Surcease: The End and the Beginning

By Dale Kiser

Surcease: The End and the Beginning is somewhat of a sequel to Top Secret: Eleven Years of Blood Sweat and Tears. Most of the main character from Top Secret show up once again in Surcease as leading characters. This is the story of a few people working to uncover and stop a very insidious operation designed to take down the leaders of many of the countries of the world. The ultimate aim is to take over all these countries. It is the story of the CIA versus The Russian Federations FSB, the successor to the infamous KGB. It is a story of some deception, assassinations, double agents, and a bit of intrigue. The writing contains some fact and some fiction. It is based loosely on the fact that the Soviets had a group named Group Nord which was composed of the chief of each of the KGB's Directorates. Group Nord was formed in the mid 1970's by the then director of the KGB, Yuri Andropov. It's main function was to plan ways the old Soviet Union could take over the US and some other countries through peaceful means primarily. And it seems to have been designed to conduct political and psychological operations directed at undermining the will of the West and NATO. Needless to say it did not succeed although the group functioned for years. I took some liberties when writing about some of the factual things.

• Language: English
• Publisher: AuthorHouse
• Release date: Sep 18, 2013
• ISBN: 9781491811467

Dale Kiser

The author grew up in both western North Carolina and northwest Washington State. He has spent several years writing about various aspects of the intelligence world, mainly the CIA. Much of his writings, although classified as fiction, are based upon actual events and happenings. Following his employment with the government, he spent several years in public education, serving as a teacher, guidance counselor, and principal. He attended several colleges and universities and taught at some. After retiring, he was able to devote time to one of his passions, flower growing. He has also spent much time hiking the mountain trails in Alaska, Washington State, and North Carolina, photographing all the interesting things he saw along the trails.

Book preview

© 2013 by Dale Kiser. All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted by any means without the written permission of the author.

Published by AuthorHouse 09/14/2013

ISBN: 978-1-4918-1148-1 (sc)

ISBN: 978-1-4918-1147-4 (hc)

ISBN: 978-1-4918-1146-7 (e)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013915592

Any people depicted in stock imagery provided by Thinkstock are models, and such images are being used for illustrative purposes only.

Certain stock imagery © Thinkstock.

Because of the dynamic nature of the Internet, any web addresses or links contained in this book may have changed since publication and may no longer be valid. The views expressed in this work are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the publisher, and the publisher hereby disclaims any responsibility for them.

CONTENTS

PROLOGUE

INTRODUCTION OF CHARACTERS

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER 8

CHAPTER 9

CHAPTER 10

CHAPTER 11

CHAPTER 12

CHAPTER 13

CHAPTER 14

CHAPTER 15

CHAPTER 16

CHAPTER 17

CHAPTER 18

CHAPTER 19

CHAPTER 20

CHAPTER 21

CHAPTER 22

CHAPTER 23

CHAPTER 24

CHAPTER 25

CHAPTER 26

CHAPTER 27

CHAPTER 28

CHAPTER 29

CHAPTER 30

CHAPTER 31

CHAPTER 32

CHAPTER 33

CHAPTER 34

Let Them Not be Forgotten For They Have Shown

the World That Freedom Is Not Free

Dedicated to my friend Mick

PROLOGUE

Many years ago within the KGB, the old Soviet Union’s State Security apparatus, a committee was formed known as Group Nord. There are several groups of thoughts about the purpose of this committee. It is known to have consisted of most of the heads, if not all, of the Chief Directorates (up to 16) of the KGB. Even though there are varying thoughts about the purpose of Group Nord, the most talked about and seemingly the most logical and acceptable, is that Group Nord’s purpose was to plan and lead activities directed at the takeover of the United States by the Soviet Union by peaceful means.

Someone characterized Group Nord as being an ad hoc committee of the KGB’s department chiefs, first assembled by chief of the KGB, Yuri Andropov. There were of course, many other support personnel involved, probably amounting to several hundred people. Some others have said it’s purpose was to develop plans which were directed at splitting the NATO Alliance, and in that process, to develop and conduct psychological and political operations that would eventually under mine the will of the West and consequently allow the Soviet to take over the US in particular.

While some lean to the purpose of that being to eventually conquer the US by war, the most logical reason seems to be to conquer the United States without firing a single shot. Some within the old KGB did say the sole purpose was to take over the United States without firing a shot. Group Nord is known to have established dates by which the take over was to occur. When that date was reached and they had not been successful, they would establish a new date for the take over and continue working toward that date.

It is also known that many KGB support people made trips to the US under the cover of such organizations as the Soviet Olympic Committee, organizations of the United Nations, as well as Trade Envoys. It is suspected that many others, unknown or known by the FBI or the CIA, made many trips to the US to secure as much information as possible. It is also known and has been well documented that many sleeper agents were sent to the US years before to be awakened at the proper time by the KGB.

