The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume II - Antietam

By Ezra A. Carman

Winner for Reprint, 2012, Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Book Award

Antietam is the eagerly awaited second volume of Ezra Carman’s magisterial The Maryland Campaign of September 1862.

Many authors have written about the climactic September 17 battle of the 1862 invasion of Maryland, but it is impossible to do so without referencing Carman’s sweeping and definitive maps and 1,800-page manuscript. His work guides every Civil War historian and comprises the basis of the National Park Service’s interpretive programs at Antietam. Indeed, even the basic layout of the National Park battlefield was based upon Carman’s groundbreaking work. Carman had the advantage of not only participating in the battle as a colonel in the Union army, but knowing, corresponding, and conversing with hundreds of Northern and Southern soldiers from corps commanders all the way down to privates. Over the decades he amassed a vast collection of letters, maps, and personal memoirs from many key participants. He used this treasure trove of firsthand accounts to create his compelling narrative. No one has devoted more time and effort to understanding what happened at Antietam than did Ezra Carman–the campaign’s first true historian.

Unfortunately, Carman did not always note from where he obtained his information, making the authenticity and reliability of his work problematic. Editor Thomas G. Clemens, recognized internationally as one of the foremost historians of the Maryland Campaign, has spent more than two decades studying Antietam and editing and richly annotating Carman’s exhaustively written manuscript. As Clemens discovered, Carman used his sources judiciously, and the stories he relates withstand scrutiny for accuracy and reliability.

Carman’s invaluable prose is augmented by his detailed maps of the dawn to nearly dusk fighting on September 17, which have never appeared in their original form in any book on the battle. Even more exciting are the newly discovered 19th century photographs authorized by Carman to document his work laying out the battlefield, a haunting visual record of how the battlefield appeared to Carman as he tried to unravel its mysteries.

The result is The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Antietam, the most comprehensive and detailed account of the battle ever produced. Jammed with firsthand accounts, personal anecdotes, detailed footnotes, maps, and photos, this long-awaited study will be read and appreciated as battle history at its finest. Indeed, we will never see such a study again.

About the Authors: Ezra Ayres Carman was born in Oak Tree, New Jersey, on February 27, 1834, and educated at Western Military Academy in Kentucky. He fought with New Jersey organizations throughout the Civil War. He died in 1909 on Christmas day and was buried just below the Custis- Lee mansion in Arlington Cemetery.

Thomas G. Clemens earned his doctoral degree at George Mason University, where he studied under Maryland Campaign historian Dr. Joseph L. Harsh. Tom has published a wide variety of magazine articles and book reviews, has appeared in several documentary programs, and is a licensed tour guide at Antietam National Battlefield. A retired professor from Hagerstown Community College, he also helped found and is the current president of Save Historic Antietam Foundation, Inc., a preservation group dedicated to saving historic properties.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Savas Beatie
• Release date: Sep 19, 2012
• ISBN: 9781611211153

Ezra A. Carman

Ezra Ayres Carman was born in Oak Tree, New Jersey, on February 27, 1834, and educated at Western Military Academy in Kentucky. He fought with New Jersey organizations throughout the Civil War, mustering out as a brevet brigadier general. He was appointed to the Antietam National Cemetery Board of Trustees and later to the Antietam Battlefield Board in 1894. Carman also served on the Chattanooga-Chickamauga Battlefield Commission. He died in 1909 on Christmas day and was buried just below the Custis-Lee mansion in Arlington Cemetery. Thomas G. Clemens earned his doctoral degree at George Mason University, where he studied under Maryland Campaign historian Dr. Joseph L. Harsh. Tom has published a wide variety of magazine articles and book reviews, has appeared in several documentary programs, and is a licensed tour guide at Antietam National Battlefield. An instructor at Hagerstown Community College, he also helped found and is the current president of Save Historic Antietam Foundation, Inc., a preservation group dedicated to saving historic properties.

Book preview

Chapter 12

The Field of Antietam

No one who ever campaigned with McClellan or Lee in September 1862, can ever forget the incomparable beauty of the valleys of Western Maryland, through and across which they marched from the Monocacy to South Mountain and the Antietam. Loveliest of these is the Antietam Valley extending from the South Mountain to the Potomac. As one descends the National road from Turner's Gap, going westward, the valley spreads out before the vision in charming, graceful undulations to the north and west; to the southwest is seen the wavy outline of Elk Ridge which bisects the valley from Harper's Ferry northward, and sinks down upon its bosom near Keedysville. It has a width of eight to twelve miles. In this charming valley, soon to be stained, yet hallowed, with blood and marking a great battle of American history—of all history—war now stalked and we follow its footsteps to the banks of the Antietam and the Potomac, to note the ground of impending battle and the approaches thereto.¹

After descending from South Mountain to Boonsboro the National road divides into four branches, one, the continuation of the main road, runs a little west of northwest to Williamsport on the Potomac, one northwest to Hagerstown; one south to Rohrersville and down Pleasant Valley, another southwest through Keedysville and Sharpsburg to the Potomac at Shepherdstown.² From Boonsboro to Keedysville, a distance of three miles, the road runs through a gently undulating country, with fine farms and noble groves of oaks. At Keedysville it strikes more swelling ground, the declining prolongation of the Elk Ridge. Immediately after crossing the little Antietam, which winds through and around the village, a road branches to the right and crossing the main Antietam by a graceful stone bridge, runs northwest to Williamsport, on the Potomac. Another road branching to the left runs a little east of the south, along the eastern base of Elk Ridge to Rohrersville, while another runs down the west side of Elk Ridge to the Burnside Bridge where it intersects the Sharpsburg and Rohrersville road.

