The Swamp Fox: Lessons in Leadership from the Partisan Campaigns of Francis Marion

By Scott Aiken

As one of the Patriot leaders in the Carolinas, the partisan campaign conducted by Brigadier General Francis Marion and his irregular force during the American Revolution prevented South Carolina from completely succumbing to British control during the period between the capture of Charleston in May 1780 and the start of Major General Nathanael Greene’s campaign to recover the Southern Colonies in December 1780. During substantial segments of this period he alone held eastern South Carolina from the British and became known as “The Swamp Fox” for his exploits and elusiveness in harassing the British with his guerilla tactics. Upon the arrival of Greene’s Continental Army of the Southern Department, Marion’s forces then reverted in part to an important supporting role in South Carolina for the duration of the war. He later assisted in the establishment of the authority of the State of South Carolina and contributed to its post-conflict termination. If General Marion had not taken action during the American Revolution, there is a good possibility that eastern South Carolina would have succumbed to British intent. That, coupled with the British occupation of Charleston, may have provided the British with the requisite momentum needed to conquer the South. Thankfully, General Marion’s call to action both militarily and politically prevented such momentum from existing. The multifaceted aspect of the American Revolution serves as an excellent case study for the conflicts of the twenty-first century: joint and combined operations, civil war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, global superpowers, civil-military relations, this conflict’s got it all! Many of Marion’s partisan actions were forerunners of today’s tactics, showing his great innovativeness and foresight as a military leader. His incessant activities diverted British and Loyalist forces, inflicted British and Loyalist casualties, supported operations of the Continental Army during its Southern Campaign, and sustained the American Revolution in South Carolina. He was extremely effective across the range of military operations, from guerilla warfare to storming forts. He was equally inept in what today would be considered information operations and even participating in the linear tactics of the day in pitched battles. Such similarity makes Marion’s partisan campaign worth study by current military and political leaders. Aiken’s portrayal of Brigadier General Marion’s partisan actions describes the forerunners of tactics common of today’s global security environment, tactics used by, and against, United States forces.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press
• Release date: Nov 15, 2012
• ISBN: 9781612511245

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Naval Institute Press

291 Wood Road

Annapolis, MD 21402

© 2012 by Scott D. Aiken

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Aiken, Scott Daniel.

The Swamp Fox : lessons in leadership from the partisan campaigns of Francis Marion / Scott D. Aiken.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-61251-124-5 (e-book) 1. Marion, Francis, 1732–1795—Military leadership. 2. United States—History—Revolution, 1775–1783—Commando operations. 3. South Carolina—History—Revolution, 1775–1783—Commando operations. 4. United States—History—Revolution, 1775–1783—Campaigns. 5. South Carolina—History—Revolution, 1775–1783—Campaigns. I. Title.

E207.M3A35 2012

973.3’3—dc23

2012025619

This paper meets the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992

(Permanence of Paper).

20  19  18  17  16  15  14  13  129  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1

First printing

TO VALERIE, MY PARENTS, AND

MY PATRIOT ANCESTORS

WHO WON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Immortal may their memory be

Who fought and bled for liberty.

