The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered

By Xlibris US

The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered arose organically from the rich heritage of St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. The same land that was witness to the Battle of New Orleans would also spawn a unique and vibrant culture known for close-knit families, good food, refineries and the activities centered around the bountiful wetlands.

Academic cultural offerings were rare when the Nunez History Lecture Series began in 2001. Some folks at Nunez Community College, the only institution of higher education in the Parish, decided to tell the stories of the people of St. Bernard and Louisiana, hoping that a handful of others might also be interested. After 14 seasons of over 100 lectures and an average attendance of over 100 people, the Lecture Series is still finding new stories to tell.

A natural outgrowth of the Lecture Series was to feature a more detailed treatment of the second most important historical event in St. Bernard Parish history, the Battle of New Orleans. And the College was the natural place since the battlefield was in sight of the campus on a clear day. However, the plans for the first Symposium were delayed by a few years when the most important historical event in St. Bernard Parish history, Hurricane Katrina, left six feet of water across the Nunez campus and up to seventeen feet of water across the rest of the Parish.

By January of 2013, the first Battle of New Orleans Historical Symposium was held at the College, with the audience likely sitting in the exact spot that soldiers mustered for the Battle. Once the Symposium became established and successful, the only nagging problem was the ephemeral nature of the knowledge being created. With some of the most passionate and knowledgeable speakers in the nation, it just seemed natural to expand and preserve the great information being presented.

So in a labor of love, many of the top lecturers agreed to put pen to paper and tell the story of the Battle of New Orleans in greater detail. The result is The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered

• Language: English
• Publisher: Xlibris US
• Release date: Dec 12, 2014
• ISBN: 9781503523807

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Copyright © 2014 by Louisiana Institute of Higher Education.

Cover Image: Courtesy of The Historic New Orleans Collection, acc. no. 1980.32

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner.

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Rev. date: 12/12/2014

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Contents

Expanded Table of Contents

Preface

Introduction A Reconsideration of the Battle of New Orleans

Part I Lead-up to the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 1 Context of the War of 1812 – American and European affairs

Chapter 2 Cochrane’s Grand Southern Strategy

Chapter 3 Battle of Lake Borgne

Part II the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 4 New Orleans at the Time of the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 5 British Landing and Early Skirmishes

Chapter 6 Events Leading up to the Main Battle

Chapter 7 The Battle of January ⁸th

Chapter 8 Battle for the Westbank

Chapter 9 After January ⁸th – British Exfiltration and Martial Law

Part III Troops, Weapons and Uniforms at the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 10 The American Army in the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 11 The British Army in the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 12 Kentuckians and Tennesseeans in the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 13 American Weaponry in the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 14 British Weaponry in the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 15 Uniforms in the Battle of New Orleans

Conclusion

Appendix

Historiography of the Battle of New Orleans

Notes

Expanded Table of Contents

Preface

Introduction A Reconsideration of the Battle of New Orleans

Part I Lead-up to the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 1 Context of the War of 1812 – American and European affairs

War Goals: American Perspectives

War Goals: British Perspectives

The Anglo-American War Progresses

The Surge of 1814

American Economic Collapse and the Course of War

Chapter 2 Cochrane’s Grand Southern Strategy

A British Presence in Florida

The American Counter-Offensive

The British Fail at Fort Bowyer

A British Diversion in Georgia

The Attack on New Orleans

Jackson takes Pensacola

Leaks from Jamaica

Jackson at the Gates

His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels at the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 3 Battle of Lake Borgne

