Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments

By J.C. Lester

Explaining Libertarianism: four theses:

1. Interpersonal liberty requires an explicit, pre-propertarian, purely factual, theory.

2. Liberty is and need only be morally desirable in systematic practice, not in every logically possible case. In practice, there is no clash between the two main moral contenders: rights and consequences.

3. Nothing can ever justify, support or ground any theory of liberty or its applications because it is logically impossible to transcend assumptions. Theories can only be explained, criticised and defended within conjectural frameworks.

4. The state is inherently authoritarian and also negative-sum. It reduces welfare overall, with the losses compounding over time. Libertarian anarchic order is the positive-sum solution to illiberal political chaos.

J C Lester is a philosopher of libertarianism. He has written widely on the subject in books, articles and dialogues. His solution to the crucial philosophical problem of interpersonal liberty provides an explicit theory of liberty and explains how its application entails self-ownership and external property, and relates to all other interpersonal matters.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Legend Press
• Release date: Nov 30, 2014
• ISBN: 9781789559972

Book preview

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Preface

It is an intellectually philistine view, often even held by libertarians, that philosophy is an irrelevance, or about undecidable matters, or merely arguing about words, or otherwise a waste of time. If we want to have a chance of practical change in the world, then what we should focus on – we are told – is propaganda. There is, it must be agreed, nothing wrong with the honest propagation of libertarianism. And there is often an immediate tension between philosophy and propaganda. Philosophy is more likely to criticise common sense and propaganda is more likely to court it. Hence it is sometimes not possible to engage in both at once. Nevertheless, philosophy is the best long-term propaganda: for philosophical confusions and problems do need to be sorted out if an ideology is to gain practical influence. In the meantime, however, a philosophical view is suspect if it is too popular: that indicates that it is not very philosophical. Thus it is philosophically auspicious to find theories that are at odds with almost all others on the subject. It is not that heterodox views are, ipso facto, more likely to be true. It is that they do, at least, stand a chance of making progress or, at worst, of challenging the orthodoxy in new and possibly illuminating ways.

Libertarian literature often displays a reasonably good grasp of the relevant economics, history, and sociology with respect to defending the interpersonal liberty of persons and their external property. But in the area of philosophy there is a considerable amount of unwitting confusion. This confusion is a significant impediment both as regards understanding libertarianism clearly and as regards dealing with criticism. It has three main aspects. First and foremost, there are muddled and moralised accounts of ‘rights’, ‘self-ownership’, and ‘non-aggression’ (when what is needed is an explicit, non-moral, theory of the libertarian conception of liberty and how it relates to people and property). Second, there are versions of, necessarily erroneous, justificationist epistemology (when what is needed is seeing libertarianism as a bold conjecture to be criticised). Third, there is the use of particular and separate moral theories to defend libertarianism (when what is needed is advocating libertarianism itself as a moral conjecture). In the following essays these three key errors – as well as numerous others – are exposed in several libertarian texts and also a couple of texts critical of libertarianism. Consequently, there is a certain amount of repetition of these major points. But this is needed until the arguments are either understood and adopted or seriously criticised – rather than dogmatically dismissed or ignored.

In order to avoid the bowdlerisation and censorship that sometimes passes for ‘peer review’, these essays are corrected from the form in which any of them appeared in scholarly periodicals. And some of the essays use ‘impersonal text’. This expression refers to texts that, as far as is practical, avoid references to authors – including the one who wrote these essays – as individuals, and speculations about their intentions, psychological states, professional probity, etc. The purpose is to make the arguments impersonal in the way that scientific articles tend to be. When addressing abstract problems, many personal references amount to ad hominem fallacies in some form and risk encouraging similarly irrelevant responses.

1) The Three Great Errors of Most Libertarians: a Concise Philosophical Analysis

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Libertarians are mistaken to seek foundations, to take sides over moral approaches, and to have no proper theory of liberty.

The error of seeking a foundation or justification

Assumptions are unsupported propositions. All observations and arguments require assumptions, and thereby remain ultimately unsupported. Similarly, all theories – whether empirical, or a priori, or moral, or whatever else – require assumptions, and thereby also remain unsupported. Any attempt to support a theory beyond assumption would require an infinite regress (defending any assumption involves making more unsupported assumptions) or infinite evidence (which involves more unsupported theories, in any case). It’s not merely that there’s always a risk of error: no epistemological support is possible (even probability theories rest on assumptions). And because we face a universe of infinite unknown facts and infinite unknown theories with our finite and fallible minds, we cannot know what potential refutations of our theories we might have overlooked. Therefore, it’s an error to think that a theory can be given a genuine foundation or justification that takes it beyond assumption or conjecture.