These sleeper agents were given instructions to infiltrate as much of our infrastructure and other systems, including our government, as possible in order to be in positions to provide pertinent information to the Soviets when it was needed. Many of these sleepers eventually attained high positions in highly influential companies and circumstances, including the US government. There was a recent unveiling of ten sleeper agents that were working within the US. They were identified and sent back to the Russian Federation. There was an exchange of other people involved in this episode.

33417.png

Some people have said to me that they had no idea any of the intelligence stuff was going on in this world. Of course my response to that is that you are not supposed to know it’s going on unless you are working directly in the business of intelligence in one of its many forms.

33419.png

A high up CIA official, Frank Wisner, is quoted to have said, when talking to prospective CIA operatives: You people have no doubt read a lot of cloak and dagger novels. If the impression you have of the Central Intelligence Agency comes from them, you’ll find you are seriously mistaken. The real world of espionage is less glamorous and more dangerous than those novels would lead you to believe. If you make it through our training program, you will spend your professional lives doing things you can’t talk about to anyone outside the office, and that includes wives and girlfriends. We’re looking for people who are comfortable living in the shadows and who can conduct imaginative operations the US government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for if things go right or wrong. What you do won’t turn up in the headlines on the front page—it won’t appear on any page—unless you foul up. You’ll be operating in the killing fields of the Cold War and you’ll be playing for keeps. If you aren’t completely comfortable with this, my advice to you is to seek employment with the Fuller Brush Company.

That statement is very reflective of the necessary character and will of anyone who would succeed at being an illegal (an operative working under non-official cover and having no supposed connection, or protection, from a government of any sort) operative during the Cold War. The illegal operative must be able to work within the shadows, often be almost friendless in a foreign country, and be willing to possibly suffer for periods of time with just the most basic amenities of life. And the illegal operative must not have any sort of need for recognition or praise for the job he or she has done. If he, or she, is willing to tolerate these, plus a thousand other things that would confront them, then they might survive and be successful. It is my belief that most of the very useful intelligence this country gathers does often indeed come from the illegals who are stationed throughout the world. Such a lonely existence they often live.

Like any endeavor regarding intelligence or counter terrorism, there is a white side—open for business and an overt; a gray side, a shadow state somewhere between public and not being here at all; and then there is the dark side. The dark side is the realm of black programs, covert organizations, and hidden agendas. In the world of black programs, organizations don’t exist, people don’t have names, and things go bump in the night. These comments are by Chuck Pfarrer, author of Seal Target Geronimo and a former member of SEAL Team Six, who knows all sides and has a right to get a bit vague at times.

33421.png

Since this writing is largely about the Russians, I thought it apropos to include a statement by General George Patton. He was, by all accounts, a man known for having his own strong opinions about people as individuals, groups of people, as well as people who did not agree with him. He particularly was known for his negative comments about his superiors during the Second World War. And he was also known to be exceptionally blunt, often at very inappropriate times. Concerning Russians he said: The difficulty in understanding the Russian is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not European, but an Asiatic, and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinese or a Japanese, and from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them. In addition to his other amiable characteristics, the Russian has no regard for human life and they are all out sons-of-bitches, barbarians, and chronic drunks.

33423.png

From 1943 on it was clear that the American General most feared by the Germans in WWII was General George Patton.

Perhaps someone should have told the general that not all Russians are sons-of-bitches. Prophetically, I believe I could say that only most of the leadership of the Communist Part and the upper levels of the State Security apparatus and all that it controlled, were sons-of-bitches of some sort.

With all this in mind, perhaps it is a bit more clear why Thomas Rhodes requested to be buried in the American Cemetery in Luxemburg as close to the George Patton Memorial as possible. Patton was a hero to him. Could it be they are communing about the Russians to this day as they rest there in the cemetery?

33425.png

This writing is somewhat of a sequel to the book TOP SECRET: Eleven Years of Blood, Sweat, and Tears. Most of the main characters in TOP SECRET appear once again here in Surcease: The End and the Beginning. And it is somewhat based upon what might have been happening within Group Nord as it attempted for several years to successfully overthrow the US government by peaceful means.

33427.png

This is a story where most all things went right as they were planned. That is seldom the case in the world of intelligence.

This is not the typical writing one would read if it were written by one of the popular writers of fiction about intelligence work in today’s world. Instead, it is mostly a writing of the conversations and the planning that went on by several individuals, as they went about trying to solve a large and terrible problem that was about to befall the world. It deals with the thoughts of the people as they continuously sought answers and continuously fought their own battles in their minds. It is about the thoughts of the people who were under pressure and often were questioning themselves and attempting to understand their own thoughts and motives. Often they must confront their weaknesses.