Cutting out the Seahorse

A Tedious Row, a Hot Fight

Contributed by S. A. Cavell

Chapter 4 New Orleans at the Time of the Battle of New Orleans

French Quarter Culture in 1815

The Culture in the Faubourgs

Medical Knowledge in 1815

French Quarter Architecture

New Orleans Under Martial Law

Contributed by Christina Vella

Chapter 5 British Landing and Early Skirmishes

The Landscape of the Battle

British Troops Reach Bayou Bienvenue

Night Battle of December 23rd

Chapter 6 Events Leading up to the Main Battle

Reconnaissance in Force

Battle of January ¹st

Plans for the Main Battle

Chapter 7 The Battle of January ⁸th

Failed Widening of the Villere Canal

The Battle Commences

Pakenham is Killed

British Frontal Attack Broken in Short Order

Chapter 8 Battle for the Westbank

Thornton Reaches the Westbank

Thornton Seeks Reinforcements

Jackson’s Bluff and Lambert’s Withdrawal of Forces

Contributed by Ron Chapman

Chapter 9 After January ⁸th – British Exfiltration and Martial Law

Martial Law in New Orleans

In Service to France

The Montebello Affair

America goes to War

The Politics of French New Orleans

Jackson Takes Command

Contributed by Donald Keith Midkiff

Chapter 10 The American Army in the Battle of New Orleans

Composition of American Troops

The Hunters of Kentucky (abridged) 1821

Weapons of the American Troops

New Orleans Goes to War

Jackson Comes to Town

Contributed by Donald Keith Midkiff

Chapter 11 The British Army in the Battle of New Orleans

Officers

Other Ranks

The Navy

Contributed by Timothy Pickles

Chapter 12 Kentuckians and Tennesseeans in the Battle of New Orleans

Kentuckians in the War of 1812

Kentuckian Expedition to New Orleans

Kentuckians and Tennesseans in the Battle of the ⁸th

Kentuckian Retreat on the Westbank

Contributed by Eddie Price

Chapter 13 American Weaponry in the Battle of New Orleans

Orleans Rifle Company, Commanded by Thomas Beale

Artillery during the Battle of January ⁸th

Infantry Weaponry During the Battle of January ⁸th

Contributed by Robert Wettemann

Chapter 14 British Weaponry in the Battle of New Orleans

Swords and White Arms

Firearms

Cannon

Contributed by Timothy Pickles

Chapter 15 Uniforms in the Battle of New Orleans

British Uniforms - The Coat

Headgear

Officers’ Distinctions

American Uniforms – The Coat

Headgear

Officers’ Distinctions

Contributed by Timothy Pickles

Facing colours and lace patterns of British regiments at the Battle of New Orleans

Conclusion

Appendix

Historiography of the Battle of New Orleans

Contributed by Jerry Schumacher

Notes

For Chloe

Preface

The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered arose organically from the rich heritage of St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. The same land that was witness to the Battle of New Orleans would also spawn a unique and vibrant culture known for close-knit families, good food, refineries and the activities centered around the bountiful wetlands.

Academic cultural offerings were rare when the Nunez History Lecture Series began in 2001. Some folks at Nunez Community College, the only institution of higher education in the Parish, decided to tell the stories of the people of St. Bernard and Louisiana, hoping that a handful of others might also be interested. After 14 seasons of over 100 lectures and an average attendance of over 100 people, the Lecture Series is still finding new stories to tell.

A natural outgrowth of the Lecture Series was to feature a more detailed treatment of the second most important historical event in St. Bernard Parish history, the Battle of New Orleans. And the College was the natural place since the battlefield was in sight of the campus on a clear day. However, the plans for the first Symposium were delayed by a few years when the most important historical event in St. Bernard Parish history, Hurricane Katrina, left six feet of water across the Nunez campus and up to seventeen feet of water across the rest of the Parish.

By January of 2013, the first Battle of New Orleans Historical Symposium was held at the College, with the audience likely sitting in the exact spot that soldiers mustered for the Battle. Once the Symposium became established and successful, the only nagging problem was the ephemeral nature of the knowledge being created. With some of the most passionate and knowledgeable speakers in the nation, it just seemed natural to expand and preserve the great information being presented.

So in a labor of love, many of the top lecturers agreed to put pen to paper and tell the story of the Battle of New Orleans in greater detail. The result is The Battle of New Orleans Reconsidered.