However, while a theory logically cannot be supported by any amount of evidence or argument, it logically can be refuted by a single sound counter-example or counter-argument (although assumptions cannot be avoided there either, and so we must criticize any offered refutations). Consequently, a theory is better thought of as a floating boat that might be sunk at any time by some, as yet unknown, counter-example or counterargument. And so we should conjecture boldly to attempt to capture more truth and then test severely to attempt to eliminate error. It needs to be understood that much evidence and argument that is often mistaken for ‘justifying’ or ‘supporting’ a theory (which is not possible) is really explaining, or applying, or defending, or testing the theory (which are entirely possible, but which usually involve various new conjectures). All this is an explanatory outline of the extreme fallibilist epistemology of critical rationalism as theorized initially and principally by Karl Popper.

Libertarianism is, therefore, best propounded as a bold conjecture in some form: for instance, People should have liberty in normal circumstances (rather than in every imaginable case). If we are asked what this theory is based on, then we should explain that it is ultimately and necessarily a conjecture – like all theories – albeit one that appears to withstand criticism as far as we can tell. We should then invite criticisms of the libertarian conjecture and answer people’s specific criticisms as best we can. This saves wasting time on elaborating impossible ‘foundations’ and stands the best chance of convincing a critic that libertarianism is not refuted and so might be correct. However, we should also try to criticize libertarianism ourselves, for we want to eliminate errors where we can. And even if libertarianism is approximately correct, it is not complete and without theoretical problems.

The error of taking sides between deontologism and consequentialism, etc.

The first thing to notice here is that one can advocate libertarianism for a variety of more basic reasons without implying that any of these is supposed to be the foundation of libertarianism. For it is also a conjecture that libertarianism is required for protecting genuine rights and duties (deontologism), or has the greatest positive welfare, or utility, or whatever, consequences (consequentialism), or allows the society most conducive to people’s desirable flourishing (eudaemonism), or is the implicit social contract that promotes the good of all (contractarianism), or greatly enhances each individual’s self-control, self-realization, and critical faculties (autonomy), or even that its long-term effect is to maximize the welfare of the worst-off group and other ‘fair’ outcomes (social justice). And the list might be indefinitely extended.

I usually prefer simply to say that I advocate libertarianism: liberty for all. I don’t mind saying that we have a strong prima facie right to have liberty and a duty to respect liberty. But that’s not intended to suggest that libertarianism is logically supported by, or even requires, deontologism. However, the real issue here is the common view that there are serious clashes in these approaches and in particular between deontologism and consequentialism. As far as I can tell, there aren’t systematic clashes in everyday practice between respecting libertarian rights and promoting human welfare. And so if one is advocating libertarianism as a practical ideology, then it’s irrelevant that we can imagine far-fetched or very rare cases where libertarian rights and human welfare clash. Therefore, it’s unnecessary to takes sides between rights and welfare.

That said, there is often a modern mistake about the nature of rights and consequences that earlier theorists tended not to make. Rights cannot plausibly be conceived of and held irrespective of the practical consequences of applying them. It’s absurd to suppose that there could be a genuine right or duty that had disastrous consequences for human beings. Rights and duties tend to evolve just because of their apparent usefulness to humans. Similarly, it’s absurd to suppose a valid form of consequentialism that in practice flouts rights and duties. In fact, libertarianism can be interpreted as a form of rule consequentialism: it provides the rule (respect liberty) that promotes the best consequences. Far from being incompatible, deontologism and consequentialism are more like two sides of the same coin. (And analogous arguments apply to the, obviously related, alleged distinction between rationalism and empiricism.)

Moreover, if theoretically pushed, deontologism and consequentialism appear to have at least some tendency to morph into each other. For if we ought to promote good consequences (however conceived), then presumably we must have some sort of duty to promote, and right to have, those good consequences. And if we ought to promote rights and duties (however conceived), then presumably we ought somehow to promote the consequence of more of those rights and duties being respected.

I don’t see that there are significant realistic clashes between any of the listed possible reasons for advocating libertarianism. However, I think it’s clearer to view them as various conjectural explanations of how libertarianism works or can be understood – especially in the face of incompatible criticisms – rather than as what libertarianism is ‘founded’ or ‘based’ on. In any case, libertarianism doesn’t need additional principles to make it acceptable. I don’t mean to imply by this that liberty is always an end in itself or the ultimate thing that ought to be valued. I’m a value pluralist: I don’t think it’s possible to reduce everything to a single desideratum. It’s simply that there’s no sound practical criticism of systematically allowing people to have liberty (or, at least, no alternative that withstands criticism better). It’s enough that libertarianism is an unrefuted practical and moral conjecture.