—Brig. Gen. P. Horry and Parson M. L. Weems,

The Life of General Francis Marion

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations

Preface

Part IVision and Foresight

Chapter 1An Introduction to the Carolina Partisan Campaign of Francis Marion

Chapter 2The Tactics of Francis Marion

Chapter 3Francis Marion and Partisan Force Leadership

Chapter 4Maneuver Warfare in the American Revolution

Part IILeadership and Innovation in Action

Chapter 5The Engagements

Chapter 6Marion and Positional Warfare

Chapter 7Marion and Information Warfare

Chapter 8The Battles

Appendix ASignificant Engagements and Battles of Marion, 1780–82

Appendix BOther Skirmishes and Raids of Smaller Scale, 1780–82

Glossary

Notes

Bibliography

Index

ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps

Map 1 Marion’s Engagements and Battles, 1780–82

Map 2 Selected British Forts and Garrisons in South Carolina

Map 3 Current Map of Snow Island

Map 4 Current Map of Georgetown

Map 5 The Battle of Eutaw Springs

Figures

Figure 1 Time Line of Marion’s Partisan Activities

Figure 2 Marion’s Attack at Horse Creek

Figure 3 Marion’s Attack at Black Mingo Creek

Figure 4 Ambush with the Decoy as Part of the Ambush Force

Figure 5 Comparison with MCDP 1

Figure 6 Typical Task Organization for Attack of a Fortified Position

Figure 7 The American Attack on Fort Watson

Figure 8 Actions Involving Georgetown

Figure 9 Sample Movement to Contact Formation

Figure 10Basic Five Rings Model

Tables

Table 1Marine Corps Leadership Traits

Table 2Times of Attack for Marion’s Engagements

Table 3Subcategories and Elements of Information Operations

Table 4Operation Just Cause H-Hour Targets

Plates

General Marion Inviting a British Officer to Share His Meal

Legend of Mrs. Motte Directing Generals Marion and Lee to Burn Her Mansion to Dislodge the British

PREFACE

It seemed as if the war not only required, but created talents. Men whose minds were warmed with the love of liberty, and whose abilities were improved by daily exercise, and sharpened with a laudable ambition to serve their distressed country, spoke, wrote, and acted, with an energy far surpassing all expectations which could be reasonably founded on their previous requirements.

—David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution

David Ramsay’s 1789 quote describes Brig. Gen. Francis Marion’s actions during the American Revolution in South Carolina in fine style. Unequivocally a military genius in the art of partisan and guerrilla warfare, Marion provides an outstanding example of leadership and innovation for the Patriot cause. His unique style of leadership and military tactics still applies in the early twenty-first century and is worthy study for those seeking to maintain liberty’s light.

Brig. Gen. Francis Marion has been my lifelong hero. My journey through time with this amazing warrior began at the Donelson branch of the Nashville Public Library as a young boy when I read Francis Marion: Swamp Fox of the Revolution, by Beryl Williams and Samuel Epstein. It was the first of many books I have consumed on this very interesting subject. My fascination with the life and times of General Marion has continued unabated through the years.

This book is a continuation of my interest on the topic and began in the year 2000 as a paper for an Irregular Warfare class at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I later received practical application in this type of warfare in Iraq. The intent of this work is to study General Marion’s partisan campaign during the American Revolution from a contemporary military viewpoint, finding strategies, tactics, and procedures useful for today’s war fighters. I look to history to unlock the reasons for Marion’s military success. Marion was highly successful; how does his success remain applicable today?

For the purposes of this book, the aspects of General Marion’s partisan campaign that are considered historical fiction or legend can still be useful as examples of war fighting. I have tried to distinguish legend from history, but this is sometimes easier said than done.

I have worked hard to ensure the accuracy of this book. I have placed a heavy emphasis on footnotes to show sources of information and to provide further clarification as required. I have, however, not cited in the footnotes information common to three or more sources. I hope as part of my research that these footnotes and references to other sources, including the bibliography, are useful to the reader.

I offer the following thoughts from modern terrain walks in South Carolina:

General Marion’s engagements were often at places where roads meet water, usually a good ambush site with some elevation advantage for the ambushers. A unit is vulnerable as it approaches and crosses a body of water because it has to slow its movement and cannot adequately maneuver against threats.

According to maps from the Revolutionary era, some of the current roads in South Carolina run approximately the same courses they did in the late 1700s.

Lakes Marion and Moultrie have altered the landscape of significant portions of eastern South Carolina. Some of General Marion’s battle and engagement sites are now underwater. People have altered and regulated the water flow downstream from the lakes, making the sites of other battles and engagements significantly different today than they were during the American Revolution. Some rivers and creeks in the area are larger or smaller than in the past, with a faster or slower water flow.

The proliferation of the economically desirable pine species has changed the vegetation of South Carolina.

Swamps remain common throughout the countryside where General Marion conducted his partisan campaign. These terrain features provide a convenient series of escapes and hideouts, while channelizing movement.