********

Special thanks go out to the contributors who gave of their time and expertise simply out of a desire to have the story of the Battle of New Orleans told, to Steve Berrien who spent long hours delicately crafting the language and to the Greater New Orleans Foundation’s Exxon Mobil Fund, Robert Berthelot, Marlene Himel and Chris Kimball who believed that this book should be published.

Contributed by Curtis Manning

Dr. Manning is a Professor of History at Nunez Community College and the Executive Director of the Louisiana Institute of Higher Education. He wrote The History of Higher Education in Louisiana.

Introduction

A Reconsideration of the Battle of New Orleans

As with all major historical events, the Battle of New Orleans has been interpreted differently over the years. Its importance, its particulars and even its very definition have undergone revision in the changing preoccupations of a modern country. In history textbooks and in the modern cultural consciousness, the Battle of New Orleans has taken on a distinct image that has shaped the America of today. While professional historians might have understood the proper context, most non-historians have gained such a little-nuanced overview that the Battle can rightly be called the most forgotten major battle that America has fought, and this relative anonymity has extended to the War of 1812 in which the Battle played the most important role. The bicentennial anniversary of the Battle is a good reckoning point to look back and reconsider what has been handed down to the current generation. And in this reconsideration of the Battle of New Orleans, the hope is that future generations might have a more accurate conception of what took place as America was still coming into its own as a great nation.

The Battle of New Orleans is often depicted as a titanic clash that took place on a single day, January 8, 1815, in what is now St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana. Led by the intrepid Andrew Jackson, the rag-tag, cobbled together American forces used squirrel-guns to defeat the once-mighty British army who were undone by their unfortunate choice of bright-red uniforms and the overzealous discipline of marching directly into the line of American fire.

On one hand, the American victory was so complete that the disheartened British forever abandoned territorial ambitions on America and slunk back to Europe to lick their wounds. Jackson was catapulted to the presidency bringing in a brand new age of American strength that included inevitable continental expansion and great country status.

On the other hand, the Battle might have been relatively inconsequential. It was superfluous because it was fought after the Treaty of Ghent was signed and the War of 1812 had already ended. Thus, the Battle of New Orleans was a somewhat low-ranking battle in a low-ranking war and likely received less coverage in a typical history textbook than the Seven Years War / French & Indian War, the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and even the War in Vietnam. Maybe it ranked with the Mexican War or Korean Conflict in relative importance in building the America of today. The misconceptions abounded.

The most basic of these misconceptions is the idea of a single battle on a single day. There were actually up to eight related military events, none of which occurred in the city of New Orleans: the naval Battle of Lake Borgne on December 14, the night battle of December 23, the reconnaissance in force of December 28, the artillery attack of January 1, the main battle of January 8, the battle on the Westbank on January 8, the bombardment of Fort St. Philip ending on January 18, and the British exfiltration completed by January 19. In each of these lay the possibility that with a few quirks of history, the end result of American victory might have been changed. Especially regarding the events on the Westbank, it could be argued that the British won the day on January 8th but simply chose to give up their gains. The Battle of New Orleans was a complex series of actions that might have portended a very different future for America.

In another important reconsideration, the Battle of New Orleans should really be considered the culmination of a multifaceted Gulf Coast Campaign by the British. This Grand Southern Strategy led by Admiral Alexander Cochrane covered the expanse from Cumberland Island, Georgia to Barataria Bay in south Louisiana, with key targets of Pensacola, Florida, Mobile, Alabama, and New Orleans, and held the possibility of ranging far inland. The plan included raising an army of Native Americans, escaped slaves and even the disaffected French and Spanish residents of Louisiana. Important battles were fought at Fort Bowyer, near the mouth of Mobile Bay, Alabama, first in September of 1814 – a British defeat that shaped the strategy for the approach to New Orleans – and finally in February of 1815 – a British victory that might have extended the War of 1812 had not the signing of the Treaty of Ghent intervened. Had events gone differently, the British might well have continued their Gulf Coast Campaign past the Battle of New Orleans