The Boonsboro and Sharpsburg road, continuing a southwest course, at the distance of a short mile from Keedysville, reaches the plateau of a prominent and commanding ridge, upon which Lee rested early in the morning of the 15th and McClellan established his headquarters on the evening of the 16th, and from which can be seen the ground upon which Lee disposed his army. From this point the road gradually descends another short mile to the east foot of the bluff, behind which, on either side of the road, Richardson and Sykes deployed their divisions on the afternoon of the 15th. Passing through a gorge in the bluff the Antietam was crossed by a stone bridge, similar to the one on the Keedysville and Williamsport road.³

From the western bank of the Antietam the road ascends a ridge which reaches an elevation of 120 feet, when 620 yards from the stream; then it descends into a ravine which snakes up from the Antietam, south of the bridge, then again ascends to a ridge where Lee drew up his right and center at an elevation of 185 to 190 feet above the Antietam, and about a mile from it, and where the National Cemetery now crowns its beauty.⁴

Lying close under this ridge, to the west, is Sharpsburg, the steeples of its churches just visible from the east bank of the Antietam; through which the road passes southwest three miles to the Potomac, opposite Shepherdstown. Before the war a stone bridge carried the road over the river, but this had been destroyed by General Joseph E. Johnston, when he abandoned Harper's Ferry in June 1861, and the crossing of the river was affected by a ford one mile below Shepherdstown, known variously as Shepherdstown Ford, Boteler's Ford and Blackford's Ford. The Potomac at this point is about 200 yards wide and the ford is just below the breast of a mill dam. In ordinary stages of water it is a good ford.⁵

When the road from Sharpsburg strikes the canal and river opposite Shepherdstown, a road ran south along the banks of the canal to the ford, and the ford was reached by another road branching off from the Harper's Ferry road, about a mile south of Sharpsburg.⁶

In reaching Shepherdstown from the west and north the Potomac makes a series of remarkable curves. At Mercerville, two and a half miles west of north from Sharpsburg, it glides in gracefully from the west, strikes the foot of a bluff which it follows southerly 500 or 600 yards to New Industry, then sweeps southwest over a mile and, curving to the right, flows southeast a mile and a half, strikes another bluff about a mile and a quarter west of Sharpsburg and turning, runs due west a mile, when it again turns and runs southeast a mile and a quarter, when again changing its course, it flows southwest between high bluffs, curves gracefully at Shepherdstown and pursues a southeast course nearly four miles, when it receives the waters of the Antietam coming in from the north. The eastern bank of the river, in this entire distance, is followed by the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which, at the time, was dry, the water being let out by the Confederates.

From Mercerville on the north to the Antietam on the south, there is but one ford practicable for infantry and artillery—the Shepherdstown Ford—entering on the Blackford farm on the Maryland side and coming out near Boteler's Mill on the Virginia side—by which Jackson, Walker, McLaws and R. H. Anderson joined Lee on the 16th and 17th, and by which the entire Confederate army retired during the night of the 18th.

The Antietam rises near Waynesboro, in the Cumberland Valley, Pennsylvania, and pursues a southerly course, flowing at times drowsily through meadows, then rippling over ledges, but more generally curving between bold bluffs, and empties into the Potomac about 10 miles above Harper's Ferry and three miles south of Sharpsburg. Joining the Potomac at an acute angle it encloses a peninsula or neck two to four miles broad and five to six miles in length.⁷

From the Antietam the ground rises gradually to the Cemetery ridge and the general course of the Hagerstown road, running north, beyond Sharpsburg it rises gradually to a beautiful plateau, then falls away in rough outlines of rocky ledges and deep ravines to the Potomac.⁸

Nearly in the center of this peninsula lies Sharpsburg, then and now, a sleepy, unenterprising town of about 1,200 inhabitants. It is situated in a saucer-like depression between two ridges running parallel nearly north and south, and bounded by hills both on the north and south. Its only value was as a strategic point from which five roads radiated.

The road running northeast to Keedysville and Boonsboro has been noted, as also, has that running southwest to the Potomac at Shepherdstown. From Sharpsburg running nearly due north, a good turnpike runs to Hagerstown, twelve miles away, which, at a distance of a little less than three miles, is crossed by the Keedysville and Williamsport road. Branch roads run from the Hagerstown turnpike, the most important of which, to us, is the Smoketown road, running northeast from the Dunkard Church, and which shall be further noted. Where the Hagerstown turnpike leaves the town to go north, a road leads southeast to Rohrersville, crossing the Antietam by a stone bridge at a distance of a little more than a mile from the town square. A road runs due south from the town square, crosses the Antietam a few yards from its mouth, beyond the limits of the battle-field, and three miles from Sharpsburg, and continues on its rough way along the banks of the Potomac to Harper's Ferry. At a mile from town a right hand branch from this road runs to Shepherdstown Ford.⁹

Not of so much importance as the five roads named was one running north from the town square about 1,400 yards, parallel to the Hagerstown road and 700 yards distant from it, then turning west and northwest to New Industry and Mercerville on the Potomac. Stretches of this road were used by the Confederates in moving to and from the left of their line.¹⁰

The turnpikes, country roads and farm lanes gave ready access to all parts of the field upon which, save along the banks of the Antietam itself, there were no obstacles to the movement of troops and but few to the passage of artillery. The undulating character of the ground, rolling into eminences of all dimensions, from little knolls over which a horse can freely gallop to steep ascents, then sinking in places to deep and broad ravines or basins, in which a corps could be hidden, made it possible to move large bodies of troops from one point to another with secrecy and comparative safety, and of this peculiarity of topography the Confederates took full advantage before and during the battle.

From what has been said it will be seen that the Antietam was spanned by four bridges; one at the mouth of the stream, which was used only by Munford's cavalry during the engagement, but by which Jackson, McLaws, Anderson and Walker might come upon the field; the bridge on the road leading to Keedysville and Boonsboro, which we shall call the middle bridge, one on the Sharpsburg and Rohrersville road, one mile south of the middle bridge, which, since the day of the battle, has been called the Burnside Bridge; and the bridge over the Keedysville and Williamsport road, one and five-eighths of a mile, east of north of the middle bridge, which we shall call the upper bridge. These gray colored stone bridges were comparatively new, artistic in design, and added beauty to the picturesque stream they spanned.¹¹

Between the bridges there are fords, most of them very difficult and impracticable for the passage of infantry and artillery. A half mile south of the upper bridge and 300 yards below the mouth of the Little Antietam, is a ford practicable for infantry and artillery, and which was improved on the evening of the 15th by Major D. C. Houston of the engineers, by cutting down the banks bordering it. This ford was used by Hooker on the afternoon of the 16th and by Sumner and others on the morning of the 17th, and shall be known as Pry's Ford.¹² There are one or two difficult fords between this and the Middle Bridge, difficult of access and egress and not practicable for the movement of troops in any considerable number. There is but one practicable ford between the Middle Bridge and the Burnside Bridge. This is 400 yards above the Burnside Bridge, in a bend of the stream, where the road from Sharpsburg closely approaches it, and was used by Colonel Crook to cross a part of his brigade, of the Kanawha Division about noon of the 17th. Less than 100 yards south of Burnside Bridge is a ford practicable for infantry but strongly and closely commanded by the steep wooded bluffs above it.¹³

Still farther down stream, where it changes course from south to the west, is another ford, practicable for infantry and artillery, but difficult of access and, defended by 100 men on the bluff which overhangs it, may be considered as impracticable. It was used by both infantry and artillery on the 17th, but neither were under fire. Six hundred yards below this is Snavely's Ford, practicable for infantry and artillery. Below this, to the mouth of the Antietam, are other fords, beyond the limits of the battle-field, generally difficult of access, and need not be considered. Generally speaking, we may say that the Antietam was fordable in many places, but with steep and rugged banks. Although constituting something of an impediment all along its course, it was only that part of it in front of Lee's right that proved to be really an obstacle in his favor.