It is not a sensationalized writing by any means. It may be a bit tedious reading now and then. But it is a writing that I suggest would be more true, and to the point, as to how intelligence people work on major intelligence problems and how they are often solved. And I will add, that many of the things written about in this writing are true, or are based on true happenings. And one more thing, it was not my intent to reveal many of the ways operatives go about doing their business.

A reader will notice that I use the term operative at times and the term agent at times relating to people working in the intelligence world. This seems to be the way it is in reality.

33429.png

Lubyanka is often mentioned in this writing. "The Center is mentioned several times. The Center is the present headquarters of the FSB and is located in one of the buildings of Lubyanka. This is also old KGB Headquarters and the infamous Lubyanka Prison where so many people were interrogated, tortured and murdered. It is still situated in Lubyanka Square in Moscow, Russia.

The building was built prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, being the headquarters of an insurance company. Following the Revolution, the building was seized by the government and became the headquarters of the Cheka, the first secret police and the forerunner to what would become the KGB and later the FSB.

When the KGB was done away with, the yellow building of Lubyanka became the headquarters of the Border Guard Service of Russia. It still houses the Lubyanka Prison and one of the Directorates of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, the FSB.

There is still a large steel door in Lubyanka Prison which still has bars over the shoulder high slot where it is known that KGB guards once spoke to political prisoners such as the Swedish Diplomat Raoul Wallenburg. But today the door leads no where. It has been sealed shut and the former infamous prison has been converted into a cafeteria and offices for bookkeeping purposes. The other floors of the building house various other departments. The state secret police agency has said that interrogation of prisoners there was stopped after the death of Stalin in 1953. This was said in 1991.

Lubyanka actually consists of three building, the yellow building being the one often seen on television. There is a KGB Museum directly behind the old prison building which has open to the public for several years.

As previously said, the Federal Security of the Russian Federation (FSB) is headquartered in Lubyanka. It is the main domestic security service of The Russian Federation. It is the main successor to the infamous KGB. Its main responsibilities are counter intelligence, internal and border security, counter terrorism and surveillance. According to Russian law, the FSB is considered a military service as was the KGB. It was created in 1995. After Vladimir Putin became president he launched a huge reorganization of the KGB and it became the FSB. Putin is a former general of the KGB.

The Border Guard Service of Russia, with its 210,000 employees was incorporated into the FSB on March 11, 2003.

The KGB was abandoned and The Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) was instituted. The FSB was formed from the FSK a little later. In April of 1995, Boris Yeltsin signed a law ordering the reorganization of the FSK, which resulted in the creation of the FSB. Since 2008, Aleksandr Bortnikov has been its director.

The FSB now has nine divisions. They are:

— Counter-Espionage

— Service for Defense of Constitutional Order and Fight Against Terrorism

— Border Service

— Economic Security Service

— Current Information and International Links

— Organizational and Personnel Services

— Monitoring Department

— Scientific and Technical Service

— Organizational Security Service

INTRODUCTION OF

CHARACTERS

Chapter 1

Charles Minter—Deputy Director for Plans of the CIA—Head of Special Operations—runs the illegals

NSA—National Security Agency

General Genada Bellnikov—Head of First Chief Directorate of the FSB, the new Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Federal’naye sluzhba bezoposnosti Rossiyskoi Federasii)—this replaced the old KGB (Komitét Gosudárstvennoi Bezopásnosti)

Lou Perry—CIA—Assistant to Minter—the Organizer—an Arkansas Razorback

Donna Hanson—CIA—Sec/Asst to Minter, confidant of many operatives

Chapter 3

Bill Henry—CIA—computer and electronics expert and communications expert

Jim and Mollie Owens—former CIA operatives who agree to come back for one more operation

Chapter 4

John Simmons—DNI—Director of National Intelligence

Julia Northrup—NSA (National Security Agency) often referred to as No Such Agency as the US Government did not acknowledge its existence until just recently

Mick Wilson—Deputy Director of Special Operations—CIA

Thomas Rhodes—Jaro Hasek—Philippe LeMans—Angel—CIA illegal operative stationed in Prague

Sonia Obrusk Malienkoff—FSB (formerly KGB) alias Blondie and Silk—usually referred to as Obrusk

Little Greek—Georgia Theopolis—citizen of Greece—a collector and seller of information

Schultz—CIA operative in Munich—an information gathering operation

Roy—FSB (formerly the KGB) operative working for the CIA in FSB headquarters in Moscow

