The Politics of Negotiation: America's Dealings with Allies, Adversaries, and Friends

By Henning Mankell

Brady examines the role that politics has played in the success or failure of negotiations between the United States and other countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing on her experience as a negotiator with the U.S. State and Defense Departments, she argues that security talks cannot be conducted in isolation from political influences.

Originally published in 1991.

A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

• Language: English
• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
• Release date: Oct 1, 2017
• ISBN: 9781469639604

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The Politics of Negotiation

The Politics of Negotiation

America’s Dealings with Allies, Adversaries, and Friends

Linda P. Brady

The University of North Carolina Press

Chapel Hill & London

© 1991 The University of North Carolina Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

95 94 93 92 91 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Brady, Linda P.

The politics of negotiation : America’s dealings with allies, adversaries, and friends / Linda P. Brady.

   p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8078-1971-9 (cloth : alk. paper).—

ISBN 0-8078-4320-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Diplomacy. 2. Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes. 3. Negotiation. 4. United States—Foreign relations— 1981-1989. 5. International relations. 6. World politics—1975-1985. I. Title.

JX1662.B73 1991 91-13

327.2—dc20 CIP

THIS BOOK WAS DIGITALLY MANUFACTURED.

For my parents,

Charles and Helen Brady

Contents

Preface

Part I: Introduction

1. Negotiating America’s Security after the Cold War

2. The Politics of Negotiation

Part II: Bargaining with Allies

3. The Failure of Domestic Consensus: Wartime Host Nation Support

4. Building Interallied Consensus: Deploying Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Part III: Negotiating with Adversaries

5. Conventional Arms Control: The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

6. Nuclear Arms Control: The Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Part IV: Dealing with Friends and Mixed Relationships

7. The Arab States and Israel: Negotiating Logistical Support for the Persian Gulf

8. The Problem of Mixed Relationships: NATO and the Out-of-Area Question

Part V: Conclusions

9. The Politics of Negotiation: Implications for Policy

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Preface

During the fall of 1980 I served as defense adviser with the U.S. delegation to the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna, Austria. From 1973 until early in 1989, when the unsuccessful talks were brought to a close, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact met weekly in the Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace to discuss the reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe.

The format of the talks required East and West, on alternating Thursdays, to deliver a plenary statement to the delegations of the participating countries. Members of the delegations often gathered in the Hofburg early on Thursday to take part in informal discussions with their colleagues. On one Thursday, as I recall, the discussion turned to politics.

A military representative from one of the Eastern delegations suggested that if the military representatives met together in a separate location for two weeks they could hammer out a reasonable agreement limiting conventional forces in Central Europe. His counterpart on a Western delegation agreed, noting that military officers—regardless of their nationality—shared an understanding of the nature of the military balance in Europe and the minimum requirements for deterrence and defense.

A third military representative, again from the East, remarked that the complicating factor in MBFR was politics. An essentially military issue had been transformed into a political debate, and herein lay the explanation for lack of progress. The nodding agreement of others present suggested the consensus of the group: if only politics were eliminated from these negotiations, MBFR might succeed. One way to eliminate politics would be to take responsibility for MBFR away from the politicians and the diplomats and place it in the hands of the military.

The problem, of course, is that it is impossible to eliminate politics from international negotiation. Political considerations influence many aspects of negotiation, from decisions to enter into discussions, to the specification of interests and objectives, to bargaining strategies and concession-making. Put differently, international negotiation does not occur in a political vacuum. Efforts to explain the process and outcome of international negotiation that ignore politics will be at best incomplete and at worst irrelevant.

This book is about international negotiation and the role that politics has played in explaining the success or failure of negotiations between the United States and selected allies, adversaries, and friends during the 1970s and the 1980s. My argument assumes that international negotiation is a political process in which nations pursue their security interests and objectives while attempting to reconcile those interests with their negotiating partners. This reconciliation or balancing of interests requires consensus-building at home and abroad. The process takes one form in negotiations between alliance partners that share, by definition, a common perception of the threat and an agreed security commitment. The process takes another form in negotiations between adversaries that share, also by definition, conflicting interests and perceptions of the requirements for international security.