In some instances, people have dramatically altered the land and vegetation of the area by, for example, installing power lines across the terrain near the Sampit engagement site, constructing a rail line near Fort Motte, and reducing the berms constructed during the siege at Fort Motte.

In most instances, the thick vegetation of the region greatly restricted fields of fire.

I have written this book for the history lover who applies lessons from the past to contemporary situations. My intent is to provide readers with a useful work for such application. I sincerely hope you enjoy reading this book as much as I enjoyed writing it!

Part I

Vision and Foresight

Chapter 1

An Introduction to the Carolina

Partisan Campaign of Francis Marion

A pox on the Lobsters¹

A pox, a pox,

Beware of Marion,

the old Swamp Fox.

—Children’s taunt

In his book, Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion, Robert D. Bass proclaims, The most significant period in the career of Francis Marion was that between August 15, 1780, and September 8, 1781. During this time he alone held eastern South Carolina from the British. ² As one of the Patriot partisan leaders in the Carolinas, Brig. Gen. Francis Marion and his irregular force conducted an unconventional warfare campaign that successfully prevented South Carolina from completely succumbing to British control during the period between the capture of Charleston in May 1780 and the start of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene’s campaign to recover the southern colonies in December 1780. ³ After the arrival of Greene’s Continental Army of the Southern Department, Marion’s forces partially reverted to an important supporting role in South Carolina for the duration of the American Revolution.

Many of Marion’s partisan actions were forerunners of today’s tactics and showed the general’s remarkable innovativeness and foresight as a military leader. Thus, Marion’s partisan campaign is an excellent candidate for study by current military and political leaders. This book, which focuses on Marion’s effort in eastern South Carolina from 1780 to 1782, centers on this theme.

Historians have described the American Revolution as a multifaceted military conflict: a world war, a colonial rebellion, and a civil war. Additionally, this struggle used joint and combined operations to defeat the British. The fighting forces consisted of allied (French) troops, the Continental Army, and community-based militia.⁴ The American Revolution is an excellent case study for twenty-first-century war fighters because it involved joint and combined operations, civil war, insurgency and counterinsurgency, global superpowers, and civil-military relations. The war was both a war of rebellion against distant Great Britain and a civil war between Patriot and Loyalist neighbors. Although Marion and his partisans often fought as an independent unit, they also frequently supported the Continental Army with intelligence, supplies, and coordinated combat actions. The Continental Army even called on Marion to augment its numbers for conventional combat, specifically at the Battle of Quinby in July 1781 and the Battle of Eutaw Springs in September 1781.

Marion was one of three main partisans active in South Carolina during the later years of the American Revolution, a time in which the British grand strategy focused on subduing the South. Two other Patriot partisan leaders, Brig. Gen. Thomas Sumter and Brig. Gen. Andrew Pickens, although significant in their own right, are the subjects of separate research. Sumter and Pickens operated mainly in the western part of South Carolina. After Marion’s first foray against Georgetown in October 1780, he was temporarily the only significant force left in the lowcountry, that is, the coastal rice and indigo plantation area of South Carolina stretching about fifty miles inland.⁵ At that time, Sumter was in the western part of the state, and Pickens was operating in the vicinity of Augusta, Georgia. Marion’s actions during this critical time were vital in sustaining the Revolution in eastern South Carolina; he and his men remained on the field of battle at a time when every ounce of Patriot resistance was priceless.⁶

Background

General Marion was born in 1732 of French Huguenot descent in Saint John’s Parish, South Carolina, where he spent much of his life. He owned the Pond Bluff Plantation on the Santee River near Eutaw Springs. He served in the South Carolina militia beginning in 1756, fought against the Cherokee Indians in 1761, and enjoyed a good reputation as a fighter. During this pre-Revolutionary period Marion gained military and political experience that would serve him well later in his partisan campaign. He had intimate knowledge of the eastern South Carolina lowcountry, land on which he was to operate as a partisan; more importantly, he knew the ways of its populace. In the months after the breakdown of Royal authority but before the official start of the American Revolution, Marion was elected to South Carolina’s Provincial Congress.