Solodyankin—KGB operative

Samon Hassan—CIA’s main man in the Arab world

Peter Wilkins—MI5—Great Britain’s equivalent to the US FBI

Molody—KGB/FSB operative

Hans Steche—former CIA operative working for the KGB

Suzanne Loire—DGSE—French Intelligence Service operative in Prague

Jean Bordeaux—Head of French Intelligence in Prague

Chapter 5

Yegeny Longinov—Head of Department 13 of First Chief Directorate of the FSB—director of Operation Surcease

Dmitri Krivitchev—Deputy Head of Department 13 of First Chief Directorate of the FSB

The Round Table:

Pegani Petropolis—A Greek who is the leader of The Round Table

Saxon—Jonathan Brinkwalter—Under Secretary of State for Russian Affairs—U S State Department

Richmond—Percy McLean—2nd Secretary of the British Embassy, Washington DC

Pierre Noire—FSB representative from France-former DGSE operative

Sidney Morrison—FSB Legal Resident in Canada-former MI6 operative

Fil Andersen—FSB representative from Norway—former operative of Norwegian Intelligence

John Thompson—FSB representative from Saudi Arabia—Brit who went over to the KGB

Amaka Akwa—FSB representative from Nigeria—former Nigerian Intelligence officer

Andrew Howard—real name is Peter Koskin—FSB Legal Resident of Australia

Li Kuang—FSB representative from China—China Intelligence operative

Petr Kolova—FSB head of Third Chief Directorate—Internal Security and Counter Intelligence

Mosi Angelleni—FSB representative from Italy—former Italian Intelligence operative

Helena Askimov—deceased wife of Dmitri Krivitchev

Chapter 6

Blondie—Silk—Lady B—Sonia Obrusk Malienkoff’s FSB alias’

Chapter 7

Alexandr Svejk—CIA resident in Prague

Alexander Dubcek—the liberal communist ruler of Czechoslovakia, succeeding Antonin Navotony

Matthew Harrington—Second Secretary for Russian Affairs, U S State Department

Chapter 8

Dennis Mosley—CIA cryptographer

John—Mosley’s contact—also identifies himself as Mr. Tinker to certain people

John’s contact is Richmond

Anthony Thomas—investigator

Chapter 9

Ivan Panin—KGB operative

Andapov—Director of the FSB

Chapter 10

Ketanova—replaces Bellnikov as head of the First Chief Directorate

Philippi LeMans—Thomas Rhodes

Jaques du Plesis—First Secretary French Embassy, Prague—Head of French Intelligence in Czechoslovakia

Anton Creitel—French Ambassador in Prague

Jeanette—Secretary French Embassy Prague

Claire Beaune—Philippe’s Secretary

Suzanne Loire—French Intelligence Operative in Prague

Jean Bordeaux—French Intelligence operative in Prague

Chapter 11

Beth Simpson—former girl friend of Dennis Mosley

Donald Swain—friend of Mosley at Cambridge

James McFarland—friend of Mosley at Cambridge

Henry Wilson—MI5 London

Gary Armstrong—US State Department Intelligence operative

Chapter 12

Ahmid Fasil—Samon’s friend in Algiers—a Saudi with huge oil interests

Vladimir Malik/Peter Townsend—FSB—suspected to be doubling for CIA

Suslov—FSB Resident (Man in charge of all intelligence gathering by the FSB in the US) Russian Embassy Wash DC. As is the usual case, the FSB Resident controls the embassy and the Ambassador

Chapter 13

Samuel Adams—head of US State Department Intelligence

Matthew Harrington—State Department—2nd Secretary for Russian Affairs

Chapter 19

James Kilpatrick—CIA—head of Cryptography

Chapter 20

Jerry Michaels—CIA operative in Greece

Chapter 21

Roy reveals that Boris Vanlkikoff is the Canadian Legal Resident of the FSB

Chapter 23

White Knights introduced

CHAPTER 1

Sed’maya Ognevka, Russia

Konstantin Chernenko, newly appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stood high on the cliffs overlooking the point where a part of the Volga River empties in to the Caspian Sea. He and other high ranking Communist Party officials, as well as several other persons of the KGB and those in political power within the Soviet Union, were gathered together to attempt to formalize a plan whereby the Soviet Union could take over the United States and several over countries of the world. It was an extremely ambitious plan, but many of those gathered there with him had said it could be done. He wasn’t entirely sure about that. He was more skeptical than convinced.

He stood gazing at the Volga and out across the Caspian Sea. Since he had taken over the Communist Party and was running the Soviet Union, he had already had to make many difficult decisions. But in his mind, he felt the decision he was trying to make now was perhaps the toughest of all and undoubtedly the most far ranging. If successful, the Soviet Union would rule most of the world and be able to take advantage of all the resources of the world.