In this position, his front covered by the line of the Antietam and an open road to Shepherdstown Ford, by which, if hard pressed, he could cross the Potomac into Virginia, Lee prepared for action. His weakness was that he had a river at his back, in front of which was the additional obstruction of a canal, and his only ford, which was in rear of one of his flanks, was open to a determined move in force, either on his right flank, by the bridge at the mouth of the Antietam, or on his left, by crossing the Antietam at the upper bridge and ford and pressing vigorously southward. It was a fairly strong position for defense in front, but entirely open to an enterprising enemy on the left, and of this Lee was well aware, and it caused him some anxiety on the afternoon of the 15th, his glasses being frequently turned in that direction to see what might be coming from the upper crossings of the Antietam, which were beyond the ability of his small command to cover.¹⁴ In anticipation of a movement on his left Lee strengthened it, late in the afternoon of the 15th, by moving Hood's Division and four batteries of Colonel Stephen D. Lee's artillery battalion to the Dunkard Church, Hood being posted between D. H. Hill and the Hagerstown road. The ground from the Dunkard Church, northwest, to a bend in the Potomac, was covered by Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery.¹⁵

This part of the field was the first contested and requires first attention. If we go from Sharpsburg, northward, on the Hagerstown road, we pass in the rear of Cemetery Ridge, on the western slope of which, on the morning of the 16th, were the four Virginia batteries of Major H. P. Jones' artillery battalion, and, a little to their left and front was Moody's Louisiana battery, the Irish gunners of which were at work throwing shells at the German batteries beyond the Antietam.¹⁶

At a distance of about 1,000 yards from town a narrow lane, to the right, gives access to the Piper farm buildings, prominent among which is a large stone barn, passing which the lane runs into the Sunken Road, and thence to the Boonsboro turnpike. From the Piper lane the Hagerstown road ascends to a ridge, crossing the road in a northwest direction, and upon which, on the 17th, was posted the artillery of R. H. Anderson's Division, and, at times, other batteries. About 300 yards to the right, and north from the Piper's lane, was an apple orchard, on a side hill, north and northeast of which was a large cornfield, extending along the Sunken Road. In this orchard and cornfield the Confederate divisions of D. H. Hill and R. H. Anderson contended with the Union divisions of French and Richardson, during the middle hours of the 17th.¹⁷

Descending the ridge and at a nearly 400 yards from Piper's lane is a sunken road or farm lane, running eastward from the road and giving access to the farms of S. Mumma and William Roulette. This sunken road after running eastward about 550 yards, runs southeast about 450 yards and reaches the plateau of the ridge overlooking the Antietam, then goes west of south 300 yards, and then southeast another short 300 yards, then south down a steep hill, a little over 300 yards to the bed of a water-washed ravine, which it follows southeast 200 yards to the Boonsboro and Sharpsburg turnpike. From frequent rains this common dirt road, in many places had been washed out, hence called the Sunken Road, and its sunken bed gave good cover for infantry. For all time to come it shall be called the Bloody Lane.¹⁸

Following the Hagerstown road, from the mouth of the Sunken Road, northward, the ground gradually rises, and at a distance of about 400 yards we strike the southeasterly corner of a body of woods—the Dunkard Church woods. The trees had been thinned out at this point, and the sward of blue grass, with an occasional tree for shade, was used for picnic parties. One hundred and fifty yards farther on, and a long mile from Sharpsburg, was and is a small, brick building, [painted white- crossed out] known as the Dunkard Church. It stands in the edge of the woods, on a slight elevation, about 40 feet west of the Hagerstown road, and became the central object of a great and bloody struggle. Toward it Hooker, as we shall see, directed his advance on the morning of the 17th and behind it the Confederates retired, when defeated and broken east of the Hagerstown road. Those who knew not its tactical value, as they came on the field, make direct steps and bent all their energies to seize this modest brick building that stands in the woods by the roadside—La Haye Sainte of Antietam.¹⁹

The Dunkard Church woods, west of the road, which, at the church, had a depth of 600 yards, ran along the road, northward, 450 yards, then there was a grass field, the edge of which, running west, at right angle to the road, about 260 yards, makes an elbow in the woods, nearly parallel to the road, about 370 yards, when it again turned square to the left and west and extended back 160 yards, making at this point another elbow. From this elbow the eastern edge of the woods presented a concave appearance, extending northerly 200 yards, when it swept westward, this gradually curving until it ran south and then east, thus enclosing a body of woods, connected with the woods surrounding and north of the church by a narrow neck. This entire body of woodland is known as the West Woods. An examination of the map will give a clearer understanding of them. This woodland is full of outcropping ledges of limestone affording excellent cover for infantry. The most prominent of these ledges starts at or quite near the southwest corner of the first field north of the church, runs northeast 800 yards and crosses the Hagerstown road at D. R. Miller's. Miller's house and barn stand on this ledge. For its entire length it affords perfect cover for infantry and is to play an important part early on the 17th. The field enclosed by the West Woods and Hagerstown road is nearly level plateau, in grass at the time, and higher than the West Woods; which slope quite abruptly down from the western edges of the plateau.²⁰

Further north the ground is open immediately on the west of the road and there are two good sized woods, detached from each other farther to the west and quite near the Potomac. West and northwest of the west woods is a prominent ridge, higher than the Hagerstown road. Midway between the northwest corner of the West Woods and the Potomac, distant only 1,200 yards, this ridge reaches its greatest elevation—Nicodemus hill—190 feet above the Antietam. It commands a wide sweep of country to the north and east and upon it the Confederates put many batteries to protect the left of their line, search the flanks of the Union lines, as they successively advanced, early on the morning of the 17th, and turn the body of Sedgwick's Division as it passed to the west edge of the woods later in the forenoon. This we shall call Hauser's Ridge. Once taken and held by the Union forces it would take in flank and reverse the entire Confederate line. The neglect to seize it was one of the principal errors in the conduct of the battle.²¹

The open ground west of the Hagerstown road was beautifully diversified with fields of corn and grass, and some that were freshly plowed, some were in wheat stubble, the fields being divided by fences of post and rail and the well known worm variety. Some of the fences are of stone. There are a few farm houses, numerous apple orchards and many stacks of grain and hay.