Marion put his reputation to good use in military leadership positions during the war. At the outset, he was a captain in the State Troops. Later, as a major, he was with the Second Regiment of South Carolina, which assisted with the epic, highly successful defense of Charleston against a British fleet at the Battle of Sullivan’s Island in June 1776. He achieved the rank of brigadier general in the South Carolina militia during his time as a partisan, in December 1780.

Before the siege of Charleston by the British on February 11, 1780, Marion was injured; he had probably broken his ankle while leaving a dinner party in the city.⁷ Under orders from Patriot commander Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, extra officers and invalids, including Marion, left the city before its capture. Afterward, Marion hid from the British in and around the swamps along the Santee River.

Charleston fell to British forces on May 12, 1780, after a successful siege of approximately three months. The loss by capture of General Lincoln’s force of 5,400 men and much matériel was the worst American defeat in the Revolution.⁸ Sir Henry Clinton, the commander in chief of the British army in the American colonies, wrote to King George III, There are few men in South Carolina who are not either our prisoners or in arms with us. Charleston’s Royal Gazette proclaimed, Not a Rebel in Arms in the Country.⁹ This was the low point for the Patriot cause in South Carolina, and at this time Marion began his extraordinary partisan campaign. Near complete British domination of the state would not last, however. Clinton’s revocation of Patriots’ paroles, the reported massacre of unarmed Patriots at the Waxhaws by Lt. Col. Banastre Tarleton of the British army on May 29, 1780, as well as the plundering and destruction of numerous farms and plantations, the mistreatment of women and children, and hostility toward the Presbyterian Church provided much stimulus for the continued fight by the state’s Patriot population against the British. Marion forcefully and effectively acted on that stimulus.

With an ankle not yet healed, Marion fled South Carolina with about ten to twenty men¹⁰ and linked up with the Continental Army in Coxe’s Mill, North Carolina, sometime before July 10, 1780.¹¹ Their first action was a sortie to Cole’s Bridge near the Pee Dee River to gather intelligence and supplies.¹² On August 15, 1780, they left the camp of the American army. Marion reentered South Carolina and organized his partisan unit, which consisted of his ten to twenty followers and the militia of the Williamsburg District. The Williamsburg militia had earlier petitioned Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates for a Continental officer to lead them. Marion volunteered and was chosen for the task.

Marion may have volunteered for this endeavor in part because in all probability his services were not overly welcomed on General Gates’ staff. Marion, a supernumerary officer, did not have much potential for increased responsibility under Gates. As stated by Col. Otho Williams, adjutant general of the Army, Their appearance was in fact so burlesque, that it was with much difficulty the diversion of the regular soldiery was restrained by the officers, and the General himself was glad of an opportunity of detaching Col. Marion, at his own instance, towards the interior of South Carolina with orders to watch the motions of the enemy and furnish intelligence. A similar statement could be made regarding the appearance of the mujahideen who fought against the Soviets, forerunners of the Taliban and government forces in action in Afghanistan today, and many insurgents past and present. People underestimate insurgents because of their outward haphazard appearance only at their own risk.

Marion’s force was one of several such units that still existed in the southern colonies after the fall of Charleston. Historians describe the leaders of Marion’s partisans as those born of the rice-planting class, including plantation owners and community leaders, while most of Marion’s men were drawn from the small farmers who lived along the Black and Pee Dee Rivers, or from the Scotch-Irish of the Black Mingo region. Marion’s men are also described as a blend of Huguenots of the Santee and the Scots of the Peedee. The historical record documents well the service of the Scotch-Irish and Huguenots. Other historians add to the force an American Indian mix, including men from the Catawba and perhaps other nations, as well as some blacks, both freedmen and slaves.¹³ The partisans armed themselves with a variety of shotguns, muskets, and rifles, as well as homemade swords, and they were usually mounted on their personal steeds.