It was March, 1984, just a month after his taking over power. And now he was being called upon to make a decision that could possibly rock the world if it succeeded, or could possible bring down the Soviet Union and all who had participated, if it failed. Deep within himself he felt the chances of failure were far greater that those of success. He stood there thinking deeply while continuously running his fingers through his thick shock of snow white hair. He wondered why he was being forced into making decisions about the operation that had been proposed. It was an operation that was almost incomprehensible to him. It was so far ranging and complex that he did not see how it could succeed.

Three days later, after much discussion and haggling, as well as much consternation on the part of Chernenko, the group unanimously voted to authorize the First Chief Directorate of the KGB to proceed with plans they called Haчaлo. Translated into English it meant Surcease. Surcease, the operation that was intended to give the Soviet Union power over practically all the world. The End of the old order and the Beginning of a new order of the world. Could it be done?

Adolph Hitler had had visions of Germany ruling a large portion of the world and look what it got him. Chernenko still had many doubts about the success of it, but he had no doubt about the consequences if it failed. He thought they ought to take some lessons from history. If it failed, the Soviet Union would likely no longer exist as it was now. Being a hard line Communist, he shuddered to think what might happen if the Communist Party lost control of the people of the countries around the world that it controlled. Would there be chaos in those countries? Maybe, or maybe not! Time would tell.

Chernenko would give the Director of the KGB, the word allowing the First Chief Directorate head to proceed, even though he felt it was a long shot. Chernenko did not know at the time, but he would not see the ending of the plan. His tenure in office would be short, brought on by his death a year later. It would be the chore of his successor to see to it that the plan continued on. Mikhail Gorbachev would have it fall into his lap.

33432.png

Langley, VA-CIA The Headquarters of the

National Clandestine Service-Office of Special Operations-Directorate of Intelligence

Three years later:

He sat looking at the message which had just been handed to him. Charles Minter, Deputy Director and Head of Special Operations, a part of the Division of the National Clandestine part of the CIA, the section of the Central Intelligence Agency that carried out many clandestine or covert operations around the world. Charles was the head of the division of Special Operations. This was the most secret of the secret, only known to exist by a few individuals within the CIA headquarters. He was often referred to by those who worked for him, or with him, as ‘Number One.’

He was mystified by the message he held in his hand. It was from Bellnikov, alias Tom, French, and probably a few others alias’ along the way. General Genada Bellnikov, Chief of the FSB’s (formerly called the KGB under the old Soviet regime) most feared Directorate, the First Chief Directorate, the one which was in constant struggle and combat with the U. S. Russian Federation Block section of the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence. There was only one person in the FSB with a higher ranking. That was the Director. Bellnikov’s rank of General assured him of all the amenities and the good things the old Soviet Union, now the Russian Federation, could provide. Most would say he had it made, a good bet to become the next head of the FSB.

It had taken the message five days to get to Minter. This told him the message was extremely important. Bellnikov had taken extra precautions in getting it out. He had avoided the normal channels and the high speed radio transmissions that could originate from several different countries. The air waves were constantly monitored so it could be intercepted, and possibly deciphered because of the recent defection of the man from the US National Security Agency. The Soviets were keeping the defection quiet for the time being. But the CIA and most of the intelligence world knew. The US public was also being kept in the dark for the time being. At least they wouldn’t admit the defection until such time as it began to leak to the news media.

But word of the defection had leaked to Minter and he’d begun taking precautions, advising everyone to be extremely cautious in what they sent out the normal ways. He didn’t want any of his illegals being compromised if he could help it.

He was especially proud of his network of illegals, those who gave their lives to live in dread and fear, possible exposure, and almost friendless. The illegal operatives were subject to prosecution by the government they worked against, while legal spies were not subject to prosecution. The legal spies, if uncovered, would simply be sent home following a lot of negative rhetoric by the discovering country.

It had taken him years to get his band of illegals to the point they were today. He had painstakingly selected and trained those who would be out there stealing or gathering the secrets needed by the CIA to help keep the enemy at bay. These people had a lonely existence in a foreign country, just trying to make a contribution to hold the other side in check until the US could get a stronger handle on them, perhaps breaking their economy.