By far the most difficult negotiations, in my view, occur between friends—countries that share neither membership in a formal alliance nor an adversarial relationship. In these cases, the absence of shared perceptions of security interests and the nature of threats to international security impedes the consensus-building necessary for successful negotiations. In all of these cases—whether dealing with allies, adversaries, or friends—history, culture, and politics are foremost in explaining the process and outcome of negotiation.

This book is organized into five parts. Part I consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 briefly reviews American efforts to enhance security through negotiation during the Cold War and identifies two themes in scholarly approaches to understanding negotiation: negotiation as art and negotiation as science. Chapter 2 presents a framework for understanding international negotiation around which subsequent case studies are organized. Elements of the framework include: background factors (history, culture, and the personal characteristics of negotiators and political leaders), context (defined as the nature of the prior relationship between the United States and its negotiating partners), substantive concerns (interests and objectives), process (bargaining and concession-making), and politics. The framework is simply that—a way of organizing the multiple influences on negotiating behavior. It does not purport to be a theory or model of negotiation but highlights those factors that should be taken into account in the development of theories or models of negotiation.

Parts II, III, and IV represent the heart of the book. These chapters offer six case studies that illustrate the role of politics and other factors in explaining the process and outcome of negotiations between the United States and selected allies, adversaries, and friends during the 1970s and the 1980s. In Part II, to examine the process by which the United States negotiates with allies, I have selected negotiations that grew out of the Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) signed by the United States and its NATO allies in May 1978. These negotiations concerned logistical support for a U.S. deployment to the European theater in time of crisis or war (the U.S.-German Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement) (chapter 3) and the debate within NATO leading to the December 1979 decision to deploy new U.S. theater nuclear forces in Europe (chapter 4).

Part III considers two cases that illustrate the problems encountered in negotiating with adversaries. These cases are the Vienna negotiations during the 1970s and the 1980s between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact concerning conventional forces in Europe (the MBFR negotiations, noted earlier) (chapter 5) and the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning theater nuclear forces in Europe (the Negotiations on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF) (chapter 6). The INF negotiations resulted in a treaty signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in December 1987.

Perhaps the most difficult negotiations in which the United States has been involved are with friends or those that concern mixed relationships. These issues are the focus of Part IV. To illustrate the problems of negotiating with friends, I have selected a series of discussions between the United States and several of the Arab states and Israel concerning basing rights and logistical support for a U.S. deployment to the Persian Gulf in time of crisis or war (chapter 7). U.S. efforts to negotiate with its NATO allies about the defense of Western interests in the Persian Gulf (the so-called out-of-area issue) illustrate the problem of mixed relationships (chapter 8). These relationships are mixed because, while dealing with its European allies (whether bilaterally or within the formal NATO arena), the United States raises issues that fall outside the scope of traditional NATO responsibilities.

My selection of cases is based on several considerations. First, these cases focus on negotiations which have as their objective the signing of a treaty or formal agreement on arms control, defense, or security matters. I have not considered the routine diplomatic exchanges that comprise day-to-day international relations. Second, these cases include recent negotiations in which the United States has been a direct participant. I have not examined negotiations in which the United States has served as a mediator, intermediary, or facilitator. Third, I have deliberately selected certain cases that have not received detailed treatment elsewhere. This is particularly true for the U.S.-German wartime host nation support talks, the conventional arms control negotiations, and discussions with the Arab states, Israel, and the NATO allies concerning logistical support for a U.S. deployment to the Persian Gulf. Finally, in each of these cases I played a supporting role as a civilian employee of the U.S. Department of Defense. The origins of this book lie in my personal observations about the role of politics in these negotiations.

Part V shifts the focus to lessons learned from America’s experience in these negotiations and their relevance for negotiating a new security framework after the Cold War. Chapter 9 raises the issue of how the United States should adapt its approach to international negotiation as traditional distinctions between allies, adversaries, and friends break down. As we enter the last decade of the twentieth century, the negotiating process is becoming more difficult, while negotiation is becoming a more essential instrument of foreign policy. The challenge facing the United States in international negotiation is learning how to make politics work for us, not against us.