In a final important reconsideration, the opposing sides perceived the importance of the Battle of New Orleans very differently. To the Americans, it was indeed a monumental victory and January 8 would suitably become a national holiday. The Americans had won the War of 1812 against the strongest country – and military – in the world, which cemented the emerging world-power status of the young nation. The gains of the American Revolution were confirmed. Great Britain considered the Battle to be a relatively inconsequential defeat in a war of secondary importance. Despite the loss at New Orleans, the British had achieved all of their goals in the War of 1812, and thus they considered themselves the victors. Their main preoccupation had been the long-running war with Napoleon, which had threatened their very sovereignty, and the War of 1812 was more of a sideshow. Even news of the loss at New Orleans was trumped by the escape from exile of the feared Napoleon on February 26, 1815.

The chapters that follow delve more deeply into these reconsiderations as well as many, many more. Yet they also back up many aspects of the narrative of the Battle of New Orleans that have survived the generations. The importance of the Battle is such that a fuller reconsideration is warranted – not just in the military tactics but also in the diplomatic, political and cultural contexts of a not-yet-formed nation.

PART I

Lead-up to the Battle of New Orleans

Chapter 1

Context of the War of 1812 – American and European affairs

The story of the Battle of New Orleans, like many historical events, is mired in mythology, hyperbole, and misunderstanding which, over the years, have obfuscated the nature of the battle, the deeds of the men involved, and the details surrounding the outcome of this last set-piece battle of the War of 1812. Like the war itself, the story looks quite different from each side of the conflict. For most Americans, the legacy of the War of 1812 has been that of a nation-building victory in a second War of Independence, one that crystallized a sovereign, national identity and produced a unifying narrative. For Britons, the conflict with America was and remains a forgotten side-show to the real war against Napoleonic France, a twenty-two-year-long struggle that threatened the very existence of Great Britain. When the British do consider the Anglo-American war, however, they deem it an unequivocal British success, based on the achievement of the government’s war aims and the status quo ante bellum peace settlement that Britain offered at the outset of the conflict. Such diverse views of the results are matched by equally opposing views of many of the actions that made up the war.

One way to understand the diversity of opinions is to place the events leading up to the Battle of New Orleans in the context of opposing political and economic aims as expressed by both America and Great Britain. Chapter 1 of this book attempts to do just that, beginning with an overview of the War of 1812 as it looked to parties on either side of the Atlantic. Chapter 2 examines more detailed operations immediately preceding the British attack on New Orleans, and Chapter 3 gives a detailed look at the Battle of Lake Borgne, the essential precursor to New Orleans, from both sides of the line.

War Goals: American Perspectives

Tensions between the United States and Great Britain were running high long before war was declared. In 1807 the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair aroused embarrassment and outrage over the impressment of sailors aboard American ships when four English nationals (and Royal Navy deserters) were forcibly removed from the USS Chesapeake by the officers and men of HMS Leopard, an incident that left three American sailors dead and sixteen wounded.¹ The controversy over impressment originated with Crown policy which stated that anyone born in Britain, or one of her colonies, was a British national no matter how long he or she had lived aboard. The American government granted nationality based on the length of residency, although no naturalization documents were issued at the time, making proof of U.S. citizenship virtually impossible.² Impressment was a time-honored fact of British life and the traditional wartime recruiting method of the Royal Navy. It was also a practice well known to seafaring residents of the relatively new American union.

Throughout the Napoleonic Wars, America had remained neutral. In economic terms this meant that it continued to trade with both France and Great Britain. In 1807 a British Order in Council sought to stop neutral ships from supplying French ports. Such measures were a standard wartime practice designed to break enemy supply lines, but American traders were affected by the order, which further agitated U.S. relations with Great Britain. President Thomas Jefferson, whose Republican politics skewed towards agrarian, rural idealism and continental expansion rather than international commerce and trade, used these incidents to punish Britain with an Embargo Act that blocked American exports to British ports, officially cutting off the best source of wheat and grain to feed Britain and her armies, especially those recently arrived in Portugal who were preparing to march against French forces on the Iberian Peninsula. Jefferson hoped that the embargo would also endear America to Napoleon who, in return, might see fit to grant an extension of the Louisiana Purchase to include the Floridas, partially fulfilling one of Jefferson’s great ambitions – to create a continent-wide United States.