That could be done if the people and Congress would just give us a little more time and more money, he thought. And especially if they would just keep their noses out of the business and let us do it the way we need to. That would be the best thing they could do, he thought. Those in Congress who thought they knew everything about how intelligence should be gathered and how to go about the daily actions needed to gather it, had their heads up their own rear ends, Minter thought. The hang-up was that Minter had no way to decode the message. He had put the boys in analysis on it, but that didn’t assure success. They might never figure it out. Even with all the acres and acres of computers, reportedly in the neighborhood of ninety acres, the NSA hadn’t been able to break it as of yet. Too many keys in the cipher machine it seemed. If it went above sixty keys, it would be difficult, but if it went to the maximum of one hundred and twenty eight keys that was known, it would be impossible. That is unless someone slipped up and sent a straight message which could be compared with the message. In the past that had happened now and then, leading to breaking of codes of enemy countries.

Minter had tried to begin the decipher process by using the ten dollar bill he kept locked in his safe by subtracting the serial numbers from the numbers at the beginning of the message. That used to work on some of the old messaging systems, but not so in this case. It gave him no clues. Often times this would at least give him a telephone number to call for more information. But this time the numbers did not mean anything that he could determine. Would he get any help from the NSA?

He knew that the boys in NSA weren’t always the most cooperative folks to work with. Maybe it was a turf issue of some sort. There seemed to be some sort of jealousy still preventing their working together sometimes. Even though the Director of the new National Intelligence (DNI), formerly the (DCI)—Director of Central Intelligence, was technically in charge of the intelligence gathering of all the intelligence agencies of the US, the others still did pretty much did their own thing. And they strongly protected their own turf, as the FBI did.

As the DNI always said, it was a fallacy to believe that the Director of National Intelligence or the Central Intelligence Agency could politically run all those other intelligence agencies. He might have a strong say in what was going on budget wise, but in the end they would do just about what they pleased. Mostly he had to be satisfied with running the CIA. This country had finally realized the need for complete cooperation between intelligence gathering agencies and had make an effort to consolidate all efforts under one umbrella, an umbrella that would make the efforts much more effective and world encompassing. This umbrella was the National Intelligence Board. But that Board was still struggling to find ways to assure cooperation between agencies.

His own boys finally told him the code seemed to be, at least in part, some sort of out-dated monoalphabetic substitution system. Those systems hadn’t been used in ciphering by intelligence people for a long time. If it was one of those, then maybe that was the reason Bellnikov chose to use it. Minter had sent Lou Perry, his assistant, to NSA to see if he could get more information about the intercepted maritime radio message transmission which was being decoded. Fortunately, the analysis boys had broken that radio code a few days earlier, with a little help from a friend in an unfriendly embassy. They had had a little time to work on the message. It had been monitored and received at the suggestion of that friend. He hoped they would have a little more time to receive and decode radio messages before the Russians found out their maritime code had been broken. Too bad we couldn’t break the main FSB code.

Aside from the United States, the Russian Federation was the only country who could afford the technology to have a ciphering system which was unbreakable as long as someone didn’t give it away. We needed one of their used one time code pads to possibly assist us.

But on the other side of the coin, he hoped the code had really been broken and it wasn’t some sort of setup to throw them off. The old KGB and the present FSB had done things such as that in the past to confuse, or to plant doubt in the minds of intelligence agencies around the world. You just couldn’t trust those people across the water in matters like this sometimes. But then, you couldn’t even trust your own organization sometimes.

As he sat pondering what it was all about, Donna, his assistant buzzed him. Lou’s here, she said.

Send him in.

The door opened and Lou sauntered in as he usually did. One would look at Lou and be completely fooled. He didn’t look smart, nor did he look devious. He looked sort of common, as someone had once said. Maybe that was why he’d been a successful field operative for so many years. He was deceptive, he was smart, and he was quick. Common! He certainly wasn’t common, it was just a look and manner he’d developed and cultivated over the years. He had out-smarted and out-fought some of the best the other side had put out against him.

Minter walked to the water dispenser and filled a cup with cold water. He turned and walked back behind his desk.

Looks like we might have something here, Lou said. He sauntered around behind the desk and stood beside Minter.

He continued, If it is some sort of monoalphabetic substitution system message, and the key which we’ve hung on to from the old days is still good, the rearranged alphabet seems to make sense. I translated the cypertex letters into the plaintext letters and then I ran it through the computer and here’s what it says. He pointed to a series of letters. Look at these letters. We’ve put them together in several sorts of forms, but the one which seems to make the most sense says, Surcease now organized and functioning It is nearing time of implementation. Implementation thought to be within six or seven months. He pointed out the word Surcease running diagonally through the jumble of letters. Then he pointed out the other words within the letter puzzle. What do you think?" he asked. Minter took the paper and swiveled his chair so that his back was to Lou. His eyes quickly took in all the letters and words on the paper. Finally he turned and looked at Lou.

He flipped the switch on the intercom that would get Donna on the line. When she answered he said, Is there any way you can get me a cup of coffee that’s fit to drink. And bring one for Lou. He looks as if he needs a strong shot of something.