This book is a product of my experience in Washington, D.C., from 1978 to 1985 and could not have been completed—indeed, it would not have been started—without the support of the Council on Foreign Relations. I was awarded an International Affairs Fellowship by the council in 1978 and spent the 1978–79 academic year in the Department of State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. My introduction to the real world of policy-making and diplomacy began there. I am grateful to Alton Frye, former director of the International Affairs Fellowship program at the council, and Kempton Dunn, current director of the program, for their support and encouragement.

My one year in Washington, D.C., turned into seven. During the six years following my fellowship experience, I held several positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, where I had the privilege of working with a number of individuals who exemplify the ideal of public service. In particular, I would like to thank James R. Blaker, Richard Darilek, Norman Eliasson, and Lawrence J. Korb, who taught me valuable lessons about diplomacy and the policy-making process.

I began work on this book while serving as Fellow in International Security and Arms Control at the Carter Center of Emory University during 1986–87. I am grateful to Kenneth Stein, former executive director of the Carter Center, for providing an opportunity to reflect on my experiences in Washington. Ken also introduced me to Paul Betz, of the University of North Carolina Press, who believed that I had something to say and encouraged me to pursue this project to completion. His patience and support, and the editorial assistance of Ron Maner and Mary Reid, helped make this book a reality.

The bulk of the writing was completed at Georgia Tech. My colleagues in the Consortium on Multi-Party Conflict Resolution—an interuniversity research project involving faculty from Georgia Tech, Georgia State, and the University of Georgia—offered useful comments on the conceptual framework. I would especially like to thank Gregory Bourne, Michael Elliott, Dorinda Dallmeyer, and Louis Sohn for their suggestions. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., of the University of South Carolina and Donald Snow of the University of Alabama also made important comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript. The index was prepared by Sharon Smith.

Part I

Introduction

There has been a dramatic change in the international environment since the end of the Second World War. In 1945 the hot war ended and was soon replaced by a Cold War and its associated security arrangements. Those arrangements provided stability and predictability for forty years. In 1989 the end of the Cold War was signaled by revolutionary change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

As it attempts to deal with these changes and the construction of a new security order, the United States will rely increasingly on international negotiation. Although negotiation has been an instrument of American foreign policy since the nation’s beginning, it has become even more important as we approach the end of the twentieth century. Resolving conflicts through diplomatic means and ensuring security through negotiation will be major themes in American national security policy in the post—Cold War world.

While the United States has increasingly turned to negotiation to address its security interests, international negotiation has become more difficult because the Cold War framework within which negotiations have been conducted since the end of the Second World War is unraveling. For most of this period, the United States has characterized its negotiating partners as allies or adversaries and has adopted negotiating strategies and tactics designed to achieve its objectives within that framework.

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev on the political scene in the Soviet Union, growing concerns within the United States about the federal deficit and trade imbalances, and the movement in both Eastern and Western Europe toward greater economic and political independence from the superpowers signal major transformations in the international system that will affect how the United States negotiates and how successfully it can achieve its security objectives through diplomatic means.

The first part of this book examines how the United States has relied on negotiation during the Cold War to achieve national security objectives and why we will rely even more heavily on international negotiation in the future. The introduction also reviews two approaches to understanding the process and outcome of negotiation—negotiation as art and negotiation as science—and describes the advantages and disadvantages of each.

Finally, Part I offers a framework for understanding international negotiation based on the premise that negotiation is a political activity which takes one form between alliance partners who share a common definition of the threat and another form between adversaries who view each other as the primary threat. Perhaps the most difficult negotiations occur between friends who share neither a formal alliance nor an adversarial relationship. In each case, whether dealing with allies, adversaries, or friends, political considerations are critical influences on the process and outcome of international negotiation.

1. Negotiating America’s Security after the Cold War

Early in the 19th century, Clausewitz claimed that war was the continuation of policy by other means, and he accurately predicted an increased reliance in the use of war in the politics between nations. Today, things are different: Negotiation . . . could now be said to be the continuation of policy by other means, and it is likely that nations will rely more on this method in the future.