Standing at the Dunkard Church and looking northeast was seen, about 600 yards distant, an irregularly shaped body of woods covering about 35 acres. These were the east woods, full of rock ledges and large boulders. Here Seymour's Pennsylvania Reserves bivouacked at night of the 16th, and here began the battle on the 17th. Looking northward could be seen at a distance of nearly a mile a belt of woods running east and west, crossing the Hagerstown road a short distance north of D. R. Miller's. These are the North Woods and were occupied on the night of the 16th by two brigades, Pennsylvania Reserves, of Meade's Division, Hooker's Corps. The West Woods, the East Woods, and the North Woods, especially the former, were remarkably free from undergrowth, and timber of oak, walnut and hickory, of great size, make grand groves, offering but slight impediment to the movement of troops.²²

At a distance of about 40 yards north of the church a country road leaves the Hagerstown road and runs northeast to the East Woods, where, throwing off a branch to the right to the Samuel Poffenberger and Michael Miller farms, then one to the left to the Joseph Poffenberger farm, it emerges from the woods and continues on to Smoketown, two miles from the Dunkard Church, where it strikes the Keedysville and Williamsport road. This is known as the Smoketown road, and at Smoketown a hospital was established.

Looking north from the church, and about 750 yards distant, was field of corn, running from the Hagerstown road east to the east woods. The field covered 30 acres, known as Miller's cornfield, for years to come it shall be known as the Bloody Cornfield of Antietam.²³

North of the cornfield was a grass field of nearly 40 acres of higher ground than the cornfield and upon which the Union batteries were posted on the 17th. In that part of this field, bordering the Hagerstown road, stands the house of D. R. Miller, an apple orchard, north and east of it, a garden in front, and in the southeast corner of the garden, close by the road, a spring of delicious water, covered by a stonehouse. Beyond the field where are Miller's house and orchard, was another field, bounded on the north by the North Woods. South of the cornfield and bounded by the Hagerstown road on the west and by the East Woods and the Smoketown road on the east and south was a field of nearly 80 acres, most of it in luxuriant clover, some of it freshly plowed. In the East Woods and West Woods and the cornfield and grass field between them, is where the terrible struggle between the Union right and the Confederate left took place—the most sanguinary part of the whole field.

At the church and extending northward, in the edge of the woods bordering the Hagerstown road, on the morning of the 16th, was one of Hood's brigades, some of the men gathering corn from Miller's field, for, since leaving Hagerstown, on the morning of the 14th, they have had nothing to eat but green corn and green apples. Out in the field in front of the church was Hood's other brigade, while in and on either side of the road, on the right of the church, was S. D. Lee's battalion of artillery, sheltered from view of the Union gunners beyond the Antietam by the high ground east of the road. Some guns of Cutts' battalion were in and near the road north of the church. There were bodies of Stuart's cavalry in the adjacent fields both east and west of the church and detachments could be seen coming down the turnpike from the north, which had been scouting in the direction of Hagerstown, and also coming and going on the Smoketown road watching the upper crossings of the Antietam and scouting the country between it and the Hagerstown turnpike. On the rough stone steps of the church Hood and Stuart were in earnest converse, the latter giving an animated account of his adventures in Pleasant Valley and on Maryland Heights and of the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and both concurring in opinion that before midday McClellan's entire army would be upon them by way of the upper crossings of the Antietam, which they were then watching.²⁴

Crossing the turnpike at the church and going east a little over 200 yards was a plateau where, on the morning of the 17th, S. D. Lee placed his artillery battalion. It is 215 feet above the Antietam and commands an extensive and entrancing view.²⁵

To the left, and but a short distance, are the Mumma buildings and just beyond these a small Dunkard burying ground, with its modest white headstones standing in pleasing contrast against the surrounding grass and plowed fields. At our feet is Mumma's cornfield, the stalks of corn beginning to wear the russet hues of autumn, and beyond this and a grass field, through which runs a spring branch from Mumma's, are the farm buildings of William Roulette—a fine country house, a large barn and some other outbuildings, including a stone house, covering a noble spring of cool, pure water. Here were brought the wounded of French and Richardson's divisions. Looking still eastward the ground descends to the Antietam, which cannot be seen, but whose winding course can be traced by the willows and sycamores fringing its banks. Beyond is seen the high ridge or bluff bordering the east bank of the Antietam, upon which were placed those long-ranged guns that drove S. D. Lee's guns from the spot on which we stand and furrowed the field with their 20 pound Parrott shot and shells. Still beyond, at the distance of one and three-quarter miles, can be seen the red brick house of Philip Pry, which McClellan occupied as his headquarters, and still beyond, a succession of farm houses, orchards, fields of grass and corn and woodlands extending on rolling and gradually rising ground to the feet of Elk Ridge and South Mountain.²⁶

Turning to the south and east can be seen the sunken road and Piper cornfield, Sharpsburg and the high ground south and west of it and Cemetery Hill, upon which are many batteries of artillery, about to open on the Union batteries across the Antietam, and, almost with the naked eye, could be seen, walking among the guns, General Robert E. Lee.²⁷

The northern part of the field, upon which the battle is to open and wage the fiercest is, comparatively quite level, but south of Cemetery Hill, it is rough, the valleys or ravines being deeper and the hills steeper. Looking to the southwest from Lee's position on the hill, could be seen D. R. Jones' Division in one of these ravines, the right of the Confederate line, and 1200 yards in advance, southeast, was Toombs' small command of not more than 450 men looking down upon the Rohrbach bridge and the Antietam, employed in piling rails along the crest of the bluff bordering the stream and collecting stones which were heaped for protection.

With the exception of these few rails and stones hastily thrown together by Toombs' Georgians and some similar defenses, made by pickets generally, there were no intrenchments on either side—not a spadeful of earth was turned—but some stone fences and outcropping ledges of rock, in the vicinity of the Dunkard Church, afforded good cover for Jackson's and Longstreet's troops, and were taken advantage of by them, and D. H. Hill had the advantage of a stone fence on the Hagerstown road and used some rail fences to strengthen his position in the Sunken road.²⁸

Excepting the woods in which the Confederate left rested and the East Woods the battle field was quite open and most of it visible from the ridges on the east side of the Antietam, on one of which McClellan had his headquarters.