The error of having no explicit, necessary, and sufficient theory of liberty

The biggest error of most libertarians is an absurdity hiding in plain sight: they don’t have an explicit theory of libertarian interpersonal liberty. They usually have some implicit grasp of liberty that works tolerably well once property is assumed. But they cannot coherently, consistently, and cogently explain exactly how liberty, as such, relates to anything. At the fundamental level, they tend to talk about self-ownership, ‘homesteading’ (initial acquisition), property transfer, etc., and the ‘non-aggression principle’ – but all with respect to ‘rights’. This not only fails to explain the role of liberty itself, it also confuses matters by conflating morals with the issue. What liberty is, and how it applies, is one question. Whether such liberty is moral is a separate question. (There is the explicit and non-moral zero-sum theory of liberty that a minority of self-identified libertarians advocate: whereby, for instance, I gain the liberty that you lose by forcing you to be my slave. But this is not a libertarian theory at all because it fails to distinguish liberty from license or power. And the, occasionally cited, ‘liberty of action’ is not in itself even a form of interpersonal liberty.)

However, the basic idea of libertarian liberty is not hard to explain. The ‘non-aggression principle’ itself is close to being a necessary and sufficient way of capturing it, if correctly and charitably interpreted (for ‘aggression’ can be misleading and the ‘non’ can appear to be absolutist). The Rothbardians – and some of their critics – are mistaken in thinking that a theory of legitimate property is presupposed, or implied, by the non-aggression principle. For the principle can do it all, by being understood ultimately in a pre-propertarian sense. First assume that libertarian liberty means not being aggressed against (or proactively constrained, or interfered with) by other people. Now assume that such aggressions need to be minimized in the event of any clashes. Then it clearly follows that secure self-ownership and the ownership-by-use of unowned resources are libertarian. For if people were not secure self-owners or could not have such ownership-by-use, then they could be objectively aggressed against by other people to a high degree: efficient economizing, and even personal safety, would not exist. One way of understanding this is that libertarian liberty tends to ‘internalize externalities’ (as economists call this, but here meant in a pre-propertarian sense). And that also helps to explain why liberty is so productive: efficient economizing is possible and the ‘tragedy of the commons’ is avoided.

Thus we can understand how self-ownership and all non-aggressively-acquired property are entailed by liberty itself. And in the event of any further issues or clashes arising, we can look at what ‘minimizes aggression’ to work out what is most libertarian. For greater clarity and precision, I tend to theorize ‘liberty’ as ‘the absence of proactively imposed costs’ and ‘libertarian practice’ as ‘the minimizing of any proactively imposed costs’. The details can become confusing unless one has first grasped the basic idea. But the basic idea of libertarian liberty is clear and uncomplicated.

A brief restatement

Philosophy can sometimes be hard to follow. Just as with other intellectual subjects, it cannot be made so simple that anyone can grasp it without some intellectual effort. But to attempt as much clarity and ease of comprehension as possible, let me briefly restate the main points in slightly different ways than in the above account.

1)    Assumptions are unavoidable and ineliminable. Logically, theories cannot be supported or justified beyond their assumptions by evidence or arguments. But they might be refuted by a single sound counter-example or counter-argument. So instead of seeking impossible support we should advocate and explain libertarianism as a bold practical conjecture that we challenge others to criticize. This makes a virtue of an epistemological necessity.

2)    We may conjecture that rights and duties that respect liberty are systematically conducive to good consequences in normal life. Therefore, it’s an error to think that the practical libertarian must either defend rights to liberty in disastrous but unlikely circumstances (absolute deontologism) or ignore libertarian rights and look only at the consequences (act consequentialism). In practice, deontologism and consequentialism evolve together. And, logically, each implies a version of the other: maximum rights observance is the best consequence; consequentialism implies rights to those good consequences.

3)    Libertarian interpersonal ‘liberty’ is simply ‘the absence of aggressions (proactive impositions) by other people’. And ‘libertarian practice’ is ‘the minimization of any clashes of liberty’ (e.g., both allowing and banning all pollution proactively imposes: therefore some compromise to minimize the clash is entailed). By applying liberty alone we can deduce self-ownership, initial acquisition, transfer, etc. There is no need for confusion (the basic idea of liberty is clear and uncomplicated) or for additional principles (it is necessary and sufficient for libertarianism).

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1 A version of this essay first appeared on libertarianism.org June 5, 2013.

2) Kymlicka on Libertarianism: a Response

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Abstract

This essay examines sections relevant to libertarianism in Will Kymlicka’s Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd ed.), making and explaining the following criticisms. Kymlicka’s preface misconstrues political philosophy’s progress, purpose, and its relation to libertarianism. In his introduction, his project mistakes libertarianism as right-wing, justice as compromise among existing theories, and equality as the ultimate value. His a note on method in effect takes as axioms, beyond philosophical examination, various alleged desiderata and the necessary moral role of the state. Moreover, his ultimate test being our considered convictions amounts to a conservative and illogical justificationism at odds with radical and coherent critical rationalism. Kymlicka’s chapter on libertarianism mistakes it as, inherently and unavoidably, free-marketist, anti-consequentialist, deontological, Nozickian, requiring a foundational moral premiss, without objective content, unmaximisable, indistinguishable from license, equality-based, anti-anarchist, self-defeating, indefensibly unfair, impractically philosophical, and without influence. A different version of libertarianism easily withstands all Kymlicka’s antipathetic criticisms.