—Gilbert R. Winham¹

The opening of the last decade of the twentieth century brought with it signs of a revolution in the international political and economic order that had been in place since the end of World War II. Revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and the fragmentation of security arrangements that had kept the peace for more than forty years.² The Cold War provided American policymakers with a framework for dealing with other nations. The division of the world into two camps—Communist and democratic—and the construction of alliances and other institutional arrangements to support that division simplified the task of identifying friends and enemies. Relationships were clearly defined, and allies and adversaries generally behaved in predictable ways.

The period ahead will be dangerous, as the relative stability and predictability of the Cold War years are replaced by the uncertainty and challenge associated with the dissolution of security arrangements grounded in the Cold War and the creation of a new international order. The pursuit of national security after the Cold War will sorely test the diplomatic, economic, and political skills of the United States. Among the most important of these skills is international negotiation—a willingness to resolve conflicts peacefully through dialogue.

Building a new security architecture in Europe is tied to transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact and to the creation of new political and economic arrangements for all of Europe. Negotiation will be central to the success of these efforts—whether they take place in the context of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or other forums. And the United States will continue to play a primary role in Europe, for both the long and short run.

During the Cold War years the United States had a mixed track record in negotiations with its allies, adversaries, and friends. On the one hand, the United States and its NATO allies successfully negotiated a number of security arrangements during the late 1970s and early 1980s. These agreements were designed to enhance NATO’s conventional force posture and, in particular, to better support U.S. reinforcements in the event of crisis or war in Europe. On the other hand, the United States generally was unsuccessful during the same period in its efforts to negotiate greater NATO support for the defense of Western interests in the Persian Gulf.

The SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreements, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, and the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, signed in 1987, are considered by most observers to be examples of the successful use of negotiation in support of American national security policy. However, during the 1970s and the 1980s NATO and the Warsaw Pact were unable to achieve similar success in negotiations about the reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

America’s experience in dealing with friends—that is, countries with which the United States had neither a formal alliance nor a history of adversarial relationships—was most frustrating. Efforts to negotiate security arrangements with countries in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf were especially difficult. The limited success that the United States experienced in gaining access to military facilities in Oman, Egypt, Kenya, and Somalia was offset by its inability to negotiate the kind of explicit cooperative defense arrangements in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf that America had with its European allies.

The American experience in negotiating with allies, adversaries, and friends since the end of the Second World War offers lessons for international security negotiations after the Cold War. Certain negotiating skills, such as patience, self-assurance, and the ability to see the problem from the perspective of one’s negotiating partner, are timeless and can be taught. Negotiators who practice these skills may enhance their chance of success. But the successful negotiation of international agreements—both during the Cold War and in the emerging security environment—ultimately depends upon far more than negotiators with an impressive repertoire of interpersonal skills.

Successful American negotiators, more often than not, are steeped in the history, culture, context, and politics of negotiation. They know that techniques that work in one situation may fail in another. A negotiating style that is effective with American allies may be ineffective in dealing with adversaries or friends. And negotiating styles that made sense for America’s dealings with its allies and adversaries during the Cold War may be inappropriate and ineffective as we move into the new political and economic environment of the twenty-first century. In this new environment, old relationships between allies and adversaries will be transformed, and relationships between friends will comprise more of the agenda of international politics.

This book assumes that the context, or the nature of the prior relationship between the United States and its negotiating partners, influences how common interests and objectives are defined as well as decisions about whether and when to negotiate, when to compromise, and how to structure international agreements dealing with national security concerns. Political factors operate differently and may be more or less critical in explaining the success or failure of international negotiation, depending upon whether the United States is negotiating with allies, adversaries, or friends. Moreover, negotiations between allies about issues that are considered to be outside the scope of the formal alliance relationship reveal their own unique political dynamics.

Perhaps the most important influence on the course and outcome of international negotiation is politics. Negotiations are influenced by (1) international politics, especially the structure of the international system and the perceived global balance of power; (2) regional politics, including the balance of power and perceptions of regional threats; (3) domestic politics, particularly the electoral process and the nature of a negotiating partner’s political system; and (4) bureaucratic politics. All of these factors must be taken into account in the design of negotiating strategies and the consensus-building process that leads to the successful conclusion of international agreements.