There was probably no battlefield of the Civil War more free and open to the movement of troops and the oversight of commanders; none were more time was allowed for preparations, which, on the Confederate side, at least, was complete, and none where the result depended so little upon purely accidental circumstances, but almost entirely and directly upon the ability of the generals and the conduct of the troops.

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1 It is most likely that Carman wrote this portion himself with a few references to the maps of the time. It does not come from any known published work.

2 The National Road was the macadam road from Frederick through Middletown and Boonsboro to Hagerstown. The other roads Carman mentioned are not portions of the official National Road. The early history and names of these roads can be found in Thomas J. C. Williams, History of Washington County, Maryland, from the earliest settlements to the present time (Hagerstown, MD: Runk & Titsworth, 1906), pp. 151–155.

3 While McClellan's occupation of this ridge is widely known and acknowledged, Lee's stop here is confirmed only by a letter dated November 22, 1900, from Major Charles Marshall, Lee's aide-de-camp at the time of the Maryland Campaign. This letter is in the Ezra Carman Papers, MSS Collection 473, Box 3, Folder 1, New York Public Library, hereafter cited as NYPL.

4 Carman inserted this note in the manuscript: The elevations are computed from the level of the water at Burnside Bridge, which is 375 feet above sea level. This information, and the exact distances cited, are the products of Col. E. B. Cope and his assistant H. W. Mattern in their engineering survey of the battlefield.

5 Henry Kyd Douglas made it clear in his postwar memoir that the bridge was wooden, for he described burning it in June of 1861. It is likely that Carman saw the remaining stone pillars, still visible today, and assumed the entire bridge was made of stone. H. K. Douglas, I Rode With Stonewall (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), p. 6.

6 The road along the canal is today's Canal Road, and the road from the Harpers Ferry Road was usually called Miller's Sawmill Road. It was used by A. P. Hill's Division on September 17.

7 In simple terms, what Carman described was the Potomac River making a large horseshoe bend from above Sharpsburg to below it, thus making the town strategically important because it lay at the base of this large bend in the river.

8 Carman referred to the high ground occupied today by the National Cemetery as Cemetery Ridge, or sometimes Cemetery Hill. Neither the current National Cemetery nor the Evergreen Cemetery across the street existed at the time of the battle. The name came from the cemetery surrounding the Lutheran Church on west slope ridge, which remains today.

9 Today the Keedysville-Boonsboro Road is Maryland Route 34, known at the time as the Boonsboro-Shepherdstown Turnpike. The Hagerstown-Sharpsburg Turnpike is known today as Maryland Route 65, was a new toll road at the time of the battle, replacing an older, more meandering route. The road to Rohrersville is now Burnside Bridge Road. Williams, History of Washington County, p. 152.

10 This road is today called the Mondell Road, but was called Taylor's Landing Road in 1862.

11 These terms arbitrarily adopted by Carman still describe the bridges today. Three of the four still exist (the middle bridge was destroyed by a flood in 1922). Helen Ashe Hays, The Antietam and its Bridges, The Annals of an Historic Stream (New York, NY: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1910), pp. 61–84.

12 This ford and Houston's efforts are mentioned in Hooker's report, U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, vol. 19, pt. 1, p.217, hereafter cited as OR. All references are to Series 1 unless otherwise noted.

13 Carman's distance is about the location of the current dam, which changes the water levels of the creek, making the exact location of this ford impossible to determine. It seems an unlikely place for a ford given the steep embankment on the western side of the creek, and it does not show on any maps.

14 Carman's training and experience as a soldier is evident as he summed up the strengths and weaknesses of Lee's position. He may have forgotten, or used figurative language about Lee using glasses, as the general's injured hands did not permit him to do anything like that. Joseph Harsh, Confederate Tide Rising: Robert E. Lee and the Making of Confederate Strategy, 1861–1862 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998), pp. 205–207.

15 See reports of Gen. John B. Hood, OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 922–923, Col. Stephen D. Lee, ibid., p. 844, and Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, ibid., p. 819.

16 The position of these batteries is confirmed by letters from Col. Stephen D. Lee, January 16, 1895, NA-AS Box 2, and Major Hilary P. Jones, January 21, 1905, NYPL Box 3, Folder 3. Carman's ethnic reference to the German batteries was the 1st Battalion, New York Artillery, which was made up of mostly German immigrants or their descendants, and part of the Union Artillery Reserve.

17 The map references for the next few paragraphs can be found in E. A. Carman and E. B. Cope, Maps of the Battlefield of Antietam Prepared under the direction of the Antietam Battlefield Board, published by direction of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, 1904, revised edition, 1908, Library of Congress, (hereafter referred to as Carman-Cope maps). Henry Piper and his family owned the house and barn to which Carman referred. Kevin Walker, Antietam Farmsteads: A Guide to the Battlefield Landscape (Sharpsburg, MD: Western Maryland Interpretive Association, 2010), pp. 77–85.

18 The farmsteads of Samuel Mumma and William Roulette are described in Walker, Farmsteads, pp. 53–61 and 62–75. The legend of the naming of Bloody Lane originated with an unidentified local woman overcome by the carnage in the Sunken Road, who knelt down and said, May God bless this bloody lane.

19 The Dunkard Church Woods are denoted as the West Woods in the Carman-Cope maps. The church was built in 1853 by the German Baptist Brethren congregation on land donated by Samuel Mumma. Ibid., p. 59. La Haye Saint is the name of the farmhouse that was the focal point of the climactic battle of Waterloo in June 1815. This comparison demonstrates Carman's military education.

20 Walker, Farmsteads, pp. 33-41, offers a description of David R. Miller's farm.

21 What Carman called the Nicodemus farm was actually owned at the time of the battle by Joseph and Mary Anne Poffenberger in trust from David Coffman. Jacob Nicodemus was evidently living at the farm, and subsequently bought it in 1863. Just south is the J. Hauser farm, which gave its name to the ridge Carman described. Land Records, County Courthouse, Hagerstown, Washington County, MD.

22 The Union troop movements Carman described took place on September 15 and 16, and will be referenced in later chapters.

23 Joseph Poffenberger's farm is described in Walker, Farmsteads, pp. 19–31. His brother Samuel's farm is located on the modern Mansfield Road just east of the East Woods. Michael Miller's farm was the next farm east of Samuel Poffenberger's home. Both of these houses still stand and are privately owned.