Introduction

In his well-known introduction to contemporary political philosophy,2 Will Kymlicka includes a substantial chapter on libertarianism plus a preface and introduction that are also relevant to this subject. These sections are quite likely to help form opinions about libertarianism with many readers. Unfortunately, very many of Kymlicka’s assumptions and arguments seem to me to be crucially mistaken. As I have no objection to his way of proceeding and organizing his views, I shall respond to Kymlicka’s points in the order in which they arise in his text. Consequently, it has proven convenient to divide my reply into sections following Kymlicka’s own sections. This should make it easier for anyone to locate and follow Kymlicka’s original text and compare it with my responses, should they wish to do so.

Kymlicka’s PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

In the preface, Kymlicka says it is difficult for me to understand why anyone would get involved in the project of political philosophy if they did not think we could make progress… (x). I heartily agree with this. In social science and even ideology progress is surely possible. However, progress is not always as obvious as in the physical sciences. And even in the physical sciences errors and dead ends have sometimes been mistaken for progress for a very long time, often decades. Where Kymlicka sees progress in political philosophy, I usually see errors and dead ends. For instance, he says, One theme which I emphasized in the first edition was the way each theory could be seen as trying to interpret what it means for governments to show ‘equal concern and respect’ to their citizens (x). Unfortunately, this thematic assumption thereby rules out of consideration things that political philosophy urgently needs to consider: specifically, private-property anarchism and a libertarianism that is unconcerned with the emotional demand for equal concern and respect; more on these points later. In what follows, I shall isolate what I take to be key errors with respect to libertarianism and try to show that they are indeed errors. Kymlicka often repeats himself, and I have tried to avoid repeating my criticisms unless an extra twist seems to be involved or some emphasis seems to be desirable.

We are soon given an example of a key error when we are informed that To date, there have been three main approaches to defending liberal democracy: utilitarianism, liberal equality, and libertarianism (x). Setting aside utilitarianism and liberal equality for the moment, by liberal democracy Kymlicka intends ‘liberal’ in a modern sense that is only tenuously related to what ‘liberalism’ originally meant and ‘democracy’ as some form of what is really elected oligarchy. Consequently, libertarianism is, on the contrary, one of the main approaches criticising liberal democracy. Why does Kymlicka not see this? As we shall see, he has succumbed to an illusion of fundamental agreement.

Kymlicka’s INTRODUCTION

1. THE PROJECT

We now turn to the introduction, where we are told that Our traditional picture of the political landscape views political principles as falling somewhere on a single line, stretching from left to right (1). True. But we are then told people on the left believe in equality, and hence endorse some form of socialism, while those on the right believe in freedom and hence endorse some form of free-market capitalism. This is, at best, some version of the modern view of left and right. The traditional view, originating in France, had laissez-faire liberals on the left and state-interventionists on the right. It was not a neat and clear division, perhaps, but it is neater and clearer than the muddled modern division that Kymlicka takes to be traditional. He goes on to discuss problems with the left-right division for some ideologies,3 but he is happy to call libertarianism right-wing.

Kymlicka notes all the various modern theories in political philosophy and suggests that, To subordinate all other values to one overriding value seems almost fanatical. A successful theory of justice, therefore, will have to accept bits and pieces from most of the existing theories (3). To think that some form of compromise must be the solution is epistemologically arbitrary. It is also suggestive of the democratic theory of truth.4 Moreover, it is, in a sense, to subordinate all other values to one overriding value namely compromise. And so it is itself both fanatical and inconsistent. By analogy, it would be just as arbitrary and inconsistent to suggest that a true scientific theory of some phenomenon will have to accept bits and pieces from most of the existing theories.

However, by way of a potential reconciliation, we are offered Dworkin’s view that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality (3) in the sense of treating people ‘as equals’: each citizen is entitled to equal concern and respect (4). This view about concern and respect cannot be right. Concern and respect inherently involve emotions and they cannot be felt for all and sundry. But liberty can be observed ‘equally’, at least in the purely formal sense that everyone is deemed equally entitled to complete interpersonal liberty. There is to be no imposed hierarchy, such that some people inherently count for more than others when it comes to liberty. Does this mean that equality is a more ultimate value than liberty itself? Of course not. The libertarian wants more liberty rather than less even if it is not spread equally. So equality cannot be the dominant principle. Consider a nutritionist who advocates vitamins as essential for everyone’s health. Does that mean that he is not really concerned with nutrition, or vitamins, or health but, because it is good for everyone, with equality? Of course