Donna answered, Do you want me to send out for some Starbucks?

Charles said, If that’s the only way you can get some that’s fit to drink. You might try the cafeteria first, but I doubt what they have there is drinkable at this hour of the day.

He turned his attention back to the information Lou had brought. After several minutes of looking at it, he replied, I agree with your conclusions. But what does it mean?

Well, Webster says surcease means to come to an end, cessation, or to discontinue.

Minter inquired, If the message is correct, they’re not really stopping something. It says Surcease now organized and functioning. To me that means they’ve got a plan going on, and that plan is going to put an end to something, or someone, which they want out of commission. And I’d surmise that once the end is accomplished, some elaborate plans will go into affect that will allow them to institute some other far reaching plans. Is it political, or is it a physical ending for someone or something? Or maybe it’s both. Could be, he surmised. He drifted off into his own thoughts. Could it also mean the beginning of something new? He wondered.

Lou stood by as he watched Minter think. He watched Minter’s eyes and he knew the computer-like brain behind the eyes was running in high gear. He was processing, analyzing the ramifications and the possibilities. He was a man who knew much and had an amazing ability to figure out complex schemes. He could also organize and plan complex operations. He was the best. He was Number One. He was Alpha and he was KUDOVE!.

A few minutes later Minter’s eyes engaged Lou’s. Lou knew it was time to talk.

I’d say it means they’ve got something complicated going which is to put an end to something. And I’d say, they have definite plans of operations once the something has ended, meaning something that would be of great advantage to them both politically and economically. That’s how they want things in this world to be, to their advantage. Lou was confident in his assessment as far as it went. But that wasn’t very far.

We need a key to all this, Minter added. We’ve got to find out what it means.

How? Lou asked.

A few minutes later Donna walked in and handed each a cup of Starbucks coffee. She said, Had to send out for it. As you thought, the cafeteria coffee isn’t fit to drink right now. Minter looked at her and thought, that’s a heck of a thing for me to have a person with a Ph.D from Princeton doing. She was a lot more talented than that.

Lou thanked her. Charles turned back to Lou. Frankly, I don’t know how. I suggest you go over to NSA again and ask them to look at the radio messages they’ve monitored in the last few weeks and see if there’s anything which might help. Ask them to put the word Surcease into the system and see what comes out. And be sure they add it to their watch list, in case it comes up again in some radio transmission. He stopped and seemed to be running something through his mind.

He finally spoke, This may indeed be a substitution system. Every substitution system has some consistencies within it. A cipher system worth a hoot does some hiding or cloaking of its repetition. That was why the Nazi’s Enigma system was so difficult to break. The Brits worked on it a long time before they were able to figure it out. The Nazi’s had a machine which was somewhat similar to one of the old typewriters we used to use. But the difference was that the machine had a series of wheels that always changed the alphabetical sequence by one letter every twenty six keystrokes. That made it hard as hell to break a message. Think about that as you and the others try to break this thing. Just think where we might be with this Surcease thing now if we could decode every message of theirs that goes into the air like we could during World War II.

Lou interjected, No doubt the breaking of the Enigma code was one of the biggest deals of all time in intelligence. General Eisenhower said after the War that the Brits and the Americans keeping the breaking of the Enigma a secret throughout World War II, was a truly amazing feat.

Charles added, I believe that’s true. We had the Germans and the Japanese codes the whole war. It seemed that some of the people like British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery had some sort of trouble using the advantages gained from it. Some believe it offended that old bird’s sense of fairness. I’m sure there were times when things were known that made the Allies cringe by not being able to use the information for fear of the breaking of the code to be discovered. But we’re not dealing with Enigma codes now. We’ve got a far more serious problem on our hand. You make sure everyone keeps on their toes about this thing.

OK, Lou said. I’ll keep on it and I’ll check with some of the other people to see if they’ve heard anything more.

Keep me posted, Minter added. As soon as Lou left he began to think again, thoughts that were more negative than positive. He might be Number One, but he didn’t feel like it right now. He felt more like a little boy lost in a storm. So many people depended on him. Sometimes the weight of it all was staggering, but he held up through the sheer force of his personality and the extreme amount of energy he possessed. And added to that, his exceptionally cunning mind and his desire to serve his country. And moreso, his desire to protect his illegals that were doing so much good work.

Lou turned around and walked back into Minter’s office. He said, Before I leave, I want to tell you a new joke I just heard about some of the famous Soviet Communist Party leaders.

Minter said, It better be good if you’re going to take up my time right now.

