowing all citizens to see who is attempting to influence whom, and about what.

But, even from a theoretical perspective not everyone advocates the view that lobbying laws represent a panacea: there are two sides to the debate regarding the theoretical reasons to regulate, or not. On the one hand, proponents of lobbying regulation discuss the importance of deliberative democracy in driving politics forward. On the other, opponents stress that regulations pose