Marion’s typical area of operations was eastern South Carolina from the North Carolina border to the Orangeburg/Jacksonbourgh (today called Jacksonboro) region. Various authors describe it as the country from Camden to the seacoast, between the Pedee and Santee rivers and immediately below Sumter’s: the low-country and the coastal plain bordering it.¹⁴ Along with Sumter and Pickens, Marion’s presence was the only sustained Patriot force in South Carolina until the Continental Army returned under the command of Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, the exception being Major General Gates’ short-duration, ill-fated Camden exhibition in August 1780. Marion’s first significant partisan action was a highly successful raid conducted on August 20, 1780, at Horse Creek, east of Nelson’s Ferry and north of Eutaw Springs. His men overwhelmed a British guard force and gained the release of approximately 150 Continental prisoners. These prisoners were survivors of the disastrous Battle of Camden, which had occurred on August 16, 1780. Marion continued to harass the British and Loyalist forces with hit-and-run attacks against isolated outposts, supply columns, foraging parties, detachments, and any other military targets of opportunity. Some have described his tactics as very similar to those used by the Viet Cong (VC) during the Vietnam conflict.¹⁵

The beginning of General Greene’s campaign to recover the southern colonies started on December 2, 1780, with his arrival and subsequent assumption of command of the Southern Department and its Continental Army at Charlotte, North Carolina.¹⁶ Preparations for the advance south soon followed. Some of the more significant battles of the campaign include Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, and Eutaw Springs. For all practical purposes, the Battle of Eutaw Springs on September 8, 1781, successfully concluded Greene’s campaign to recover the South for the Patriot cause. This bloody battle ended in a tactical draw, but the Americans left the battlefield as both sides claimed victory. The British lost 40 percent of the two thousand troops engaged and were thus forced to return to Charleston. At this point Greene had largely regained all of South Carolina and Georgia, except for the cities of Charleston and Savannah.¹⁷ The center military stage then shifted to the British defeat at Yorktown, which soon followed in October.

Shortly after the start of Greene’s campaign in December 1780, a fundamental change in the organization of Marion’s partisan band occurred. That month Governor John Rutledge appointed Marion to the rank of brigadier general in the South Carolina militia and placed him in command of all militia regiments east of the Santee, Wateree, and Catawba Rivers.¹⁸ This newfound authority gave Marion access to more of South Carolina’s militia for manpower, increasing his combat power. As such, Marion’s Brigade was formed, evolving the composition of the forces for partisan actions.

After the brilliant success of Greene’s campaign, Marion continued to conduct highly effective partisan and militia operations against the Loyalist population of eastern South Carolina. He relentlessly continued these operations for the duration of the war. Meanwhile, the British opened peace negotiations on April 12, 1782, after the collapse of Prime Minister Lord North’s government. In accordance with peace negotiations finalized by the Treaty of Paris on November 30, 1782, the British evacuated Charleston on December 14, 1782. (They eventually evacuated New York on November 25, 1783.)

Map 1 highlights the locations of Marion’s engagements and battles during the period from the British capture of Charleston to the final withdrawal of British troops. Figure 1 shows a time line that portrays Marion’s partisan activities in relation to significant events of the American Revolution in the South. His incessant activities diverted British and Loyalist forces, inflicted British and Loyalist casualties, supported operations of the Continental Army during its Southern Campaign, and sustained the American Revolution in South Carolina. Each action will be studied in turn.

Vital to British efforts in the South was economy of force, presently recognized as a principle of war.¹⁹ Under the British plan, their troops would no longer attempt to occupy and hold all Southern territory. Instead, the war was to be Americanized. Territory liberated by the British would be turned over as quickly as possible to American Loyalist units for occupation, policing, and further defense. This action would free the British army to move on to liberate other areas. With care and patience, Americanization could mean that a relatively small British force could conquer the whole South and thus win the war.²⁰ This strategy is often adopted during a counterinsurgency campaign; Vietnamization attempts during the Vietnam conflict are one example. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine calls for building and training local forces during the course of a campaign and then transitioning territory to indigenous control. This strategy has been followed in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 2006 U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual provides great detail on this topic.