24 The lack of rations and placement of troops are confirmed in Stuart's report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 819, S. D. Lee's report, ibid., pp. 844–845, and John B. Hood, Advance and Retreat (Edison, NJ: Blue and Gray Press, 1985), pp. 41–42. No source has confirmed the story of Hood and Stuart talking at the Dunker Church on September 16.

25 Carman measured elevations from the 375 feet above sea level benchmark of the creek at Burnside Bridge. Cemetery Hill is actually 215 feet above the 375 feet at the bridge, or 590 feet above sea level.

26 The Mumma and Roulette farms were identified earlier. A description of the Phillip Pry house is found in Walker, Farmsteads, pp. 125–137.

27 Although Lee's headquarters were located west of Sharpsburg, he spent much of his time on Cemetery Hill. William M. Owen, In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery: A Narrative of Events During the Late Civil War from Bull Run to Appomattox to Spanish Fort (Boston, MA: Ticknor & Co., 1885), p. 141, confirms meeting Lee on his way to Cemetery Hill on the morning of September 16.

28 While not a complete explanation, the fact that Lee's army was not entrenched indicates he planned to move, and not fight, at Sharpsburg.

Chapter 13

The Prelude to Antietam

(September 16, 1862)

General Lee was an early riser. On the night of the 15th his headquarters were pitched in a body of open woods nearly three-fourths of a mile west of the Sharpsburg town square, on the right of the road leading to Shepherdstown. Very soon after daybreak of the 16th he had breakfast and was on Cemetery Hill, and after walking among the guns of the Washington Artillery, trying in vain to pierce the fog that hung over the course of the Antietam, to see what McClellan was doing, walked back to the roadside, where a campfire was smoldering. Here, about sunrise, a young officer of Longstreet's staff rode up, dismounted, and delivered a message, to which Lee listened attentively, then as in a soliloquy, said: All will be right if McLaws gets out of Pleasant Valley. Still earlier in the morning he had heard that the head of Jackson's column had reached the Potomac and that, when Jackson left Harper's Ferry, McLaws was still in the valley, but had been ordered by Jackson to follow him as soon as possible.¹

We return to Jackson and Walker, whom we left at Harper's Ferry and Loudoun Heights on the morning of the 15th. We have noted the receipt by Jackson of Lee's orders to join him as speedily as possible, but Jackson's men were out of rations and these could not be immediately supplied. Late in the afternoon General A. R. Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, was ordered to march to Sharpsburg, 14 miles distant. Two only of his brigades—Lawton's and Trimble's—were ready and Lawton started with these near sunset, leaving General Early, with his brigade and Hays’, to follow as soon as possible. Lawton marched up the Virginia side of the Potomac until late in the night and went into camp about four miles from Shepherdstown Ford. Early was not promptly supplied with rations, and it was midnight when they had been cooked. At 1 a. m. he marched with his brigade and Hays’ and overtaking Lawton, the entire division was on the march at early dawn, crossed Shepherdstown Ford at sunrise and, proceeding on the Sharpsburg road, halted in a wood, about a mile from town, near Jackson's Division, that had preceded it in crossing the Potomac.²

No sooner had the surrender of Harper's Ferry been assured than Walker descended Loudoun Heights, crossed the Shenandoah at Keys’ Ferry and marched to Halltown, where he halted for rations. At 1 a. m. he resumed his march, overtook the rear of Jackson's force, about an hour later, and reached Shepherdstown Ford between daylight and sunrise. His division crossed the river early in the day, and halted in a grove about midway from the ford to Sharpsburg, where it remained until 3 a. m. of the 17th, when it moved to the right and took position to cover Snavely's and Myers’ fords south of Sharpsburg.³

Jackson made this report:

Leaving [A. P.] Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and take the requisite steps for securing the captured stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding general, to rejoin him in Maryland with the remaining divisions of my command. By a severe night march we reached the vicinity of Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th.⁴

Some of Jackson's staff officers and others say that Jackson reported to Lee at daylight on Cemetery Hill. General Walker says that he rode forward with Jackson from Shepherdstown Ford about 8 o'clock. In another article in the volume referred to he says that after the troops had crossed the Potomac he rode forward with Jackson at midday to report to Lee:

I expected to find General Lee anxious and careworn. Anxious enough, no doubt he was; but there was nothing in his look or manner to indicate it. On the contrary, he was calm, dignified, and even cheerful. If he had a well organized army of 100,000 veterans at his back, he could not have appeared more composed and confident. On shaking hands with us, he simply expressed his satisfaction with the result of our operation at Harper's Ferry, and with our timely arrival at Sharpsburg; adding that with our reinforcements he felt confident of being able to hold his ground until the arrival of the divisions of R. H. Anderson, McLaws and A. P. Hill, which were still behind, and which did not arrive until the next day.⁵

Jackson and Walker brought to Lee about 10,300 officers and men. This was not a large reinforcement but, with 15,600 already in position, gave Lee an aggregate of infantry, cavalry, and artillery of 25,900 men, all veteran soldiers. It was a compact, well trained force. As the long day wore on, and gave the men time to rest, Lee became confident that he would not be called upon for any serious work that day and, that by morning, McLaws and Anderson would be with him, his army, except for A. P. Hill reunited and ready to give McClellan battle.⁶

During the afternoon and night of the 15th McClellan's forces moved to the positions assigned them, but it was not until after daybreak of the 16th that the great body of them were in their designated places, some brigades did not get up until noon. Hooker's (First) Corps was in the forks of the Big and Little Antietam. Sumner's (Second) Corps was on both sides of the Boonsboro and Sharpsburg road, Richardson's Division in advance, near the Antietam, on the right of the road. Sykes’ Division was on the left of Richardson's, and on Sykes’ left and rear was Burnside's (Ninth) Corps. Mansfield's (Twelfth) Corps was at Nicodemus Mill or Springvale. Pleasonton's cavalry division was just west of Keedysville.⁷

Near midnight of the 15th two companies each of the 61st and 64th New York, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Nelson A. Miles, passed along the rear of Sedgwick's Division and some distance along the bluff below the middle bridge, then turning back reached the bridge just as a party of Union cavalry came riding sharply over it from the south bank. They informed Miles that the enemy had fallen back and that there were none in the immediate front of the bridge. Miles crossed the bridge to the west side of the creek, and marched cautiously west along the highway. It was then daybreak. A heavy fog prevented vision for more than fifteen or twenty feet; the dust in the road deadened the sound of the footsteps and silence was enjoined. Miles who was in advance, had reached the crest of the ridge about 600 yards beyond the Antietam, and was about to descend into the broad ravine where the Confederates were in position, when he ran upon a Confederate crossing the road, whom he captured and from whom he learned, that he was very near the Confederate line. The command was faced about and moved back with as much silence and celerity as possible, and recrossed the bridge before the fog lifted, but long after daylight of the 16th.⁸