The reality of Jefferson’s embargo was that much American shipping, now working illegally, continued to supply British ports around the world. Napoleon was aware of the persistent U.S. support for Britain and retaliated by burning American ships whenever they were found. Napoleon viewed America with disdain and saw its neutrality as characteristic of a weak and ineffectual nation of opportunists.

On the home front, the embargo drove a wedge between the Republican government and the New England Federalists, who depended on blue-water trade for survival. It was a divide that would worsen over the course of the war, leading to talks of Northeastern secession that came to a head at the end of 1814 during the Hartford Convention. The economic consequences of the embargo, which slashed customs revenues and turned legitimate traders into black marketeers, were a prescient warning to Jefferson and James Madison³, his successor as president, of the fiscal dangers associated with disabling foreign trade. It was a warning neither heeded as they pressed ahead with domestic territorial ambitions which also included annexing Canada.⁴ Jefferson clarified his plans in July 1807 in a letter to John Armstrong, then the American Ambassador to France: "If the English do not give us the satisfaction we demand [in consequence of the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair], we will take Canada which wants to join the Union, and when with Canada we shall have the Floridas … ."⁵ The Republican belief in a long-desired Canadian union with America persisted despite Canadian alliances with Indian nations fighting U.S. troops and militias on the Northwest frontier and around the Great Lakes.

From the start, the War Hawk governments of Jefferson and Madison sought to refocus American ambitions, shifting the outlook from international trade and commerce, which fostered unwanted cosmopolitanism and the supremacy of cities, to domestic expansion and the goal of a continental Union in which rural life reigned supreme and trade looked inward to local markets. In just a few years the Republicans had transformed from a party of Francophile Jacobins to one of Old World American patriots who denounced dissenters as traitors. Republican foreign policy had always favored France and maintained deep suspicions towards the English government. Such a view influenced Jefferson’s reaction to the outcome of negotiations in London, headed by American diplomats James Monroe and William Pinckney on matters of the embargo, and ultimately, impressment.⁶ The deal struck by Monroe and Pinckney stated that Britain would legalize the American re-export trade, a practice by which cargoes shipped from foreign (often French) ports were unloaded in the U.S., remaining ashore just long enough to be considered American cargo, then reloaded and shipped out to their original destination. It was a way for American traders to get around embargoes and Orders in Council and keep trade flowing. In exchange, the U.S. would agree to an official link between British and American maritime trade, effectively ending U.S. neutrality and its ability to trade with France and her occupied territories. Monroe and Pinckney also concluded an agreement by which America would hand over all seafaring British nationals who had lived in the U.S. for less than two years, in exchange for a complete cessation of impressment.⁷

Jefferson refused to put the agreement before the Senate, concerned that it might pass. Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin had worked the numbers: approximately 9,000 men, half the skilled able seamen working in U.S. shipping at the time, were British. Gallatin advised Jefferson against the deal, in full knowledge that maritime trade could not survive the loss of so many of its most skilled sailors.⁸ While Jefferson cared little enough for the health of foreign trade, the excuse was an expedient one, as it justified a war that would enable the U.S. to further its goal of territorial expansion. He proceeded on a path towards war with Great Britain which the Madison administration declared on June 18, 1812.

The declaration was based, in large part, upon unfounded hopes that France was sympathetic to American interests and on false intelligence that Napoleon had revoked the Berlin and Milan Decrees.⁹ These laws were the founding principles of Napoleon’s Continental System, which enforced trade within the Empire. One result of the Decrees was that the rights of neutral shipping, which included the rights of American traders, were curtailed. This policy was based on the accurate assumption that neutrals would also be transporting goods and supplies to the enemies of France. Napoleon allowed the American government to be deceived by rumors of a revocation but maintained an aggressive stance on American shipping.