Map 1. Marion’s Engagements and Battles, 1780–82

Map 1.Marion’s Engagements and Battles, 1780–82

Source: Map from Hugh F. Rankin, Francis Marion: The Swamp Fox (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1973), 62–63. Engagement and battle sites added by the author.

Note: After the map was prepared, the author was notified that Parker’s Ferry is north of Jacksonborough, about four miles upstream—not south, as reflected on Rankin’s map. The location is substantiated by the presence of Parker’s Ferry Road running parallel to the river, about four miles northeast of present-day Jacksonboro.

Figure 1. Time Line of Marion’s Partisan Activities: Diversion of British and Loyalist Forces

Figure 1.Time Line of Marion’s Partisan Activities: Diversion of British and Loyalist Forces

The British attempted Americanization during the Revolution, but they were not successful. The effort was thwarted thanks in part to General Marion and other Patriot partisans and militia. The Patriots’ persistent actions against both British and Loyalist military units forced the British to remain heavily involved in their attempt to conquer and control the southern colonies. Although American Patriot and Loyalist militias fought each other in isolated skirmishes, the Battle of King’s Mountain on October 7, 1780, was the only significant southern battle in which all the participants on both sides were Americans, with the lone exception being the Loyalist leader, British colonel Patrick Ferguson.²¹ Partisan forces, including Marion’s, made complete physical security unattainable for many pacified areas. Rebel guerrillas and militia could achieve local superiority against any particular body of Loyalist self-defense militia and sometimes even against mobile detachments.²²

The British reconquest and control of the southern colonies proved extremely difficult. General Greene articulated this fact in a letter to Gen. George Washington on May 14, 1781, writing that if the British divide their force, they will fall by detachments, and if they operate collectively, they cannot command the country.²³ A northern example further illustrates this point. Maj. Gen. Friedrich Wilhelm von Lossberg, commanding German troops in Rhode Island, was pessimistic about the chances of ever pacifying the rebellious colonies: We are far from an anticipated peace, Lossberg wrote, "because the bitterness of the rebels is too widespread, and in regions where we are masters the rebellious spirit is still in them. The land is too large, and there are too many people. The more land we win, the weaker our army gets in the field. It would be best to come to an agreement with them [emphasis added]."²⁴ For the British, this would be a hard lesson fully realized only after the disaster at Yorktown.

The importance of considering truces holds true in the present day. As various conflicts have shown, enemies will come to the negotiating table when it suits their best interest. Past negotiations between the French and the Viet Minh over the future of Indochina and current debate over negotiation with the Taliban in Afghanistan are good examples of negotiating with irregular forces for conflict termination. Truce negotiations, as practiced by Marion, can serve to end conflict in certain circumstances.

Marion’s partisan campaign successfully diverted British and Loyalist forces from other military operations. Counterinsurgencies through the years have proved to be manpower intensive, and the British Southern Campaign was no exception; their manpower was a finite resource. The occupying British army in South Carolina originally consisted of about four thousand men, including both British regulars and Loyalists. The British needed more than three-fourths of these men to garrison key towns and forts across the state, leaving relatively few for extended offensive operations.²⁵ Because of the efforts of Marion’s partisan forces and others, such as those led by Sumter and Pickens, the British had to protect their supply lines constantly and aggressively, garrison a series of inland forts, and expend enormous time, resources, and effort in trying to destroy their foes. Military forces have repeated such expenditure throughout history; examples include the counterinsurgencies of Malaysia (Britain), Algeria (France), Vietnam (France and United States), Afghanistan (Soviet Union and United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom, waged by the United States with some coalition support).