Lou winked at him and continued, It seems that Lenin, Stalin, Khruschev, and Brezhnev were all riding along in a railroad car when it stopped unexpectedly. Lenin says, Let us call a council so that the peasants and workers can fix the problems themselves. But this fixed nothing. The train is still stuck. Stalin furiously sticks his head out the window and yells, If this train does not begin to move the driver will be shot. So they shot the driver but the train still doesn’t move. Khruschev then stands and says, Let us take the rails from behind the train and use them to build the track in front. They do that but still the train does not move. Finally Brezhnev says, Comrades, comrades, please, let us simply close the curtains, turn on the gramophone, and pretend we are moving." Lou looked at Minter and chuckled.

A bit of a smile came to Minter’s face, I just hope you’re able to keep your humor when this thing is over one way or another.

Lou responded, I believe this accurately illustrates the futility of the Russian system. I could tell you a few other jokes about the leaders of the Communist Party. Next time I’ll tell you one about Chernenko and Gorbachev.

"I’ll bet you could. But I’d like to ask you to do it some other time as I’m very busy right now as you know.

Lou countered, as he quickly closed the office door, Yes boss.

CHAPTER 2

Charles Minter

Charles was a graduate of Dartmouth College located in beautiful Hanover, New Hampshire. His post graduate degree was from Cornell. Dartmouth was the smallest of the Ivy League Colleges, founded in 1769 before the American Revolution. He was proud of his schools, but didn’t extol his virtues as a graduate of these prestigious schools. However, he would be quick to defend them if some one should challenge them as great educational institutions. He had such fond memories of Dartmouth Hall which was built in 1784, long before the colleges most of his friends had attended were even thought about. If he had any smugness about his school it was just that.

He was a former member of US Army Military Intelligence, having served in the Alaska and the US as well as briefly in three other countries before being transferred to the Washington DC area. After two years in DC, he was approached by a CIA operative of high rank, who asked him to go to work for the CIA. After some deliberation, he decided to make the change.

His reputation as a planner, and his ability to solve complex schemes, led to his rapid promotions. Promotions that had finally gotten him to his post as Director of Special Operations, the most secret of the secret within the intelligence community. Very few people even knew of its existence. Of course, as usual there were rumors about such an organization that often ran rampant throughout the intelligence world, but to this point little was known about it in both the intelligence world, as well as the outside world. That was the way it needed to be for it to operate as it was intended, far from the scrutiny of anyone with the exception of three people.

Charles prided himself on many things, especially the work of his prized people, those who remained unknown to the world, and most often even to those who worked right beside them in many capacities. These were the people he devoted his life to. These were his illegals, the people who gave him the most results. These people who were out there usually operating by themselves with out any sort of protection, other than their own cunning minds, for fairly long periods of time. Of course they were subject to arrest if exposed. Some have referred to these individuals as being out in the cold or deep cold since they were on their own most of the time without any kind of protection from their country, until they were called in to be checked out both mentally and physically.

Usually a deep cold agent would be brought in every two or three years to go through psychological testing, as well as polygraphs, to determine if he or she was still a viable operative who could perform, as well as be trusted. These were operatives who were subjected to the most grueling and friendless of times in which they were under the most pressure to perform, while keeping from being exposed. Minter had been very successful at running these illegals for a long period of time. He was proud of the successes he and his operatives had had over the years he’d been involved in this segment of the CIA’s work. Quietly to himself, he often thought that most of the worthwhile intelligence that was gathered was the result of his people and their untiring efforts. Of course he kept those thoughts to himself. It was not politically wise to say those things to others, but he knew it was true. Turf wars were something he had to avoid in order to protect his people and Special Operations as a whole.

CHAPTER 3

Langley-CIA Headquarters-Office of Special Operations

Could this Surcease thing be what Bellnikov’s message was all about? Something told him there was a connection. When Bellnikov said something big was going on, he’d sort of sloughed it off. Bellnikov had said the same kind of thing in the past about some things and it really hadn’t turned out that way. Either Bellnikov occasionally was not aware of the total scope of things, or else there was someone, or some part of the FSB, that was allowed to bypass the Director of the First Chief Directorate about some things. He didn’t know which it might be, but thought it might be a little of both. The evidence he’d collected seemed to point in that direction. That of course made him even more wary of what he saw or heard. Somehow, he had to get some keys or something to break the message.

Five days later he got a break. That was the way things usually went in the business. Honor among thieves, a lot of bologna sometimes, but the truth more often. A screwed up world he lived in, he thought. If there’s enough money, influence, or power to be shared in some way, a break would usually come.

Hopefully, within a month or two, he’d have some more of the answers. It was critical that he find out something which would lead to more information being discovered. He now knew from Tom that there was a strong threat against the leaders of several countries around the world. At least that