The second piece of false intelligence that hastened Madison’s call for war was the belief that the British government had incited the bloody attacks on American settlers on the Northwestern frontier by stirring up Native American aggressions over land and cultural encroachments. In fact, the Indians of the region needed no encouragement beyond a desire to defend their territory and their traditional way of life. Any British involvement in the incursions came from private individuals acting independently and without Crown sanctions.

War Goals: British Perspectives

For Britain, the view of war with America looked quite different. Throughout the political and diplomatic skirmishes of 1807 and beyond Britain’s primary, unrivaled concern was not the United States but France, which posed an imminent existential threat. Napoleon Bonaparte embodied that threat on two levels: first, with the threat of invasion; and second, with a threat to the economic survival of Great Britain. Napoleon’s Continental System represented a form of economic warfare: as British exports were excluded from the ports of the ever-expanding French empire, the loss of trade revenues constituted a real danger to Britain’s economic stability.

With tens of thousands of troops in Portugal, Spain, and Flanders, hundreds of Royal Navy war ships blockading French ports from Denmark to the Mediterranean, and combined operations in the West Indies, the British government had stretched its military resources to a breaking point. In this world-wide theater of operations Britain often found herself fighting alone against the French military juggernaut. The Prime Minister, Lord Liverpool, a strong Tory leader who brought much needed stability to the government when he took office in 1812, was tough-minded and possessed a clear vision of how peace with Napoleon had to be concluded. Liverpool was determined to see Britain come away from the French Wars with economic security through guaranteed access to markets in the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal in particular. With these concerns at the forefront Liverpool and his war cabinet including, Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Bathurst, Secretary for War and the Colonies, and Lord Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty, took months to comprehend the seriousness of the American declaration and to realize that Madison’s government sought all-out war.¹⁰

Their incredulity stemmed from the fact that America’s two stated reasons for going to war – to stop the impressment of sailors aboard American ships, and to emancipate Canada from the British yoke – were issues on which Britain could not and would not negotiate. Impressment related directly to the core strength of the Royal Navy. As Britain’s primary defensive weapon in the war with France, the navy relied on the service of skilled sailors, and the Crown felt perfectly justified in exercising its right to conscript subjects wherever they appeared for the sake of national security.

When it came to Canada, colonial pride was not the only issue at stake. Canadian forests provided one of the best sources of shipbuilding timber, another vital artery of the Royal Navy. The Canadian colony also represented a major market for British West Indian trade and helped maintain a balance of power in North America. So as Madison and the War Hawks threw down the gauntlet, Liverpool’s government scoffed at the idea of America going to war over demands that Britain would never concede. This challenge was, to Liverpool and his cabinet, a trifling annoyance and a distraction from the real conflict that raged across the Channel.

More importantly, Lord Liverpool knew that Britain could not sustain two wars at once. Shortages of men, materiel, and money demanded that British efforts remain focused on defeating Napoleon. The conflict with America had, therefore, to be concluded as swiftly as possible without giving an inch on Canadian territory or maritime belligerent rights, which included the right to impress subjects of the Crown, the right to stop and search neutral shipping, and the right to seize those neutral ships and cargoes if it was determined that they were bound for an enemy port. These rights were longstanding prerogatives of the British government and were adopted, in one form or another, by most seafaring European powers in times of war.

Shortages of men and money subsequently dictated British strategy in America. Liverpool’s government developed a three-point plan to first, defend Canada on the frontier; second, maintain a naval blockade to economically cripple American shipping and commerce; and third, conduct coastal raiding in strategic areas to draw American forces away from Canada and disrupt local population centers, thereby souring public support for the war. This, it was hoped, would increase public pressure on the American government to bring an end to the conflict.

To alleviate the shortage of men under arms, Britain considered re-deploying a significant number of troops from the West Indies garrisons to aid the fight in the U.S., although the idea was rapidly shelved. The West Indies regiments existed to protect the interest of powerful planters who feared, in addition to French attacks, the possibility of a slave rebellion. Since the Haitian slave revolt of 1803, dissension had been rife in the