In the Southern Campaign waged by the British, the decisive struggle was actually between Patriot and Loyalist irregulars and militia vying for compliance and support of the populace. In this effort, the Patriots clearly won. The Patriots eventually managed to control the countryside, making supplying a British army in the interior of South Carolina impossible. This fact is confirmed by the retreat of Lord Francis Hastings Rawdon, deputy of Gen. Lord Charles Cornwallis, after his victory at Hobkirk’s Hill on April 25, 1781. Although Rawdon repulsed General Greene’s attack, the British retreated to Charleston in the face of a possible renewed Patriot advance. The final victory of the Patriot irregulars in South Carolina was owing in large measure to better organization and audacious leadership, but also in part to the inability of the British to develop and equip a Loyalist force capable of containing the Patriots.²⁶

General Marion significantly contributed to the irregulars’ better organization and audacious leadership and also hampered British supply activities. The widespread and relatively efficient Whig [Patriot] organization significantly contributed to the British army’s inability to obtain a dependable supply of provisions.²⁷ The lack of supplies constrained British operations in the South. In his 1787 memoir, one of Marion’s adversaries, Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, wrote that the general’s partisan activities had an enormously adverse impact on the British army’s resupply operations: Mr. Marion, by his zeal and abilities, showed himself capable of the trust committed to his charge. He collected his adherents on the shortest notice, in the neighborhood of Black river, and, after making excursions into friendly districts, or threatening the communications, to avoid pursuit, he disbanded his followers. The alarms occasioned by these insurrections frequently retarded supplies on their way to the army; and a late report of Marion’s strength delayed the junction of the recruits, who had arrived from New York for the corps in the country.²⁸

In addition to hampering the British in obtaining adequate amounts of supplies by preventing the harvesting of rice and grain and collecting livestock, General Marion’s partisans also hindered British transportation efforts. In December 1780 Marion was in control of routes along the Santee River. This forced British supply trains to take the longer, more circuitous route from Monck’s Corner to Friday’s Ferry on the Congaree River instead of crossing the Santee River at Nelson’s Ferry.²⁹ In a letter to Sir Henry Clinton, British lieutenant colonel Nisbet Balfour wrote on January 31, 1781, By the best accounts from Greene’s army he was on the 25th to the eastward of the Peedee; and I learn his intentions are to distress the country by making frequent inroads of cavalry into it—one of which, yesterday morning, destroyed the wagons and Quartermaster General’s stores at Monk’s Corner. Two very enterprising officers, Lee and Marion, are employed on this service.³⁰

British and Loyalist foraging parties were also easy prey for Marion’s troops.³¹ In addition to producing casualties and lowering morale, targeting such foraging parties aggravated the British supply problem. Marion’s partisans also routinely gathered all available food sources to prevent their use by the British and Tories, further exacerbating the British supply challenge, and some of these supplies made their way into the Continental Army’s possession. In June 1781, for example, Marion’s men moved cattle from the areas near Monck’s Corner and Haddrell’s Point in present-day Charleston County and from Saint Thomas Parish to places where British raiders could not get them.³² Marion’s forces also compounded British supply and transportation woes by removing boats from local rivers, including the Santee, at opportune times and hiding them. These actions not only complicated the supply of British forces but also restricted their tactical maneuver. Examples abound of Marion’s actions adding to the British army’s logistical challenges in North America. On today’s fields of conflict, insurgents routinely attack the supply lines of conventional forces. Overall U.S. tactical successes have occurred since 9/11 in Afghanistan and Iraq despite these attacks, which are most notably carried out by improvised explosive device (IED) and which have been somewhat offset by technology as well as overwhelming combat power.

The river systems in South Carolina north of the Santee River could serve as British invasion routes in the drive toward North Carolina. However, they could also serve as excellent infiltration routes south for small Patriot parties to disrupt the long and vital supply line from Charleston to the main British army inland.³³ Terrain analysis of the potential area of operation is vital in campaign design. Such study has a direct impact on the force’s task organization, methods of transport, and determination of objectives. To protect the supply line between the army operating inland and its source of supply in Charleston, the British had to garrison a series of inland forts. Map 2 shows the location of these essential outposts.

These inland forts were susceptible to isolation, attack, siege, and capture. They appear somewhat like the series of forward operating bases (FOBs) and other outposts used by counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the arrays in Afghanistan and Iraq have always had good mutual support, robust security forces, and air support, which have reduced the insurgents’ ability to isolate, siege, and capture. Most attacks have been by indirect fire; no attack has seriously threatened the present-day U.S. FOB system.