There has been much criticism on the failure of McClellan to attack Lee on the afternoon of the 15th or atleast early on the 16th. We have referred to the failure to do so on the 15th. The situation, inviting prompt attack on the morning of the 16th, is well stated by General F. A. Walker in the History of the Second Army Corps:

If it be admitted to have been impracticable to throw the 35 brigades that had crossed the South Mountain at Turner's Gap across the Antietam during the 15th, in season and in condition to undertake attack upon Lee's 14 brigades that day with success, it is difficult to see what excuse can be offered for the failure to fight the impending battle on the 16th, and that early. It is true that Lee's forces had then been increased by the arrival of Jackson with J. R. Jones and Lawton's divisions [also Walker's—inserted by Carman], but those of Anderson, McLaws and A. P. Hill could not be brought up that day. A preemptory recall of Franklin, in the early evening of the 15th, would have placed his three divisions in any part of the line that might be desired. Even without Franklin, the advantages of concentration would have been on the side of McClellan. When both armies were assembled the Union forces were at least nine to six, of the Confederate six only four could possibly have been present on the 16th. Without Franklin the odds would still have been seven to four.⁹

It is evident that McClellan had no idea of fighting Lee on the 15th. There seems to have been no intention to do it early on the 16th, certainly no orders to that effect were issued, nor did he make any preparations. In fact he expected Lee to retreat during the night of the 15th.¹⁰

At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 16th, after telegraphing his wife that he had no doubt delivered Pennsylvania and Maryland, McClellan dispatched Halleck:

The enemy yesterday held a position just in front of Sharpsburg. This morning a heavy fog has thus far prevented us doing more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there. Do not know in what force. Will attack as soon as situation of enemy is developed.

Halleck replied to this dispatch:

I think however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject.

When this dispatch was read by McClellan, during the afternoon of the 16th, contempt was written on his face as he remarked, the idea of Halleck giving me lessons in the art of war.¹¹

When the fog lifted he missed S. D. Lee's guns, which had been moved to the left, or, as he reports:

It was discovered that the enemy had changed the position of his batteries. The masses of his troops, however, were still concealed behind the opposite heights. Their left and center were upon and in front of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown Turnpike, hidden by woods and irregularities of the ground, their extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence near the cross-roads to the north of Miller's farm, their left resting upon the Potomac (sic in McClellan's report.) Their line extended south, the right resting upon the hills to the south of Sharpsburg near Snavely's farm. This changed position of the batteries is given by McClellan as one of the reasons for not making the attack before afternoon, for, he says, he was compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, finding fords, clearing the approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of the troops over the few practicable approaches from Frederick. These had been crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery pressing on with the hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to resist an attack. Many of the troops were out of rations on the previous day, and a good deal of their ammunition had been expended in the severe action of the 14th.¹²

From the time of McClellan's arrival on the field until Hooker's advance in the afternoon of the 16th, nothing seems to have been done with a view to an accurate determination of the Confederate position. From the heights east of the Antietam the eye could trace the right and center, but the extreme left could not be definitely located, nor was the character of the country on that flank known. It was upon this flank that McClellan decided to make his attack and one would suppose that his first efforts would be directed to ascertain how that flank could be approached and what it looked like. This was proper work for cavalry, of which he had a good body available for the purpose. Pleasonton's cavalry division was in good shape and elated with its successful achievements, culminating in the discomfiture of Fitz-Hugh Lee's Brigade at Boonsboro, the day before, and confident of its capacity for further good work. But it was not used.¹³

As far as we know, not a Union cavalryman crossed the Antietam until Hooker went over in the afternoon of the 16th, when the 3rd Pennsylvania cavalry accompanied him. Nor can we discover that the cavalry did any productive work elsewhere. It did not ascertain that there were good fords below the Burnside Bridge, leading directly to the right-rear of the Confederate line, and we know of no order given for its use, save a suggestion to Franklin, to have his cavalry feel towards Frederick. The part taken by the cavalry this day is very briefly told by Pleasonton, in his report: On the 16th my cavalry was engaged in reconnaissances, escorts and support to batteries. If any part of his command, except the 3rd Pennsylvania, was engaged in reconnaissances and supporting batteries we do not know of it.¹⁴

The first movement of the day was to crown the bluff east of the Antietam with artillery and cover the Middle Bridge. This bluff, which, south of the bridge, almost over-hangs the Antietam, recedes from it north of the bridge for a short distance, then approaches it. It rises 180 feet above the stream and commands nearly the entire battlefield.

The Reserve Artillery, which arrived late in the evening of the 15th, was put in position, early in the morning, by General Henry J. Hunt, chief of artillery. Taft's New York battery, and the German (New York) batteries of von Kleiser, Langner, and Wever were placed on the bluff north of the Boonsboro road, Taft's Battery relieving Tidball's which rejoined the cavalry division. Von Kleiser relieved Pettit's New York battery. The four New York batteries had 20 pound Parrott guns and were supported by Richardson's Division. South of the Boonsboro road, and about 9 a. m. Weed's Battery (I, 5th U.S.) and Benjamin's Battery (E, 2nd U.S.) were run up the bluff in front of Sykes’ Division. Each battery, as it came into position, opened upon such bodies of Confederate infantry as could be seen, and upon the Washington Artillery and Hood's Division batteries, on Cemetery Hill, and the batteries on the ridge running north from it, and the reply was prompt and spirited, during which Major Albert Arndt, commanding the German artillery battalion, was mortally wounded.¹⁵

As the Confederates were short of ammunition and the range too short for their guns, Longstreet ordered them to withdraw under cover of the hill. General D. H. Hill says that the Confederate artillery was badly handled and could not cope with the superior weight, calibre, range, and number of the Yankee guns. An artillery duel between the Washington Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the Antietam, on the 16th, was the most melancholy farce in the war.¹⁶