The prevailing academic view of international negotiation conflicts with what international negotiation actually entails—namely, politics. Many analysts argue that misperceptions of national interests are the fundamental causes of international conflict and that negotiation is a rational process. Recent literature suggests a trend toward thinking that such concepts as the balance of power are irrelevant, when in fact the structure of the international system and the relative capabilities of its members do influence decisions about whether and when to compromise or to rely on instruments other than negotiation to achieve national security objectives. These considerations are just as important in explaining America’s dealings with its allies and friends as with its adversaries.

While political considerations often are incorporated in the development of negotiating strategies, some scholars are reluctant to admit that political factors may drive the negotiating process, or at least strongly influence the outcome. This reluctance may stem from a belief that it is easier to manipulate perceptions than to understand or modify political and strategic relationships. In any event, the result has been to depoliticize explanations of American success and failure in international negotiation.

The conflict resolution approach to negotiation, which was extremely popular in the 1970s and the 1980s, attempts to define a successful formula for agreement and a set of negotiating tools that can be applied to any negotiation. According to some scholars writing in this genre, negotiating an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union is no different than buying a used car. In my view, this approach—one that neglects critical historical, cultural, and political differences between parties to a negotiation—creates unrealistic expectations about the ability to resolve every conflict and may make already difficult negotiations impossible.

A framework for explaining the effects of history, culture, context, and politics on the process and outcome of international negotiations is the subject of chapter 2. The remainder of this chapter focuses on two issues. First, how has the United States used international negotiation since the Second World War in support of national security policy? And, second, how have scholars conceptualized negotiation, and what relevance do the major themes in the literature on negotiation have for an understanding of the politics of negotiation?

Negotiating Security during the Cold War

Negotiation has been a key instrument of American foreign policy since the close of World War II. Many of the international negotiations in which the United States has been involved have been in support of national security interests and objectives. The primary legacy of the Second World War was an increased American role in international affairs. The growth of United States economic and military power and interests demanded greater participation in the international system. The greatest influence on America’s use of international negotiation in support of national security objectives was the outbreak of the Cold War and the policy of containment of the Soviet Union.

The negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed by the United States and eleven other Western nations in 1949, signaled extensive American military support for the defense of Europe and demonstrated the U.S. commitment to a coalition strategy. Despite greater reliance on international negotiation to achieve security arrangements designed to counter the threat of Soviet expansionism, the United States continued to run the show. American economic and military power in the immediate postwar period enabled the United States to have its way—albeit in the context of negotiated agreements—with its European allies. The Europeans had no other choice.

These relationships remained relatively constant throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s, although by the mid-1960s economic, military, and political changes had occurred that seriously affected how the United States negotiated and with what degree of success. The deepening involvement of the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet achievement of strategic parity by the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the economic recovery and growing independence of the European states and Japan changed the way in which the United States pursued international negotiations in support of its security interests. A perceived shift in the global balance of power resulted in a reassessment of U.S. commitments and strategy—reflected in the Nixon Doctrine— and increased support for negotiated settlements in Vietnam, with the People’s Republic of China, and with the Soviet Union.

These shifts in the balance of power led to greater reliance on negotiation with American allies. No longer could the United States take for granted the automatic support of its allies for U.S. policies abroad. The economic successes in Europe and Japan and the greater political independence that followed led the United States to rely increasingly on negotiation to achieve its security objectives, even when dealing with countries that shared a formal alliance relationship. Disagreements between the United States and its European allies were especially serious on issues that extended beyond the NATO area, narrowly defined. Efforts by the United States and its European allies to coordinate policies to combat international terrorism or to support Western interests in the Persian Gulf illustrate the problem.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States began to take the Soviet Union more seriously as well and to turn to negotiation to settle differences. This shift became most obvious in 1969 when the Nixon administration began to pursue its policy of détente. Among the most important achievements of that period are the SALT I agreements on strategic nuclear forces.

The situation also led in the 1970s and the 1980s to greater reliance on negotiation with friends—that is, countries (many