General Marion, along with Lt. Col. Henry Light Horse Harry Lee of the Continental Army, conducted the siege and capture of Fort Watson east of Orangeburg in April 1781 and Fort Motte northeast of Orangeburg in May 1781 (both are discussed in chapter 6). Other British forts, such as Forts Granby, Galpin, Balfour, Ninety-Six, and Cornwallis, were seized by the Patriots or abandoned during Greene’s Southern Campaign. The British and Loyalists lost more than eleven hundred prisoners during this series of combat actions.³⁴ After the action against Greene at Hobkirk’s Hill near Camden in April 1781, which was followed by the losses of these inland forts, Lord Rawdon decided that he would be unable to maintain any British garrison more than seventy miles inland or from Charleston itself.³⁵ This shows the weakened state of the British position and their reduced freedom of movement during the spring of 1781, a situation to which Marion’s actions significantly contributed. The Viet Minh’s effort against the French in Indochina, culminating at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, provides a modern parallel.

The British attempted in vain to destroy Marion’s partisan force, which diverted available British troops, already in short supply. In early 1781 Lord Rawdon sent Col. Welbore Ellis Doyle with his Loyalist militia unit, the New York Volunteers, to destroy Marion’s partisan band. Although Doyle destroyed Marion’s supply base on Snow Island, Marion subsequently succeeded in drawing Doyle’s force into several traps, inflicting heavy casualties, and forcing them to seek quick refuge in British-held Camden. Perhaps the best-known British attempt to eliminate the Marion threat was on November 8, 1780, when Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton’s dragoons chased Marion’s force for seven hours and twenty-six miles through the thick swamps near the Santee River. Marion’s route had included a thirty-five-mile trek from Richbourg’s Mill Dam to the head of Jack’s Creek, around to the Pocotaligo River, and back to Black River, which finally ended at Benbow’s Ferry. History attributes Tarleton as saying, Come, my Boys! Let us go back, and we will find the Gamecock [Sumter], but as for this damned old fox, the Devil himself could not catch him.³⁶ Thus Marion acquired the nickname Swamp Fox and a growing reputation as a skilled partisan.

Map 2. Selected British Forts and Garrisons in South Carolina

Map 2.Selected British Forts and Garrisons in South Carolina

Source: Modified from George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1957), 454.

The targeting of insurgent (and terrorist) leadership should always be weighed carefully. As was the case with the search for Osama Bin Laden, the proper resources will always be scarce for this type of foray. Will the search unduly expend resources better spent on prosecuting other aspects of the campaign? Will the demise of the insurgent leader create an undesired martyr? Will the leader’s demise allow another, more capable leader to emerge? At times, it may be better to allow an enemy leader to remain in power, especially if his military decisions jeopardize his own success (e.g., Adolf Hitler).

In several cases, partisan efforts disrupted the movements of British forces. For example, Marion and Lieutenant Colonel Lee prevented British lieutenant colonel John W. T. Watson from joining his force with Lord Rawdon in time for the Battle of Hobkirk’s Hill.³⁷ In another example, in December 1780 near Halfway Swamp, Marion attacked British major Robert McLeroth’s forces as they were escorting British recruits from Charleston to the Seventh Regiment, located inland. Marion’s attack delayed McLeroth’s linkup with the regiment. Additionally, in the same month Cornwallis determined it necessary to leave the British Sixty-Fourth Regiment in South Carolina rather than take it on his campaign into North Carolina as planned; this reduced his on-hand strength in Virginia before Yorktown.³⁸ Marion played an indirect role in the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton and his legion at the Battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781. Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, British commandant of Charleston, had detached so many men to protect his lines of communications in the lowcountry because of Marion’s efforts that he could not send reinforcements to Ninety-Six when requested. As a result, when Patriot brigadier general Daniel Morgan took a position to threaten the post, Lord Cornwallis had to send Tarleton out from Ninety-Six to drive Morgan off, setting the stage for the Battle at Cowpens. Similar actions by Marion at Parker’s Ferry reduced British cavalry strength, shaping conditions for the Battle of Eutaw Springs.³⁹

The successful actions of