At 1 p. m. Taft's and von Kleiser's batteries were moved from the north to the south of the Boonsboro road; Taft relieving Benjamin, who went to the left, near Burnside Bridge, and von Kleiser taking position about 120 yards on Weed's right. Kusserow's Battery, of 20-pound Parrotts, relieved Taft, north of the road, but not in the same position. From Taft's, von Kleiser's, and Weed's positions one could look to the right, through the open space between the East and West Woods, and see Hood's men as they advanced to meet Hooker, late in the day, and their guns were brought to bear upon them, as also, upon Jackson's men as they took position near the Dunkard Church, about sunset. From the bluff north of the Boonsboro road the gunners could look down the Sunken road, and it appeared but a stone's throw to Piper's cornfield in and around which were the men of Rodes’ Brigade. There were very few points of the Confederate line that these batteries could not reach, and on many they had an enfilade and reverse fire.¹⁷

Early in the morning a signal station was established on the crest of Elk Ridge. The extensive view from this position commanded Sharpsburg and Shepherdstown, the country in the vicinity, and the approaches in every direction. It communicated with signal stations at McClellan's headquarters, with some on the extreme right, and with Burnside's headquarters.¹⁸

Sykes' Division was on the south side of the Boonsboro road, its right, Buchanan's Brigade, resting on the road, opposite Richardson's left. On the left of Buchanan was Lovell's Brigade, extending down toward the Burnside Bridge. Warren's Brigade of two New York regiments (5th and 10th) were held in reserve. Later in the day, it, with Randol's Battery (E and G, 1st U.S.) was moved to the left, out of the line of fire of the Confederate guns on Cemetery Hill; the new position in a piece of woods, and covering the approaches in the direction of Harper's Ferry. At 7 a. m. Captain Hiram Dryer, 4th U.S. Infantry, was ordered to take the Middle Bridge and establish part of his regiment on the west bank of the Antietam.¹⁹

Upon arriving within 200 yards of the bridge he passed the pickets of the 3rd U.S. Infantry, when he detached Lieutenant John L. Buell, Company G, to advance rapidly to the bridge, which was done without opposition. Dryer then marched the regiment to the bridge and threw four companies across it, which were posted under cover of a stone bank and wall on the right of the road, and of a rock-ledge and barn on the left. In about two hours it was observed that the enemy was advancing a skirmish line on both sides of the road, upon which, two companies, under Lieutenant Buell and R. P. McKibbin, advanced on either side of the road to hold the Confederate in check. They advanced about 300 yards up the ascending road and met the enemy, who, after exchanging a few shots, fell back under cover of the ridge, behind which lay George B. Anderson's Brigade. About the same time the Confederate batteries on Cemetery Hill began a vigorous shelling of Dryer's skirmishers and upon the batteries on the bluff in his rear, beyond the Antietam. The firing was of short duration and did but little harm, wounding 3 of Dryer's men, two others were wounded by the skirmishers. At sunset Dryer was relieved by the 1st Battalion, 12th U.S. Infantry, Captain M. M. Blunt, and recrossed the Antietam. As soon as the bridge had been taken by the regular infantry, two companies of the 5th New Hampshire, under Captains Cross and Long were sent to destroy the mill-dam a few yards below the bridge, hoping thus to lower the waters of the creek above and make fording less difficult, but did not succeed in breaking the dam, for want of proper tools. Several companies of Richardson's division were on picket during the night, and in the morning, four companies of the 5th New Hampshire, under Major E. E. Sturtivant, were detached to guard a small aqueduct, crossing the Antietam near Neikirk's, nearly a mile above the bridge.²⁰

During the forenoon the Twelfth Corps advanced from its bivouac near Nicodemus’ Mill and massed in a field west of Keedysville and in rear of French's Division. In the afternoon, Morell's Division of the Fifth Corps passed through Keedysville and bivouacked on the left of the Boonsboro and Sharpsburg Turnpike.²¹

The valley of the Antietam at and near the Burnside Bridge is narrow. On the right of the stream the high bank was wooded below the bridge and about 200 yards above it, and commanded the approaches both to the bridge and the ford immediately below it. The steep slopes of the bank were lined with rifle pits and breastworks of rails and stones. These, together with the woods, were filled with Toombs infantry, while numerous batteries commanded and enfiladed the bridge and ford and their approaches.²²

McClellan seems to have had some apprehension that the Confederates might attack his left by this bridge and by the valley below it and, about noon, ordered Burnside to move farther to the left, to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge and to reconnoiter the approaches to it carefully, as he would probably be ordered to attack there on the next morning. Later in the day he rode to the left to satisfy himself that Burnside had properly placed his troops to secure his left flank from any attack made along the east bank of the Antietam, as well as to carry the bridge. He was not satisfied with the dispositions made by Burnside and found it necessary to order some changes, the result of which was that, late in the afternoon, Burnside's Corps, except Willcox's Division, was moved to the left and front, in three columns, and took position upon the rear slopes of the ridge on the east bank of the Antietam, the center of the corps being nearly opposite the bridge, the batteries were placed on the crest of the hill near the bridge, the infantry in close support, Benjamin's Battery being on a knoll, some distance to the left and back from the bridge.²³

Burnside's movement was not opposed, nor disturbed, save by a few shots from Richardson's Battery, south of Cemetery Hill, but Toombs’ skirmish line thrown across the bridge for observation, was seen near a cornfield southeast of the bridge, upon which Captain H. F. Duval, with his company of the 36th Ohio, went forward and drove it through the cornfield and back over the bridge. About the same time Capt. James Wren with a detachment of the 48th Pennsylvania went a mile down the Antietam and saw nothing but Munford's cavalry, on the west bank of the stream.²⁴

The 79th New York was detached and sent to guard the signal station at McClellan's Gap on Elk Ridge, and the 28th Massachusetts and 50th Pennsylvania, both under command of Major Edward Overton, were sent to Elk Ridge, where the Rohrersville road crossed it, to support some of Pleasonton's cavalry, which was keeping open the communications with Franklin in Pleasant Valley.²⁵

General McClellan reports that the ground in front of the entire Confederate line consisted of undulating hills, their crests, in turn commanded by others in their rear. "On all favorable points the enemy's artillery was posted, and their reserves, hidden from view by the hills on which their line of battle was formed, could maneuver unobserved by our army, and, from the shortness of their line, could rapidly re-enforce any point threatened by our attack. This position, stretching across the angle formed by the Potomac and the Antietam, their

Reviews for The Maryland Campaign of September 1862

[gldyson · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

This is the most detailed account of the battle I have ever read. I recommend taking your time reading it and use maps other than those included to follow movements over the field. The description of the action at the company level or even smaller (since many brigades and regiments were reduced to company size) through first person accounts helps paint a clearer picture of that terrible day. I will take the book with me on my next visit.